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URBANIZATION

Its Effects on Government and Society

by

John Giffen Thompson

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PREFACE

The disproportionately rapid growth of the city population and the consequent growing concentration of the population in the urban centers constitute among the most striking features of recent times in the development of the advanced countries. According to the Census of 1920, 51.4 per cent of our own population live in urban centers—that is, in cities and towns of 2,500 population or more. And if to this more strictly urban population there be added those persons who live in incorporated places of less than 2,500 population, what may be called the "agglomerated" population comprised approximately sixty per cent of the total population in this country, in 1920. There are no data to show what proportion of the total population lived in places of 2,500 population or more at the beginning of the national period in our history; but in 1790 only 3.3 per cent lived in places of 8,000 or over, and by 1820 but 4.9 per cent lived in urban centers as thus defined. By 1920, however, 43.8 per cent of our total population lived in places of this size and upwards.

The cityward trend is even more in evidence in some of the European countries. England and Wales, which had but 50.2 per cent of the population living in cities and towns in 1851, had increased the urban population to 79.3 per cent of the total by 1921. And by 1911 there had been a loss of approximately one-half million in the number of males employed in agriculture, as compared with the year 1851. Scotland is almost as highly urbanized as England and Wales.

Sixty per cent of the population of Germany lived in the cities in 1910, and in Saxony the urban population comprised seventy-three per cent of the total population in the same year. Belgium is also highly urbanized; while the territorial diminution of Austria resulting from the World War had the

effect of greatly increasing the already heavy concentration of the population of that country in the city of Vienna.

By 1921 the urban population of France had reached 46.3 per cent of the total population; and between 1846 and 1911 there was an absolute loss of more than 4,550,000 in the rural population of that country. In Switzerland the distribution of the population between the urban centers and the rural districts is not greatly different from that which prevails in our own country.

In Italy the ten largest cities increased in population at the rate of seventy-seven per cent during the period 1871–1911; while the increase for that country as a whole amounted to but twenty-nine per cent for the same period. The city population of the Netherlands and of Denmark also grows more rapidly than the rural population, though there is a good annual increase in the rural population in both countries and in recent years the excess in the urban rate of increase has been slight in the latter country.

Though Australia is a newer country than our own, the urbanizing movement has proceeded to greater extremes there than with us—the distinguishing feature being the disproportionately great concentration of the population in the provincial capitals. The six state capitals of Australia comprised, between them, forty-three per cent of the total population of the Commonwealth in 1921; and three-fifths of the total increase of population during the decade ending in 1921 occurred in these capital cities. Even in New Zealand the returns of the recent census show that the four chief towns had increased in population to a greater extent in the previous decade than all the rest of the country—rural areas, secondary and small towns—combined. Since 1891 there has also been a pronounced movement of population toward the city in Canada—the urban population increasing to the extent of more than sixty-two per cent during the decade 1901–11, while the rural population increased only about seventeen per cent. "During the same period the cities of Winnipeg and Vancouver absorbed about one-half, and Mon-

treal and Toronto more than one-half, of the total gain in population for their respective provinces."

"In Asia, Japan is rapidly developing her manufacturing and commercial interests—with the normal results so far as the concentration of population is concerned; and China and India, which have long contained a certain number of important cities, though still predominantly rural and agricultural, have entered upon the stage of industrial development, and doubtless upon the era of rapid city growth."

It is evident that the marked change in environment implied for a large proportion of the citizenry by a development such as this, and the growing influence, in the political and social spheres, of the urban environment and of those persons who are directly or indirectly subject to that environment, must raise a number of questions as to the general political and social consequences of the movement. It is a matter of the most common knowledge, of course, that such questions have long been raised and that they continue to invite the large attention of people everywhere. This volume represents another attempt at an examination of the consequences of urbanization, as viewed primarily though not exclusively from the political point of view.

In the main the attempt must speak for itself, without prefatory comment here. It is desired, however, to call attention to the fact that in appraising the rural or urban influence, respectively, the emphasis has been placed prevailingly upon the absence, or the presence, of a distinct group life among an agglomerated population rather than upon any distinction of mere size as between various groups of agglomerated population. In other words, while the official interpretation of the distinction between rural and urban is usually dependent upon whether a center of population has attained a size representing a certain minimum number of persons, say 2,000 or 2,500 or some other minimum number, rural is interpreted in this volume as meaning primarily the open country, including those agglomerated groups that are so small, so unquestionably rural or agricultural, or so devoid

of any intimate, organized political life as closely to approximate the open country; while urban is interpreted as embracing all groups of agglomerated population, irrespective of size except as just noted, which possess a definite political life and organization that associate the members of the group in an intimate political nexus.

It would be folly, of course, to deny that there is a difference in influence resulting from the urban environment in some measure proportional to the difference in size of the urban community in question. Whether urban means great city, a city of moderate size, a small town, or even a mere village, is at times of undoubted consequence. And whether a center of population is primarily commercial or industrial, whether it is largely residential, whether it is in comparatively close touch with the active life of the wider community or of the nation in general, or whether it is isolated from this wider relation and largely reflects the influence of the surrounding countryside, is also of much significance at times. But on the whole the distinction between rural and urban is drawn as indicated above in this volume; and such a distinction is believed to be valid, and even necessary, from the political point of view.

It is admitted, however, that this distinction between rural and urban that is based upon a general contrast between the population of the open country on the one hand and an agglomerated population on the other can not be applied without qualification in the Old World, where the rural population is in many cases prevailingly, or even wholly, a village population. But the most that appears to be required in this connection is that the "village" should be interpreted as normally and prevailingly rural in Europe, while in our own country and in many other countries the "village" is rather to be considered normally, or at least frequently, urban from the political point of view.

Lastly, it may be noted that in a general way, though not unqualifiedly, occupation has been accepted as a significant index of the distinction between rural and urban and that in accordance with this practice agricultural has been ac-

cepted as substantially equivalent to rural and non-agricultural as substantially equivalent to urban.

To strike a more personal note, it may be stated that the author did not set out originally to write a treatise on this particular phase of the subject. But in the course of a study of the subject of urbanization and rural depopulation in general the question of the political and social consequences of the city-ward movement presented itself as an important feature for consideration. And on the basis of what had already been done toward an investigation of the subject the writer found himself quite uncertain, and even baffled at times, as to just what conclusions were warranted in that connection. For it was discovered that while a great deal had been written on that phase of the subject and it had long been widely discussed in a popular way, comparatively little had really been done at its proper and scientific investigation. There was, relative to the subject, much of mere opinion and of mere tradition that had been handed down from generation to generation and that had found its way into print and that had been cited back and forth by the various writers who had occasion to refer to the subject. But even this material was contradictory in character. Some excellent work had been done with reference to certain phases of the subject; but apparently it had never been investigated in any comprehensive way. In order, therefore, to arrive at any conclusions in which he himself felt that he could have confidence, the author felt impelled to go into the subject more thoroughly. And this volume represents the results of that venture.

The writer desires, finally, to express his appreciation of courteous and helpful assistance from members of the staffs in the various libraries where he has gathered materials for this treatise; of courteous answers to inquiries by letter; of helpful suggestions from persons too numerous to mention individually; and last, but not least, of the encouragement and unwearied assistance of his wife.

J. G. T.

Washington, March 16, 1927.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

Preface v

I. The Rural Bias 3

II. The Urban Bent 24

III. Urbanization and Civil Liberty 39
- I. Religious Liberty; Freedom of Thought, of Speech, and of the Press; "Individual" Liberty; "Personal" Liberty 41
- II. Human Freedom versus Slavery and Serfdom in Country and in City 50

IV. Urbanization and Economic Freedom 57

V. Political Liberty, or Democracy, as a Concept and as an Ideal 90

VI. Rural and Urban Contributions to Democracy in the Old World, Ancient and Mediaeval Times 100
- I. The Ancient Oriental States 100
- II. The City-States of Greece and Rome 102
- III. Democracy in the Middle Ages 105

VII. Rural and Urban Contributions to Democracy in the Old World. Modern Europe 115
- I. The Period of the Reformation 118
- II. The Development of Political Liberty in England 129
- III. Rural and Urban Influences in the French Revolution and in Recent Times in France 137
- IV. The Development of Democracy in Modern Germany 144
- V. Rural and Urban Contributions to Democracy in Recent Times in Other European Countries 147

VIII. Rural and Urban Contributions to Democracy in the United States. General Survey 151
- I. Democracy in the Colonial Period 153
- II. Rural and Urban Contributions to the Revolution 160
- III. The Adoption of the Federal Constitution 166

CHAPTER PAGE

IX. Rural and Urban Contributions to Democracy in the United States. General Survey (*Continued*) 171
I. The Jeffersonian Movement 172
II. The Jacksonian Movement 176
III. The "Log Cabin" and "Hard Cider" Period 188
IV. The Civil War Period 193
V. The Granger and Greenback Period 195
VI. The Alliance and Populist Movements 197
VII. The Progressive Movement 200

X. Rural and Urban Contributions to Democracy in the United States: Special Features of the Struggle for Democracy 206
I. Democracy and the Suffrage Franchise 206
II. Democracy and Representation 219
III. Democracy and the use of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall 224
IV. Democracy and the New England Town System 231

XI. The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Knowledge or Intelligence, and upon Political Initiative or Enterprise 239
I. General Intelligence 239
II. Political Knowledge or Intelligence 250
III. Political Initiative or Enterprise 266

XII. The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Inventiveness: General Forms and Principles of Government .. 273

XIII. The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Inventiveness (*Continued*): Special Principles and the Forms of Local Government 296

XIV. The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Activity. 323

XV. The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Leadership. 347

XVI. The Effect of Urbanization upon Public Spirit 367

XVII. The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Purity ... 388

XVIII. The Effect of Urbanization upon the Efficiency of Government 411
I. Urbanization and the Efficiency of Government in the Spheres of the State and Nation 411
II. Efficiency in City Government 417

CHAPTER PAGE

III. Comparative Efficiency of Government in the Urban Centers and in the Rural Communities 430

XIX. The Effect of Urbanization upon Economic Efficiency and upon the Health, Physique, and Natural Growth of the Population 444
I. Effect upon Economic Efficiency 444
II. Effect upon the Health and Physique of the Population. 448
III. Effect upon the Natural Growth of the Population 465

XX. The Moral Consequences of Urbanization 479
I. Intemperance 480
II. Vice and Immorality 484
III. Crime and Criminality 490
IV. The Divorce Problem 502

XXI. The Religious Consequences of Urbanization 509
I. The Rural and the Urban Environment from the Point of View of Religion and the Church 509
II. The Rural Exodus and the Rural Church 511
III. Urbanization and the Asserted Religious Decline 512
IV. The Rearing of the Young in Country and in City 526

XXII. The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Preparedness for War 534
I. Urbanization and the Cause of International Peace 535
II. Urbanization and the Domestic, Civil and Political Factors in War 539
1. Urbanization and Patriotism 540
2. Urbanization and the Assimilation of Alien Elements 551

XXIII. The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Preparedness for War (*Continued*): Urbanization and Political Stability 564

XXIV. Urbanization and the Ponderables and the Imponderables in War: The Gun and the Man Behind the Gun. 588
I. Urbanization and the Material Equipment for War 588
II. Urbanization and Individual Military Capacity 603

XXV. General Summary and Conclusions 614

Index 619

URBANIZATION

URBANIZATION:
ITS EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY

CHAPTER I

The Rural Bias

The practically unanimous prejudice in favor of agriculture and the agricultural class, and in favor of rural life in general, among the philosophers and among the political thinkers and writers of the ancient world was to a very large extent based upon the asserted superiority of the agricultural class and of the rural environment with reference to government and with reference to political affairs in general. Xenophon, in his *Economist,* condemned the "base mechanic arts" as leading to physical enervation and enfeeblement of mind and soul, which made artisans unworthy friends and ill defenders of the fatherland. Agriculture, however, he regarded as equally honorable with war; and a citizen might engage in the former, as in the latter, without reproach. Even kings and emperors might do themselves honor by engaging in the actual performance of the tasks associated with agriculture. Agriculture teaches the lesson of mutual assistance, he believed; and he asserted that attachment to the soil makes the agriculturist more ready than others to defend the country.

Euripides speaks of the farmer as the "sole mainstay of the state"; and when, after the Peloponnesian War, city life became almost universal in Attica, Plato looked back with regret to the simple agricultural life of the past. In his

Republic Plato does exclude the cultivators of the soil both from "those of gold who rule" and from "those of silver who guard" and includes them with the subject masses of "iron and brass." But in the more practical *Laws* citizenship is to be limited to those who own land and are engaged in agriculture.

According to Aristotle, democracy is not a desirable form of government. But if there must be a democracy the least objectionable form is that where the agricultural population makes up a majority of the people.[1]

The Romans, imitators of the Greeks in so many other ways, imitated them also in the high respect with which the latter assumed to regard agriculture. The accepted type of patriot in Roman tradition was Cincinnatus, who was reputed to have been called from the plow to rescue a Roman army from defeat and to have returned to the furrow when he had accomplished the task. It is not remarkable that the Roman *agricultural* writers should have been prejudiced in any case in favor of agriculture. But both they and the chief philosophical writers of the nation wrote at a time when the decay of Rome had already set in. As in Greece, war and the trend of industrial development had destroyed over large areas the small holder and had driven him to the cities or to the provinces. The free distribution of grain drew multitudes of the idle to Rome and seriously injured domestic cultivation. And the evils that appeared in connection with this urbanizing movement were marked by all these writers with impotent regret.

Cato, in his *De Re Rustica,* held to the view that the agricultural population "produces the bravest men, the most valiant soldiers, and a class of citizens the least given of all to evil designs"; and both by example and by precept he strove against the growing luxury of the times and held up as the ideal the simple agricultural economy of the early republic. Varro complained of the preference of the Romans

of his day for city life; and the growth of the latifundia, or large slave farms, with the accompanying elimination of the small peasant cultivators and their concentration in Rome and in the provincial cities, have long been cited as a chief cause of the downfall of the Roman power and held up as a warning example of what may be expected from the asserted inordinate urban development of our own time.[2]

During the Middle Ages the ancient prejudice in favor of the agricultural class as an element in the state continued practically unchanged. But later, in the mercantilist period, which was coincident with the rise of national trade and commerce and with the early development of the modern national state, agriculture and the agricultural class were for the time subordinated to commerce and manufactures, and the commercial and manufacturing population were exalted to a place of superiority.

With the French physiocrats of the eighteenth century, agriculture and the agricultural class were again magnified as the real basis of the state and the commercial and manufacturing pursuits and classes were again subordinated. The elder Mirabeau, asserting that the state is a tree and that agriculture is its roots, urged that agriculture should be encouraged and protected in every possible way, that the agricultural class should be recognized as the real basis of the state, and that the exodus from the country to the city should be counteracted. Quesnay, himself of rural birth, expressed the same view of the fundamental importance of the agricultural class; and Rousseau, with his passion for a state of nature and of savagery, anathematized cities and city life and idealized agriculture and the agricultural class in their political relations in a manner similar to the physiocrats, though differing greatly from them in his other political notions.

The rural bias likewise dates back many centuries in England; and attempts were made very early in that country

to prevent the trend of population to the towns.[3] Thomas More and many others, both in his own day and later, mourned the displacement of men by sheep in the rural districts in connection with the enclosure movement that resulted from the ravages of the Black Death; and the first Sir John Fortescue paid high tribute to the military qualities of the English rural masses of his day. The London-born poet, Cowley, sang

"God the first garden made, and the first city Cain."

Cowper a century later expressed the same idea of the superior excellence of rural life and of the rural population in the words

"God made the country, man made the town."

And the contemporary Goldsmith put into imperishable rhyme the feeling both of himself and of his fellow citizens that the nation was suffering irreparable loss when the later enclosure movement threatened to sweep from the land

A "bold peasantry, their country's pride."

From that day down to the present time individuals of prominence in England have not ceased to give expression to the idea of the political and social superiority of the rural population; though scientific formula, such as "the degenerative influences" asserted to grow out of urban life, have more and more displaced the earlier poetic effusions. One writer, enlarging upon an idea that had long obtained credence, declared that very few families survive in Central London for more than four generations and that probably a majority of them lose the fine stock of health brought with them from the country, within two generations.[3a] Another writer asserted

that the "great military powers of the Continent" were well aware of the race degeneration resulting from city life and that "with them agricultural protection was mainly a device to maintain the supply of country-bred recruits." [4] Again, the agitation growing out of the fact that the examination of recruits for service in the Boer War appeared to show serious physical deterioration as compared with the men who offered for service at the time of the Crimean War finally led to the appointment, in 1904, through the Privy Council, of a committee on physical deterioration—an agitation that has been by no means stilled by the generally reassuring results of this notable investigation.[5]

The eminent eugenist, Francis Galton, emphasizing more than a score of years ago the factor of the birth rate, declared: "The great danger to high civilizations, and remarkably so to our own, is the exhaustive drain upon the rural districts to supply our large towns. Those who come up to the towns may produce large families, but there is much reason to believe that these dwindle away in subsequent generations. In short, the towns sterilize rural vigor." [6] A little later H. Rider Haggard, adding the further view that more land-bred folk were required because of their asserted "steadfastness in the midst of the shifting developments of a neurotic age," asserted similarly that "The flocking of the land-born to the cities is the writing on the wall of our civilizations." [7] And in the midst of the struggle of the nations in the recent World War the same writer voiced the well-known sentiment that the land "is the nursery of peoples" and that "those whom the land nurses the cities eat." "I am driving," he continued, "at the almighty truth that if nations and empires are to endure they must root themselves in the land. No tree can flourish for long that tries to suck its strength from brick and mortar; it must dwindle presently and perish." [8]

Sir Horace Plunkett is of the opinion that the city maintains an apparent superiority in many respects only by draw-

ing constantly on the best citizenship of the country districts;[9] Director E. J. Russell, of the Rothamstead Experimental Station, noting the tendency of the less educated and working class in England to crowd into the towns, has said that no system of society can be stable unless it keeps a big population on the land;[10] a man who has risen in that country from the humble status of an agricultural laborer to rural leadership and to membership in Parliament has declared that the depopulation of the rural districts and the overpopulation of the towns "have together become a national danger of the first magnitude";[11] and former Prime-minister Lloyd George, in declaring shortly after the close of the recent war that "a systematic effort must be made to bring a population back to the land" in the United Kingdom, urged that policy largely on the ground that the country is the place to grow strong men.[12]

German authorities and investigators have long voiced very similar views. Max Nordau, whom Weber very aptly styles "the apostle of degeneration," has supported in an extreme manner the thesis of physical and mental degeneration as a result of life in the cities.[13] Dr. George Hansen argues more conservatively the "superiority of country-bred people."[14] More recently Dr. Ernst Kraepelin has charged that the "modern Kultur," of which the city represents the highest expression, is responsible for the majority of mental maladies, which he asserts to be comparatively rare among country dwellers and unknown among primitive peoples, and has declared that the city is more conducive than the country to the great contributive causes of physical and mental degeneration, alcoholism and the social diseases.[15] And Prince von Bülow, in his well-known volume, *Imperial Germany,* identifies with the agricultural elements of the fatherland the forces that made Prussia great.[16]

In France, in recent years, the relation of the rural population to the national interests has attracted especial atten-

tion in connection with the excessively low birth rate, to which the urbanizing movement has, in greater or less degree, contributed. Laharpe displays much prejudice in favor of rural life, contending in the usual vein that existence in the open country is the only normal life while the city environment leads to deterioration and decay.[17] M. Baudrillart interpreted the cityward trend and the accompanying disinclination for farm life as proof that moral progress had not marched abreast with material progress.[18] M. Cheyson, in language that recalls that of Rousseau, has characterized the cities as "devourers of men."[19] M. Rondergues, in similar vein, has represented the cities as murderous and devouring while holding the country fecund and healthful. M. Usquin, declaring that to arrest depopulation is to work for the safety of the French fatherland, deems it absolutely necessary to this object to retain the rural population on the soil. And even M. Guillon, who takes in general a very favorable attitude toward the cityward trend, admits that it is doubtfully beneficial from the religious and moral point of view.[20]

The Italian historian, Ferrero, sees in "extravagance" and in "excessive urbanism" the two chief maladies that are sapping the world. In the present tendency toward the abandonment of agriculture and the overdevelopment of cities, with the great prevalence of luxury and the excessive cost of living in the urban centers, in the mania for grandeur and boastful showiness, in the spirit of sterile rivalry, public and private, and in the continuous inflation of popular vanity and of professional class pride, he finds a modern parallel of the situation in Rome at the beginning of the second century and anticipates a similar outcome.[21]

One of the most striking characterizations of the agricultural class as superior material from which to construct the democratic state came from our own Jefferson, ultra-democrat and nominal farmer, in the earlier days of his career. The people engaged in agriculture he declared to be "the chosen

people of God, if ever He had a chosen people"; and, no doubt influenced by the physiocratic views of the French philosophers, he expressed the view that "cities and manufacturing were alike essentially evil," declared the former to be "ulcers on the body politic," and ironically opined that the mobs of great cities add just as much to the support of pure government as sores do to the strength of the human body. Writing to Madison with reference to the adoption of the new Federal Constitution of 1787, he said: "I think our government will remain virtuous for many centuries, as long as they are chiefly agricultural. . . . When they get piled up upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe." [22]

Manufactures and the manufacturing class found a champion in Hamilton and in others, though he and his associates were almost as far as Jefferson from realizing the degree to which industrial life and city development were to extend in our subsequent history and claimed but a minor, though necessary, place for the urban element in our national life; while Washington and John Adams, though more nearly allied to Hamilton than to Jefferson in their political views in general, were little behind the latter in exalting agriculture and the rural element.

The partisans of manufactures in this country declared, in 1819, that the most specious and generally prevalent argument against manufacturing establishments was grounded on their asserted debasing and demoralizing effects; while the most captivating pictures were drawn relative to the purity, innocence, healthfulness, and independence of agricultural employment.[23] Thus the Committee on Agriculture, in the national House of Representatives, in reporting on February 2, 1821, its "Objections to an increase of duties on imports," asserted that while economically agriculture and commerce could claim no preference over manufacturing, the statesman and the patriot could scarcely hesitate to wish that

the agricultural class should greatly predominate: "The agricultural state is more favorable than any other to the improvement of the physical and moral powers of man. Whilst an agricultural nation will be as powerful as others, it will be more virtuous and happy. It is in this state that the body is invigorated by healthful exercises; that the mind is ennobled by the freedom and independence of rural life; and that man feels the true dignity of his nature. Who would think of comparing the brave, hardy, and independent yeoman of this, or any, country, to the miserable half-starved, rickety population of an English cotton factory? Who would compare the hardy mountaineer who pursues the deer, or slays the buffalo . . . to the poor, decrepit, emaciated creature who has been all his life engaged in the same dull, stupefying routine of drawing out a ten yard thread, or manufacturing the eighteenth part of a pin?" [24]

Commercial organizations and interests, even, joined in similar remonstrances on similar grounds. The Chamber of Commerce of the city of Philadelphia warned that the manufactures and workshops of England were the nurseries of pauperism and discontent and called attention to the heavy poor rates in that country and to the use of troops in the suppression of insurrection. And the citizens of Charleston likewise lauded rural life and painted a foreboding picture with reference to the conditions in manufacturing cities.[25]

Neither was this rural bias confined to the regions where the doctrines of Jefferson decisively prevailed, as is emphatically shown by the eloquent appeal made by Chancellor Kent in the New York State Convention of 1821 in favor of continuing the provision that senators in the legislature of that State be chosen only by the votes of freeholders. "The great leading and governing interest of this state," he said, "is, at present, the agricultural; and what madness it would be to commit that interest to the winds! . . . With that wholesome population we always expect to find moderation, fru-

gality, order, honesty, and a due sense of independence, liberty, and justice. It is impossible that any people can lose their liberties by internal fraud or violence so long as the country is parceled out among freeholders of moderate possessions, and those freeholders have a sure and efficient control in the affairs of the government. Their habits, sympathies, and employments necessarily inspire them with a correct spirit of freedom and justice; they are the safest guardians of property and the laws. We certainly can not too highly appreciate the value of the agricultural interest; it is the foundation of national wealth and power." [26] And the same sentiments were voiced with scarcely less eloquence by Jesse Buel, who was "bred to a mechanical business" but turned agriculturist and as editor, author, and scientist, did much to promote agriculture in this country, and by Henry Colman, who though born in Boston became agricultural commissioner for the State of Massachusetts and likewise did much to place that calling on a more scientific basis.[27]

Jefferson's view of the superiority of the farmer as a citizen and his skepticism of the city man as an element of value in the state have thus been shared, in greater or less degree, by very many of our foremost public men and political thinkers—as well as by many of the very large number who receive their opinions only as a part of the environment to which they have been born. To a considerable extent, no doubt, this view has been reinforced by the necessity, or advantage, of paying homage to a class which long constituted an overwhelming majority of our voting population and which still represents our strongest single electoral group. But beyond this there undoubtedly has been a large measure of sincerity in the tributes that have thus been paid to the rural element.

Certainly we may assume that the two distinguished foreign investigators and authors relative to our political institutions were free from this element of delicate political flat-

tery. De Tocqueville, in discussing in his *Democracy in America* the causes that contributed to the maintenance of a democratic republic in this country, pointed out that America had no great capital city whose disturbing influence was directly or indirectly felt over the whole country, and whose predominance had always represented a serious blow, he believed, to the representative system elsewhere. Noting the elements of disorder in a few of our largest cities, he dismissed the circumstance as of small contemporary importance. "Nevertheless," he said, "I look upon the size of certain American cities, and especially on the nature of their population, as a real danger which threatens the future security of the democratic republic of the New World: and I venture to predict that they will perish from this circumstance, unless the government succeed in creating an armed force, which, while it remains under the control of the majority of the nation, will be independent of the town population, and will be able to repress its excesses."

A generation ago the late James Bryce, though he had shortly before pointed out the failure of this prediction of De Tocqueville,[28] yet recorded, in *The American Commonwealth,* the much-quoted observation that city government represented the one conspicuous failure in our democratic system and asserted that "In great cities the forces that attack and pervert democratic government are exceptionally numerous, the defensive forces that protect it exceptionally ill-placed for resistance." And in recent years the same distinguished author characterized "the inordinate growth of our modern cities," in various countries, as "a very great evil," involving the possibility of grave political consequences in addition to other elements of danger.[29]

Scientists, educators, churchmen, publicists, and other prominent writers and speakers in this country in more recent years have voiced in no uncertain terms their apprehensions and convictions as to the asserted evil results of city

life upon our population and upon our institutions. Dr. Andrew D. White, in his annual address as president of the American Social Science Association in 1891 said: "Our cities are the rotten spots in our body politic, from which, if we are not careful, decay is to spread throughout the whole country." [30] President Hyde, of Bowdoin College, has termed the country "the fountain of the nation" while the city is "an inland lake, fed by constant streams, but without outlet." [31] And Dr. Josiah Strong, though convinced of the inevitable growth of the city population, asserts that the city has become "a serious menace to our civilization," because in it most of our dangers are enhanced and all are focalized.[32]

Theodore Roosevelt gave at least a qualified assent to the claim that we ought to get more people back to the land; [33] Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover fears the overdevelopment of industrial life and possible dependence upon foreign sources for our supplies of food, and maintains that the farms and villages are the sources that have always supplied our country with "its true Americanism, its new and fresh minds, it physical and its moral strength"; [34] the late Franklin K. Lane, former Secretary of the Interior, in urging his proposal for soldier settlements declared to the members of a congressional committee that "as statesmen" they could not afford to have the people of the United States "become dependent upon foreign countries for food supplies" and remain "centered, as they now are, in the cities"; and a great number of men in public life, both at the national seat of government and from the individual States, voiced a similar sentiment at the hearings relative to this proposal.[35]

Bishop Spalding, assenting to the view that city populations are decadent and would die out if they were not reinforced from the country, finds the home, which he calls "the fountain-head of the life of a civilized people," "less potent and sacred" in the city than in the country.[36] In the view of

Bishop Ireland, "The moral life of the nation, its sound citizenship, its safe political motion, are dependent upon the farming population"; and if "the life-blood of the nation" should be "restricted in its coursings to those vast and incongruous agglomerations that are cities," he believes that national decay and death would be inevitable.[37] And Dr. Charles W. Eliot, who was a lifelong and consistent exponent of the view of the superiority of rural life, warned of the danger to health and physique, to morals, and to the reproductive capacity, from work in the factory and from residence in the congested centers of population.[38]

Another educator finds city life "terribly devitalizing"; [39] still another sees deterioration of the American stock through migration of the best men and women of the farm to the city, where there is, in his view, less opportunity for clean development; [40] and President G. Stanley Hall eulogized the educative influences of the old New England farm and denominated the city "the great sterilizer." [41] Dr. Eugene A. Davenport, emphasizing the open country as "the breeding ground of the race," has declared that "the Americans who shall be here a century from now will mostly be descended from farmers"; [42] President David Kinley is on record as believing that life in the city "checks the assimilation of American ideals"; [43] and Dr. Liberty Hyde Bailey, whose intimate acquaintance with the conditions of rural life, long-continued study of its problems, and eminent balance and sanity in their consideration entitle his opinions to respect in special degree, describes the agricultural class as the natural balance force or middle-wheel of society between the laboring class and the wealthy corporate classes and characterizes the agriculturists as "steady, conservative, and law-abiding" and "to a greater extent than we recognize the controlling element in our civilization." [44]

George Walter Fiske, in his interesting volume, *The Challenge of the Country,* unfavorably contrasts the luxury

and vice, the nervous tension, and the tyranny to close confinement, in the city, with the virile and stimulating environment of the open country; and calling attention to the oft asserted belief that a disproportionately large number of our leading men of all lines have been born or bred in the rural districts, he quotes Professor Giddings with approval: "Genius is rarely born in the city. The city owes the great discoveries and immortal creations to those who have lived with nature and with simple folk. The country produces original ideas, the raw materials of social life, and the city combines ideas and forms the social mind." [45]

Of all the critics of city life and advocates of rural civilization, none has written or spoken more vigorously than Professor Thomas Nixon Carver. Premising that the conditions of country life encourage a more wholesome relation between the sexes, earlier marriages, a more favorable attitude toward offspring, and thus make for larger families, while city families "tend to die out through celibacy, sterility, and various other agencies," he characterizes the rural districts as "the seed bed of civilization . . . from which even the cities are stocked with people." And he holds that if the country should continually lose its most virile elements to the city, there to become sterilized through the artificialities and vices of city life, the quality of the rural population itself must decline with consequent fatal effect upon the cities themselves.[46]

Similar views are set forth by Charles Otis Gill and Gifford Pinchot, in their volume, *The Country Church*; and ascribing the fall of Rome to the decadence of country life rather than of city life, they suggest the danger of a like fate for our own country on similar grounds.[47]

Journalists and business men, no less than publicists, educators, and churchmen, set forth the theory of the political and social superiority of the rural elements of the population. The editor of one of our most widely read farm journals, asserting that the pride of the nation once lay in its

sturdy farmers—that they have been its "soldiers of progress,"—warned that "unless we can still maintain a farm life in which the greatness of American life can flower, the armies of progress will suffer that decadence which comes to the hosts of any nation when they come from pavements, instead of from meadows and plowed fields." [48] A prominent newspaper, referring to the continued marked trend to the urban centers as disclosed in the last federal census, declared that "a condition dreaded by sociologists and patriots" was thus revealed.[49] Another large-city daily charges up to "the pull toward the city" and to the "disproportionate industrialization of the people" not only economic complications but "a seriously strained national mechanism with increased centralization of government." [50] And in a journal conducted under the auspices of an urbanized man of rural birth, himself a decided contributor to city growth through the industry which his business genius has made possible, we are told: "The modern city is an anomaly, its tremendous popularity is offsetting the balance of life. Millions of people living above sewers and between stone walls and beneath forests of electric wires, is much more unnatural than an army of millions of men in the field." [51]

Students and investigators in the field of political science naturally view the subject in its more directly political aspects. Thus Professor J. W. Garner calls attention to the large floating population in great cities, with no local attachment or civic pride; and he points to the thousands there with low standards of life. In the city the individual is lost in the multitude and the restraining influence of public opinion, so powerful in the country, is lacking; while the problems of local government that are to be solved have been enormously increased by the growth of cities.[52] And President F. J. Goodnow has asserted that "One of the most marked features of municipal development is the almost universal tendency which urban communities have shown toward the

development of oligarchical government; toward the subjection of the vast majority of the urban population to the control of the more important and powerful economic classes in the municipal society." [53]

Moreover, a group of historical investigators and writers in this country, manifesting a pronounced tendency toward emphasis upon economic factors in the interpretation of the political and social development of peoples and premising their conclusions largely on the asserted relation between the agricultural population in this country and the development of our American democracy, approximate the generalization that political democracy and free government can not exist anywhere apart from the political control of the agricultural classes. As Professor Turner puts it, with the passing of free lands—the basis of American democracy—"The problem of the United States is not to create democracy but to conserve democratic institutions and ideals." [54] The Italian writer, Loria, similarly makes the categorical statement that "Political liberty can . . . only develop where there is an abundance of free land, and with the progressive diminution of this element freedom is gradually curtailed and eventually disappears"; and he purports to see in the political development of our own country a striking illustration of the truth of this generalization.[55]

Even some of those who look with confidence to the ultimate political and social consequences of urban development admit, in view of the prevalence of conditions in the large cities that appear to militate against the existence of democracy and especially in view of the corrupt and inefficient city government still all too prevalent in our land, that "Democracy must fight for its life in the cities." "Here we have conditions that are hostile to democratic institutions. The masses of the people have no keen interest in the preservation of their property, and so they do not require proof before permitting change. Their impecunious condition is made unbear-

able by the immediate proximity of flaunted riches. Envy, hatred, and willingness to strike reckless blows at the existing order are a natural result. The patriotism that attaches to citizenship where it enjoys the obvious benefits of free government is deadened in the breasts of people who think they have nothing to lose from the overturning of existing institutions, and perhaps something to gain. Where vice is a commercialized pursuit, where congested poverty submerges a large percentage of the people, where humiliation whispers discontent and irresponsibility promises immunity to crime, there is reason to fear the unrestrained authority of the populace." [56]

In short, it is claimed that urban life and the urban environment are unfavorable to the maintenance of liberty, equality, and democratic self-government; that the relatively ignorant and propertyless masses in the cities afford a fertile field for the propagation of radical and subversive ideas of government and are thus subject to the influence of the mob spirit and inclined toward extreme and unrestrained action and toward political instability and the jeopardizing of the public order; and that, the urban elements in general being without attachment to the soil and without a sufficient stake in the preservation of the community and of the state, love of country fails of its full measure of development and the safety of the nation is thus imperiled in time of war.

Moreover, this same poverty and ignorance of the urban masses, together with an asserted feeble civic spirit and other untoward influences and conditions in the city, are believed to contribute to the lack of an effective public sentiment among the urban population and thus to facilitate the prevalence of political corruption and boss rule in politics and to encourage the continuance of inefficiency in government. And these tendencies are reinforced by the vastly increased difficulty and complication of political life in the congested centers, where hundreds of thousands of people are thrown

into intimate contact with each other and where there are thus a myriad of services to be supplied publicly and a multitude of clashing interests and relationships to be harmonized and pacified.

To these unfavorable estimates of urban life are to be added the view that the urban environment is unfavorable to the health, physique, and reproductive potentialities of the people and that the national vitality and the normal growth of population are thus threatened or impaired and the military efficiency of the nation in consequence put in jeopardy; and the view that city life favors the colonization of alien immigrant elements within narrow areas and enables them to retain their former habits of thought and of life and prevents their amalgamation with the native population, to the grave injury of national sentiment and solidarity.

Again, it is believed by many that the stereotyped character of city life and the lack of initiative in general that prevails in a community where a large majority of the population performs its daily tasks from start to finish under close and constant supervision are unfavorable to the development of political initiative, imagination, and genius; and that there is thus a lack of capacity both for political leadership and for effective participation in general in community life, and especially for the development of political agencies and institutions requisite to the intricate and complex needs of city life.

Lastly, over against the asserted natural or normal life of the open country, with its assumedly superior encouragement to frugality, sobriety, and industry, and to all the pure and simple virtues that constitute so valuable an asset to the community and to the nation, is set the so-called artificial, luxurious, and vicious environment of the city, with its enervating influences that threaten the character of both growing youth and grown adult through the loosening of the ties of home and of religion.

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CHAPTER II

The Urban Bent

The presentation that has been made in the previous chapter constitutes a serious and weighty indictment of urban life from the political and social points of view and a strong brief in favor of the superiority of the rural elements in the national life. But before we turn to an examination of the facts of history and of contemporaneous life in order to inquire into the validity of this indictment and brief we must first give attention to a presentation of the opposing, though minority, view; the view that the urban elements of the population are, in general, in no degree inferior material for the building of a stable and progressive political organization, or that they are even superior to the rural elements in this respect and that the city very usually has been in the van in the movement toward a higher and better political life.

The view is thus strongly held by some political thinkers and writers, and by others, that citizenship and political life in general find their highest opportunity for exercise and expression and their greatest promise in the city environment. Even Plato and Aristotle, while they idealized agriculture and the agricultural class, yet conceived of the city-state as the ideal state and of the free and well-to-do-resident of the city community as the ideal citizen. Indeed, Aristotle would exclude the immediate cultivators of the soil from "any share in the government of the state, as being without the necessary leisure and cultivation, and apt to be debased by the nature of their occupations"; [1] and his expressed preference for the predominance of the agricultural element in the population,

in a democracy, represents a most doubtful compliment to that class in that their asserted superiority is ascribed to the fact that they have neither the leisure nor the inclination to busy themselves about government at all, and not to any positive political capacity or virtue on their part.[2]

It frequently has been pointed out, as indicative of the fact that political development beyond the simplest and crudest beginnings and citizenship in any essential sense originated in the city community, that the very word "citizen" originally denoted the inhabitant of a city and that the word "political" traces back to the collective activities of the members of a city community.[3] Moreover, it was through the cities that the political and legal institutions developed by the ancient Greeks and Romans, in the city-state form, were preserved in the dark ages and handed down to us as a priceless heritage. "The free cities of the Middle Ages are the links through which have been transmitted to us the liberties of Greece and Rome," wrote Woodrow Wilson more than a score of years ago; and he states further that "the city, the municipality,—the compact, coöperative, free population of a small locality,—continued to breathe the only political life of which the world could boast." [4] Professor Sloane, too, declares that "When we speak of the great revival of the human spirit which occurred in the later Middle Ages throughout the western world, the agricultural classes must be excluded almost entirely." And the conspicuous part played by the cities, and by the urban population, in the political aspect, as in other aspects, of this revival is abundantly proved by the evidence that is submitted below.[5] Even so decided a partisan of rural life as Professor Carver admits that "modern democracy arose first in the cities and towns." [6]

Reverting to the controversy over the introduction and promotion of manufactures, in our own early national period, it is of interest that the partisans of manufactures were not without worthy means of defence in that controversy. For

Patrick Colquhon, lord provost of Glasgow, police magistrate in London, and distinguished investigator and author in the field of social and economic science, was prominently quoted by the spokesmen for manufactures to the effect that there was less of pauperism and of crime among the manufacturing than among the agricultural population in the England of that day.[7] And Alexander Hamilton, in his "Report on Manufactures," in 1791, declared that there were more examples of "remissness" among cultivators of the soil than among "artificers." [8]

Not only did Hamilton and his followers repudiate the charge that manufacturing centers were the haunts of tumult, pauperism, immorality, and vice; but they also contended that, by giving employment to those who otherwise would have remained idle, manufactures, which meant of course agglomerated population, actually contributed to diminish crime and vice and to further the good order of the community and of the state. And Scotland was instanced as a country which engaged in manufacture to an important extent for export and whose population yet sustained a high elevation both in physical and in moral character and was in no sense weakened for war.[9] Accepting as a matter of course an attitude toward child labor that was practically unchallenged in that day, others asserted that children in manufacturing establishments were "inured to habits of industry, order, and regularity, which generally adhere to them through life." [10]

As a matter of fact the morals of the early factory population in this country were carefully looked after; and the operatives were required to receive both secular and religious instruction. A Massachusetts woollen manufacturer, testifying before a committee of Congress, in 1828, upon being asked "What is the comparative state of morals in New England between the agricultural and manufacturing population?", replied, "I think the opportunities for moral and

religious instruction are decidedly in favor of the manufacturing community, it being one of the first objects of the proprietors of the large establishments to provide schools and houses for religious worship." Another manufacturer on the same occasion declared that his twenty-six years' experience in different branches of manufacturing had led him to believe that not only was the congregation of large numbers of hands in manufacturing establishments not injurious to the morals of the laborers but that the moral as well as the pecuniary condition of the laborers employed had been, in general, materially improved; and he pointed out that all the children employed in, or dependent upon, the factories of these establishments were regularly taught in Sunday School until they had acquired the rudiments of a tolerable education.[11]

Moreover, provisions for the comfort and cleanliness of the employees in these factories attracted the attention of travelers from abroad; and according to the testimony of the operatives themselves they enjoyed a degree of health equal or superior to that experienced previous to entry into factory life.[12] Further, intellectual conditions among these early New England factory operatives were on an unusually high plane; and it was a common saying, about 1840, that "every shoemaker in Lynn was fit to be a United States Senator."[13] It is of interest that even Jefferson himself, by implication at least, in later life retracted something of his earlier depreciation of manufactures and of cities, and of the alleged harmful influences resulting from such aggregations of population. For so changed were his views as a result of the interference of England and France with our commerce and shipping during the period of the Continental War and of the War of 1812 that he declared: "To be independent for the comforts of life, we must fabricate them ourselves. We must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist." [14]

Nor have there been lacking in the middle and later

periods of our national life champions of the view that it is possible to construct a sound and enduring political and social organization from the human material of our industrial centers. Thus, in a remarkable report in 1851 on "domestic manufactures," by a committee representing an agricultural society including the counties of Franklin, Hampden, and Hampshire, in Massachusetts, the members of the committee, after admitting that large manufacturing establishments had largely displaced home manufacture in that State, declared: "It is in vain to fight against Providence; it is wise to direct as we best can the great tide of civilization. Labor in cottages, labor by hand of all sorts, we can return to if we choose, but who will choose so to do? We are not insensible to the many evils which infest manufacturing neighborhoods, but exclusively farming regions have never so far raised themselves above our common humanity as to be faultless, free from social vice, and we must infuse such wiser and better life as we have into the civilization that must be, and wait patiently until it comes of age, and can prove that goodness and beauty were not exhausted by the world of our fathers, but can be realized even within the precincts of the huge factory, and within the sound of the heavy bell." [15]

Two score years later, at a time when the problem of the so-called "abandoned farm" was attracting special attention in New England, in a report by one of the official bureaus of the same State the view was presented that the "idyllic New England life of the past" was not necessarily to be ascribed to its prevailingly rural environment: "The farms of New England have in the past nurtured strong and brave men, but it was not because of any specially favorable economic conditions. It was the New England character, the New England home life, the New England respect for the church and school, which, frequently in the face of adverse circumstances, developed the New England citizen." [16]

In 1870, in an address on the cityward trend, before the

American Social Science Association, a favorable attitude toward that trend was taken;[17] and in 1895, before the same association, President Frederick John Kingsbury, citing in his presidential address the views of Nordau, Morel, and others, as to the alleged deteriorating influences resulting from city life, championed the opposite view. Noting the great improvement in city sanitation in recent previous years, he cited authorities to the effect that the city was more healthful than the country, emphasized the deadening isolation of rural life as illustrated in the deterioration of certain remote New England rural communities and of the mountain whites of the South, and pointed to the "low and degrading character" of amusements in the country village. He held that superior food could be obtained in the city, that sanitation, except among the very poor, was better in the city, and that only in the city was superior medical skill available. He cited the opinion of authorities in historical and political science in support of the view that cities have always been the centers of freedom and political liberty. And speaking from the results of his own observation, he declared: "I have been fairly familiar with the streets of New York and Boston for the last fifty years, and there is no fact in that connection with which I have been more impressed than the physical improvement which has taken place in both men and women during that period. The men are more robust and erect, the women have greatly improved both in feature and in carriage; and in the care and condition of the teeth in both sexes a surprising change has taken place." Lastly, he proceeded to quote himself as saying of a certain gathering that those "prematurely old, bowed, decrepit, and uninteresting people who make up most of the gathering are true representatives of our rural population." Rural life he declared to be indeed ideal—but only as a place for recuperation for the city resident.[18]

"I am not ready to admit that the traditional 'inde-

pendent' farm family on 80 or 100 acres is always essential, as we have been taught, to the maintenance of democratic institutions," writes Dr. L. H. Bailey, in spite of his favorable estimate, already noted, of the political qualities of the rural population; and noting that we "have passed the rural stage of our civilization," he holds that the interaction of urban and rural life "is going to produce for us a deeper, a more complex, and a richer civilization than could have been dreamed of one hundred years ago." [19] President David Kinley appears to find no serious objection to city life except the doubtfully valid one of its supposed lack of capacity to achieve the assimilation of American ideals among the foreign-born who congregate in the cities; and he catalogues important advantages that it affords.[20] Dr. A. E. Winship has concluded, after careful investigation, that the city has supplied a much larger proportion of the successful men of today than our social philosophers have thought; and he has asserted that the advantages, educational, commercial, professional, and social, offered in the cities give the fortunately born city boy a better start in life and a better equipment for his life's work than the country lad enjoys.[21] Moreover, the results of recent authoritative investigations tend strongly to confirm this view of the superior contribution of the urban centers to the supply of leaders in the various lines of human activity and accomplishment.[22]

Lastly, Sir Horace Plunkett has quoted Theodore Roosevelt as saying that the "modern, well-governed city had by successive physical, social, political, and educational improvements brought it about that the townsman was physically and mentally better favored than the country man." [23]

Neither have the pro-rural champions in England had the lists wholly to themselves. The members of the Royal Statistical Society, before whom Dr. G. B. Longstaff presented his views relative to the dangers of city life, in 1893, were not inclined toward an alarmist opinion and were disposed, on

the whole, to look upon the cityward movement not unfavorably.[24] The weighty authority of the late Professor Alfred Marshall may similarly be cited in opposition to the extreme pro-rural view.[25] Contrary to the impression that is usually given in periodical literature and elsewhere with reference to the conclusions of the British "Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration," of 1904, those conclusions were distinctly reassuring—thus confirming the conclusion of Wilson Fox, in the previous year, that there had been no deterioration of the *rural* population of England as a consequence of the migration to the towns.[26] And Dr. C. W. Saleeby, member of the National Birth-rate Commission and eugenist of note, paying a tribute to the physique, health, and morale of the new British armies, in 1915, after the stern test of war had been applied to the manhood of Britain, declared that "The stale talk of our degeneracy was never based on knowledge, nor showed any attempt to remedy the voluble ignorance from which it echoed." [27]

Lastly, Professor Sloane parallels his depreciation of the agricultural classes of Europe at an earlier period with the declaration that the class of agricultural laborers in England and western continental lands today "can scarcely be said to form an integral part of the people";[28] and Mr. F. E. Green, in his *Tyranny of the Countryside,* has repeatedly and emphatically expressed the conviction of the political impotence and ineptitude of the same class in England.

Quite generally favorable, as already suggested, has been the conclusion of those investigators who have made a study of the political and social results of urbanization as one phase of the effects in general of city life. The English writer, Vaughan, three quarters of a century ago concluded that city life tends to foster just and enlightened views in relation to political science. He held that great cities are always the centers of vast experiments in the history of society and that the need of governmental regulations leads to attention

to and interest in popular government. "Cities are states upon a small scale, and are of necessity schools in relation to the policy most in harmony with the genius of a people." Asserting that almost everywhere in modern Europe cities had become more or less free and that they had been the centers from which nearly all the freedom of the nations of Christendom had been diffused, he referred to the growth of civil and political liberty in England as commercial cities developed and to the coercion of tenants by the great landlords in matters of opinion and in other respects. Identifying the struggle between the feudalism of the past and civilization as related to the development of the commercial classes in the cities and their championship of civilization against the feudal powers, he charged that the reactionary political interests of his day had for this very reason been incited against the cities and the city populations and had with prejudice termed the cities and city life an evil that should be gotten rid of at any cost; and in flat contradiction he concluded that "As nations come to abound in great cities, they learn to become their own defenders and their own rulers." [29]

Our own contemporaneous writer of this period, Professor George Tucker, of the University of Virginia, whose analysis of the causes and of the consequences, actual and anticipated, of city growth must be regarded as extremely remarkable in view of the early stage at which the movement had arrived, delivered a judgment somewhat more restrained. "The growth of cities," he wrote, "commonly marks the progress of intelligence and the arts, measures the sum of social enjoyment, and always implies increased mental activity, which is sometimes healthy and useful, sometimes distempered and pernicious. . . . In the eyes of the moralist, cities afford a wider field for virtue and vice; and they are more prone to innovation, whether for good or evil. The love of civil liberty is, perhaps, both stronger and more constant

in the country than the town; and if it is guarded in the cities by a keener vigilance and a more far-sighted jealousy, yet law, order, and security are also, in them, more exposed to danger from the greater facility with which intrigue and ambition can there operate on ignorance and want." [30]

In an environment so Jeffersonian, a disposition to deal with such evident fairness and discrimination in relation to cities and city life is worthy of more than passing mention.

In Germany, Dr. R. Kuczynski, in his *Der Zug nach der Stadt,* effectively criticised the views of Hansen, who has been cited above as a leading exponent of the asserted degenerative influences of city life; and the similar views of Kraepelin have also been controverted by one of his fellow-countrymen.[31]

In France, M. Leroy-Beaulieu more than a score of years ago concluded that in the light of the very low mortality rate in England, with her disproportionately large number of city dwellers, it was necessary to abandon the view that the cities are necessarily less healthful than the rural districts;[32] M. Guillon refuses to accede to the views of those moralists who idealize country life as synonymous with all that is good and identify city life with all that is vicious, and he declares that the fecundity and physical vigor of the individual and thus the future of the race are by no means essentially compromised by the rural exodus;[33] while M. Zolla, though inclined to believe that the rural exodus threatens the morals and the physique of the population, joins with M. Guillon in describing it as economically advantageous, and declares that in a country with a stationary population the increase of the industrial element at the expense of the agricultural is necessary for the welfare of both agriculture and industry.[34]

Our own Weber, in his thorough work, *The Growth of Cities,* in discussing the more strictly political effects of urbanization, does full justice to the unfavorable aspects of

the situation. But he finds weighty advantages to offset the disadvantages; and even so long ago as twenty-five years since, when the recent improvement in city government in this country had scarcely begun, he was able to note decided betterment over the conditions discouragingly cited by De Tocqueville when our cities were very much smaller, both in number and in size, and when the urban population comprised a very much smaller proportion of the total population. In estimating what may be called the politico-social effects of urbanization, Weber reaches conclusions much more decidedly favorable to the city. For he holds that commerce and manufacturers "introduce order and good government, and guarantee the liberty and security of individuals in both city and country"—a near endorsement of the views of the more optimistic Vaughan. Again, "The new industrial forces which transformed the solidified age of authority into a liquefied Age of Freedom," he says, "have naturally been more predominant in the cities than elsewhere, for the close contact of man with man in a dense population removes prejudices and engenders liberalism. . . The cities . . . are favorable to free thought and the sense of individual responsibility." [35]

Especially emphasized, as a result of city life, is this feature of social solidarity, by M. Vandervelde, Belgian scientist, author, and publicist. Citing Schmoller to the effect that "The countryman is conservative . . ." while "The city resident is liberal, progressive, and social-democratic," and indorsing the view that the Australian colonies owe their ultra-democracy to the preponderance of cities in that Commonwealth, he develops at considerable length the conclusion that the chief political influence of the cityward movement is the growth and dissemination of socialistic sentiment—an outcome that, as a socialist, he naturally welcomes and accepts as beneficial.[36]

Lastly, the essential consonance between the development of city life and the best and highest political development

has been admitted, or urged, by not a few prominent political thinkers and writers in more recent years. In this connection the name of Woodrow Wilson has already been mentioned. Significant, too, is the admission of James Bryce, in passing judgment on the soundness of De Tocqueville's predictions of a half-century before, that though there were indeed no great capital cities in this country there were cities "greater than most European capitals" and that the Republic had nevertheless not been imperiled by their growth.[37] Again, Dr. Albert Shaw, discussing some thirty years ago the political conditions in cities, asserted that the great majority of people were destined to live in cities or under conditions more or less urban, in the future, in the United States; and he declared that the inevitable order was not to be rebelled against as an evil but welcomed as if it were the most desirable of destinies. "For," he continued, "the present evils of city life are temporary and remediable." [38]

Another of our writers, though not unappreciative of the rural civilization that is passing and not unmindful of the defects of the city at present, yet regards the city as the hope of democracy—the hope of the future—and has voiced this view in eloquent terms: "For the first time in history we have a really democratic city, safeguarded in its democracy by law. Through this fact the city has become a tremendous agency for human advancement. It already serves us to a greater extent than does the state or nation. It is an organism capable of conscious and concerted action, responsive, ready, and intelligent. The ease of organization, the responsiveness of the official to his constituents, the comparative inexpensiveness of experimentation, all indicate that the city is to be the area where the social and political forces that are coming to the fore will play. This fact is scarcely less significant than the city itself, for with universal education, a free press, a free ballot, all contributing to the formation of definite political and social ideals, civilization is armed with powers

such as she has never before enjoyed, powers whose possibilities for the future it is as impossible to measure as are the movements of society itself." [39]

Still another writer, already cited with reference to the political dangers of city life, takes a hopeful attitude in spite of the common belief that democracy "has failed to justify itself in the cities of America." "In many respects," writes this investigator, "great cities are the most favorable fields for the working out of democracy. The very nature of city life compels manifold co-operations. . . . In the city the opportunities for public discussion and the immediate exchange of ideas are ever present. The citizen who has any wits for public affairs has a chance to cultivate them. The gigantic common interests which compel the establishment of public utilities offer an unrivalled field in a practical way for the development of civic spirit and municipal efficiency, both of which are essentials to a realization of democracy." [40]

Professor Zueblin has enthusiastically catalogued the multitude of achievements that have marked municipal progress in this country in more recent years.[41] And another recent writer along political lines has professed his faith in city life in the following words: "As a matter of fact, the city is the flower of civilization. It is in cities that culture develops. It is from cities that progressive ideals originate. The city should be looked upon with pride, and the development of its municipal life fostered." [42]

Finally, one of our foremost thinkers and writers in the political field, an acute and penetrating student of our contemporary political institutions, has recently characterized the city population in a way to bring out the balance of good and evil from the point of view of politics and government; and if he confirms some of the asserted unfavorable influences, he contradicts others of them and, on the whole, justifies the expectation of a favorable issue in view of the recent progress and reform in city government: "The city popula-

tions are more volatile, less dependent upon the associations of home and church, more influenced by things of the moment and less by tradition, more ardent in their championship of new doctrines, and generally accounted to have more initiative." And sensing that quality of extremes which every careful investigator has had occasion to recognize as a characteristic of city life, he asserts: "The city of today is responsible for most of what is good, and for most of what is bad, in our national life and ideals." [43]

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34. *L'Agriculture Moderne,* Paris, 1913, pp. 303, 319, 322-4.

35. Pages 425-431. Cf. Burgess, Ernest W. (Ed.), *The Urban Community,* Chicago, 1926, pp. 60-61.

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CHAPTER III

Urbanization and Civil Liberty

The contrasting views of the political and social aspects of rural and of urban life presented above show extreme divergence, and even total contradiction, in many instances. For there is scarcely an assertion relative to the political and social effects of urban life or relative to the political and social characteristics of the urban population that has not been repudiated as not applying or that has not been similarly asserted as exclusively characteristic of rural life and rural people. These contrasting views appear to afford a very good reason for suspecting that different elements in the urban population and different types of the rural element may differ among themselves, respectively, quite as much as, and at times perhaps even more than, the urban population as a whole differs from the rural population as a whole, with reference to political and social characteristics. It also seems likely that a political or social characteristic that appears to attach to the rural population in one country at a given time may, in another country at the same time or in the same country at a different time, attach rather to the urban population, and vice versa.

It is not unlikely that these circumstances have afforded occasion for, if not justification of, the widely divergent views that have been held relative to the subject. But this marked divergence of opinion may also be accepted as evidence of a lack of caution and of discrimination on the part of very many who assume to speak with authority on the subject. And an appeal may therefore be taken from tradi-

tional views and from authority to the evidence itself, contemporaneous and historical.

The passion for liberty or freedom[1] and the desire to dominate over others are among the most fundamental of human instincts. It is therefore of very great interest and importance as to how the development of cities and the disproportionately rapid growth of the city population have affected the relative strength of these opposing passions. In considering this phase of the general subject, however, it must be recognized that human liberty and human freedom are but relative terms and that men's conceptions of these terms have differed in different times and places and that our own concept of their content and their extent is still in the making. Moreover, these terms do not mean at all the same thing to different people and to different classes. Lastly, these terms themselves are not simple, irreducible, concepts but are seen, on close examination, to be made up of a number of more or less similar, more or less different, concepts—just as each of the terms "city" and "country" is not a simple term for the present purpose but represents classes and types of people that differ widely among themselves in political and social characteristics.

Thus when we speak of human liberty or human freedom we may mean religious liberty, liberty of thought, freedom of speech and of the press, "individual" liberty, "personal" liberty, or personal freedom as opposed to the status of a slave or of a serf; or we may mean national freedom, or independence of a foreign power, and the right to self-government in general and to individual participation in government in particular; or we may mean such a relation to the means of production and to their manipulation and exploitation as will make possible the adequate satisfaction of the material wants of life, afford the direct gratification that free economic activity produces, and create a substantial basis for the enjoyment of the other forms of liberty. The most of these

terms are more or less closely related and many of them are in part mutually inclusive. Yet at the same time they for the most part represent important distinctions that justify their more or less separate consideration.

The second of these three groups refers, of course, to "political liberty" and as representing the main subject of inquiry in this volume will engage us predominantly in the various chapters that follow. In the present chapter, however, we shall deal briefly with the first group, under the head of "civil liberty"; while in the next succeeding chapter we shall consider "economic freedom," which is perhaps closely allied to "civil liberty" but which is at the same time in a measure apart from and anterior to it, and also anterior to political liberty.

I

Religious Liberty; Freedom of Thought, of Speech, and of the Press; "Individual" Liberty; "Personal" Liberty

Milton in his *Areopagitica* puts liberty of thought, of speech, and of the press above every other form of liberty: "Give me liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all other liberties." These forms of liberty are, indeed, among the most cherished possessions of human kind. And though they are non-political in character and thus may seem not to come strictly within the scope of the general subject under consideration, the state or community does as a matter of fact inevitably become involved in their determination and they in turn exercise the most marked influence upon the more strictly political forms of liberty.

That religious liberty, freedom of thought, of speech, of the press, in general, and freedom of the person, have been without doubt favorably affected by the development of city life is abundantly proven by the fact that these precious

privileges bulked large among the concessions that were wrung from the masters of tyranny, largely through the efforts of the cities and of the city populations, in the long struggle for civil and political liberty in general. And because the close connection between the struggle for civil and for political liberty makes it impossible, as well as unnecessary, to make a separation between civil and political liberty in the discussion, the historical evidence for the conclusion that has just been stated will thus be found in part in the subsequent chapters that consider the relative contribution of the rural and of the urban elements in the struggle for political liberty.

Among the oriental peoples of antiquity the idea of religious liberty received impulse from neither urban nor rural sources as that idea was almost wholly lacking among these peoples in that age. Authorities differ as to the extent of religious toleration under Roman rule in ancient times. Doubtless the situation varied somewhat from time to time. There is very general agreement, however, that liberty of thought and of discussion, and thus religious toleration, had its earliest developments among the Ionian Greeks and among the Athenians. Xenophanes was preëminent among the pioneers of this movement, and "went from city to city" spreading the gospel of "free speculation."[2] Some authorities credit Constantine with having taken a notable step toward religious liberty in the Edict of Milan, in A.D. 313. But others, with more favorable ideas relative to the prevalence of religious toleration in pre-Christian Rome, date a new period of enchainment of the reason from the time of Constantine.[3]

The period of the Middle Ages, characterized by the predominance of the rural, feudal regime, was distinctly unfavorable to religious toleration. The towns alone, at this time, afforded an opportunity for a measure of religious freedom, just as they were almost solely the centers of political liberty during this period. In the twelfth century Paris and

Bologna were the leading centers of the early manifestations of freedom of thought that presaged the later developments associated with the Renaissance;[4] and this latter movement, which counted so heavily in its full fruition toward religious freedom, was overwhelmingly urban in its origin and development.[5] The Reformation, which was ultimately to contribute in notable degree to the promotion of religious liberty but which at first afforded occasion, both to its opponents and to its partisans, for religious persecution, was likewise predominantly urban in its origin and early development—though in less degree than the Renaissance.

Some find the immediate impulse toward religious toleration at this time in one of the saner phases of the Anabaptist movement of the sixteenth century—a movement that was predominantly urban in origin and leadership but that found the largest scope for development among the downtrodden peasantry of Central Europe. Others trace the beginnings of religious toleration as we know it today in the almost contemporaneous teachings of the Sozzini, who were both natives of the city of Sienna. With the fuller development of the Reformation and of the movement toward political liberty with which it was associated, its real fruits as contributory to religious freedom became increasingly manifest—especially in the cities of the Netherlands and of England.[6]

The modern movement toward religious liberty received a large impulse from the intellectual movement that preceded, in France, the events of the Revolution. And from this great epoch, which was essentially urban in its setting,[7] substantial religious toleration is to be dated in that country.[8] This French contribution to religious liberty was to have an earlier, and even more generous fruitage, however, in America, where conditions were more favorable to the movement and where urban and rural influences were honorably combined in its promotion. On the urban side must be listed the notable work of William Penn, in Pennsylvania, and the

even more notable contribution of Roger Williams, in Rhode Island; while to Jonathan Edwards, another urban representative, must be extended the credit, in greatly preponderating degree, for the disassociation of church and state in the New World.[9]

The rural impulse toward religious freedom in America, in this early period, proceeded preëminently from the Pilgrims in Plymouth, and from the Maryland Toleration Act of 1649, by Lord Baltimore. The French influence manifested itself in the later Revolutionary period—particularly through the agency of Jefferson, Franklin, and Madison. The work of Jefferson and of Madison, representative of the rural contribution, was conspicuously manifest in the Bill of Rights of the Virginia constitution of 1776; while Franklin labored earnestly, as a typical urban representative, for religious liberty in Pennsylvania. All three contributed to the epoch-making introduction of the principle of full religious liberty in the Federal Constitution of 1787—which was, however, mainly the work of city men.

But the favorable influence of the urban environment relative to religious freedom is proved also, for the present day, in the general agreement that there exists on the whole a larger measure of tolerance for the opinions and views of others in the city community than in the rural districts. This condition applies both with reference to religious matters and with reference to other matters of opinion and of conduct. It will generally be admitted, perhaps, that it is usually the rural religious congregations today that continue rigidly to insist upon the maintenance of sectarian differences among the various religious bodies; and the intolerant spirit in religion is usually in proportion to emphasis upon narrow differences of opinion relative to religious subjects.[10] Indeed, no small part of the charge of irreligion that is marked up to the account of the urban by the pro-rural elements finds its basis in this larger measure of religious tolerance on the

part of the former. This attitude is sometimes expressed by saying that many city folks are so tolerant in respect to matters of religion that they are practically without religious convictions of their own—an allegation that may not be entirely without the force of fact.

There is generally believed to be, too, a larger inclination toward tolerance on the part of the urban elements with reference to the personal habits of individuals, such as the use of intoxicants and indulgence in other habits and practices of questionable character. And while this is more usually described as a matter of deference to the "personal liberty" of the individual it is fundamentally rather a matter of deference to the will or thought or opinion that lies back of the habit or practice than to the habit or practice itself. Indeed, one of our prominent writers, whose views on various subjects are regularly syndicated through a large number of newspapers and who yet can by no means be regarded as sympathetic toward the use of intoxicants or toward analagous practices or habits, referring recently to "the narrow and illiberal censorship of acts" in the rural community, finds in the desire to escape from this environment and in the "inborn desire for spiritual freedom" the real cause of the exodus to the city.[11]

It may thus be taken as almost universally accepted that the urban elements are more "liberal" than the rural elements; and though this circumstance may have its unfavorable as well as its favorable aspects, it without doubt contributes today, as it has contributed in the past, to promote freedom both with respect to the outward forms and activities of religion and with respect to the subtler and more intimate spheres of thought, of speech, and of publication, in the religious field. Without doubt, too, the urban environment exerts a similar influence today with reference to freedom of thought, of speech, and of the press, in general.[12]

Yet, on the other hand, there is necessarily a large meas-

ure of interference in the city environment with individual actions and activities where these are charged with an immediate social relation. The urban resident is not at liberty to expectorate just where he pleases, nor to dispose of the garbage in just the way that may appeal to himself as proper, nor otherwise to jeopardize by his actions the health and reasonable enjoyment of his fellow-citizens. He may not ride his bicycle without a light, after certain hours, nor at any time without a bell to signal his approach to his neighbor who walks. The latter occasionally submits, like his neighbor who drives a motor car, to direction as to when he may cross the street at the busy corners, in the large urban center. And if he differs too strenuously from his fellow-citizen of the opposite political party relative to the opinions on matters of state, that have kindly been handed down by the party newspapers, both are quite likely to be asked to "move on" and cease obstructing traffic or disturbing the peace. If the urban citizen permits his lawn to become unsightly through growth of a crop of weeds it is not unlikely that he may have the matter attended to for him and the bill sent to him and its payment enforced; while his rural cousin suffers no restrictions, either as to height or as to the number to the front foot, with reference to the jimson weed or white-top that he may grow in his yard. On every side the urban resident appears to be hemmed in with restrictions and hedged about with regulations as to just how he may conduct his affairs; while the rural dweller appears to be free to conduct himself in most respects essentially as he pleases.

The time was, not long since, when the recital of these differences as to the degree of interference with individual actions in the urban center and in the rural community would have been sufficient decisively to settle in favor of the latter the question of the relative extent to which individual liberty prevails in each of these two spheres. But today all this seems less convincing. For though it would be a serious mistake to

assert that it is no longer possible for our liberties to be threatened by undue interference, the negative definition of liberty, that it consists in being let severely alone, appeals to us less and less strongly. We have come to realize that liberty is not something that is absolute, something that we either have completely in respect to every matter, important or unimportant, or that we do not have at all, but that liberty is rather relative and residual, a balance of reasoned gain over reasoned loss, and thus positive in its final analysis. It is thus a minor consideration if we are restrained, in the urban community, with reference to a large number of acts or activities the performance of which could bring but little gratification at best to the individual, but which, if practiced by the community in general, might seriously discommode or injure every one under the conditions of an agglomerated population within a restricted area. The average urban resident in time learns to subscribe to the true creed of all real community life—restraint in all matters that are non-essential to the individual, where liberty would be only license and yet where it would threaten the common interest, but liberty in all the great essentials, and in respect to as many of the minor interests of life as circumstances will permit.

It thus comes about that the ordinary law-abiding urban citizen does not feel as a restriction upon his reasonable liberty the limitations to which he must submit. There is no indication that the urban resident, as compared with the resident of the open country, has become broken in spirit or servile in manner, or that he gives other evidence of existence in an environment where liberty is essentially lacking. It does not appear that his real liberty is compromised or that his worth as a citizen or his enjoyment as an individual is seriously diminished by the necessity of taking the public good into account in the pursuit of his affairs. Over against the non-essentials with reference to which he is restrained, the urban resident enjoys the opportunities for a fuller life and

for the fuller expression of his individuality, that the urban environment on the whole affords and that are especially facilitated through coöperation and intimate contact with his fellow-citizens. Moreover, the urban resident enjoys the liberty of transferring himself and his activities back to the rural community; and the fact that he does not ordinarily accept this opportunity may be regarded as proof that his liberty has not been curtailed in any vital way in the urban environment.

Rural life and the rural environment have their advantages and their compensations. But the liberty with which the rural resident is familiar is, in no small measure, of the negative kind—the kind that is akin in character to that of the savage and that approaches it in degree in proportion as the environment becomes more typically rural and is farther removed from the haunts of men. The real liberty that makes life worth while for the rural resident today, however, is the same liberty under law that is enjoyed by his urban brother. When we examine into the actual conditions of rural life the "proud independence" that has been ascribed to the rural dweller suffers material diminution, and he is seen to be, like other members of the community in general, essentially dependent upon his fellows and not especially different from others in his attitude toward liberty and toward the restraints of civilized life. And though the public good requires a larger degree of restraint upon the individual in the urban than in the rural community, full scope is left in the former for the enlargement of the positive aspect of liberty; and when credits and debits in the account are balanced it does not appear that the latter retains an advantage over the former in the comparison.[13] For the subtraction of a larger sum from one than from another of two quantities may still leave as large a remainder in one case as in the other, if the two quantities from which the subtraction be made are unequally large at the start.

Again, there can be little doubt that "individual liberty" is better promoted by the country than by the city environment if that term be taken as synonymous with "individualism." For there is undoubtedly a tendency toward collectivism in urban life, while individualism characterizes the rural community. But we have come today to make something of a distinction between "individualism" and "individual liberty," and no longer regard these two terms as synonymous nor accept the definition of the former that, in opposition to socialism or communism, it is that theory of government which "favors the utmost social and economic liberty of the individual." [14] "Individualism" has come rather to mean, today, *excessive* emphasis upon individual liberty of the negative sort; and its characteristic prevalence in the rural community has come to be regarded as objectionable rather than as advantageous.

Lastly, there appears to be no virtue in either interference or non-interference as such. At times we need to have positive things done by the state or by the community in order to set men free. At other times it is to the interest of all classes to have the activities of the state or community restrained within narrower limits. It is not every form of rural organization that favors individual freedom nor every rural class that is privileged to enjoy it. Individual liberty was conspicuously lacking to the great mass of the rural population during the feudal regime; and the modern system of landlordism, toward which there appears to be a strong trend in agriculture in its maturer stages of development, is not particularly favorable to its promotion. In many countries today the farm tenant bows in subjection to the landowner; while the rural laborer grovels before both classes, until, despairing of his native countryside, he flees to the city to secure that individual liberty that is so conspicuously lacking for such as himself in the country districts.[15]

II

Human Freedom versus Slavery and Serfdom in Country and in City

Nothing is clearer than that slavery and serfdom have declined as cities have developed. For these two forms of human bondage are almost exclusively features of a rural economy, inasmuch as they are forms of utilization of human effort adapted mainly to certain phases of agriculture and of the other extractive pursuits.[16] Much is said at times, indeed, of "wage slavery" and of "serfdom" relative to the conditions that often are declared to attend the employment of hired laborers in the city industries. But phraseology of this sort is merely metaphorical when so applied.[17] However objectionable such conditions may be they do not represent a status of bodily slavery, or even of serfdom.

Not a few of the ancient cities included considerable areas of agricultural land within their limits; and the ancient city-states embraced the contiguous rural areas, as well as the city proper, as a component part of the city-state community. Slaves were used in the cultivation of these areas as well as in the handicrafts that were followed within the city limits as more narrowly defined. Moreover, the slave trade always centered in greater or less degree in the cities, though it was mainly incidental, of course, to the employment of slaves in agriculture and in other rural occupations.[18]

There may be reasonable difference of opinion as to whether slave labor was really more profitable than free labor in those branches of agriculture where slaves were more especially employed. But there can be little doubt that its use was relatively uneconomical, from early times, in the handicrafts and in the other town employments. And it can scarcely be doubted that this circumstance had very much to do with the fact that while slavery was the basis of society

in ancient times, "In the mediaeval town . . . mechanic labor is free from the earliest time at which we have definite knowledge of it." [19] With the development of modern industry, with its machine production, its higher standard of living for labor, and its keener and closer competition for markets, the issue became more and more decisive in favor of the use of the relatively intelligent and willing free labor and less favorable to the employment of the ignorant and reluctant slave.

Even in agriculture slavery tended to yield to serfdom, and the latter eventually to free labor. And the rise and growth of the "free towns" during the later stages of the feudal period contributed in various ways to the decline of serfdom in agriculture. The development of trade and commerce facilitated the introduction of the money regime and its gradual substitution for the system of personal service as between man and his feudal master. Moreover, both the expansion of trade and commerce and the rise of the town handicrafts contributed to destroy the independent economy of the manors and to bring the manorial population and the people of the towns into closer and closer touch. The example of freedom in the towns, therefore, must have been an increasingly potent force making for freedom in the surrounding rural areas. And to these towns fled many a serf who made good his claim to freedom through residence there. "Stadtluft macht frei." [20]

Serfdom disappeared earliest in the Low Countries and in England—the countries, in Europe, most developed commercially and industrially; and it persisted longest in Russia, the most agricultural of the great countries of that part of the world. In England, through the decision of Lord Mansfield, in 1772, instant freedom came to every slave whose feet touched British soil. And though England was preceded by Denmark in the abolition of the slave trade, the former country played an honorable and leading part in this movement and in the abolition of colonial slavery. In Eng-

land, as in this country, too, the Quakers were leaders in this reform; and George Fox, founder of the sect, was the son of a weaver of Drayton, Leicestershire. Wilberforce was born at Hull, his father being a member of a commercial house in that important seaport city; and the former thus grew up in a city environment to play a leading part in the great work of liberation. Clarkson, born at the port of Wisbeck, Cambridgeshire, also grew up in non-rural surroundings. Brougham was born in Edinburgh and grew to manhood there before going to London.

William Penn, eminent leader of the Quakers who came to this country, was London born; in 1688 the German Friends of Germantown, Philadelphia, "raised the first official protest ever uttered by any religious body against slavery"; and Philadelphia and Boston were always leading centers of anti-slavery agitation in this country. Another urban representative, however, whose contribution to the cause of human freedom in general has never been surpassed in this country, had already raised his voice against slavery in the colonies. For Roger Williams protested, in 1637, against the enslaving of the captive Pequot Indians. And there was passed in Rhode Island, too, in 1652, "the first positive legislation" against negro slavery in this country.[21]

Lovejoy, Lundy, Whittier, Bryant, Theodore Parker, and John Brown were all of rural derivation; but only the last can be said to have had a rural career. Garrison, the son of a Newburyport, Massachusetts, sea-captain, began active life as an apprentice in the shoe-maker's trade at that place, changed to the trade of printer, and became a successful writer and editor. In Boston he became associated with Lundy in an anti-slavery publication; and later, with Isaac Knapp, he established the *Liberator* there. Channing, Emerson, and Charles Sumner were all born in Boston, as was also Wendell Phillips, son of the first mayor of that city upon the organization of a city government in 1822. Harriet Beecher Stowe,

the daughter of a minister and descended from the original founders of New Haven, was born in Litchfield, Connecticut; Longfellow was a native of Portland, Maine; John Quincy Adams was a native of Quincy, Massachusetts; and Walt Whitman, though of rural birth, was of sea-faring ancestry on his mother's side. The first anti-slavery convention was held at Philadelphia and was promoted mainly by abolitionists from Boston. And, generally, city men and women and city influence played a prominent part in the anti-slavery crusade.

On the other hand, Abraham Lincoln, under whose leadership slavery was destroyed in this country as an incident to the winning of the Civil War and the preservation of the Union, was born on a farm; and the open country and the village, as well as the urban centers, furnished still other leaders and naturally supplied many of the rank and file in that great conflict. Both the Northern farm population and the industrial population of the Northern cities did valiant service in the great struggle that led to the freeing of the slaves in this country; [22] though the leaders among the urban workers—and perhaps many of the rank and file—hesitated at first and declared for compromise. In England, however, the textile population of Lancashire, and especially of Manchester, though suffering grievously from unemployment as a result of the exclusion of raw cotton through the Northern blockade of Confederate ports, were a very rock of strength in the important task of holding England to the Union cause. Lord John Russell and John Bright, born in London and in Rochdale, respectively, also used their great influence to the same end; though Gladstone, a native of Liverpool, was rather inclined to sympathize with the South.

The slave power itself, in the United States, was almost purely agricultural—indeed was "eminently rural in its political economy and national outlook." [23] In fact, with the development of the factory industry, which removed manufac-

turing from the home and transferred it from a hand to a machine basis, the slave States became even more thoroughly agricultural than before. So long as manufacturing remained on a domestic and handicraft basis slave labor could be applied with a certain degree of effectiveness in the fabrication of the low-grade goods that were required for the use of the slaves themselves. But the invention of the cotton gin made slave labor more profitable than before in the raising of cotton, while at the very same time the introduction of factory manufacturing made it almost totally unprofitable in manufactures. The plantation owners soon found that they could purchase the coarse goods, that they formerly made with slave labor at home, from abroad or from the North more economically than they could produce them for themselves. It thus came about that while the Southern States produced almost as large an amount of textile goods as the Northern States early in the century, long before the time of the Civil War the former had dropped completely out of the running.

Leading men of the South had at one time had ambitions to develop manufactures in that section, thinking that slave labor might be used successfully or that industry might be based upon a system of free labor in case the system of slave labor should pass. Indeed, as is well known, there was at the beginning of the national period a rather well-defined movement in the South toward the abrogation of the slave system. But this movement was completely checked by the invention of the cotton gin and by the development of the cotton manufacturing industry on a factory basis. The regime of slavery now came definitely to be accepted by the controlling elements in the South as the fundamental basis of their whole economic, political, and social system—a regime that they aggressively defended from attack and that they endeavored to promote in every possible way. And when the secession of the slave States occurred at the beginning of the Civil War and an independent government was organized, that govern-

ment was consciously and specifically based upon the institution of human slavery—"a society . . . more aristocratically constituted than those of feudal times." [24]

The debasing influence of slavery with reference to the personal status of the slave himself by no means comprised the whole of the injury that the system of slavery worked to civil and political liberty. "The habit of absolute rule, always dangerous, was peculiarly corrupting when it penetrated every department of daily life, and when no external interference checked individual caprice in its action on the feelings and fortunes of inferiors. It tended to destroy the power of self-command, and exposed the master to the baneful influences of flattery." [25] Moreover, through the corruption of morals it tended to undermine the basis of free political institutions in general.

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3. Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 51 ff.

4. Bell, Mary I. M., *A Short History of the Papacy*, N. Y., 1921, pp. 142-3.

5. See below, pp. 115-7.

6. Below, pp. 118-129.

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10. See Eddy, George Sherwood, *India Awakening*, N. Y., 1911, p. 12, and Dennis, Jas. S., *The Modern Call of Missions*, N. Y., 1913, pp. 76, 281. See also *Missionary Review of the World*, July, 1918, p. 542, March, 1919, pp. 195-6, Aug., 1919, pp. 561, 971, and July, 1920, pp. 597-600; and the *New Era Magazine*, June, 1921, p. 377.

11. Dr. Frank Crane, on "Leaving the Old Farm," in Chicago *Daily News*, March 27, 1920. The exodus to the city of course has no single "real" cause. F. E. Green, in his *Tyranny of the Countryside*, London, 1913, p. 88, quotes a village laborer of "the best type" in an English rural community as saying: "A man mustn't think for

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18. See an article, ''Urbanism: A Historic, Geographic, and Economic Study,'' by Pierre Clerget, in *Ann. Rep. Smithson. Inst.*, 1912, pp. 654-5.

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CHAPTER IV

Urbanization and Economic Freedom

It is perhaps through the threat to economic freedom that city life would appear to present the gravest menace to human liberty in general. It is not necessary to assent to the extreme theory of economic determinism in order to appreciate the vast influence of economic factors and of economic status in human political and social organization. It is a trite saying, but one that will bear much repeating, that there can be no real liberty that is not based fundamentally on economic freedom. That democracy "is not in reality what it is in name until it is industrial, as well as civil and political," [1] and that "Political tyranny is only possible because it has behind it the pressure of the economic screw," [2] are propositions that carry a great deal of force. If it be true that substantial economic freedom is unattainable in the city, or is attainable only with very great difficulty there, we may well despair of realizing the ideals of human freedom in general there; and we can scarcely hope to preserve the liberties of men anywhere if we can not preserve them in the cities, with their constantly increasing proportion of the total population and with their constantly increasing political power as compared with the rural districts.

It is frequently pointed out that the mass of the city population is made up today, not of individuals engaged in an independent business, as is asserted to be true in the case of a majority of the rural population, but of individuals on a wage or salary basis; and that the latter are more or less lacking in capital or in a reserve for maintenance and thus

quite dependent for employment upon a relatively few persons of large wealth, and consequently of large power, who through means of the corporation effectively control and manipulate the instruments of production and thus control the opportunities for employment and for the means of livelihood. Self-employment is thus asserted to be the distinguishing mark of agriculture today, while employment by others characterizes the city industries—a situation which is declared to be exactly the reverse of that which prevailed in earlier times and which is held to explain both the generally admitted fact that the cities and towns were the sources of the rise of freedom and of liberty in earlier times and also the asserted fact that it is difficult or impossible to preserve those priceless privileges in the cities today.

Professor Carver has put the situation with his accustomed clearness and force: "Some of the deepest students of political and social tendencies have come to doubt whether democracy can ever develop to a high stage of efficiency except among people who are in the main self-employed. It is true that modern democracy arose first in the cities and towns, but it is likewise true that at that time the cities and towns were the homes of self-employed men. Before the rise of the factory system such manufacturing as was done was carried on in small shops by craftsmen who were in the majority of cases self-employed. The rural districts, however, were under the feudal system. Conditions are exactly reversed at the present time. Under the factory system the great majority of people in the indoor industries work under bosses. Since the break-up of the feudal system and the rise of the one-family farm, which is the characteristic farm in this country, the average dweller in the country is his own boss." [3]

In these modern times the individual employee in the city may indeed ordinarily be free with respect to his religious beliefs and habits. But it will be urged that he is not free to join himself to or to participate in any organization

or movement, or to champion any cause that may jeopardize the material interests of those who hold his fate and that of those who are dependent upon him so securely in their hands. The threat, open or covert, to shut down the plant and thus to throw the employees out of work in case of the election of a certain candidate for office, contributes effectively toward depriving the urban laborer of the privilege of a free ballot and toward enabling a few employers to decide the issues whose decision or determination rests theoretically upon the entire electorate. Even the personal habits and life of the employee are sometimes subject to oversight or regulation outside of the hours of employment, by employers; and those who are especially active in labor-union affairs are often kept under constant surveillance by hired agents of the employing interests. The black-list is utilized against the employee who is inclined to insist upon his rights or who dares to make an effort to arouse his fellows to an active interest in the conditions that surround their employment; the lock-out is applied against the workers as a group if they attempt to act together; the courts are invoked against those who attempt over-zealously to persuade other workers from taking the place of those on strike or of those toward whom the lock-out has been directed; and the military is called in at the slightest indication of violence.

"Laborers are numerous and employers are few." And generally speaking "in the history of the greater part of the world, conditions have been such that laborers rather than employers have been at a disadvantage in bargaining." [4] In case of concerted cessation from work, the workers, since labor is perishable, are unable to make good at another time the loss of today's employment; and in any case, because of the lack of the means to maintain themselves for any considerable length of time as against the much greater resources of the employer, they are forced to yield eventually to the terms laid down by him to them.

Under such circumstances is it not clear that the workers in the urban industries can not be free?

A hundred years ago, when the question of the extension of suffrage to a manhood basis was a moot issue in this country and the struggle was at its height, it was predicted by some of the ablest men of the day, delegates to the State constitutional conventions where this issue was being fought out, that the industrial employees in the coming centers of population would not be free to use the ballot in accordance with the dictates of good citizenship, but that, "absolutely dependent upon their employers," they would be "dead votes, counted by the head," by these employers.[5] Chancellor James Kent, renowned author in after years of *Commentaries on American Law,* as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention in New York State in 1821 pointed out that New York was destined to become a great manufacturing, as well as commercial, State and urged that "The men of no property, together with the crowds of dependents connected with great manufacturing and commercial establishments, and the motley and undefinable population of crowded ports, may, perhaps, at some future day, under skilful management, predominate in the assembly. . . ." He declared that there was a tendency in *"ambitious and wicked men, to inflame these combustible materials";* and he urged that "one master capitalist with his 100 apprentices, and journeymen, and agents, and dependents" would "bear down at the polls an equal number of small estates in his vicinity, who can not safely unite for their common defense."[6]

Though the concern expressed here was mainly for the interests of the agricultural class and for the welfare of the State in general, it can not escape attention that the coming industrial class itself was assumed to be destined to exist without the means to insure its own freedom. Anticipated to be essentially subservient itself, it was expected to become the instrument of slavery with respect to others.

On the other hand, as by very many at present, the rural or agricultural elements of the population were regarded as essentially independent and unafraid, secure in the ownership and possession of their own land, owing fealty to no one, able to maintain their own position, economically and politically, and possessing neither the inclination nor the means to threaten the rights or liberties of others.[7] Though it is admitted that farmers are dependent to a much greater extent than the members of any other class upon the natural facts of the physical world, it is held that even today, when farming is no longer a self-sufficing pursuit, the former are comparatively independent of "conditions existing in the world of men."[8]

When the matter at issue is put as it has been put above and illustrated from the case of our own country, the claim that human liberty is favored by the conditions of rural life and jeopardized by the conditions that prevail in the urban centers makes a strong appeal. It can not be denied that the members of the agricultural class in this country have enjoyed from the first, always with the very important exception of the slaves, and to a smaller extent the indentured servants of the early colonial period and the freedmen of today, a large degree of economic freedom and have thus been able to make good their claim, on the whole, to the rights of free men. No more, it might seem, have they been able to threaten the liberties of others. As has been said of sea-power in the world of international relations, so it perhaps might be said of the rural status that it is strong for defense alone. Able to preserve its own liberties, it is powerless to threaten the liberties of others.

Even with respect to that most defenseless of all rural classes, the class of agricultural laborers, it would be difficult to imagine, for this country, for the most part, anything of dependence or of servility. In the main, the condition set forth with reference to the agricultural worker by Peter R. Living-

ston, gentleman farmer and landlord on a large scale, in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1821, still prevails with us today: "It is not the fact, in this country, that money controls labour; but labour controls money. When the farmer cradles his wheat and harvests his hay, he does not find the labourer on his knees before him at the close of the day, solicitous for further employment; but it is the farmer who takes off his hat, pays him his wages, and requests his return on the morrow." [9]

With a change of one hundred years in the date and with due regard to the development in farm machinery within the past century, Livingston's description would quite exactly express the situation with reference to which the average farm employer finds himself in respect to his hired labor, in a very considerable part of this country today. For it is a very frequent complaint of the farm employer, north of the Ohio and Missouri rivers and east of the Rocky Mountains at least, that one must be exceedingly deferential and tactful in his treatment of the farm laborer lest the latter take umbrage and leave his job forthwith. On the other hand, there undeniably have been times when the wage-earner in the city, and even the salaried man, has gone with his hat in his hand to the employer—perhaps to a succession of employers—and has asked as a privilege for the opportunity of earning his daily bread.

Yet, upon close examination, the case will be seen to be materially less conclusive, for the rural community, than at first appears. We are not privileged in this connection to forget the long persistence of human slavery in an important rural section of this country. Nor would it be seriously contended that the freedmen in this country enjoy any very considerable measure of economic freedom in the great rural areas where they are for the most part concentrated today. "Peonage" is not unknown today in the rural South; [10] and whether laborer, cropper, or bona fide tenant, the southern

Negro in the rural districts is very far from being his own master, either in the economic, in the civil, or in the political sphere. The claim may be advanced that the Negro with his mule and plow on his little farm in the South is more his own master than he can possibly be in the city. But this is very doubtful. In the city, North and South, the Negroes are discriminated against in many ways. They are excluded from the best opportunities and are forced into lines of work that are ill-paid and that are attended by bad conditions of employment in general. But that conditions are nevertheless more tolerable for the Negroes in the cities, at least in the Northern cities, than in the rural South, is abundantly proven by the tremendous movement of this element of our population from the latter section to the Northern cities in recent years.

On the little cotton farm the Negro is not often an independent proprietor. He is very frequently not even a bona fide farm tenant. More usually he is a cropper or possesses a status otherwise that differs but little from that of a hired laborer. Usually he is largely dependent upon the white landlord or plantation owner for supplies, or for the backing which enables him to secure these while his crop is being raised. Consequently he is ordinarily under almost as close supervision as if he were in name, as he is in effect, merely an agricultural laborer;[11] and after his crop is raised he is often not free to dispose of it as he would nor is he free to plan his operations as he might wish for the next year. In fact, the Negro cropper not infrequently has less independence than the out-and-out agricultural laborer of his own race, since it is less easy for him to "pick up and go" on short notice if conditions do not please him.[12] And if he should attempt to improve his condition and status within the rural sphere, he would find but a limited field of choice in an environment where the whole economic and social organization is cast, for him, into pretty much the same mold everywhere.

If slavery is dead in this country, the shadow of slavery still remains—not merely, though more especially, in the great rural areas where it took root and where it had large development, but in the urban centers in the South and in both country and city elsewhere, where it has been projected from its native rural habitat.

In earlier days the economic independence possessed and displayed by the white agricultural laborers in this country was doubtless due in large measure to the opportunity afforded to take up land and become independent cultivators on their own behalf. Yet now that the supply of free land is practically exhausted in this country it does not appear that the white agricultural laborer has lost any of his independent status. Indeed, there is reason for supposing that, on the whole, that status is stronger than ever before. But the strength of his position today does not rest substantially and ultimately upon the competition among farm employers for his services. It is based, rather, upon the competition of the city industries with each other and with the farm employers for the services of the potential farm laborer. Had there not been this extremely expansive opportunity for employment in the city industries [13] as the free land was taken up, it is a foregone conclusion that there would have been in this country a large dependent rural class which would have had a status that lacked substantial economic strength. Instead of urbanization contributing to weaken the economic status of the propertyless population, there is, then, a very important sense in which it has served to maintain and strengthen that status. For the cities have contributed materially to improve the position of the rural dependent classes—or even entirely to eliminate them—by affording these classes alternative profitable employment in the urban industries, where the opportunity to join with their fellows undoubtedly secures to them a stronger economic status than they would have enjoyed as individual laborers or tenants in a maturely devel-

oped rural economy in a non-urbanized country. Not only in this country but in other countries as well is the tremendous effectiveness of this influence written large in the historical relations between the farm employer and the dependent rural classes in the last century.

In spite of the conditions that make strongly for the manifest independence of the farm laborer in many parts of this country, there are serious elements of weakness in his position if he remains a farm employee. For one thing, he very commonly can obtain employment on the farm for but a portion of the year and at the close of the busy season he is under the necessity of offering his services in some other labor market—something that must very frequently be done under disadvantageous conditions. Again, he very usually must accept lower wages and longer hours of work on the farm than prevail in the majority of urban industries, because of the inability of the average farm employer to offer better terms. He thus shares in serious elements of weakness in the economic position of the farm employer himself—elements of weakness to which attention will presently be called. Further, scarcity of free land and markedly increased land values make it far less easy than formerly for him to attain in time to the relative independence of a farm owner; and the position of a farm tenant frequently involves serious limitations upon his economic freedom.

The feature of "social ostracism" or of "social inferiority," which very commonly attaches to the position of the hired farm worker in comparison with that of the hired city worker, is an evidence of economic weakness on the part of the former. In part this feature is associated with that close personal relation that the farm laborer often holds to his employer—a relation that has often been emphasized, and rightly, as having its advantages but which also has serious drawbacks. In much larger part, however, this position of recognized inferiority on the part of the rural hired worker

is to be ascribed to absence of that association with fellow workers which is so marked a feature among the urban workers and which gives the individual member prestige and standing in that he is one among a number of equals and that he has back of him an organization that is able to deal with the employer on his behalf on something like even terms.

All these unfavorable features in respect to the position and status of the farm laborer acquire importance in the proportion that employment is discontinuous and limited in duration at any one point, or is lacking competitively in adjacent city industries, and in the proportion that the workers are ignorant, possessed of slender financial resources, or suffer under other serious disadvantages. That these especially unfavorable conditions for the hired rural workers prevail in much larger measure in this country than we are usually accustomed to recognize is shown by the fact that the I. W. W. movement is largely a movement having its origin and development among rural workers and its basis in just such conditions of rural employment. These unfavorable conditions are present in appreciable degree in the wheat fields of the Southwest and Central West during the harvest season. But they are much more in evidence in the sugar-beet fields and in the orchards and vineyards of the Pacific and Mountain States, and in the lumber and mining districts of the same general regions. Here, even in the open country, in purely agricultural or horticultural areas, conditions of employment that could scarcely be equalled under the worst urban surroundings have prevailed and have led to riot, bloodshed, and loss of life.[14]

A few years ago the Commission on Land Colonization and Rural Credits of the State of California, premising that the farm laborer should have a "definite and self-respecting position" and that it ought to be possible for him to marry, have a comfortable home for his family, and bring up his children as self-respecting members of the community, as-

serted that this was not then "even remotely possible." The existing conditions attending the farm laborer in California, as disclosed by the investigations of the State Immigration and Housing Commission, were declared to be a menace. With the group in general largely and increasingly alien, sixty per cent migratory, working days of from ten to sixteen hours, and poorly lodged or not housed at all, the degeneration of the white laborers into mere vagrants under these conditions was declared to be inevitable.[15] And without doubt, careful investigation would reveal equally bad conditions in other States.

But other important qualifications than those relating to unfavorable conditions, past and present, among the Negroes in the South and those relating to the status of hired farm workers, must be applied to the assumption that the agricultural population in this country has always represented an independent and self-employed class. For though farm tenancy is by no means so objectionable, under favorable conditions, as is very often assumed, it must be admitted that wherever it replaces operating ownership economic independence is, to a certain extent, diminished. As an alternative to the position of farm laborer that of the farm tenant is, of course, ordinarily preferable. Under the most favorable conditions, those that attend the cash tenant, the status of the farm tenant may be little inferior to that of the owning operator. Under the most unfavorable circumstances, those that attend the cropper, the status of tenancy may be even less satisfactory than that of the bona fide farm laborer. Between these extremes the range of economic dependence or independence varies widely according to the character of the particular system of tenancy prevailing, according to the resources and character of the tenants themselves, and according to the degree of success with which public authority has intervened.

Of much significance, therefore, in connection with this phase of the subject is the rapid increase in farm tenancy in

this favored land of ours. Taking the country as a whole, the census of 1920 shows that approximately two farms out of every five are operated by tenants. And in certain sections of the country the percentage of tenancy runs as high as two-thirds to three-fourths of all farms. It is not necessary to assent to the extreme alarmist views with respect to the marked increase in tenancy in this country in order to recognize that a development such as this renders it essential materially to discount the ordinary assumption of the agricultural population in this country as a great body of independent proprietors. It may be, and should be, granted that a system of farm tenancy such as prevails in this country, with widely distributed ownership of many relatively small or medium-sized farms, is much to be preferred, from the point of view of the degree of economic independence that it affords, to a system of operating ownership of a relatively few large estates cultivated by means of great numbers of hired laborers. Yet, on the other hand, we must admit that conditions in this country have changed widely from the status of independent ownership that, except for a few districts in New York and elsewhere, prevailed almost universally over the country in early days. That this change has been associated with a certain decline in economic freedom among the farm operators admits of scarcely a doubt.

In view of the extent to which many of the farm owners were involved in earlier days, through the borrowing of funds up to a large proportion of the total value of their holdings on rather onerous terms, and in view of the unfavorable markets and of the low prices that often prevailed for their products, it is easily possible to overestimate the degree of economic independence attained by them. Yet they were, in the main, owners and not subject to notice to vacate their holdings at the expiration of a lease, with the loss of the advantage of the improvements which they had made, or with the alternative of paying a higher rent if they remained. If

they wished better schools for their children or improvements of other kinds at public charge they were free, without restraint, to vote the levies necessary to accomplish these objects. They grew such crops as they chose and marketed them when and where they pleased. They raised or kept live stock of such kind and in such numbers as they saw fit and made such disposition of these as they deemed best. They made improvements, or not, as they wished; and the results of the sacrifices that they underwent inured to the advantage of their own children, if not to that of themselves directly, instead of to that of the sons and daughters of others.

Moreover, farm tenancy in this country, as everywhere, is unfavorable to coöperation or association among farm operators; and the characteristic weakness of the business of farming on the market side is thus decidedly emphasized where tenancy largely prevails.

A few years ago in this country, quite outside the areas of Negro tenancy, we heard and read of many tenants competing for the possession of a single farm, of the payment of greatly increased rents, or of "bonuses" in addition to the cash rents or division shares previously exacted, of the refusal of landlords to make improvements or to assist in the purchase of fertilizers, of evictions and of the asserted confiscation of the property of tenants by large-holding landlords, alien or native, of the use of force to intimidate renters, of arbitrary control with reference to the choice of crops, of efforts on the part of landlords to control elections where land taxes or other matters of special interest to owners were involved, of discrimination against tenants on personal or political grounds, and of the existence of conditions of life in general, among the tenant population in considerable areas, that were emphatically inconsistent with the reasonable assumptions of a sound American citizenship.[16] Even Professor Carver, who already has been quoted relative to the asserted superior degree of economic freedom prevailing in the rural

community, has said: "I know of no earthly power that can preserve a country from ruin and decay if absentee landlordism prevails." [17] And though we have as yet, perhaps, a minor proportion of real absentee landlordism in this country, another of our prominent educators has characterized the American system of farm tenancy as the worst of which he has knowledge in any country.[18]

If it is necessary materially to discount the assumption of the agricultural population in this country as an independent and self-employed element, it is much more necessary to make such qualifications in case of the rural populations of the Old World. It has been comparatively but a brief time since the masses of the agricultural population of Russia were released from a condition of serfdom. And just as the very substantial shadow of slavery continues in this country in the rural South nearly three-quarters of a century after emancipation, so in Russia the formal abolition of serfdom at about the same time, though bringing of course an "immense benefit," has been very far from placing the rural masses of that country in a condition of substantial economic freedom. Due to the inadequate allotments, the peasants have been under the necessity of renting additional land from the proprietors at excessive rents or of wandering through the country, and even of migrating into Galicia and East Prussia by the hundreds of thousands, in order to secure the employment necessary to enable them to eke out a hard existence; and even less tolerable, if possible, is the condition and status of the great number of hired agricultural laborers who constitute the mass of the rural population in certain districts of Russia.

A recent writer, who quotes another authority to the effect that there were, in the year 1909, seven million workers in rural Russia who were idle a good portion of the year and who yet had seventeen million souls dependent upon their labor, repeatedly points out the marked weakness that nor-

mally characterizes the economic status of the rural masses of that country; and he finds in the limited extent of the urban development of Russia a chief cause of the unfortunate conditions under which her rural population lives.[19]

The dependent and servile condition of the class of agricultural laborers in many parts of the former German Empire—especially in Pomerania, Mecklenburg, Silesia, and East and West Prussia—and in Old Austria is well recognized. And a studied and persistent attempt was long made in Germany to render as precarious as possible the economic and political status of the incoming seasonal rural workers from Russian Poland and from other parts of Russia. Dissatisfaction with their lot has led to the migration of large numbers of agricultural laborers from the rural districts in both Germany and France; and though more has been accomplished in these two countries than in England in the direction of converting agricultural laborers into small holders, in the main it has been through migration to the urban centers that these laborers have released themselves from the limitations and the low status that they formerly suffered in the rural environment.[20]

The condition of the agricultural laborers of Italy, who constitute nearly one-third of the total population and forty per cent of the agricultural population, has been described as being, in general, "hard and in places absolutely miserable." Another forty per cent of the agricultural population of Italy is made up of tenants, whose economic status leaves very much to be desired and whose relations to the owners still partake much of the character of feudal times.[21] Here again an inferior status has led to migration of the rural workers to the towns and to their emigration, in large numbers, to the Americas and elsewhere. Moreover, in kindred Roumania, as late as the close of the recent World War less than one per cent of the heads of families owned more than one-half of all the land—with the result that the remaining

more than ninety-nine per cent, with their dependents, sustained a relationship of near-slavery to the former.[22]

In Belgium, more than one-third of all persons engaged in agriculture consist of hired laborers; and though there is an appreciable movement of this class into that of the so-called independent farmers through the use of plots of land which they cultivate for themselves, it is nevertheless admitted that their lot in the meanwhile is "not an enviable one."[23] Numbers find their way to the cities, for daily employment if not for definite residence; and, as elsewhere, there appears to be little doubt that they thus materially improve their economic status.[24] Moreover, three-fourths of the small holders of Belgium are tenants and two-thirds of the cultivable land is under tenant cultivation; and the proportion of tenancy has increased for all classes of holders since the middle of the last century. Again, there is much evidence of concentration in the ownership of land, as sixty-two per cent of the land is owned by two and a half per cent of the owners and four-fifths of the owners have less than five acres each. It is a question, therefore, if any considerable proportion of the self-employed members, even, of the agricultural class in Belgium are in a position of particular economic strength or enjoy any great measure of economic independence.

Moreover, it is admitted by a friendly critic that the Belgian farm tenant has very limited freedom to differ from his landlord in political and religious matters, and that, whether from choice or from constraint, he seldom opposes the latter's views along these lines.[25]

Even among the justly celebrated coöperating small holders of Denmark economically ideal conditions do not prevail. For, according to an estimate of a few years since, the properties of these peasant proprietors are mortgaged to an amount exceeding half their value;[26] and it is the testimony of one

of these small holders that while about one-half succeeded, one-third "just lived," and the remainder failed.[27]

Of the approximately 900,000 persons engaged in agriculture in England and Wales at the present time nearly three-fourths are agricultural laborers; and about ninety per cent of the farm operators are tenants. Thus only about three per cent of the total agricultural population of these two countries enjoy that superior economic status that is ordinarily associated with the ownership of land.

Without doubt the agricultural laborer in Britain reflects the most dependent economic and social status of any great class in the United Kingdom.[28] He often lives in a "tied" or attached cottage, and is thus likely to be evicted from his home in case he offends. He has small opportunity for alternative employment in a community where there is usually but a single employer, or, at best, a very few and these indisposed to compete strongly against each other for his services. Usually he is without any appreciable financial reserve. Indeed, he is much more likely to be in debt, because of an inadequate wage and the necessity of supporting a large family; and he has perhaps an even chance of ending his days in the parish poor infirmary. Ordinarily he has been without a supporting organization and has thus been obliged to bargain individually with his employer. Less has been attempted on his behalf by public authority than on behalf of the urban workers; and that little is likely to miscarry because the machinery of local government is very largely in the hands of those against whom the action on his behalf may have been initiated. Without education, relatively speaking, and with little knowledge of the opportunities that may be open elsewhere in agriculture; with no real root in the land of which he is so useful an appendage; and with small opportunity to reach out after something better and higher in his native habitat, it is small wonder that his condition

has so often been described by the word "hopeless" and that the younger generation, at least, so frequently turn their feet abroad or toward the urban centers.

Judged by various accepted tests, it would appear that England has, on the whole, perhaps the most satisfactory system of farm tenancy of any country. Yet it does not appear, from moderate opinion, that reasonable security of tenure has yet been guaranteed; and it is quite generally admitted that much is yet to be done in order to secure to the tenant, at removal, adequate compensation for the improvements that he has created. At the will or caprice of the owner, or through his decease, the tenant in England may still face the alternative of giving up his holding or of paying the higher rent that the improvements which he himself has made justify economically if not ethically. Or the tenant may be forced into the position of purchasing the holding on terms that make financial success or economic independence extremely problematical.[29]

According to the view of less friendly critics, the system of farm tenancy in England is to be charged with not only these faults in exaggerated degree but also with permitting other injustices and exactions of a gross character. Moreover, as in Belgium, there is substantial evidence of restraint exercised by landlords with respect to the political, if not the religious, convictions of their tenants.[30]

Mr. David Lloyd George, in discussing, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, the taxation of land in his famous budget speech of April 29, 1909, compared urban and rural landlordism and admitted that many of the conditions in the agreement for agricultural tenancy were "oppressive, irritating, and stupid." But in comparison with "the conditions imposed upon either a colliery owner or upon a town lessee" he characterized those obtaining in agricultural tenancy as "the very climax of generosity." It may be admitted, indeed, that the urban landlord probably succeeds better than the rural

landlord in appropriating the economic rent that his property produces. But the strength of the economic position that a tenant is able to achieve and maintain depends much less upon what he yields up than upon what he is able to retain; and as very many of the urban tenants of business sites are men, or business corporations, of large and even immense capital and as the sites which they lease very frequently afford a decidedly favorable opportunity for the exercise of superior business ability and for the rapid accumulation of large wealth, it is extremely doubtful whether the conditions imposed upon the urban tenant impinge upon economic freedom to as great an extent as those to which the average farm tenant must yield. Moreover, leases on urban tenancies usually run for long terms and the tenant is given comparatively a free hand in the utilization of his leasehold—a reminder that absentee landlordism may not be without its advantages. Relatively great security of tenure is thus afforded, and the lessee is comparatively free from interference during the life of his lease.

Lastly, the economic status of the bona fide proprietors of the soil, who are found to comprise a much narrower proportion of the rural population than is often assumed, is by no means so strong and assured as generally supposed. The inability to organize effectively in the rural community and the disadvantage at which this circumstance places the rural hired worker have already been noted. The same disadvantage attaches to the farm tenant in relation to the landlord, and for the same reasons. Very little progress in the direction of association for mutual protection and for the protection of mutual interests in general has been made anywhere by farm tenants. Finally, the relative inability of farm operators as a whole, owners or tenants, to associate themselves effectively with reference to their business relations with the city interests commonly reduces the former to a status of comparative weakness in their dealings with the latter.

The unorganized, or ineffectively organized, rural community deals on disadvantageous terms with the strong and closely organized urban community. Even the hired farm laborer, as already intimated, shares in the consequences of this weakness; while the city workers, on the other hand, through the effectiveness of their labor union organizations share with the urban business interests in this advantage over the rural community and reap material benefits from this condition of affairs—a fact of which both they themselves and the farm operators are quite keenly aware.[31]

This superior opportunity that the urban population enjoys in combining forces and thus dominating the unorganized rural interests with reference to the business relations between the two classes was long since noted, and remarked at length, by Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations*.[32] Professor Carver admits that the farmer himself does not always agree with the frequently expressed view that he is "the most independent person in the world."[33] At best the farmer is much at the mercy of the natural forces. Drouth and frost and cold and heat and excess moisture and flood constantly threaten his economic status. Nor is this all. For a too favorable season, with resulting overproduction of commodities for which there is, in general, an inelastic demand, is almost more serious than short crops—a fact of which we have had in recent years a striking illustration. For record, or near-record, yields of nearly all of the important crops in this country for the year 1920 undoubtedly constituted, through the subsequent excessive decline in the price of farm products, a fundamentally important factor in bringing great numbers of farmers in widely extended regions and in far separated areas to a condition of extreme financial distress, and even to bankruptcy and financial ruin.[34] Within the course of a few months the agricultural interests of the nation had suffered a financial loss that has been variously estimated between $5,000,000,000 and $7,000,000,000—or a

reduction in purchasing power amounting to from thirty-five to fifty per cent.[35]

From the wheat districts of the West and Northwest, from the corn belt, from the cotton producing sections of the South and Southwest, from the vegetable and fruit and seed growers of the Mountain and Pacific Coast regions, and even from the stockmen and wool growers, came the cry of distress and the cry for relief. To a louder chorus than ever rose the familiar and oft-repeated complaint, by the agriculturists, of gambling in farm products, of concerted conspiracy to depress the price of their commodities, of manipulated credit deflation, of excessive transportation charges, of excessive margins collected by the middlemen dealers who distribute the farmers' crops and live stock products, of excessive prices charged them for what they are under the necessity of buying, and of excessively high wages and unreasonably short hours of the "labor profiteers" in the urban centers. With the appeal for credit to enable him to hold his products for better prices and for the immediate closing of our markets to foreign agricultural products, the farmer emphatically coupled exhortation to the individuals of his own group to join hands everywhere in a series of organizations that would enable them to fight their battles and to obtain "economic justice."

Underneath the whole situation the farmer thus senses the fundamental economic weakness of his position—that as a result of his unorganized, or ineffectively organized, condition he very frequently has a determining voice neither in respect to what he has to sell nor in respect to what he must buy. And though there is perhaps no other complaint that the farmer is so much disposed to make in comparing his own condition with that attending other classes, most people in premising the independent character of farm life forget, or ignore, the market side of agriculture.

Admittedly, since he could at least provide in no small degree for his own subsistence by the production of foodstuffs,

and perhaps supply the materials for clothing and shelter, from his own land, the individual farm operator could not be reduced, in earlier days, to so dependent a status as the propertyless and unemployed urban worker. But as time went on and there developed a constantly increasing tendency toward dependence upon the market, both in selling and in buying, this condition of forced self-dependence proved less and less satisfactory as a substitute for real economic independence, and is acknowledged by no one as such today. For the system of money economy has displaced the system of natural economy, and economic independence no longer consists in being assured of the bare necessities of life. Payment of taxes is no longer received in produce. The money lender insists upon the payment of interest on the mortgage in legal tender or its equivalent. The minister is not satisfied to accept his salary in the form of a donation of foodstuffs. The hired farm laborer insists upon payment in cash. And the farmer himself interprets the moneyless status as one of subservience and degradation.

It makes no great difference, as affecting economic status in principle, whether the individual offers his labor for employment in an overstocked or well-controlled labor market, or whether he offers the results of his labor in an overstocked commodity market.[36] And if it has not infrequently been the misfortune of the urban worker to suffer the former experience, it has probably been the lot of the farm producer, in this country, quite as frequently to have the latter experience. For in addition to the drawbacks already alluded to, or perhaps as emphasizing those drawbacks, the existence of a vast area of practically free land of great fertility which was rendered especially easy of access through a favoring land policy, has resulted in an almost continuous tendency toward overproduction of agricultural products and in consequent excessive competition among farm producers. Appearing, therefore, to enjoy a status of substantial economic strength and

freedom through their ownership of the means of agricultural production, the agricultural interests have in reality not infrequently enjoyed but the shadow while the substance largely escaped them. Though sometimes they have misjudged the cause of their unfavorable situation and not less often, perhaps, have mistaken the character of the remedies which they proposed, the recognition of the fact of their unsatisfactory status at least has been clear—a conclusion to whose accuracy the frequent discontent of the agricultural class in our history abundantly testifies.

In an old and well-developed country, where the land has long been completely occupied and where there is a strong demand for agricultural products and a minimum of competition among the agricultural producers, landowners are very likely to be in a position to much more than maintain their own economic status. This is especially likely to be the case, of course, if the importation of farm products from the outside world can be prevented. Under such circumstances a system of concentrated holding of land and of landlordism and tenancy is very likely to develop. In such a case the most fundamental of all the natural resources, the most vitally important of all the means of production, is subject to control by a relatively small number of persons who are in a position to threaten the economic freedom. and thus the freedom in general, of others.

Partly through the operation of the Corn Laws, which seriously restricted the importation of grain, and partly as a result of the "natural protection" that the inadequate facilities for ocean and land transportation at that period afforded, the English landlords and large farmers of the three-quarters of a century following the publication of the *Wealth of Nations* enjoyed such a dominating economic and political status. But the great majority of the rural population of England did not participate in this dominating status. The small-holding owners and tenants, and especially the great number

of agricultural laborers, were reduced to such a condition of misery and subserviency as has been equalled in no other period in the history of that country subsequent to the breakdown of the feudal system and the disappearance of serfdom.[37]

As a matter of fact, the urban population suffered less from the predominating control exercised by the small group of landlords and large farmers than did the agricultural laborers and small farmers. There is no doubt that the workers in the factories, for a time denied the advantages of organization among themselves and with a mimimum of intervention on their behalf by public authority, fared ill enough. But it seems clear that, even so, they enjoyed an economic status more tolerable than that possessed by the agricultural laborers—a conclusion that is not only supported by a comparison of the conditions actually prevailing among the two classes but that is also rendered strongly probable by the fact that the movement of population was away from the land and into the growing cities.

In time, too, the growing urban population, after first having forced political reforms and wrested political control from the hands of the landed elements who had formerly largely monopolized it, struck a telling blow at the privileged economic position of the latter by forcing the abrogation of the Corn Laws and opening up British markets to foreign grain. Moreover, it was the distress of the inhabitants of rural Ireland and of the agricultural laboring population in England, rather than of the urban workers, that became the immediate occasion, in 1846, for the repeal of the Corn Laws.

With the improvements in transportation that have from time to time been introduced, this policy of free imports, though not without benefit to the farmers and landowners themselves, has functioned more and more effectively to restrain any tendency on the part of the latter to regain their former privileged position. Indeed, the position of the landed

classes in England today, so potent in enabling them to dominate the dependent rural classes, is wholly impotent to impose a similar constraint upon the urban population. For the latter are practically independent of the former for their supply of food and wholly so with regard to employment. And so unsatisfactory is the status of the landowner in England today as a purely economic feature that only the large possession of wealth gained from other sources, or perpetuated through employment in more prosperous lines, has enabled the landowning class to sustain itself in its agricultural enterprises. For years it has been recognized that the ownership of land in England has not rested on a real commercial basis—a fact that has contributed materially to weaken the economic status of all the rural classes, including the owners themselves. Here in England, at least, instead of the position of the landowner being strong as to the defensive and weak on the offensive, it is rather strong in the latter respect with reference to the dependent rural classes and weak on the defensive with respect to the non-agricultural interests.

In spite of the apparent strength of the economic status attaching to the self-employment feature in agriculture, it is thus extremely doubtful, for the various reasons to which attention has been directed, whether the economic status of the rural population as a whole, and considering the various important countries of the present, is one whit superior to that enjoyed by the urban population in general. One could doubtless come to diametrically opposite conclusions as to this point by fixing his whole attention upon a part of the urban population or upon a part of the rural population, or by drawing his conclusions from the conditions that exist in a single country and disregarding those that prevail in other important countries.

Particularly is there danger of overlooking the very decided advantage that superior opportunity for association and organization affords to all classes of the urban popula-

tion. If the individual wage earner were under the necessity of facing single-handed the concentrated wealth and power of the employing interests he could scarcely enjoy a very strong economic status, even with considerable interference on his behalf by governmental authority and admitting the more tolerable conditions afforded many workers through direct employment by the government. So insignificant would be his individual bargaining power that he could frequently make no terms relative to his employment but would be compelled to submit to whatever conditions might be offered to him. At the worst, the employment that meant everything to *him* might be a matter of almost complete indifference to the *employer;* at best, the competition of employers for his services might strengthen his economic position very materially at times.

The situation is very different, however, where the urban workers have been able, as they have been in so many instances, to organize and to substitute their tremendously great united strength for the puny weakness of the individual worker. In this way the whole economic and social position of the urban worker has been enormously strengthened. Quite dispensable as individuals to the employer, the members of the labor union are quite indispensable to him as a group. As thus united, they fairly match, and not infrequently exceed, the latter in strength. The lock-out and the black-list they match with the strike and the boycott; and over against the injunction and the appeal to the public authorities for protection in case of attempted violence the workers set the strong voting power and the active public sympathy that their large numbers insure. As an offset to the great resources of the employing interests they present the possession of the similarly great financial resources that their organization has been able to accumulate and that in case of a protracted struggle take the highly practical form of the strike benefit. In the ability and skill of their leaders they not infrequently

rival the employing interests; and in unity of spirit and in willingness to undergo sacrifice to achieve the common end they very commonly exceed the latter.

The assumption that in the struggle between the employing and the employed interests the latter are practically helpless in comparison with the former is thus an untenable one in case the workers are organized. The loss of wages to the latter is no more certain in case of a strike than are the losses that the former must undergo; and in very many cases the losses to the former are equally serious. Interest and other fixed charges continue whether the plant is operated or not. Inability to make deliveries jeopardizes the possession of valuable markets. The event of the strike often brings a threat of serious property loss through violence or in other ways; and large sums must be expended for the services of extra watchmen and of others whose employment is made advisable by the conditions that the strike brings. Finally, there is the ever present possibility that the strike may be lost in any event by the employer, since a very considerable proportion of all strikes are successful. The sums that grafting union officials are frequently able to extort from employers under threat of calling a strike afford eloquent testimony to the fact that the employer very often feels anything but certain that he will not come off second best in a contest with union labor and to the further fact that the risk of loss is hardly less serious to the former than to the latter during the continuance of the strike.

Much that is true is said in a critical way of the "soulless corporation" and of the absence of the "personal touch" in connection with employment in cities. But there is need of qualification. The corporation is, on the whole, a democratic and not an autocratic form of business organization. For a corporation not only represents the association of a number of different persons instead of the will of a single individual but is also a creature of the state and thus subject to a degree

of control much beyond that to which the individual employer is ordinarily subjected. It thus happens that there is very often more protection against arbitrary action in the treatment of employees in the city industries and a more careful maintenance of their rights than is the case with respect to the dependent classes in the rural districts. Wages, hours of work, sanitary conditions, and other conditions surrounding employment in the city industries, are either regulated by law or are affected indirectly by public authority in their determination. This is especially true in the case of the public utilities, which provide so considerable a proportion of the employment in the cities.

Moreover, the government itself, in its various branches, has become a very important employer of labor; and by far the greater proportion of these public employees are to be found in the urban centers, where, so far from being subjected to arbitrary control and reduced to a hazardous economic status, they often enjoy a privileged position under a benignant rule that carefully considers their rights and general welfare, and even their vested interests. Even on the part of a great many private corporations today there has come to be manifested, either perforce or as a result of a more intelligent appreciation of the importance of the personal factor in employment, a largely increased and comparatively adequate consideration of the reasonable rights and interests of their employees and a desire to encourage the development of character, of personality, and of an improved economic status, on their part. Particularly important, in this connection, is the attempt by many urban employers, corporate or individual, to encourage thrift—that first step toward a more independent economic status—on the part of their employees.

Our conclusion must be, then, that the view that conditions have been reversed from those that prevailed in earlier times—that a condition of relative economic dependence has replaced one of essential economic independence in the cities

and that a change of an exactly opposite character has occurred in the rural community—is not sustained by the facts. It seems probable that pessimistic views as to the conditions that prevail in this connection in the cities today see these present urban conditions in unreal contrast with supposedly ideal urban conditions in those earlier times. That the city dwellers of that day enjoyed, on the whole, a superior degree of economic and political freedom, as compared with the rural population, seems clear. But it is wrong to suppose that all the various classes in the cities enjoyed an equally satisfactory status or that there were not marked differences of status among the various urban elements at this time. Indeed, so impressed with this fact has been one authoritative writer, already quoted,[38] that he has concluded that cities in all times represent an "almost universal tendency toward the subjection of the vast majority of the urban population to the control of the more important and powerful economic classes in the municipal society." But if we accept the conclusions of this writer as valid for our cities of today we must also accept them as equally valid for the cities of earlier times; and this latter conclusion is directly at variance with the vast majority of informed opinion and at variance, as we shall see, with the facts upon which an informed opinion must be based.

It obviously would be wrong, however, to pass to the opposite extreme and to regard the rural status in general as essentially and necessarily weak from the economic point of view. In this status there are strong as well as weak elements; and in such a country as our own the rural economic status probably averages up well, on the whole, with that of the urban population. In England the urban status clearly excels. In Germany a slight advantage may attach to the rural status, though it is not yet clear as to how the changed conditions brought about by the Great War may have affected the situation there. In France the relative economic status

of the two classes appears to be, on the whole, quite similar to that which exists in our own country; while in Russia and in Italy the rural status appears to be inferior.

Much depends, of course, on future developments, as the newer agricultural countries like the United States and Canada tend to lose their earlier characteristic of a rural population consisting largely of the families of independent, but non-associating, proprietors on a small or moderate scale. If such a system as to tenure and scale of ownership should on the whole continue to prevail in these countries, but with the very important added feature of coöperative organization, there would be good reason for believing that the reasonable economic freedom of the rural population as a whole would be assured. If, on the other hand, there should be a considerable development of a system of large landed estates in these newer countries, with or without a system of tenant operation and requiring the employment of a large amount of hired agricultural labor, and with the cities having reached the saturation point and affording little further means of escape from the country, the economic status of the great mass of the rural population might be seriously compromised in these hitherto fortunate countries. In case of unfavorable rural developments such as these, the cities might again become, what they admittedly were in earlier times, the undoubted and almost exclusive haven for the oppressed and the preeminent sphere for the promotion of human freedom, civil, religious, economic, and political.

Much depends, in turn, upon future developments in the cities. The opportunity for economic coöperation is by no means lacking to the city workers; and the realization of such a program might be expected to do much to strengthen the position of the urban industrial elements. Moreover, there has already been appreciable progress in the direction of democratizing the modern industrial organization; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that still greater results may be

achieved along this line. Lastly, the admitted trend toward socialism in the urban centers might reasonably be expected to solve the problem of economic freedom for the urban masses, whatever disadvantages of other kinds it might involve.

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32. Bk. IV, c. II.

33. *Principles of Political Economy*, p. 215.

34. There were, of course, other factors of importance involved.

35. In an address before a gathering of farmers at Leesburg, Virginia, the late Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Wallace, declared on August 14, 1922, that while the purchasing power of the wages of railroad employees in 1921 was 51 per cent greater than in 1913 and that of the wages of coal miners 30 per cent greater, the purchasing power of the wages of farm hands was 4 per cent less, and that of farmers' earnings 25 per cent to 40 per cent less than in 1913.

36. Carver, *op. cit.*, pp. 551-2.

37. Some authorities maintain, perhaps mistakenly, that the rural masses reached a lower depth at this time than during the feudal regime.

38. See above, pp. 17-18.

CHAPTER V

Political Liberty, or Democracy, as a Concept and as an Ideal

The discussion of the influence of urbanization upon the development of political liberty, or democracy, properly divides itself into two general parts—that which has to do with the external or international aspects of the subject and that which deals with its internal or domestic aspects. The first phase would inquire into the manner in which the growth of cities and of city life has influenced the movement for national freedom or independence, or for national self-determination. It would thus consider the influence of urbanization upon the inclination for national independence and upon the ability to achieve it. These factors, in turn, are conditioned by a number of more or less separate factors—upon the strength of the sentiments of patriotism and nationalism, upon the degree of success attained in the amalgamation of alien immigrant elements, upon efficiency in war, upon the general political capacity of the people, and upon national efficiency in general. The first phase of the inquiry would thus turn, ultimately, upon the answer to the question as to how these latter factors have been influenced, or are today being influenced, by the growth of cities.

The second phase of the inquiry would consider the manner in which the development of cities and the growth of the urban population have affected in the past, and still affect, the progress of democracy and self-government within a country itself. A final answer to this second phase of the subject likewise rests upon the results of an inquiry as to the effect

of urbanization upon a number of individual, more or less separate, factors which jointly condition the progress of democracy within a country, but which also have an important relation to the question of national independence and to the welfare of the state and the happiness and well-being of its citizens, in general. These factors include political intelligence, political initiative, and political genius, public spirit, political purity, efficiency of government, the moral and religious factors, and other factors taken up for discussion below.

Inasmuch as the achievement of national independence, or of national self-determination, and the progress of self-government within a country have had so intimate a relation in a number of countries, it will be convenient to combine these two phases of the inquiry in the more historical parts that follow, with a reversion to more or less separate treatment later.

In taking up for discussion the subject of the influence of urbanization upon political liberty, or democracy, it may perhaps be profitable to call attention to a few considerations relative to the meaning and significance of democracy and relative to the acceptability with which it is received as a form of government, or as a principle of social relationship in general.[1] The term "democracy" literally means, of course, "the rule of the people." But great variation at once appears the moment an attempt is made to give practical form or expression to the idea as an actual political or governmental feature. The distinction between "pure democracy" and "representative democracy" is too elementary to require statement here. But the inaccuracy of the frequent identification of "republicanism" with "representative democracy" may be noted, inasmuch as representative democracy is more nearly approached in some countries where a monarchical system nominally prevails than in other countries that bear the name "republic." Again, while "pure democracy" as a pri-

mary form of government, such as that which prevailed in the ancient Greek city-states and in the early New England towns, has tended to disappear and to be replaced by representative democracy as the political unit extended territorially, yet the practice of "pure democracy" as a subordinate, though important, feature of popular rule has become in a modified form more and more common through the use of the initiative, the referendum, and the recall.

Aristotle identified democracy with mob rule and characterized it as the perverted form of "polity" or "constitutional government," which was "the rule of the majority of the free and equal citizens." Locke and Hooker appeared to assume the possibility of a "perfect democracy," and defined democracy as the "majority making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own choosing." [2] Jefferson "conceived democracy to be government by the citizens in mass, acting directly and personally according to rules established by the majority." He was, however, a believer in actual government by the "natural aristocracy founded on talent and virtue." [3] Hamilton, writing in *The Federalist,* defined democracy as a form of government where power is in the hands of the people and is exercised (1) by themselves, or (2) by their representatives.[4] Madison, also writing in *The Federalist,* more narrowly distinguished between a democracy and a republic, identifying the former with "pure democracy" and the latter with "representative government." [5]

John Stuart Mill defined a democracy as that form of government in which "the whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise the governing power through deputies periodically elected by themselves."[6] It is evident that within the period between Madison and Mill the term "democracy" had so gained in respectability and been so enlarged in scope as definitely to embrace, as presaged by

Hamilton's definition, both "pure democracy" and "representative government."

Professor Garner quotes John Austin as stating that a democracy signifies "any government in which the governing body is a comparatively large fraction of the entire nation," cites Sir Henry Maine to the effect that a democracy can be most accurately described as "inverted monarchy," and himself sums up the characteristics of a democracy as follows: "If the great mass of the adult male citizens share in a government, either through the choice of its agents, through participation in the enactment of law by means of the so-called initiative or referendum, or through a popular assembly of all the citizens, we have a democratic form of government or a democracy." [7] Professor Giddings holds that democracy as a form of government consists in "the actual administration of political affairs through universal suffrage," that democracy as a form of state is popular sovereignty or "popular distribution of formal political power," acting, possibly, through representative institutions, and as a form of society the "democratic organization and control of the non-political forms of association"—or it can be defined as a combination of all three of these different forms.[8]

Still others, again, have emphasized equality as the central idea in democracy. Thus the democratic aspirations of the partisans of the French Revolution found expression in the words "Liberty, fraternity, and equality." De Tocqueville found the essential qualities in the American democracy in 1835 in the "general equality of conditions" that he observed and in the fundamental influence which this circumstance exerted on both the political character and laws of the country and over the civil society, together with the complete acceptance of the idea of the sovereignty of the people.[9] A similar view is suggested by one of our own recent writers, with emphasis upon the genetic relation between

equality and democracy: "Equality, at least potential equality, is perforce vitally connected with social democracy. In some respects equality and democracy are identical. Ideas of equality arising from individual sources rapidly pass into the social fabric, to be in turn transposed into political democracy." [10]

Professor John Dewey interprets democracy to mean that "personality is the first and final reality." "From this central position of personality result the other notes of democracy, liberty, equality, fraternity. . . . Personality, responsibility, individual initiative, these are the notes of democracy." Then, sensing the fact that democracy is something that has long been sought for and not yet wholly attained, he writes: "Democracy, like any other polity, has been finely termed the memory of a historic past, the consciousness of a living present, the ideal of the coming future." [11]

Finally, another view, which stresses the advantage and necessity of the absence of checks to the expression and carrying into effect of the popular will, interprets democracy to mean the facility of the public to get exactly the kind of government that it wants.[12]

All these various terms by which democracy is described are used more or less synonymously with "democracy" and with each other. Yet distinctions are made that in some instances, and especially in the view of some persons, differentiate them more or less widely from such identification. It is maintained by some critics of democracy that democracy, when interpreted as majority rule, is very frequently inconsistent with self-government and individual liberty, as well as with equal rights, justice, and fraternity, in that it fails to secure the rights of the individual against violation by the community, or those of the minority against violation by the majority.[13]

Again, when democracy is described as "the rule of the people" it is of interest to ascertain just what persons or

classes the term "people" includes. The England of before 1832 would ordinarily be described as a democratic country because of her system of responsible government through representative, parliamentary rule. Yet we are told that previous to the reform of 1832 fifteen thousand persons elected a majority in the House of Commons.[14] In our own country, always regarded as typically democratic, suffrage was for a long time much limited through various restrictions. After manhood suffrage was won for the adult white population in general it was still withheld from the free Negroes in some States and from the slaves everywhere; and though it was nominally extended to the freedmen by the Fourteenth Amendment, a large number of Negroes are nevertheless disfranchised today in the South. Moreover, it is only very recently that suffrage has been granted to women, in this country. Lastly, suffrage is denied with us to all persons under legal voting age, to mental defectives and criminals, to residents of the District of Columbia, and to aliens in many parts of the country. It is evident, therefore, that "the rule of the people" may mean, and often does mean, something very different from the rule of *all* the people.

Still another feature that has much to do in determining just how democratic in reality a nominally democratic government may be is the nature and character of the representation that the different elements of the population or the different sections of the country enjoy. Thus the aforesaid concentration of control in the hands of a very few persons in England previous to 1832 was due much more to inequitable representation than to direct limitation of suffrage. Moreover, there were in parts of our own country at the same time grossly inequitable arrangements with reference to representation. Nor have these inequalities by any means wholly disappeared as yet in this country.

Then, popular rule depends for its actuality upon other factors: upon qualifications for holding office, upon the pay-

ment or non-payment of the representatives of the people while in office, upon the nature of the nominating machinery, upon the existence or absence of certain checks upon the intervention of the people, checks that are capable of making that intervention so indirect and remote that the result may not be popular rule at all, and upon still other factors.

It is thus evident that democracy as the rule of the people is but a relative matter. It is very doubtful, indeed, whether any such thing as absolute democracy is possible. It is at least certain that absolute democracy has not yet been attained in even the most democratic countries, in spite of the general trend toward democracy in the world as a whole in the last two or three centuries. Much less, then, may we expect to find anything resembling a perfect democracy in previous political epochs. Moreover, we shall find contradictory features with reference to democracy in different countries, among the different classes in the same country, and in the same nation or the same class at different times. Democratic sentiments and aspirations and democratic features of government are often found closely associated, in individual people or in individual nations, respectively, with very undemocratic sentiments and aspirations and with very undemocratic features of government. And there will be found to be rapid advance along many lines in the direction of democracy associated with slow progress, or even with notable reaction, along another line or other lines.

There is great need, therefore, of being on guard against hasty generalization with reference to the extent of democracy characterizing any people or class of people in comparison with some other people or with some other class. As in case of the concept of liberty, so with reference to democracy there is danger of fixing too narrowly upon a certain phase of the concept or of too narrowly interpreting the concept as a whole, or of fixing upon some particular contribution toward democracy, and thus of drawing a conclusion that will

not be found to be generally applicable. In particular, it may be said that conclusions making extreme claims, for either city or country, with reference to a contribution toward democracy are more than likely to be based upon a partial view of the situation or upon the assumption that democracy may be interpreted here or there in an absolute sense.

That democracy does not represent, in the minds of some, a desirable or advantageous form of government has already been indicated. By such persons, therefore, any force or movement contributing to the growth of democracy would not be recognized as beneficial but as otherwise. To say that either city or country had contributed to the growth of democracy would be to condemn, in the eyes of these persons, and not to commend. Attention has already been called to Aristotle's view of democracy as the rule of the mob. Neither Plato's conception of democracy in the abstract nor his opinion of its desirability as a form of government differed materially from that of Aristotle. Not a few of the colonial and revolutionary fathers, in this country, abhorred democracy—which they conceived exclusively as the direct participation of the people in government, after the manner of the Greek city-states and the city-republics of the later Middle Ages. John Cotton in 1664 denounced democracy as "the meanest and worst of all forms of government." [15] John Adams in his letters "defends the institution of nobility, upholds the superiority of the well-born, hints at hereditary rather than elective tenure of office, and betrays throughout a profound distrust of the self-governing capacity of the people." [16] Alexander Hamilton, in spite of early predilections, had shifted far from a belief in democracy by the time he had reached the height of his career; and in his last written expression on politics he warned against democracy as "the real disease that threatened the country." Gouverneur Morris was also a disbeliever in democracy—as were many of the other prominent Federalists of the day.

All through the period of the struggle for a broadening of the right of suffrage prominent public men and statesmen in this country expressed their hostility to democracy. A delegate in the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1820–21 declared that there was but a step between a democracy and a despotism. Chancellor Kent, in the New York constitutional convention of 1821, opposing the proposal to remove the property qualifications for suffrage, expressed concern at the tendency in the United States to "vibrate from a well-balanced government to the extremes of the democratic doctrines"—the extreme democratic principle of universal suffrage having terminated disastrously, he said, in every European republic.

That democracy should have had many opponents in the Old World is also to have been expected. Even Burke characterized a "perfect democracy" as "the most shameless" as well as "the most fearless" thing in the world.[17] Both Lecky and Maine feared and distrusted democracy; and Lord Acton has also been cited among its critics.

It is very evident, therefore, that whether the city or the rural community may have been more responsible for the promotion of the democratic spirit and democratic institutions, there has been far from general agreement as to the desirability of such development or promotion. The position taken here, however, is that the movement in the direction of democracy is to be welcomed and that every agency that has contributed materially to such a movement is to be regarded as having contributed in the long run to human welfare and to human happiness. The excesses that have been associated with the development of democracy every friend of popular rule must admit to have been many and serious. Nor can he fail to acknowledge the number and gravity of the problems, very many of them incident to city life, that democracy faces today. Yet the evils associated with popular rule are clearly more tolerable than those associated with

autocracy. And the former promise, in the long run, to reflect a greater degree of alleviation than the latter.

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CHAPTER VI

Rural and Urban Contributions to Democracy in the Old World. Ancient and Mediaeval Times

I

The Ancient Oriental States

Though the ancient oriental states contributed much to the development of the arts and of civilization in general, and even to the development of law, they contributed little to the development of democracy. There were, especially in the cities, individual rights guaranteed by law or by custom; but though there was thus civil liberty in appreciable degree there was little or nothing of political liberty or self-government. Government took, in the main, a theocratic, monarchical form; though in the Phoenician city-states, and in a measure in Babylonia, the kings often had but a nominal authority on account of the influence exerted by the wealthy merchant families. The chief features of this ancient politico-social organization were paternalism, caste, slavery—all essentially undemocratic.[1]

As a result of the chronic state of war, growing in large measure out of the unstable delimitations of the boundaries of the respective rival states, the issue of political liberty within any particular country was subordinated, in the main, to the necessity of providing for defence against external aggression or to the making of war upon neighboring states. Though we read much of the building and taking of cities and though the ruling authority was usually located within some city, all of these countries, with the exception of

Phoenicia and possibly of Babylonia, were essentially agricultural. Both in Egypt and in Babylonia the highly intensive character of the agriculture, due to the extraordinary fertility of the soil and to the extended practice of irrigation, gave rise to densely settled communities. The agriculture of these countries thus assumed the village or suburban type, with many towns and an occasional large city, in contrast with the pastoral type represented by the other leading states of the ancient oriental world.

As among the European peoples in ancient and mediaeval times, there was little of political life or activity outside the cities in the ancient oriental states. But while many of these cities developed a varied and active municipal life and were the centers of the arts, of learning, and of civilization in general, they were, in the main, largely local in the scope of their political activities and were of themselves unable to create any general political organization. So far as the latter existed, it was the work rather of the militaristic rural or pastoral element, working, however, with and through the instrumentalities that the cities provided or afforded. Rival cities warred with each other for supremacy and the conquering cities imposed their rule, for a time, upon those that were subjected. But the cities of any particular country usually lacked political unity, which neither the definite conquest of the other cities by one leading city nor the threat of external attack was able to effect. The sphere of such measure of political liberty as prevailed, the cities were unable, perhaps because of relatively pacific tendencies, to create a strong centralized or federated political organization that would afford protection from external aggression and thus provide a shelter within which democratic self-government might have developed. The militaristic rural or pastoral element, on the other hand, promoted political centralization only at the expense of civil freedom and local initiative and was relatively destitute of the forms and agen-

cies of political life. The ancient oriental world thus failed, as did the western peoples of ancient times with the partial exception of the Romans, to secure that combination of independent political organization on a national scale and of local autonomy within that is so necessary for the development of a substantial degree of self-government.

II

The City-States of Greece and Rome

De Tocqueville pointed out that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations," and that "Municipal institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach; they teach man how to use it and how to enjoy it." [2] And Professor Munro, quoting this view approvingly, asserts that history has demonstrated its truth—that it was in such local areas, rural and municipal, that men first became familiar with the principles of civil liberty and obtained their first lessons in free government as a practical art.[3]

It is undoubtedly true that in early days among the western peoples where democratic self-government on a national scale first developed the rural community made an important contribution through its local institutions for self-rule, even though the degree of authority exercised in and through these institutions may have been more restricted than is often recognized.[4] Of this nature were the popular assemblies among the ancient Greeks and Romans previous to the era of the city-state, and the folk-moots of the Germanic peoples. This fundamental form of pure democracy was carried up from the *gens* or clan through the successive stages of a higher political organization in ancient Greece and Rome until, in perfected form, it reached a climax in the city-state

organization—where, as already indicated, citizenship in the modern sense originated and political science in the modern sense was born.

At the opening of the historical period the development of this relatively democratic political organization had already passed, among the Greeks and Romans, into the city-state form. The democratic organization in the Greek city-state, the features of which are too familiar to call for description here, included but a small minority of the total population and thus represented a limited democracy according to present standards. But it was thorough-going and complete as far as it extended; and that it abundantly justified itself as a form of political organization is evident from the extraordinarily rich civilization that was developed in these Greek city-states—a civilization that has immeasurably enriched the world for all time.

Even more striking in respect to the development of government and law, though materially less significant from the point of view of democracy, were the results of the quasi-democratic organization on the city-state basis in the Italian peninsula. The expansion of the Roman territory and power did indeed represent the conquest and planting of a large number of cities, and there was indeed in the maturer stages of Roman development a very decided predominance of cities and a dearth of rural populations and dwellings.[5] But it was the persistence in larger degree of the primitive rural influence in Rome that has been held responsible for the failure of such a development of democracy in the Roman polity as occurred in the Greek city-states.[6]

Professor Fairlie is of the opinion that there was "little popular influence" in the government of these subject cities in the earlier days of the Roman power, and that the growth of the imperial system in the later period began, from early in the second century, to contribute to the restriction of such local autonomy as these cities had formerly enjoyed.[7] But

Mackinnon declares that the cities enjoyed, under imperial auspices, "a very large measure of self-government," which they began to lose only as the imperial system itself fell into decline and left the municipalities at the mercy of powerful, but irresponsible, local or provincial elements.[8] And William Stearns Davis, pointing out that "the fostering of cities and of city life" in the Roman empire reached a climax under Hadrian and that this great emperor exerted himself effectively in the direction of "the abolition of distinctions between the provinces and the mother country," asserts unequivocally that "Contrary to general belief, there was much liberty under the principate—not at Rome, where the noblemen of proud ancestry were likely to become dangerous conspirators, but for the dwellers in the innumerable cities, great and small, that dotted the map of the Empire."[9]

Moreover, there was "no lack of bustling political life" in these cities; nor was the "feeling of civic pride and public obligation" wanting in them. In short, "The duty of the imperial government to foster and not to oppress, the duty of the favored individual to repay for the conditions that made his prosperity possible, was more clearly recognized in the first and second centuries A.D. than in perhaps any succeeding age until the twentieth."[10]

At the best, the political life of these ancient Roman municipalities did not represent modern democracy, and doubtless falls materially short when tested by this standard. And in the attempt to extend the city-state system, with its relatively simple and undeveloped agencies of democratic organization, to an imperial basis, there is no doubt that the principle of democracy was sadly warped in time and eventually broke down under the strain. Such an outcome is not surprising. The wonder is that these agencies should have proved capable of such tremendous accomplishments and should have manifested such extraordinary vitality. Doubtless the evils of long-continued war had much to do with

the unfavorable outcome of the Roman attempt to combine democracy and empire.

Yet this attempt represented a necessary stage through which political organization must needs pass in the development of the democratic state. For if local self-government is the foundation of democratic government in general, it is not the only form of democratic government and can not achieve its best results except in relation to and in harmony with a central, national political organization similarly democratic.

The Graeco-Roman city-state system represented, then, a positive contribution of the utmost importance with reference to the development of political democracy in the modern sense, as it did also with reference to human progress and development in general. It is worthy of notice that while democracy was retained to a relatively large degree in the cities of the Roman Empire during the centuries of the attempt to expand the city-state into an empire, the rural districts were more and more given over to the serfdom and slavery of the *latifundia* or large-estate system. As has been said in the case of the England of today, so at this time to pass from the cities to the rural districts of the Roman domain, which of course came to include Greece as well as other countries, was to pass from the realm of the free to the land of the unfree.

III

Democracy in the Middle Ages

Checked for a time in the period of Charles the Great, the decline that had set in relative to orderly and democratic government coincident with the decay and dissolution of the Roman imperial system received a new impetus from the chaos that followed the passing of the Carlovingian regime. Mackinnon asserts that the growth of the feudal system was "as fatal to free municipal institutions as it was to the rights

of the free rural population." But he significantly qualifies this statement by the admission that "some traces of the old municipal administration survived in the administration of the cities"; and he follows this admission with a recognition of the superior vitality of the tradition of liberty in these centers. For he refers to the revival of civic life in the cities of Italy and Southern France as early as the eleventh century —a revival that became "general and irresistible" in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and that became admittedly the foremost force making for the restoration of the ancient liberties and for their further development in the direction of modern democracy.[11] Likewise, James Bryce, who has certainly done full justice to the rural contribution to modern democracy, refers to "the progress of popular government in the modern world from its obscure Italian beginnings in the eleventh century, A.D., in the controversy between the secular and the spiritual powers." [12]

If the privilege of self-government in its early form was thus lost or restricted in the feudal period, the extent of the deprivation was much more complete in the rural districts than in the cities. For not only were the liberties of Greece and of Rome in large measure conserved and later transmitted by the cities of the Middle Ages to the modern world but it was in these same cities that the struggle for a more complete political liberty, against the feudal barons and occasionally against the king, centered. Not only in Italy and in Southern France but also in England, in the Netherlands, and in Germany, the cities and towns became, in varying degree, influential centers of the development toward both local and national self-government.[13] The centers of commerce, and later of the handicrafts, the cities required for their growth an increasing degree of self-rule; and their wealth and military prowess enabled them to command it.

In Italy and in Germany numbers of the cities in the Middle Ages reached a position of local independence—being

specially favored by "their immediate dependence upon a nominal national government which had lost all power to interfere in the management of local affairs." [14] In France, and especially in England and in the Netherlands, the development of municipal life and of political rights in general took a more normal course on account of the greater strength of the central government and of the resulting necessity under which the cities were placed of playing a part in the evolving national system, in addition to the developing of their own political life. More restricted for the time being on this account than were the cities of Italy and of Germany, they yet achieved modern political liberty sooner in the end because they developed it in normal relation to the national state. "In the long struggle for English liberty," says Adams, "the boroughs were to play an honorable part, but they did it, not as independent powers, but as corporate elements in the state."

The cities of all these countries formed leagues for the protection and promotion of their commercial interests and in that connection exercised practically sovereign powers. "Translated into other terms," continues Adams, "this increase of commerce and development of cities becomes the rise of the Third Estate into a position of influence and power, beside the other two. This is a fact of the utmost importance in the general history of civilization, because this once begun . . . in reality never ceased" but culminated in the "practical absorption of the other two estates in the final achievement of modern political democracy on a national scale." And except in America he believes this development to have been carried out, previous to the nineteenth century, largely by the city populations.[15]

Nowhere was the development of political democracy in mediaeval and early modern times more marked or more significant than in the Netherlands. The effect of the Crusades was to stimulate the growth of commerce, and thus the rise

of cities, there as elsewhere in southern and western Europe. As elsewhere, too, these cities obtained, from the twelfth century on, charters from their feudal lords extending certain privileges and rights that varied somewhat from city to city but that were not different in the main from the rights similarly obtained by cities of the same period in other countries. The political privileges extended by these charters were at first enjoyed by but a small proportion of the inhabitants, so that the early form of government in these Flemish cities was in the nature of an oligarchy. But this form was soon succeeded by a more democratic organization. "The great mass of the townsmen organized in trade guilds—of weavers, fullers, dyers, smiths, leather-workers, brewers, butchers, bakers, and others . . . as soon as they became conscious of their strength rebelled against the exclusive privileges of the patricians and succeeded in ousting them from power." The patricians relied upon the support of the French crown. But at the battle of Courtrai "the handicraftsmen laid low the chivalry of France" and "secured the triumph of the democracy." [16]

Particularly marked, at this period, was the political and civic development of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres. Later, the Flemish cities lost their liberties through the mutual dissensions and jealousies that enabled Charles VI of France and the count of Flanders to overwhelm them at Roosebeke in 1382. Still later, when the struggle for political liberty had come to coincide with the movement for religious liberty, the leadership in democratic development passed to the cities of the northern provinces—a leadership that had a rich fruition, and a very meaningful one for democracy, in the achievement of Dutch independence early in the modern period.

The towns and cities of England were having an analogous development, though in relation to a somewhat different national setting. In contrast with prevailing conditions on

the manorial estates, these cities were slowly but surely gaining the fundamental elements of freedom and of self-government for themselves; and these blessings they were also bestowing upon those who were so fortunate as to escape to them from the heavy hands of the feudal masters. Moreover, the towns and cities were playing a leading part in the working out of that system of national self-government, in England, which so long pointed the way to other peoples.

London already enjoyed a quasi-independence that befitted its cosmopolitan character, even previous to the Norman Conquest. It was none the less loyal, however, to the nation as a whole; and at the battle of Hastings, under the lead of their valiant sheriff, Ansgar, Londoners did their full duty. Yet William of Normandy treated the city with marked favor and gave it its first charter. Possibly London was not able, under the strong rule of the Conqueror, to retain all of its earlier democratic character and freedom, though he "gave his word to the citizens that their property should not be taken from them, and that their privileges should be continued."

Henry I's charter was still more liberal, giving to Londoners the right to collect for the king the taxes fixed for the city and for the surrounding district, of appointing the sheriff, of being subject to the immediate jurisdiction of no tribunal except that of their own appointment, and of exemption from certain obligations and requirements. London also achieved the doubtful honor of being largely responsible for placing Stephen on the throne and received a charter from him; and taking advantage of the necessities of Richard I, that city gained by bargain, in 1191, the charter that enabled it finally to become "a compact and perpetual organization under its lord mayor and twelve aldermen, each representing one of the twelve wards of the city." And other towns, following the example of London, gained similar corporate rights, with the highly prized privileges of *firma burghi* and

of being under the jurisdiction of their own courts and magistrates.

Nor was London content with securing its own immediate rights. "It had a great hand in forcing John to sign the Great Charter. It took the lead in resisting the mismanagement of his son." [17] And with the Cinque Ports, and the lower classes generally, it decisively backed up Simon de Montfort in his notable struggle with the king and a number of the barons on behalf of the popular rights. Freeman accepts as testifying to "the place which that city held in the political estimation of the time" the fact that when a letter was sent at this time to the Roman See, "in the name of no less a body than the whole Nobility, Clergy, and Commons of the English realm," the seal of the city of London was borrowed for the signature.[18] Inasmuch as Edward I revived and fully adopted, in 1295, Simon's scheme for a national council or parliament consisting of representatives from all the great groups of the population, London and the other important towns thus had a leading part in the establishment of what was to develop in time into a really democratic agency and into the controlling political force of the country.

Yet it would not be at all correct to suppose that the rural population, in spite of the marked lack of freedom among the rural masses, played no important part in these momentous developments in England. For the struggle for popular rights was not infrequently a struggle of the barons and the people against the king; and when, contrariwise, it was a struggle of king and people against the barons, there were always individual barons who were on the popular side and whose leadership meant very much for the popular cause. Moreover, the middle classes in England, upon whose support the movement for popular government rested in such large measure, consisted not only of the town population but also of the smaller landowners. Indeed, some very competent authorities maintain that throughout the Middle Ages the

struggle for popular rights in England, so far as it was a popular struggle, was supported mainly by the knights of the shire, while the representatives of the towns are asserted to have remained, on the whole, indifferent or silently acquiescent.[19]

But this latter view, in turn, is clearly untenable. It is true, of course, that "Nine-tenths of the cities of mediaeval England would now be regarded as mere country towns" and were, in fact, "country towns even then." [20] These towns would therefore naturally often reflect the predominating influence of the landed aristocracy; and the number of strictly urban representatives in the House of Commons, even at the close of the Middle Ages, was thus necessarily limited. Indeed, many of the boroughs were, and long continued to be, simply appanages of the landed nobility and of the crown. But this theory of the political insignificance of the cities and towns during the Middle Ages, in England, fails to account for or to explain the manifestly great, often decisive, political influence exerted by London and by others of the larger towns—an influence that is written clearly and unmistakably in the ordinary, familiar facts of English history from very early times.

Moreover, the cities and towns were clearly in the lead in the acceptance and promotion of those principles of civil, religious, and political freedom which the natural leaders from the landed aristocracy were perhaps more willing to see realized in the centers of population and in the national sphere than in the rural community itself. Further, there was a very considerable infusion of urban stock in the rural aristocracy, through intermarriage and through the entrance of individuals from the urban classes into the nobility. To this direct liberalizing influence that the towns exerted there must be added the indirect influence that they exerted upon the rural members through contact on the part of the latter with the culture of the larger urban centers.

The non-free masses in the rural districts not infrequently sympathized with the popular movements and lent such aid at times as they were capable of lending, though their attitude was ordinarily determined by that of their feudal masters. Occasionally, too, the rural masses rose on their own behalf—as in the Peasant Revolt of 1381. But it is unwarranted to say, as has been said, that the Peasant Revolt was "not only the first great national movement toward democracy" but was also "the first uprising of the English people in opposition to all their hitherto recognized rulers in Church and State" and "the first outburst" in England "against social injustice." [21] For the main objects for which these peasants contended were the personal rights and privileges that the population of most of the towns and cities already had won for themselves and for which the latter did not need to struggle further, though they were sympathetic toward the efforts of the peasants to improve their own status.

The poorer classes in London and in the other towns did not enjoy, indeed, the same rights of self-determination in local affairs as were enjoyed by the privileged classes there. As early as 1196, shortly after London had secured its charter from Richard I, the craftsmen, day laborers, and similar groups, under the leadership of William "Longbeard," a burgher, revolted against what they deemed an unfair distribution, as between themselves and the burghers, of the taxes levied by the city upon itself on behalf of the king. And the revolt of 1381 had an urban phase which was directed toward breaking down the monopoly of political control possessed by the local oligarchy, "who engrossed all municipal office and oppressed the meaner citizens." But while the poorer urban classes continued to enjoy but a comparatively small measure of political liberty they did possess civil rights and did enjoy personal freedom for which the peasants struggled in vain nearly two hundred years later.[22]

Into the details of the feudal system and into any par-

ticular description of the manner in which under its regime the rural masses, in spite of certain customary rights and privileges, were deprived of the substantial elements of economic, civic, and political freedom, it is unnecessary to go. These facts are so familiar and the marked inferiority of the status of the rural dependent classes in comparison with that enjoyed by the bulk of the urban population is so universally recognized and admitted that no extended presentation of these facts is needed here.[23] Whatever qualifications may be claimed with reference to the completeness of the liberty enjoyed by considerable elements of the urban population during the Middle Ages and the early centuries of the modern period, it is acknowledged by every competent investigator that the people of the cities not only achieved a much larger degree of freedom in all its phases for themselves during this time than did the rural population but also made a decidedly superior contribution to the development of freedom in general, in comparison with the latter.

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CHAPTER VII

Rural and Urban Contributions to Democracy in the Old World. Modern Europe

If there was one common and universal characteristic that lay underneath all the varied but slow-moving changes which marked the close of the mediaeval and the opening of the modern period, it was that of the rediscovery of the value of the individual human soul—not merely in some future world but now and in the present world. The movement was thus fundamentally one in the direction of freedom, economic, religious, civic, and political. And though this freedom that had been denied by the feudal masters and by kingly and spiritual over-lords was destined to be jeopardized in turn by the undue development of the power of the national state and by its identification with the personal rule of the national monarch, the evolution of the national state, the setting of it free from ecclesiastical control, and the reduction of domestic factional powers to submission to the national authority represented another necessary stage in the long struggle for human freedom. This movement represented the first phase of the modern trend toward democracy.

The rescue of the liberties of the people from the all-inclusive domination of the national state itself, and of the national monarch, and the rendering of the national state amenable to popular control and the making of it serviceable to the interests of all the people through the development of the proper agencies represented the second phase of the modern democratic movement. In respect to both phases of the movement there were economic and religious aspects that

were intimately involved with the political aspect. The desire for national religious freedom and for individual religious liberty—at least in its negative aspects—were the two-fold feature of the religious aspect of the first phase of the movement; while the fuller achievement of individual religious liberty in its positive aspects represented the dominant religious feature of the second phase.

In both phases of the modern democratic movement the economic aspects were of very great significance, though they were less in evidence on account of being largely extra-institutional. The economic aspect of the first phase of the movement included the decay of the feudal system with its almost purely personal-service status and the substitution of a status of pecuniary relations in agriculture and in the politico-social sphere, the break-down of the system of local economy, and the development of industry and of commerce on a national scale in which the handicraft economy of the towns gave way to the early beginnings of the factory system in manufacture. The economic aspect of the second phase of the movement consisted in the completer organization of commerce and industry on a national scale, the maturer development of the factory system, and ultimately the unshackling of trade and of industry from the all-inclusive interference of the state.

How small a part agriculture and the rural population played in the economic aspects of these movements is at once evident. Even where agriculture and the rural population were directly involved they played in the main a purely passive part. Commerce and trade, and later manufactures, and thus the city populations, played the decisive part. The economic results of the crusades, the finding of a sea-route to the East, the discovery of America and the importation of the precious metals from the New World, and the expansion of foreign, and especially of colonial, trade and commerce, were all primarily the work of the urban commercial and

trading interests. Even the first steps toward the organization of manufactures on a large-scale factory basis were taken by the trading cloth merchants of England, who gave out materials to groups of mechanics and paid the latter for the cloth they made, in their homes, from these materials.

On the intellectual side it is scarcely necessary to call attention to the overwhelming urban influence. Centered originally in Constantinople and the Italian cities, the intellectual side of the Renaissance found its earliest patrons among the wealthy merchants of these cities and its leading exponents among scholars of city birth in various countries. Among the scholarly names that might be cited in this connection, it is sufficient to point out that Pomponazzi, "the herald of the Renaissance," was born at Mantua, Italy; that Petrarch was the son of a Florentine notary; that Boccaccio was the son of a merchant of Florence; that Erasmus was a native of a suburb of Rotterdam; that Sir Thomas More was born in London; and that Caxton was "a London trader."

The sources of the revolutionizing mechanical inventions of the period were hardly less prevailingly urban. Whoever was responsible for the modern rediscovery of the use of gunpowder, the earliest reliable account of its use dates back to the city of Florence in 1326. Gutenburg was a native of the city of Mainz, in Germany; and Coster, his rival in fame as the inventor of printing, was born in the city of Haarlem, in the Netherlands. For the later period, James Watt, son of a small merchant, was born in the Scottish seaport of Greenock; Hargreaves, probably a native of the considerable town of Blackburn, was originally a carpenter and hand-loom weaver; Arkwright was a barber of Preston before he became an inventor; Crompton, though of rural birth, was born near Bolton, a town famous for its woollen manufactures from early days; Wyatt was born near Lichfield and worked as a carpenter until the age of thirty years; John Kay was born near Bury, in Lancashire, and was educated abroad

and then placed by his father in charge of a woollen manufactory which the latter owned at Colchester; Cartwright was a minister, who had entered University College, Oxford, at fourteen years of age; and Jacquard was a native of Lyons, France.

I

THE PERIOD OF THE REFORMATION

Notwithstanding the many-sided character of the general movement which ushered in the modern period, it will be sufficient for our purpose, which is illustrative rather than exhaustive in aim, to devote the chief attention to the political and religious aspects of the movement. For it was around these two intimately associated aspects that the democratic movement centered. The intimate relation between the struggle for political liberty and that for religious liberty, at the time of the Protestant Reformation, has been emphasized by many authoritative writers. Thus one writer declares that "The principles of the sovereignty of the people, inalienable and imprescriptable, and its realization in the modern state, belong peculiarly to the Reformation." [1] And another writer states that "The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century was the great dissolvent of European conservatism," though he adds, with less accuracy, that "If European democracy owes much to the Protestant Reformation it owes nothing at all to the direct teachings of the Protestant leaders." [2] For the social and political doctrines of Huss and of Wiclif were essentially revolutionary and were immediately fruitful in that direction. And Calvin and his associates and followers established, in Geneva, a system of civil and ecclesiastical government that was essentially democratic in its implications and in its influence upon political ideas, however much it may have departed from the democratic ideal in a practical way. Indeed, the immediate

and direct, as well as the ultimate, consequences of the teachings of Calvin and his group and the influence of the civic and religious polity that they built up at Geneva, relative to the development of the movement for political and religious freedom in general, were immeasurably great.[3] Zwingli, too, was comparatively democratic in spirit and sought "to reorganize the Swiss constitution so as to reduce the wholly disproportionate voting power . . . which the Forest Cantons exercised."

As to the indirect contribution of the teachings of the Reformation to the political awakening, there is practically universal agreement among historians of repute. For the doctrines of the Reformation not only represented a revolt against regularly constituted authority in religion and were thus provocative of revolt in the political and economic spheres as well; but by their emphasis on the dignity and worth of the individual human soul they also contributed in a positive manner toward the movement for individual political rights. If the leaders of the Reformation sometimes rebuked the excesses to which the people, swayed by their teachings, went, it must be remembered that these excesses threatened the very movement itself, as they occasioned the charge that it was essentially subversive of all authority.

Nor are we, of course, at all justified in applying the higher and more enlightened standards of today in judging the policies and acts of these Reformation leaders. It is easy today, when the battle for religious liberty has been definitely won from the forces of ecclesiastical tyranny, severely to criticise these leaders for their grave failure at times to permit to others the liberty, in the religious sphere, that they wished to claim for themselves in relation to those with whom they had joined battle. The issue of the struggle was as yet hanging in the balance; and the fear that grows out of self-defence still gravely imperiled constituted a most serious impediment to the full manifestation of liberty by its own parti-

sans. We may therefore well temper our criticism of their conduct at times out of a due understanding of the conditions under which they labored.

If the rural elements played but a small part in the great events and developments that featured the opening of the modern period, their participation in the struggle for political and religious freedom illustrates very much better than in the mediaeval period that common sentiment in favor of democracy on the part of both the rural and the urban population to which Professor Giddings referred when he declared that "democracy tends to establish an intellectual solidarity of the country and of the town" in the long run.[4] But even so there is substantial evidence that the town led the country in a movement for which both must be given credit, though in unequal degree.

Wiclif, born in the near vicinity of Richmond, Yorkshire, an ancient market town that had long enjoyed municipal privileges, pursued anything but a rural career, though he numbered followers in country as well as in town. It is certain that he had many followers among the peasants and even among the landed nobility. Indeed, we are told by one writer that up to the time of Henry V the Lollard strength, politically, "had lain among the country gentlemen who were representatives of the shires."[5] But another writer asserts that Wiclif found most of his supporters among the weavers of Norwich, in Norfolk, and that "during the persecution of the Lollards more persons suffered death at the stake in Norfolk than in all the other counties of England combined."[6] And still another writer, referring to the rapid increase of Lollards in London, states that "it was said that when five men met on the street corner three of them were sure to be Lollards."[7] Merchants and burgesses supported them with money, as nobles and country gentlemen likewise supported and protected them.

Later, when Elizabeth came to the throne and found her-

self forced, at a critical period in the history of the struggle for religious freedom and political liberty, to defend the realm against Philip of Spain, Englishmen of all parties and of both faiths rallied to the support of the national cause. Yet it was, on the whole, the people of the towns, which were overwhelmingly Protestant, who supplied the most active and unwavering support; while the people of the rural districts, especially those in the North, were in no small measure still inclined toward the old faith and in some cases even made common cause with the Spanish.[8]

Though the Reformation in Germany was emphatically a popular movement and was supported by both rural and urban elements, it was in the towns and cities that the chief strength of the movement lay. It was the industrial workmen from the cities, rather than the peasants, who "wandered from province to province, carrying the economic gospel of free labor and the religion of Lutheranism" both to their own countrymen and also to their brother workmen on the borders of France and Flanders.[9] It was the representatives of a number of important cities, too, who met at Spires and at Ulm and took concerted measures to protect and promote the teachings of the reformed doctrines when these were threatened by the plans made at Regensburg by the Romanist party. Even the so-called "Peasants' War" in 1525 was no less significantly an urban than a rural movement. Indeed, the demands made by the working classes in the towns were more radical than those made by the peasants, though the former already enjoyed a favorable status in comparison with the latter.

A similar situation prevailed in Switzerland. Zwingli, though born of free peasant stock, began his career as a reformer at Einsiedeln, where he "looked rather to the City Fathers than to the pope" for support. As a result of his efforts at Zürich, where he next located, that city "practically withdrew from the Roman Catholic Church" and Bern

and other towns soon followed the example of Zürich;[10] while the five Forest Cantons of Lucerne, Zug, Schyz, Uri, and Unterwalden were the center of an opposition so bitter toward the new faith that under the leadership of Zürich a religious and political league of Swiss and adjacent German cities was organized in its defence.

Perhaps there is no other place than in these Forest Cantons of Switzerland where the ancient folk-moot has survived in its "pristine" character; and James Bryce has claimed for them an origin of popular government that "dates farther back than it does anywhere else in the world" today.[11] But Freeman, while granting that these cantons "still remain the most perfect examples of rural Democracy which the world ever saw," yet maintains that it was only the accession of towns like Lucerne and Bern to the League of Forest Cantons that prevented this section from lagging even farther behind the rest of Switzerland in their democratic development or even from "reproducing some of the worst features of Aetolian life."[12] And it is certain that the influence of these regions upon the development of the modern democratic movement has been immeasurably less than that of the city of Geneva.

Perhaps in no country more than in France were the activities associated with the Reformation so centered in the cities. The first signs of the new religious and political movement showed themselves at Meaux, "a place full of working-people—mechanics, wool-carders, cloth-makers, and artisans,"—which lay well toward the Flemish frontier, within reach of the influences that were at work among the Flemish artisan population in the same trades. Previous to 1560, indeed, the bulk of the Protestant party in France was made up of industrial workers; and later, in 1572, the Venetian ambassador "still characterized the Huguenots for the most part as craftsmen,—cobblers, tailors, and such ignorant people." The condition of the industrial workers in France

and in Germany appears to have been less favorable than that enjoyed by the town and city population in England and in the Netherlands. To the former, then, the Reformation came "as the first organized movement of discontent," and numbers of them attached themselves to the Protestant cause, "not on religious grounds but because the Reformation constituted a protest." [13]

The peasant masses of France, though their condition was even more pitiable than that of the city artisans—perhaps because of that very fact,—were largely untouched by the new movement. Among the middle class of agriculturists, however, especially in the south and west of France, there came to be a very considerable Protestant following. As owners of land, these agriculturists could leave only with great difficulty under the persecution that later fell upon the Huguenots. But even so not a few resolved to do so and found their way, with their more numerous mercantile and manufacturing countrymen and fellow-believers, to England, to the Netherlands, and to Germany. The aid of the peasantry along the frontiers was even invoked by the King in order to intercept these refugees in their attempt to escape from France.

Certain elements of the feudal nobility attached themselves to the Huguenot cause in order to further their resistance to the attempt of the monarchy to reduce them to subordination to a national central authority. The Edict of Nantes had secured to the Huguenots, for a time, liberty of conscience, partial rights of public worship, large civil rights, a quasi-state recognition of Protestantism, and a strong political position. But rendered uneasy by the defection of Henry IV from the Protestant faith, frightened by partial failure in the maintenance of the rights guaranteed by the Edict of Nantes, and most of all, perhaps, misled by these feudal leaders who were actuated by political ambition, the Huguenots again revolted. Unsuccessful and their great

stronghold of La Rochelle overwhelmed in 1628 in spite of assistance from England, the Huguenots yet received back from Richelieu "their common rights within the body politic" and this, together with the change in international issues from a religious to a political basis at about this time, served largely to eliminate the active political features from the Protestant movement in France and to leave it mainly religious in its outward expression.

From this time many of the leaders of the nobility fell away from the Huguenot cause, though a number of the smaller gentry and many merchants, manufacturers, and skilled workmen remained Protestant. Protected for some years in their religious liberties, "the Huguenots of the middle class devoted themselves with great success to industrial employments of various kinds" [14] and proved themselves as enterprising and industrious in the towns as in the agricultural districts. The terrible persecutions that accompanied the *dragonades,* and the final revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, forced into exile the great majority of the Huguenots who were unwilling to abjure their faith. Hundreds of thousands, more than four hundred thousand, of these enterprising and liberty-loving people left France never to return. Hundreds of manufactories were closed, many large towns were half-deserted, and several great branches of manufacture received a death-blow. Thousands of vine-dressers and farmers also fled, under conditions of peculiar difficulty, from their homes and property, whole villages were depopulated, and large areas of land went wholly out of cultivation.[15]

In the Cevennes, the small farmers and vine-dressers, together with the cloth and silk weavers and other industrial workers, inspired with exceptional religious enthusiasm, for years carried on armed resistance in their mountain districts against the attempt to force them to give up their faith and laid down their arms only when they had forced concessions.

In spite of every difficulty the remnants of the Huguenots in France persisted in clinging to their belief, until civil and religious liberty were restored to them at the Revolution.

In the internal struggle between monarchic absolutism on the one hand and aristocratic and democratic liberty on the other, in France, the issue thus rested with the former. The real Huguenots, largely an urban element, fought the fight for democracy. The nobility, a landed interest at first in considerable measure associated with the Huguenots, fought for aristocratic liberty—a fight that it was necessary for them to lose before political liberty on a national basis could be realized. Richelieu did much to win the fight for the monarchy against the latter by crushing that element. Mazarin barely preserved the fruit of Richelieu's work in this respect by temporary self-effacement in the days of the Fronde. But both ministers, in spite of their great work for national political development, unfortunately contributed to monarchic absolutism and thus to the loss, for the time, of the cause of political liberty in France. It was the national monarch and not the people of France who constituted the state, and it was his will and not theirs that constituted law. When the crown should fall into incompetent hands it was evident that there would be a revival of the old struggle between the masses and the aristocratic and privileged classes and that the issue of political liberty ultimately would have to be fought out, in more than one campaign, between the two classes.

Of the cause of political liberty in France, the Huguenots, in spite of all the faults of their leadership and organization, were the most redoubtable champions. And when Louis XIV and the Catholic clergy drove them from France by the hundreds of thousands they not only weakened that country essentially in her intellectual and economic resources and added just so much to the resources of rival countries, but they postponed the triumph of political democracy at home for more than a century. For the practical destruction of the Hugue-

nots in France took from the provincial cities the strength that would have held in check the excesses of the Parisian populace in the days of the Terror and from the rural districts an element that would have made the rural population something other than a party of mere reaction in the period of the Revolution.

On the other hand, in the other countries to which the Huguenots were exiled they contributed not merely intelligence and economic resources of enormous value; they became, more effectively than ever, in their new environment, a tremendous force making for liberty, civil, religious, and political.

In the Netherlands there was repeated, in the early modern period, the same superior contribution by the cities to the cause of political and religious liberty that we have just noted in France. Something of the fierce enthusiasm of the Flemish cities for liberty toward the close of the Middle Ages has already been noted. An enthusiastic writer, referring to the arrival in England of refugees from the Netherlands in the days when religious and political persecution were at their height, under Charles V, in the latter country, says: "They came from a land filled with cities which, until the days of Alva, had been the home of civil liberty; where trade was unshackled by monopolies or arbitrary impositions; where justice was impartially administered, imprisonment by royal warrant unknown, and the pardon of criminals for money unheard of; where liberty of debate in their legislatures was unquestioned and where taxes had been imposed only with the consent of the governed." [16]

Thorold Rogers, directing his eulogy to the northern provinces, writes with even warmer praise: "I hold it that the revolt of the Netherlands and the success of Holland is the beginning of modern political science and of modern civilization. The debt which rational and just government owes to the seven provinces is incalculable. To the true lover of lib-

erty, Holland is the Holy Land of modern Europe, and should be held sacred." [17] Scarcely less eulogistic are the words of still another writer, who points out that "Holland became the home of modern religious liberty, the haven of innumerable free spirits, and the centre of activity of printers and publishers, who asked for no other imprimatur than the prospect of intelligent readers." [18]

These enlightened and religious workmen of Holland, including a certain proportion of workers of the soil, but made up for the most part of men engaged in the handicrafts, swarmed into Lincolnshire and Norfolk, England, where they "laid the foundations of the weaving industry, which made Norwich the second city in the kingdom," and where they repeated the work of reclamation that they had carried on in the low lands of their former home.[19] Still later, after Holland had made good her freedom and when England in turn felt the heavy hand of the oppressor, under the regime of the Stuarts, and the stream of migration was reversed and turned from that country toward Holland, the cities of the latter country became veritable "cities of refuge." To Amsterdam the Pilgrim exiles directed their flight as "the city which stood for Protestantism, for liberty of speech and thought through that long and desperate struggle with Spain which had ended in the foundation of the Netherlands Republic"; and in Leyden they found the employment that enabled them to support themselves during the period previous to their subsequent migration to the New World, and the opportunity to develop that system of self-government in their religious life that they later so successfully adapted to the civil and political sphere in New England.[20]

It is highly significant that in the very midst of the struggle for independence Holland sprang almost at once to commercial supremacy and at the same time developed her manufactures in a very remarkable way; while agriculture, though retaining its technical superiority, yet sank to the

rank of a minor industry. Holland thus became more predominantly urban in the very midst of a political development that meant very much for the cause of democratic government both at home and everywhere else. It is significant, too, that Louis XIV called Holland "a nation of shop-keepers," as Napoleon similarly designated England later.

In Scotland, where the struggle for religious freedom under the leadership of John Knox and his associates was waged for a time under circumstances that made the outcome of the issue there extremely critical for the whole Reformed cause, and which shared with England in the later decisive battle for constitutional liberty, the towns also played a leading rôle. It is true that a majority of the leaders of the Reformed movement, including even the redoubtable Knox himself, were nominally of rural derivation. But the most of these leaders were born in the near vicinity of certain towns which constituted avenues of contact with the Reformed movement on the Continent and in England and which afforded entrance to its influence in Scotland; and it was from these towns as centers that the movement spread in the latter country. Both John Major and John Knox were born in, or very near, the town of Haddington, an important center of the grain trade. George Wishart, who claimed Knox as disciple and associate in the period immediately preceding the martyrdom of the former, sprang from the younger branch of the Wisharts of Pitarrow. But Patrick Hamilton, another distinguished martyr of the Reformed cause in Scotland, was a native of the diocese of Glasgow; Andrew Melville was born in the vicinity of Montrose, a seaport of Forfarshire; and James Halyburton was a native of the important town of Dundee, whose active promotion of the Reformed movement earned for it the title of the "Scottish Geneva."

St. Andrews, seaport and university seat, played an extremely important part in the spread of the new doctrines. Perth, Sterling, and Ayr, like Dundee and Montrose, were

discovered by the authorities who attempted to suppress the movement to be "nests of heretics." Leith shared with Dundee and Montrose in affording entrance to Lutheran and other literature of the Reformed cause; and the inhabitants of Glasgow manifested a "fervent anti-prelatical sentiment," and its prisons were "constantly filled with rebels for conscience' sake."

Moreover, it was from centers like Geneva, Paris, and Poitiers, and from the cities of the Netherlands, and from such men as Calvin and Beza and Peter Ramus, that inspiration and leadership were largely drawn.

A certain portion of the nobility and of the rural gentry gave a not altogether sincere and constant support, in Scotland, to the Reformed cause. But the majority of these classes were found among the partisans of Mary and of the old faith. And, as in Europe generally, the burghs of Scotland, in spite of the numerical inferiority of their population, soon became "a main support of the Reformation." [21]

II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL LIBERTY IN ENGLAND

In England, as in Scotland, the contribution of the rural community to the growth of religious liberty and democratic government in later modern times has been relatively more important than in the Continental countries, with the possible exception of Switzerland. Yet there are those who find in the history of England convincing evidence of the inability of a rural civilization to contribute effectively to the development of political liberty. Thus one writer contrasts the passion for freedom on the part of the industrial classes in that country with the submissiveness of the rural classes and emphasizes the part played by the former in preserving and developing English liberty while the latter were passive or even

supported the king in his attempt to reduce the people to submission. "The opposition to the arbitrary power of the crown grew with the development of the industrial classes. The tiller of the soil, as Irish history has shown, can exist even when denied almost every human right. But manufactures and commerce require the air of freedom." [22]

Another writer has pointed out that Toryism found its most important source in the landed gentry. The rural clergy of the Established Church also formed another extreme Tory element. On the other hand, the Tory leaders themselves recognized London as "the great centre and stronghold of Whiggism and Dissent." [23]

Whether, at the time of the Civil War, the wide rural areas of York constituted the chief rallying ground for the Royalist cause or whether the King received his most conspicuous support from Cornwall, where rural feudal conditions still prevailed, and whether the Parliamentary party found its chief center of strength, outside of London, in the North in the manufacturing centers of the West Riding or among the seaport population in the South and East, it is almost universally conceded that London itself was the great stronghold of the popular cause and contributed decisively to the downfall of Charles I.

Buckle, characterizing the Civil War as an outbreak of the democratic spirit, a movement emanating from the lower strata of society, asserts that the popular leaders comprised few persons of high rank. He points out that Joyce, who carried off the King, was "recently a common working tailor"; that Colonel Pride, who purged the House of Commons, was originally a drayman; that Venner was a wine-cooper, Tuffnel a carpenter, and Okey formerly a stoker in a brewery; that Cromwell himself was a brewer, and that Colonel Jones, his brother-in-law, had been a servant to a private gentleman; that Deane had been the servant of a tradesman, Colonel Goffe an apprentice to a dry-salter, Major General Whalley

an apprentice to a draper, Skippon a common soldier, and that others were peddlers, hawkers, linen-drapers, silk-mercers, apprentices to grocers, woollen-drapers, weavers, tailors, haberdashers, wood-mongers, shoe-makers, tinkers and cobblers.[24] Gomme lists the number of Londoners in the various Parliamentary regiments and points out that the London regiments that fought so gallantly and to such good purpose at Newbury, as at Edgehill and elsewhere, were mostly captained by merchants or large shopkeepers; and Green has graphically described the part played by the London train bands and watermen in the early stages of the conflict.

There is indeed every reason to suppose that the King found the main part of his support among the rural elements while Parliament depended for a large part of its backing upon the city population. But Parliament and the Puritan movement owed not a little to rural support also. The Civil War, in England, and its results were in fact due to that happy combination of rural and urban forces that has been so striking a characteristic of our own democratic development. By no means every townsman was a "roundhead" nor every countryman a "cavalier." And the post-Restoration terms "court party" and "country party" were not wholly contradictory, each in itself. The former drew, indeed, upon the rural districts for the great mass of its supporters. But the King and his personal following "at court" gave the party its name through their leadership. Likewise the "country party" depended for a large measure of its support on the towns. But the leadership, especially at first, was more largely vested in those influential members of the landed interest who stood strongly for the rights and liberties of the people and against the arbitrary rule of the king and of his creatures than Buckle appears to admit.

Thus all three of that immortal trio—Eliot, Hampden, and Pym—were "country gentlemen of good estate." Earl Essex, at first in command of the Parliamentary army, was

of course of the nobility—as was Holles, at that time a member of the House of Commons and later a baron. Waller, among the ablest of the Parliamentary generals, was a knight. Selden was of rural descent, Haselrig and Vane were knights, and Strode was the son of a knight. Of the two prominent political theorists and philosophers of the popular cause, Locke was of rural origin, while Milton was born in London. Lastly, Cromwell himself was originally of rural descent and more or less a farmer on his own account through the period of young manhood—"a quiet, unobtrusive squire of Huntingdonshire," one writer calls him.

But Parliament and the Puritan cause received more than mere leadership from the rural element. Green tells how, early in the struggle, mounted freeholders from Buckinghamshire and Kent traversed London on their way to St. Stephens, vowing as had London itself "to live and die with Parliament." Hampden and others of the rural Parliamentary leaders raised regiments from their own tenantry; and Hampden and Cromwell exerted their influence in the counties adjacent to London toward the organization of the "Eastern Association," in which there was a strong rural element and which constituted a vital factor in sustaining the Parliamentary cause. Lastly, Cromwell's "Ironsides" included "God-fearing yeomanry" from the eastern counties as well as Puritan tradesmen from the towns.

London was not in sympathy, generally speaking, with that phase of the Puritan Revolution that represented the abrogation of parliamentary government, the substitution of military force as the ruling power in the state, and the establishment of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate—in short, with the Independent regime. Neither could the rural elements be said to be in control at this stage. The "Barebones Parliament" contained about the same proportion of rural and urban elements as the previous parliaments. Perhaps it would be accurate to say that there was a larger ur-

ban leadership but a somewhat diminished urban—at least, large town—support in general at this stage than in the Civil War proper.

Neither was there distinction between country and town in the general agreement in favor of the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, which London supported, though returning four dissenters to the Parliament of 1661. Puritanism had become temporarily odious to the nation in general and the cause of constitutional liberty had been discredited by the excesses of the popular party. Yet the democratic fruits of the Puritan Revolution were real and substantial, though not immediately gathered. A decided check, presently seen to be decisive, had been given to absolutism in the monarchy and a long stride had been taken toward placing the supreme power in the hands of the popular branch of the national legislature. Liberty of worship and religious toleration were not yet realized, but national independence in religion was virtually assured; and substantial progress in the direction of civil liberty was presently made through the establishment of the freedom of the press in 1679 and the passing of the habeas corpus act in the same year.

In this tardy, but substantial, garnering of the fruits of the Revolution during the dangerous period of the Restoration, the towns—and particularly London—were overwhelmingly responsible. As Green says, whatever strength the "country party" retained in its resistance to the king "lay chiefly in the towns, whose representation was for the most part . . . in the hands of their corporations, and whose corporations, like the merchant class everywhere, were in sympathy whig."

Though all classes joined in the revolt against James II, London and the other towns again played the decisive part in his deposition from the throne in 1688. This time the fruits of democratic progress were both impressive and also immediately realized. The monarchy was definitely subordi-

nated to Parliament by the "bill of rights" in 1689; freedom of worship was virtually assured by the toleration act of the same year; and through the origination and introduction of the cabinet system, government was presently made responsible and responsive to Parliament and thus indirectly to the country at large.

Much remained to be done, however, by way of rounding out and enlarging this democratic system, and especially in actually establishing it in English practice. And here again, though space can not be taken to present the evidence at length, the urban contribution was overwhelming. Due to the superior numbers of the rural population, amongst whom tory sentiment prevailed, the country as a whole probably remained tory in sympathy. But through force of circumstances the whig party, which was predominantly urban but which did admittedly enjoy the advantage of rural leadership, continued over a long period in charge of the government and under their rule the results of the Revolution of 1688 were definitely confirmed and established.

Later, when the whig party had begun to fall under the control of an aristocracy comprising the large landed interests and a group of politicians, who ruled through ownership of a number of decayed election boroughs which were boroughs in name only and were less and less representative of the growing urban constituencies, revolt appeared within the party itself and the elder Pitt, himself sprung from a merchant line, came to power on a wave of popular sentiment that had its source in the cities and towns. The movement toward the disfranchisement of the "rotten boroughs" and the extension of representation to the towns that had grown up in northern England with the progress of the industrial revolution also received the support of the younger Pitt. And when these aims were finally achieved in the Reform Act of 1832, the result was largely due to urban pressure, and especially to pressure from the people of Birmingham, though again

there was the advantage of a goodly measure of rural leadership.

For the "Second Reform Acts," in 1867 and 1868, which extended to the workingmen something of the political rights and privileges that had been granted to the middle classes by the Reform Act of 1832 and further improved parliamentary representation, the urban classes were even more prevailingly responsible—both in general support and in immediate leadership. Of the Chartist movement, which for a score of years had promoted this cause, Orth says: "Its organizers were carpenters, its orators were tailors and blacksmiths and weavers . . . and its writers were cotton spinners." [25] Francis Place, the most distinguished of this group, was a London tailor who had been a prominent leader also in the agitation for the Reform Act of 1832; and he has been called "not only one of the prophets, but one of the great statesmen, of modern democracy." [26]

Again, the "Third Reform Act," in 1884, which gave to the counties the same franchise that the legislation of 1867–68 had extended to the boroughs and which in particular enfranchised the great body of agricultural laborers, was carried through by Gladstone with the support, largely, of the urban constituency of his party. Moreover, the urban elements were also largely instrumental in securing the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872 and effective corrupt practices legislation in 1883—policies that have contributed much toward making the various reform acts real, and not merely nominal, democratizing steps.

Lastly, it is significant that highly urbanized Britain should have taken that most recent step in democracy, the enfranchisement of the female population, even before we ourselves had taken it and almost at the very moment when it was being decisively rejected in comparatively rural France —where it still fails of realization.

Practically every writer of authority has admitted the

democratic character of the British system of national, and even of imperial, government. Occasionally, able and thoughtful students of government from among our own countrymen have not hesitated to assert that the governments of Great Britain and of her main colonies are more democratic and more responsive to popular sentiment than is our own government. Certainly the more restrained view that "It would be foolish to assert that the citizen of the United States today enjoys a greater degree of liberty than the subject of the crown, either in England or Canada," will command assent among the great majority of unprejudiced critics.[27]

It would appear that in one respect, only, may our own country be considered more democratic than England—namely, with respect to the greater prevalence in the latter country of class distinctions and class status. But this condition is one that concerns the social rather than the political sphere in England. Politically, there appears to be as little of class distinction there as in our own country; and when this factor of economic and class status does become involved with the political factor in England, it occurs in the rural districts, as we have seen, rather than in the towns and cities. In the second place, it should be kept in mind that these aristocratic and undemocratic notions of class distinction are to be traced, not to the development of cities and of city life but back to the typically rural institutions of the feudal system and to the continued prevalence of a system of large landed holdings with tenant operation. And it is strictly true that these class distinctions have tended to disappear, in England, in proportion to the development of cities and city life. The cities in England have always been the main source of the "levelling" influences in English social and political life.

It is thus of very great significance, for our present purpose, that in England, the most highly urbanized country in the world and the country where urban life has had its most

extreme development in general, the superior influence of city life in contributing toward democracy should be so clearly manifest.

III

RURAL AND URBAN INFLUENCES IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND IN RECENT TIMES IN FRANCE

The development of modern democratic government in France dates, of course, from the days of the French Revolution—a political event of the first importance, not only for France but for the whole world. For France has led Continental Europe, with the exception of Holland and possibly of Switzerland, in democratic developments, and in some respects has led all countries along this line. In this leadership, Paris, seconded by other French cities, has always been well in advance in more modern times. The rural districts in France, however, while they have contributed the valuable elements of stability and conservatism, have not infrequently been the sphere of political reaction and stagnation.

Paris and the other cities coöperated in the early stages of the Revolution. Later, the Parisian populace secured control and carried the movement into the phase of the Terror. But the masses in the rural districts were either relatively passive or positively reactionary throughout. When, at the opening of the Revolution, the States-General assembled, it was dominated by the third-estate or middle class, which was made up chiefly of the bourgeoisie or city elements. The latter, having won economic strength and prestige and having arrived at a consciousness of personal and class importance through these achievements, were no longer willing to remain deprived of political power and of civil and political privileges.[28]

Paris was the center, too, of a revolution in ideas that

preceded, as well as accompanied, the events of the Revolution proper; and this intellectual influence manifested itself strongly among the bourgeoisie as well as among the intellectuals proper. Even when the Revolution had passed into the Terror, under the control of the proletariat, the leadership remained chiefly with the intellectual bourgeoisie. The Girondists, with whom the Jacobins presently successfully disputed control and who represented the moderate aims of the Revolution, found their chief support in the "thriving burghers of the provincial cities" and were themselves lawyers, publicists, philosophers, tradesmen, mainly from Bordeaux, Chartres, Lyons, and Paris. Brissot, the son of an inn-keeper, was born at Chartres and was a lawyer in Paris at the opening of the Revolution. Pétion, son of a *procureur* in Chartres, also became an advocate in his native city and was elected a deputy from there to the States-General in 1789. Vergniaud, born at Limoges, became a lawyer at Bordeaux and was likewise sent, from the department of the Gironde, to the States-General. Roland, born at Thizy, became successively a clerk, inspector of manufactures at Amiens and Lyons, and minister of the government under the king in the early days of the Revolution. Condorcet, eminent mathematician and philosopher, was born in Ribemont, Picardy, but as a resident of Paris represented that city in the Legislative Assembly of 1791. Madame Roland, perhaps a greater power in the Girondist group than her husband, was born in Paris, the daughter of an engraver of that city.

Rousseau, political philosopher of the Revolution, was of course a Genevan, sprung from a French religious refugee family. The leaders of the Jacobins, and of the Terror, were likewise mainly of the bourgeoisie. Danton was born at Arcis-sur-Aube, but was a lawyer resident in Paris at the opening of the Revolution. Marat was a physician—later an editor—who had traveled to London, Edinburgh, and other places, but who practiced his profession mainly in Paris. Robespierre

was born at Arras and also practiced law there, but devoted himself in addition to literature and to political agitation.

When the States-General assembled in 1789 the privileged classes, representing the landed interest largely, refused to consent to such a constitution of that body as would have given the third estate the preponderance they demanded. The king, vacillating and irresolute, finally cast his lot with the aristocracy; and, the third estate having assumed the precedence, he attempted to coerce it by the use of the army. Thereupon the citizen-soldiers of Paris stormed the Bastille, the third estate became the National Assembly, and the Revolution was on. Immediately governmental authority crumbled everywhere, both in towns and in country districts. Many towns and cities created municipal organizations for themselves and replaced the authority of the agents of the king by their own control. Pillage and incendiarism occurred on the country estates. The National Assembly aimed to eliminate personal servitude, with a qualified handling of the various feudal claims. But the peasants resisted moderation; and the decrees of the 4th of August, 1789, "issued in a wholesale transfer of property from one class to another without any indemnity for the losers." The whole feudal system crumbled at a stroke.

The "Declaration of Rights" brought into sharp contrast the fact that by means of the property qualification for the franchise the political ascendancy of the middle classes had been established while the propertyless masses remained without political rights and privileges. The urban proletariat, and especially that of Paris, enthused by revolutionary doctrines and aroused by this contrast between theory and fact as to their own political status, and goaded also by the "appalling dearness" of bread and of food in general, first gained an ascendancy over the National Assembly and the Legislative Assembly from without; and later, when the limited franchise had been replaced by universal suffrage and

the bourgeoisie representation had been reduced by indifference or intimidation, it dominated the National Convention from within. A struggle then ensued between the Girondists, representing the bourgeoisie, and the Jacobins, in which the latter won. The king was sent to the block, the Girondists soon followed, and the regime of the Terror was established.

The peasants had temporarily rallied to the support of the Revolution when the republic was established. But in many districts they were but little influenced by the wider ideas or issues of the Revolution. And when, in February, 1793, the Convention decreed a general levy in order to recruit the depleted armies that were fighting foreign enemies on the eastern frontier and an attempt was made to enforce conscription, a counter-revolutionary insurrection took place in Vendée and in other prevailingly rural districts where ignorance of the issues of the Revolution was especially pronounced. On the other hand, the peasants also failed to support the provincial cities when the latter revolted against the domination and excesses of the Parisian mob.

The ending of the Terror was due, in the first instance, to a division among the members of the Terrorist group. But the ultimate disappearance of the Jacobin power was due to the reassertion of themselves, both in Paris and in the provincial cities, by the middle classes.

The immediate issue of the Revolution, on account of the fear and hatred inspired by the Terror, was the postponement of the realization of full political freedom for many years. But the results in the civil sphere were immensely great. The old abuses and privileges were not restored. "Uniformity of laws and institutions was enforced throughout France. The legal privileges formerly distinguishing different classes were suppressed. An obsolete and burthensome agrarian system was abolished. A large number of large estates belonging to the crown, the clergy and the nobles were broken up and

sold at nominal prices to men of the middle or lower classes. The new jurisprudence encouraged the multiplication of small properties. The new fiscal system taxed men according to their means and raised no obstacle to commerce within the national boundary. Every calling and profession were free to all French citizens, and in the public service the principle of an open career for talent was adopted. Religious disabilities vanished, and there was well-nigh complete liberty of thought." [29]

The gain in the direction of civil and religious liberty was therefore very great. Large progress was made in the realization of equality, and democracy was greatly promoted in the ordinary social relations.

It is thus clear that the beneficial results of the French Revolution were mainly due to the bourgeoisie, who were for the most part residents of the provincial cities or of Paris. The excesses of the Revolution were due largely to the dominance of the Parisian populace, under the leadership of a handful of fanatic intellectuals. The upper rural classes were those who were dispossessed and overthrown by the Revolution. The rural masses, though benefiting more than any other class from the Revolution, played on the whole a minor part and one that was on the whole reactionary.

The restoration of the monarchy, at the close of the Napoleonic period, placed the control of the government in the hands of the great landed proprietors and initiated an extremely reactionary regime. This domination of the landed aristocracy continued until the Revolution of 1830 transferred control again to the hands of the middle and lower classes—a control that continued to 1848. During this period constitutional government was further perfected and was for a time adhered to faithfully. But the liberal government of this period rested upon a narrow electorate of much less than a quarter of a million voters; and when the king presently abandoned constitutional for personal rule, bourgeois dissat-

isfaction combined with socialistic and communistic agitation on the part of the unfranchised masses to accomplish the temporary establishment of a republic with universal suffrage, in 1848.

The Second Republic was rather too liberal to suit the bourgeoisie but hardly radical enough to satisfy the Parisian masses. The resulting instability therefore led to the restoration of the empire in 1852—an overturn that was accomplished largely through the rural electorate. Political freedom was now restricted, though Louis Napoleon wisely promoted civil and economic liberty.

When the Second Empire came to grief under the shock of the Franco-Prussian War and was presently succeeded by the Third Republic, the new regime was notably one sponsored by the urban elements. Thiers, who was elected to the leadership by the National Assembly in 1871 in order that he might save as much as possible out of the French defeat and who later was given the title of president of the French Republic, was born at Marseilles, the son of a locksmith of that city. First elected deputy from the nearby town of Aix, he later came to represent the city of Paris, by which he was repeatedly returned. Gambetta, eminent soldier and patriot, and life-long liberal and republican, was born at Cahors, the son of a grocer of Genoese origin. He went to Paris at the age of nineteen to study law and was later returned as deputy by both Paris and Marseilles, but chose to represent the latter. It is highly significant that the signal service that he was enabled to render in connection with the permanent establishment of the Third Republic was largely due to the prestige that he enjoyed through having been returned to the Chamber of Deputies, in 1876, by each of the four great cities of Paris, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Lille. Wallon, known as "the father of the Constitution," was born at Valenciennes and represented his department, the Nord, with its numerous

industrial cities and population, both in 1849 and later in 1871 and subsequently.

On the other hand it was the inclination of the rural voters to favor a return to the Napoleonic regime that precipitated the movement for the establishment of a republic by the liberal and moderate groups. Moreover, in the further development of political democracy in more recent years, in France, the agricultural population has continued to play a relatively passive part. The influence of the clerics, who have represented the most active of the anti-republican groups, has been especially strong among the rural population. And a large proportion of the republican leaders under the Third Republic, together with the socialist leaders of the various types, from Fourier, Saint-Simon, and Louis Blanc to Millerand, Viviani, and Herriot, have been of urban, or non-agricultural, origin.[30]

The rural population of France has exercised an important function in contributing a necessary conservative and stabilizing influence to offset the relative instability and radicalism of the urban population—and especially of the city of Paris. Moreover, by their eminent industry and thrift they have done much to create and maintain for France a solid economic basis for the development of the democratic government which it has been chiefly the part of the city population to promote. It is singularly inappropriate, however, to claim, as has been done, that to no other circumstance than that the French peasant owns the land that he works is due the fact that France has been a democracy "for a hundred years." [31] Not only is this view widely at variance with the facts but it most seriously complicates the explanation of the development of the British democracy, where the rural population is both small in proportion to the total population and also conspicuously does not own the land that it works. Moreover, the rural population of France has con-

tributed notably less to democratic development than has the British rural population.

IV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN MODERN GERMANY

Though there was a very considerable degree of sympathy in liberal circles in Germany with the French Revolution in its early stages, it can scarcely be said that there has been, up to the close of the recent Great War, at least, any general movement toward democracy in recent times in that country —in spite of the strong trend of the population toward the city in the last fifty years. Indeed, it probably will be admitted by most non-Germans that there has rather been a decided trend toward autocratic government in Germany within this period.

In spite of the disillusionment among Germans, as a result of the spirit of national aggrandizement which the French Revolution soon developed and in spite of the terrible humiliation visited by France, under the leadership of Napoleon, upon Prussia at Jena and Auerstadt, the revolutionary disturbances in France in 1848 found answering echoes in Germany and Austria. Germany had indeed benefited, directly and indirectly, by the democratizing results of the French Revolution. Even Napoleon had done much, during his brief intervention in Germany, to liberalize and modernize the laws and the political and social organization of the various political divisions of that as yet non-unified country. Under Stein and Hardenberg much further progress had been made, in Prussia, in modernizing and in a measure in democratizing the civil and social institutions, and even the government, of that state. Serfdom was abolished, municipal rights were granted to the cities, the opportunities for education were made available to all, and access to civil offices was placed upon an equal basis. But the reactionary

influence of Metternich was potent in restraining the movement toward political liberty in the German states, and delayed unification constituted a complicating and retarding factor.

Upon the inception of the revolution in Vienna in 1848 and the consequent fall of Metternich, the liberal elements in Germany also broke into revolt. The leaders of the revolutionary disturbances in Germany at this time were of the upper middle class, though the "real fighting body of the insurgents consisted of the poorer working classes of the towns." While the peasants were "abject subjects, little better than serfs," the urban laboring men of Germany were "achieving a mass consciousness" and were pressing for political and economic reform.[32]

Though they won some temporary concessions in 1848, the liberal elements in Germany were unable to retain these advantages; and the most venturesome were soon forced to seek safety in exile. Partly because of the loss of these leading spirits by exile and partly because of the initiation of the policy of imperialism by Bismarck, the democratic movement in Germany from this time forward suffered a stunted development. Political development in that country in recent times has signally failed to achieve the quality of popular initiative. Up to the close of the Great War, Germany, in spite of the marked material development of that country, had not yet passed out of the political stage represented by France under Louis XIV. There is a close analogy, too, between the present condition of national distress and humiliation into which the policy of Bismarck and the German kaisers has plunged Germany and the distress and ultimate humiliation into which the brilliant, but mistaken, policy of Louis XIV plunged France. And in both cases, too, illiberal feudal influences, in opposition to the liberalizing impulses of the urban centers, have been very largely responsible for the political mal-development.

Though there is a small non-socialist liberal element among the urban population in Germany, the social democratic movement, which is preponderantly an urban movement in Germany, represents practically the only democratic feature in the recent political development of that country. Such opposition to imperialistic and autocratic developments as have appeared in recent decades in Germany have been manifested among the social democracy of the urban centers and not in the rural districts. Though the term "Junker," or "squire," was applied to the merchant princes of Germany in the Middle Ages, from the middle of the last century, at least, it has been applied primarily to the reactionary rural aristocracy. The predominating place occupied by the interior province of Brandenburg in the development of Prussia, and thus of modern Germany, in contrast with the relatively unimportant place held by the free cities of the coast, is well recognized. And in recent years the "Junker" group has found perhaps its most ardent members or supporters among the great landlords of East Prussia and Pomerania—the "classic land of the junkers," as a correspondent of one of our metropolitan newspapers has termed these two divisions of the former German Empire.[33]

Moreover, as already pointed out, the dependent rural classes in Germany have remained largely without the rights and privileges that the urban working classes have secured. In these two provinces just named the agrarian workers have never been permitted to organize; and though they are supposed to have received that right with the recent revolution and since then "have been trying to form unions and effect wage treaties with the landed proprietors," they apparently have not met with much success. This situation has resulted in strikes among these rural workers, and the land owners' union has been accused of obtaining control of "the whole military apparatus of Prussia" for the reduction of these strikes.[34] It is significant, too, that these same regions and

these same influences have been charged with responsibility for the uprisings against the Ebert government in the early part of 1920. "Pomerania and Silesia swarm with the old junker landlords, who practically control the countryside. They were pan-Germans during the war, Kappists a month ago, and will remain monarchists always," wrote another American newspaper correspondent whose commission placed him in position to learn the facts.[35]

Undemocratic tendencies in Germany previous to the close of the World War have thus been manifested in spite of large urban development in the last fifty years and not because of that urban development. Yet it must be admitted that for some reason or other the urban elements in Germany have failed, in large measure, to exercise that traditional marked liberalizing and democratizing influence that we have seen in the case of the city populations in so many other countries in all times, and even in Germany in earlier times. True, the urban elements in Germany in recent times have not exercised a political control at all proportional to the growing numbers of the city population. But this fact does not really explain the situation. For the proportionally small control exerted by the urban elements there is in itself in need of explanation. Yet it remains clear that the urban influence in Germany in recent times has been liberal and democratic in comparison with the rural influence in that country.[36]

V

RURAL AND URBAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEMOCRACY IN RECENT TIMES IN OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

As is suggested below, relative to rural and urban leadership in the political development of Italy in recent times, the modern contribution to democracy in that country, like

the contribution in ancient, and especially in mediaeval, times has been prevailingly urban.[37]

The unique place held by the Swiss city of Geneva in connection with the development of modern democracy has already been noted. Relative to the development in Switzerland of the use of the initiative and referendum as agencies of democratic government, it will be shown below that from the point of view of origins credit must be ascribed in preponderant degree to rural sources; while from the point of view of more recent use and promotion of these agencies the palm must be awarded to the cities.

In Denmark a very great deal of credit must be ascribed to the rural population for the remarkable system of economic coöperation that has been perfected in the agricultural sphere in that country. But in the strictly political field there seems no reason for assigning a similar superiority to the rural elements.

Little needs to be added, perhaps, regarding other European countries beyond what has already been said of some of them in other connections. Outside England and Switzerland, and possibly Denmark, in neither ancient, mediaeval, nor modern times has the rural population in Europe exercised an important, not to say predominating, influence in directly promoting the democratic movement. Whatever evils may be charged to city life and city growth, an historical survey of political development in Europe distinctly shows that the city populations there easily have been foremost in the struggle for religious, civil, and political liberty.

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CHAPTER VIII

Rural and Urban Contributions to Democracy in the United States. General Survey

It is in the United States, as already indicated, that the strongest claim is made for a vital relation between a predominatingly rural civilization and the development of a genuine democracy. In strong opposition to the view held by not a few authorities that the government of Great Britain and of her chief colonies is perhaps more democratic and more responsive to popular impulse than is our own government, there are those who contend that only in the New World—and especially in the United States—has there been a *bona fide* and genuine development of democracy. In the view of this latter class such democracy as has manifested itself in the Old World is non-indigenous there and but an inferior type transplanted from this country or from this hemisphere.[1]

The late Woodrow Wilson expressed in a somewhat different way what he was pleased to regard as the unique character of democracy in the New World. Speaking at a dinner given in Paris, on May 26th, 1919, by the Pan American peace delegation in honor of Dr. Epitacio Pessoa, president-elect of Brazil, he asserted that the world at large had accepted those common principles "which have united the Americas time out of mind" and declared that it was of the "fountains which have sprung up out of the soil of the Americas" that the peoples of the world were then drinking. "I am not of course suggesting or believing," he con-

tinued, "that political liberty had its birth in the American hemisphere, because of course it had not, but the peculiar expression of it characteristic of the modern time, that broad republicanism, that genuine feeling and practice of democracy that is becoming characteristic of the modern world, did have its origin in America, and the response of the peoples of the world to this new expression is, we may perhaps pride ourselves, a response to an American suggestion."

Something of the same broad acceptance of the principles of democracy in this country appears to have impressed De Tocqueville on the occasion of his visit here in 1835; though a recent Italian writer has taken that eminent Frenchman to task for failing to perceive, as he asserts, that democracy in America had already begun to disappear by the time of the latter's visit to this country.[2]

Of the importance of the contribution of America—certainly of the United States and Canada—to the development of democracy there can be no doubt. But it is the opinion of the present writer that a careful study of the political and constitutional development of the United States tends strongly to warrant support for two conclusions relative to the source of democracy in this country and relative to the influence of the marked urbanizing trend here in the last century upon the development of democracy. In the first place, there is every reason to believe that certain rural and certain urban influences have combined to promote the democratic movement in this country, while other rural and urban influences have combined to retard that movement. In the second place, the conclusion may safely be ventured that there has been a steady, though not necessarily continuous, movement toward democracy in this country contemporaneously with the movement toward urbanization. And if, as the present writer believes readily to be possible, these two conclusions can be established, it may safely be concluded that the experience of this country, too, goes to show that

city life and the city environment are thoroughly consistent with the development of democracy.

The extreme view that the New World is exclusively the home of genuine democracy, whence the latter has been transplanted elsewhere, with inconsiderable success, must be judged to be without any substantial evidence in its support. But consideration of the question of the relative rural or urban contribution to the democratic movement in this country involves a preliminary inquiry as to the extent to which democracy is indigenous in this country and as to the extent to which rural or urban influences predominated in any transplanting of democracy from the Old World.

I

DEMOCRACY IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD

The truth seems to be that the origin of democracy in this country, together with that "peculiar expression of it characteristic of the modern times," must be ascribed to a combination of democratic influences and institutions brought by the early colonists from the Old World and of the favoring environment that these colonists found in the New World. Neither the spirit nor the institutions of democracy were peculiarly indigenous to this country. The Pilgrim and Puritan fathers, with all their admitted limitations, brought with them the spirit as well as the practice of democracy. As Woodrow Wilson truly said, political liberty did not have its birth in this country. But the peculiarly favoring conditions that existed in this country, and particularly the absence here of the undemocratic sentiments and forces that held sway to so large an extent in Europe and which have been seen to have been largely of rural origin there, contributed to the transformation of the political forms and practices with which the colonist fathers were familiar in

their former home into something that was practically unique when it finally came from their hands in 1787.[3] It was this circumstance that early gave the spirit and practice of democracy in this country a breadth and inclusiveness that have indeed been added to and much surpassed with our later political development but that long pointed the way to other countries.

That the democratic spirit and democratic institutions with which our fathers were familiar in the mother country were largely urban in origin, though combining rural influences as well, we have already seen. But the same combination of rural and of urban influences appears in the make-up of the fathers themselves. John Fiske asserts that the leaders of the New England migration were country gentlemen of good fortune and that the rank and file were mostly intelligent and prosperous yeomen.[4] And that the cavalier element dominated among the Virginia colonists is commonly recognized. The Pilgrims were indeed materially more rural as to ultimate origin than were the Puritans. But as already suggested, the sojourn of the former in the cities of Amsterdam and Leyden undoubtedly constituted "an important preparation for the future life of the Pilgrim colony in New England." [5]

The Puritans, on the other hand, in spite of a very considerable proportion of rural folk were prevailingly urban in leadership and in general origin; and it was their influence, rather than that of the earlier Pilgrims, that gave form to the New England political and religious institutions.[6] James Bryce refers to the Puritan settlers in New England as being "largely townsfolk, accustomed to municipal life and vestry meetings." And Hinsdale thus contrasts the New England and the Virginia colonists: "The founders of New England came from towns and cities, and they naturally set up municipal institutions; the founders of Virginia came from the English counties, and as naturally set up county

institutions. That the one would be more congenial to a civic democracy, the other to a landed gentry, goes without saying." [7]

Endicott, leader of the first body of colonists of the Massachusetts Bay Company to the New World in 1628 and after the death of John Winthrop almost continuously governor of that colony until his own death, was probably a native of Dorchester; and a large proportion of the colonists who accompanied were recruited in Dorchester and from nearby places. Winthrop himself, first governor of both Company and Colony and the "master spirit" of the enterprise, was of rural birth and residence; but he early took up the profession of the law and spent much of his time in London previous to his departure with the second, and larger, expedition sent out in 1630. London and Boston, which was the next largest port after London in the kingdom at that time, played an even more important part, perhaps, than Dorchester in contributing to the development of the colony of Massachusetts Bay. Several merchants of London were associated with Endicott and Winthrop in snatching the enterprise from failure; and William Coddington, a prominent merchant of Boston and later one of the fathers of Rhode Island, was another of the associates in the adventure. Moreover, Roger Williams, founder of Rhode Island and "the first and foremost exponent in America of the theory of the absolute freedom of the individual in matters of religion," was born in London, the son of a merchant tailor.

As a result of these colonizing expeditions Boston and Charleston were founded, and, with the assistance of some earlier Dorchester elements, Salem was established—events of the first importance, of course, in the founding of Massachusetts, and of the English colonies in general in America. Moreover, the Connecticut settlements were not less prevailingly urban in origin.[8]

Even more decisive in importance, perhaps, were the

urban influences that prevailed in the *form of organization* of the Massachusetts Bay enterprise. As one of our historians puts it: "In Massachusetts . . . a trading company did not beget, as elsewhere, but literally *became* a political state." [9] Another writer but enlarges upon the same idea when he asserts that in "the matter of government, both colonial and town, the records seem clearly to indicate that the usages and forms of procedure were those in vogue with the English commercial associations of the day; and, accordingly, they must be looked for in that charter of 1629 which incorporated a business company to establish and maintain a plantation on Massachusetts Bay."[10] And still another authoritative writer says, relative to the charter of the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay: "The corporation was a trading company. It was ready to their hand, through the antecedent voyages of 'sea-dogs,' adventurers and merchants, seeking profits from the new countries." [11]

It is clearly evident, therefore, that whether the political organization developed in New England is to be traced in large measure to the corporate business forms that these colonizing enterprises took, as some maintain, or was patterned after the ecclesiastical organization that the colonists brought over with them, as others contend, or, as is more likely, is to be traced in a measure to both sources, the urban influences were very potent in the origin and development of American democracy. Even those who insist that the New England town system is the product of "the rocky soil" of that section must distinguish between the characteristically rural environment of the southern colonies, from which sprang a typically aristocratic form of political organization, and the essentially urban and associative environment of New England, from which sprang a typically democratic form of political organization. Religious, social, and economic influences in New England combined to create comparatively densely settled communities of an urban or semi-urban type; while

these same influences in Virginia, though that colony also was founded by a trading company and received from that company in 1619 a charter providing for the earliest system of representative government in the colonies, worked increasingly toward a system of dispersed population.[12]

When we turn to consider the source of those currents of native, or at least of naturalized, origin contributive to the democratic movement in this country, we meet prominently the view of those who are strongly inclined to the opinion that this movement has been essentially the result of a rural impulse that has had its spring among the population of the frontier regions. The proponents of this view assert the existence in all the colonies, from a very early date, of a clear line of cleavage between the democratic and undemocratic elements—the former representing the purely agricultural and debtor classes of the interior and frontier and the latter representing the propertied commercial and industrial classes of the coast region.

Thus Professor Turner writes: "Indeed, in the period before the outbreak of the American Revolution one can trace a distinct belt of democratic territory extending from the back country of New England down through western New York, Pennsylvania, and the South. In each colony this region was in conflict with the dominant classes of the coast. It constituted a quasi-revolutionary area before the days of the Revolution, and it formed the basis on which the Democratic party was afterwards established. It was therefore in the West, as in the period before the Declaration of Independence, that the struggle for democratic development first revealed itself, and in that area the essential ideas of American democracy had already appeared." He then refers to a number of events in our early history which tend, as he believes, to bear out this view. Thus in Bacon's Rebellion the small landholders of interior Virginia, "seeing that their powers were steadily passing into the hands of the wealthy

planters who controlled church and state and lands, rose in revolt." A similar contest, it is asserted, arose a generation later in Virginia under the governorship of Alexander Spottswood, between the frontier settlers and the property-holding classes of the coast. The War of the Regulation in the Carolinas and the Declaration of Grievances issued by the people of the back counties of these sections on the eve of the Revolution are likewise taken as showing the steady persistence of the struggle between the classes of the interior and those of the coast.[13]

Another writer has similarly called attention to this early distinction between debtor and creditor classes in the colonial period. The people of the inland towns and hamlets, he asserts, were usually in debt to those of the coast towns for salt, seeds, tools, and other articles; and the creation of these great debtor and creditor classes, with the attendant hatred of the latter by the former, he regards as one of the chief results of colonial growth. In this connection he refers to the feeling of hostility cherished by the farmers of the Berkshire region against the Boston merchants, and by the farmers of the Blue Ridge against the coast towns in Pennsylvania and Virginia. And he finds in this early period, too, the beginning of the present antipathy between the City of New York and the up-state sections.[14]

Moreover, this same asserted division between democratic rural elements in the interior and undemocratic elements, largely identified with the urban population, on the coast is declared to have extended into the period of the Revolution and to have afforded the basis for division between the Patriot and Loyalist parties, respectively, in that great struggle. And John Adams has frequently been cited as to the existence in this country, both previous to the Revolution and subsequently, of a "Country Party" and a "Court Party," with an alignment very similar to that which distinguished the parties of the same name in the mother country.[15]

With this tendency to identify the rural elements in this country in the colonial period, and even later, substantially with the forces of democracy and the urban elements with the forces of aristocracy and reaction, it is not possible to agree. It is worthy of note that many of the instances that have just been cited to show an early division between a popular and an aristocratic party have been drawn from the southern colonies, where there was practically no urban population and where the issue lay almost wholly between the population of an interior, or frontier, agricultural region and the rural residents of the old and well established regions along the coast. Moreover, the main support of the conservative party in the northern colonies seems also to have come from the older agricultural districts and not from the urban centers, though it is quite possible that conservative leadership there came largely from the cities. Indeed, the small proportion of the urban to the total population at that time and for many years subsequently made impossible the forming of any considerable element in any party from the urban population alone.

Again, the habit, or misfortune, of falling into debt and the inclination toward repudiation of debts can scarcely be identified with devotion to the essential principles of democracy. Nor do the hatred of the creditor by the debtor and the frequent contempt of the former for the latter necessarily qualify the latter as a genuine apostle of democracy nor necessarily condemn the former as a reactionary. Though these two classes may often have had conflicting views relative to economic issues that involved their personal relations, they may each have had an equally real and sincere interest in the promotion of the principles of political democracy.

Lastly, as we shall proceed forthwith to show, the evidence does not support the conclusion that the rural classes during the period of the Revolution were, in general, Whig or anti-British, and the urban classes Loyalist or pro-British.

II

RURAL AND URBAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE REVOLUTION

The tremendous significance, for the cause of democracy in the world, of having the principles of self-government in a national way take firm root in the midst of the colossal resources of North America is so evident as scarcely to require mention. The comparative attitude of the country and of the city population in the American colonies toward the struggle for national independence and the relative part played by these two elements in that momentous struggle are therefore subjects of the first importance with reference to our general inquiry.

Dissent has just been expressed from the view that the so-called "debtor" or agricultural element afforded the main support of the patriot cause during the Revolution. As a matter of fact careful investigation shows that no particular class and no particular section can be singled out as having been wholly devoted to the interests of the Revolution throughout the whole of the period of that struggle and to the exclusion of other classes and sections.

Much has been said of the "embattled farmers who fired the shot heard round the world"; and John Adams has often been quoted to the effect that he was wont to say in later life that "it was in silently listening to the tavern talks among farmers as he rode the circuits that he first came to realize that American independence was both inevitable and close at hand." [16] But these circumstances by no means prove that the rural elements were patriotic and the urban elements pro-British. Their real significance and explanation lie in the fact that the agricultural class greatly outnumbered all the other classes together; that in any considerable body of Revolutionary soldiers that element would therefore be likely to predominate; and that until the movement for independence

should be likely to receive the support of a large proportion of this overwhelmingly numerous class there could be no hope of national freedom. It is most illuminating in this connection to observe that the talk among the farmers which occasioned the remark ascribed to John Adams related to the conflict that the people of the city of Boston were already carrying on with the King and Parliament.[17] It was clearly a question whether the great body of farmers would support the struggle against Britain that had already been started.

It is significant of the leading part played by Massachusetts—and especially by the city of Boston—in the Revolution that Faneuil Hall, "that guild temple of traders and aldermen, butchers and clerks, hucksters and civic magistrates" where "the spirit of the people conceived an embryonic nation," should have found its location in the chief city and seaport of New England and should have come to be recognized later as "literally 'the cradle of American liberty.'" [18] And it was the people of Massachusetts, too, and especially those of Boston, whom Burke had in mind when he declared of the American colonists that "They augur misgovernment at a distance, and snuff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze." [19] According to John Adams himself "the trumpet of the Revolution was sounded" when, in 1760–61, James Otis, a Boston lawyer, made his argument against the "writs of assistance." Boston and Massachusetts led in opposition to the Stamp Act; and the titles Boston Massacre, Boston Tea-Party, Boston Port Bill, and Bunker Hill afford eloquent testimony to the leadership of this city in the struggle of the colonies for independence. The names of Samuel Adams, John Hancock, Joseph Warren, and Josiah Quincy constitute further evidence of this leadership; and the historic events at Lexington and Concord were but incidents of the previous occupation of Boston by Governor Gage with British troops and of the struggle that followed at Bunker Hill.

Nor did the other important cities fail in evidencing a determination to support the patriot cause. The movement against the Stamp Act was ably seconded by New York City, and the non-importation movement of 1765 had its origin there. The Sons of Liberty originated as a patriotic organization in that city, organized largely from unfranchised mechanics and artisans; and there the first "liberty pole" was erected, and in a conflict with British soldiers over this emblem of freedom early in the year 1770 the first patriot blood in the struggle for independence was shed. New York City had its own "tea party" though the opportunity did not come until four months after the famous affair at Boston. In response to the Boston Port Bill the merchants and mechanics of New York City "called a mass meeting and named a committee of correspondence," which proposed, on May 23d, 1774, a Continental Congress and named delegates from New York to the proposed assembly. Of the prominent leaders of the Revolution in the colony or state of New York, Hamilton, Jay, Livingston, and Schuyler were of urban origin; and Gouverneur Morris was born within the area now embraced within the confines of New York City.

The part played by Philadelphia in the Revolution was less spectacular—perhaps because of the pacifist influence of the large Quaker element. But its contribution was solid and important. That city furnished Dickinson, Franklin, and Morris—"Penman," "Diplomatist," and "Financier," respectively, of the Revolution. There met the two Continental Congresses, there Washington was made commander-in-chief, and from there the Declaration of Independence was made and from Liberty Bell was proclaimed "liberty through all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof." And except for some months in 1777–78, when it was in possession of the British forces, Philadelphia remained practically the seat of government for the Colonies throughout the Revolution.

The name of Benjamin Franklin is of such superlative

importance in connection with the events that preceded and led up to the Revolution, as well as in connection with those events associated with the Revolution itself, as to merit special attention. Franklin was probably unequalled in general political capacity and aptitude and in broad sense and wisdom among the Americans of his time. And it is significant that he, too, was born in Boston and that he was subject to the influences of city life throughout his career, either in the city of his birth, in Philadelphia, his adopted home and at that time the metropolis of America, or in the capital cities of the chief European countries. Franklin's thoroughgoing democracy is attested by the attacks on the Pennsylvania constitutional convention of 1776, of which he was chairman and which has been characterized as "radical, perhaps beyond any which had gathered together before in the colonies," and on the resulting constitution, which provided for a unicameral legislature and for the "recall." And he has been described directly as a "friend and defender" of the ultra-democratic views, in the colonies, in opposition to the "moderate republican" views of John Adams.[20]

But the Revolution was accomplished by the aid of no one section and of no one class. The names of Washington, of Jefferson, of Lee, and of Patrick Henry stand for the conspicuous contribution of the typically rural colony of Virginia, which shared honorably with Massachusetts in the leadership in the struggle. Van Tyne asserts that in 1768 Samuel Adams probably stood alone in the belief that the colonies must become independent;[21] and the predominant part played by the town-meeting, not only in Boston but all over New England, in promoting the opposition to the mother country and in leading up to formal separation, is universally recognized. But division among the rural frontier elements in North Carolina led the whig faction to propose the famous Mecklenburg resolutions; and that colony was the first to authorize its delegates in Congress to unite with the delegates

from other colonies in a declaration of independence. Virginia was the first colony to instruct its delegates actually to propose such a declaration; and one of these delegates, Richard Henry Lee, scion of an ancient Cavalier family, moved the declaratory resolution in Congress. The resolution was seconded by John Adams, a man of rural origin and a strong partisan of separation yet a born aristocrat and holding views widely at variance with those of Jefferson—main author of the Declaration and a representative, in a somewhat qualified way, of the rural elements. With Adams and Jefferson on the committee relative to declaration were Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston, all men of city origin or training. John Hancock, president of the Congress and first signer of the Declaration, was, as already pointed out, from Boston. Pennsylvania and Delaware, due to the influence of Dickinson, who favored the Declaration in principle but believed it to be premature, gave a minority vote against the resolution. New York did not vote on the resolution at the time, as the Provincial Congress had refused to instruct the New York delegates relative to the resolution; but the newly elected congress, which replaced this body almost immediately, adopted the Declaration forthwith.

Though space is lacking for the presentation of the evidence bearing on this point, the altogether confusing and contradictory character of the testimony as to the attitude displayed toward the Revolution, when examined from the point of view of the alignment of the different classes among the mass of the population, simply demonstrates that the Revolution was supported by no one class in particular. Anyone can convince himself of the accuracy of this statement by consulting the evidence itself as presented by Alexander Graydon, Winsor, Sumner, Charles Francis Adams, Van Tyne, Flick, Osgood, and other writers. The rural classes of one

colony or section were strongly whig; while those of another colony or section were as warmly loyalist. Even in the same colony or section the rural elements that were zealously in favor of the Revolution at one period were not infrequently quite decidedly disaffected at another period. Lastly, the rural population of a given region was often bitterly divided over the issue, as was well instanced by the bloody struggle at King's Mountain, in 1780, between whig and loyalist frontiersmen in western North Carolina.

A similar situation prevailed among the different urban classes—the testimony being particularly contradictory in the case of New York City. Graydon, speaking apparently of conditions in 1777, expressed the definite opinion that New England was "far behind the other provinces in the display of an ardent, unequivocal zeal for the cause," and asserted that the "men of fortune and condition" in that section were willing to let the "poorer and humbler classes" do the fighting. But he immediately evens the score as between that section and the more rural South by saying, "Neither did the fighting department appear to be fashionable among the gentry of Virginia." It has been claimed, too, that Massachusetts furnished nearly thirty per cent of all the soldiers put into the field by the colonies during the Revolution, and an even greater proportion of the sailors; while Virginia, with the largest population of any of the colonies, provided fewer soldiers than Connecticut, which ranked next to Massachusetts in this respect.

Moreover, we are told that in Rhode Island a great majority of the returned Revolutionary soldiers found themselves disqualified by the freehold qualification for suffrage —proof that they did not belong to the proprietary landed interest at least. A delegate at the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1820–21 asserted similarly that the freehold qualification for suffrage in that State disqualified "the

laboring parts of society," who had been "the ones who achieved our independence." Further, like complaints were made in other States.[22]

There is thus not the slightest justification for crediting either the rural or the urban elements preponderantly relative to the achievements of the Revolution. Credit is due to both elements in this "high emprise." Contrariwise, evidence discreditable to both elements is not lacking.

III

THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Hildreth, Beard, and others have shown that the Federal Constitution of 1787 was supported and adopted very largely through urban influence and that the opposition was derived, in the main, from the agricultural population—particularly that of the interior and frontier districts.[23] Many of the slave-holding planters of the South, however, were among its supporters. Washington himself, president of the Convention and certainly its most influential member, and Madison, whose distinguished services in the drafting of the Constitution and in securing its adoption by the States are universally recognized, were of the rural group. In New York the rural population of the southern counties united with the people of New York City and Albany in favoring the Constitution; and there was of course other rural support. But, in the main, urban influences predominated.

The significance of the division of classes for or against the Constitution of 1787 in its bearing upon the question of the relative democracy of these classes is, however, somewhat in dispute and depends very much upon the estimate of the Constitution itself as a democratic instrument. To those who regard the Constitution, as first adopted, as a great charter

of democracy—and there are many such—the strenuous opposition of the rural classes can scarcely be considered as convincing evidence of democracy on their part. On the other hand, those who regard the Constitution as first adopted essentially an undemocratic instrument of government may find evidence of the democracy of the majority of the rural population in their hostility to its adoption.

That the Constitution of 1787 was less democratic than the Declaration of Independence and less popular in character than the ineffective Articles of Confederation which it replaced, is undoubtedly true. In a sense, then, its adoption represented a reaction from the popular views that had previously prevailed and from the doubtfully democratic spirit represented in such movements as Shays' Rebellion and the Whisky Insurrection—movements which drew the opposition not only of men like Knox and Washington but also of that democrat of democrats, Samuel Adams. Though at first opposed to the Constitution, Adams was led to champion its ratification by Massachusetts as a result of the passage of resolutions in its favor at a mass meeting of mechanics or tradesmen in Boston and by the suggestion of a later incorporation of a Bill of Rights, Jefferson, likewise, had no "essential objection" to the Constitution except the absence of a bill of rights.[24]

It is also true that according to present standards the Constitution as originally adopted was a comparatively undemocratic instrument. But when viewed in the light of the stage of development in democratic government at that time and when considered not merely as a declaration of principles, as was the Declaration of Independence, but as an actual instrument of government, the Constitution of 1787 goes far to justify the claim for it as a great charter of democracy. Opposition to its adoption, then, reflects no great credit upon its opponents. The essential democracy of the frontier agricultural classes is not in question. But it con-

stitutes no proof of that democracy that they were opposed to the Constitution because it provided for the recognition and funding of the public debt and not for its repudiation, and because it promised to hinder the passage, in the States, of the flood of legislation providing for the relief of debtors and for the issue of paper currency. They were democratic in spite of, and not because of, their attitude toward these issues. On the other hand, those persons, among whom was Washington himself, are not to be accused of being undemocratic because they opposed the repudiation of the public debt and the reckless issue of paper money.

The period since the close of the Revolution had been one of political impotence and of growing economic and social unrest. The Articles of Confederation had signally failed to heal the difficulties under which the people labored at the close of a prolonged and exhausting war and to point the way toward a real national development for the disparate political units that had temporarily come together in a struggle to free themselves from outside domination. Goaded by the distresses of the situation and doubtless invited by the impotence of the government, reckless men seemed disposed to take matters into their own hands; and to careful observers it appeared as though the political and social bonds that tied men together were about to dissolve. Under such circumstances a due conservatism was not inconsistent with a thoroughgoing devotion to democracy. Though conservative in comparison with the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, the Federal Constitution of 1787 was yet markedly innovating and radical in comparison with the fundamental structure of any other existing government. And the surest proof of the wisdom of those who drew it up and secured its adoption is to be found in the striking national development to which it opened the way.

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CHAPTER IX

Rural and Urban Contributions to Democracy in the United States. General Survey *(Continued)*

The same asserted alignment of the rural debtor classes, as the champions of democracy, against the plutocratic elements of the commercial and industrial centers, cited in the preceding chapter for the colonial period and for the period of the Revolution, has also been accepted by these same writers as having continued through the struggle over the Constitution and also as having manifested itself in the triumph of the Jeffersonian democracy in 1800 and in that of the Jacksonian democracy a third of a century later. Moreover, the various phases of the struggle between the democratic and undemocratic elements throughout our subsequent history, as well, have been, by some, closely identified with an asserted corresponding division between the rural and urban elements.

One of the most notable phases of this post-Revolution struggle has been the contest over financial questions—embracing the fierce conflicts relative to the first and second United States Banks and relative to banks in general, the controversies of the greenback period following the Civil War, and the silver issue during the last quarter of the last century. Another phase has related to the struggle to bring railroads, and other non-banking corporations, under the restraint and control of the government. Still another phase has had to do with the liberalizing of the Constitution itself, either through amendment or in some other way. Another phase has had to do with the successive broadening of the suffrage franchise. Lastly, another phase has had to do with

the popularizing of the nominating machinery and with the movement for a more direct participation of the people in the affairs of government through the increasing use of the initiative and referendum.

In respect to almost all of these issues, the popular party, standing for democracy and the rights of the people, has been by some authorities almost completely identified with the agricultural classes.

To this conclusion assent can not be granted without very serious qualification. It is significant that all reference to the attitude toward slavery and to responsibility for that system in this country has been omitted in this connection. Again, the question of the attitude of the rural and of the urban classes, respectively, toward the liberalizing of the suffrage franchise has been practically ignored; the part played by each group with reference to the matter of inequality of representation has been treated in a partial and biased manner; and credit has been assigned with little discrimination relative to the movements toward popularizing the nominating machinery and toward a larger degree of popular government through the use of the initiative, referendum, and recall. Before any dependable conclusion can be arrived at as to the relative inclination toward democracy on the part of these two classes, their attitude in respect to each of these important indices of democracy must be carefully determined —a task that is undertaken in the present chapter and in the succeeding chapter.

I

THE JEFFERSONIAN MOVEMENT

The view that the Democratic-Republican victory under the leadership of Jefferson in 1800 was the result of the support of the agrarian interests while Federalism in that cam-

paign was backed by the same professional, mercantile, and capitalistic classes which were asserted to have supported the adoption of the Constitution, has been advanced by Hildreth, Schouler, and Henry Adams, and has been reasserted by Beard against the attacks of Bassett and Libby, who have contended that Jefferson received the support, rather, of the regions of wealth and talent. Channing, again, appears to side with Bassett and Libby.[1]

It does not appear, however, that the question at issue can be so decided as conclusively to bear out either of these opposing views. That Jefferson received a majority of the agrarian vote and that a vast majority of the total number of votes that he received were those of rural voters are evident from the decisive character of his victory in a country whose population was still overwhelmingly rural. But it is admitted that the Republican vote in the cities was comparatively "very large"; and there is no doubt that in widely distributed rural sections the vote was adverse to Jefferson and his party. New York City and County, Boston and the whole of eastern Massachusetts except Essex County, Baltimore, and Annapolis were carried by the Republicans; while Philadelphia, Providence, and Charleston returned Federalists. But the Shays' insurrection territory in Western Massachusetts, anti-Federalist in 1788 at the time of the vote on the ratification of the Constitution, went Federalist in 1800 though the population was almost exclusively rural; and Maine, then a part of Massachusetts, also went Federalist though certainly largely frontier in character. Moreover, the fact of the Federalist victory in these rural districts renders improbable and virtually invalid Beard's assumption that the Republican victory in Boston was due to the favorable vote of a rural element in the suburbs of that city.

Doubt of the really urban character of the Republican victory in Baltimore is removed by the overwhelming character of Jefferson's triumph there; and the significance of his

victory in Annapolis is emphasized by the fact that that city had long been noted for its people of wealth and culture. In New Jersey it is significant that the Federalist victory resulted from the fact that agricultural West Jersey, which was conservative and Federalist, out-voted East Jersey, which was commercial, liberal, and Republican.[2] Moreover, it would be absurd to regard the Federalist triumph in such States as Vermont and New Hampshire as due to urban plutocratic influence.

The figures presented by Beard relative to the vote in New York City by wards, in 1800, in an effort to show that the real urban vote in the metropolis was anti-Jefferson, do indeed bear out his claim that the "heart of the city" supported the Federalists. But this indicates nothing more than the generally recognized fact that there is an ultra-conservative element in almost every city, made up in large measure of the large business and financial interests. It does not prove the city population as a whole undemocratic or ultra-conservative—either for today or for New York City in 1800. Indeed, Beard's own figures show a very considerable Republican minority vote in the wards constituting the heart of the City —especially for assemblyman, in respect to which office a more liberal franchise prevailed and for which office the Jeffersonian candidate prevailed decisively in the City as a whole. Moreover, a vote based on manhood suffrage undoubtedly would have greatly increased the Republican vote in the heart of the City as well as have greatly increased the Republican majority for assemblyman in the City as a whole.

Neither does Beard's claim that the rural elements in the outlying regions "overwhelmed the men of trade and finance at the lower end of Manhattan" appear to have much force or significance in explaining Jefferson's victory in New York City and vicinity in 1800. According to the first census of occupations, in 1820, there were but 386 persons engaged in farming in New York County, then nearly coterminous

with the City, while there were 3,142 engaged in commerce and 9,523 engaged in manufactures. It seems very likely, therefore, that the number of persons within the limits of New York City in 1800 who might be regarded as really rural was relatively small in comparison with the number of artisans and others engaged in the various city occupations who resided in the outlying wards and who were doubtless largely disfranchised by the property qualifications for suffrage. Moreover, it is passing strange, relative to the claim that Beard makes in this connection, that as the outlying rural element became less and less important in the population of New York City, with the passing years, that City should have definitely passed from Federalist control and have become continuously more and more Jeffersonian and Jacksonian in its sentiments.

Lastly, though Libby's claim that the Federalist party in New York State represented "country constituencies in sparsely settled regions remote from the activity of business life and out of touch with national progress along every line" may be extreme, it is yet significant that in the contest for governor in that State in 1792, between the federalist, John Jay, and the anti-federalist, George Clinton, it was the throwing out of the votes of the three remote and rural counties of Clinton, Otsego, and Tioga on a technical irregularity that gave the election to the latter.

On the whole, therefore, it can not be regarded as proven that the rural districts, in general and in proportion to their population, played any greater part in the great democratic revolution of 1800 than the urban centers. Considering the small urban population and the proportionally greater disfranchisement of the popular elements in the urban centers, there is evidence of quite as much democratic sentiment in the cities as in the rural districts at that election.

II

THE JACKSONIAN MOVEMENT

The years that had passed since 1800 had been years of preparation for the further expansion and further expression of the democratic movement. Indeed, they were years when that expansion went rapidly forward; and it was in the Jacksonian movement that this expansion found recognition and expression. On the strictly political side, the features of the period following 1800 were the liberalizing of the suffrage franchise, the democratizing of the Constitution, and the increasing popularization of the political system in general.

Though a number of amendments to the Federal Constitution, designed to constitute a bill of rights, had been accepted soon after its original adoption and ratification, no further considerable progress in the direction of a democratization of the Constitution through a formal change was made for a long period. But democratization went forward nevertheless, through common consent and popular usage as well as through judicial interpretation. By 1800 the presidential electors had already come to be simply passive agents for the expression of the popular voice with reference to the choice of a president instead of independent factors in that choice. Again, the electors themselves, at first chosen by the various State legislatures, presently became subject to choice by the direct vote of the people. Then, too, the example set by Washington, and followed by Jefferson, of refusing a third term as president went far toward establishing the principle of limited succession in the national executive and thus tended strongly to differentiate the new government from that monarchical form toward which, in the opinion of some, it was believed to lean.

Further, the system of nominations through congressional

or State legislative bodies was presently displaced by the selection of candidates in conventions of delegates more or less popularly constituted. Rotation in office and popular access to office became a marked feature of the new democracy that particularly distinguished it from the Jeffersonian democracy and that was, perhaps, its chief distinguishing feature in general. Associated with these two features were the development of parties and party government and the regrettable rise of the spoils system and of the partisan spirit. Another feature was the extension of the principle of direct election of officials at the expense of the system of appointment.

On the side of judicial interpretation the trend was in the direction of centralization and nationality and seemed, at least, to be non-popular and undemocratic. But that this was so only apparently and that such a trend worked ultimately and in reality toward actual democracy is indicated by its acceptance, and even promotion, by both Jefferson and Jackson when they attained the presidency. The later identification of the state rights party with the forces that struggled to perpetuate slavery is significant in this connection.

As reflected in matters of public policy, the struggle turned around the questions of a national bank, of the tariff, of the relative sphere of the federal government, the States, and the individual corporation in respect to internal improvements, and of slavery.

With respect to this whole series of developments and issues, political, constitutional, and socio-economic, as with respect to the Jacksonian constituency itself, it is impossible to say that the popular side was represented by the members of any particular class, rural or urban. Because of its importance with reference to the present inquiry, the subject of the liberalizing of the suffrage franchise is reserved for later special consideration. But the results of that examination may be anticipated here to an extent sufficient to point

out that the statement just made applies without qualification to the suffrage controversy. The popularization of the functioning of the system of presidential electors may be ascribed, in a general way, to the same combined rural and urban influences that swept Jefferson into power in 1800. But it is significant that South Carolina, an agricultural State, should have been the last in the Union to accept this palpably democratic change.

Reference has already been made to the particularly favorable attitude of the Jacksonian constituency toward the popularization of the machinery of election; and there can be no doubt that the hostile attitude of the frontier democracy toward the congressional and legislative nominating caucuses had much to do with paving the way for the rise of the nominating convention. But William H. Crawford, of Georgia, representing the old Jeffersonian democracy, was the only one of the candidates in 1824 who was willing to accept the handicap of a nomination for the presidency at the hands of a congressional caucus and he was the last candidate in the history of the country who was openly nominated in this manner. As early as 1812 De Witt Clinton, then mayor of New York City, had been nominated for president in a legislative caucus by his supporters in opposition to Madison with the object, in part, of breaking up the system of congressional nominations for the presidency—again a significant invoking of the principle of a liberalized nominating machinery against an associate of Jefferson and a prominent member of the Virginia political hierarchy.

In the meantime there had been growing up in New York and Pennsylvania a system of State party conventions in which delegates representing the political parties came together and made nominations for State officers; and this system was, in turn, soon to displace that of nominations by State legislatures, for the presidential office. In New York City in September, 1812, at a Federalist conference, origi-

nated by three city men, De Witt Clinton had been nominated for the presidency by the convention method also. And later, both in New York and in Rhode Island, interests favoring the candidacy of J. Q. Adams, whom some would identify as the candidate of the urban plutocracy, were prominent in promoting the convention method of nomination.[3] In September, 1831, the Anti-Masonic Party, an anti-Jackson though predominantly rural organization, at Baltimore held the first undoubted delegate national convention for the nomination of a candidate for president. The other candidates in this campaign were similarly chosen or endorsed; and from this time forward no other plan has ever been openly followed.

It is thus far from correct to identify the Jacksonian democracy in disproportionate degree with the rural elements or to credit it exclusively with this reform.

The theory of the general fitness and eligibility of any citizen or party worker for office was one that was close to the heart of the Jacksonian democracy; and it was upon this theory that the system of rotation in office was based. But this view was supported by the liberal urban elements as well as by the liberal rural elements; though it seems clear that there was a better appreciation among the urban population in general than there was among the people of the rural districts, of the unfortunate effects of this system upon efficiency in the public service. On the other hand, the system of rotation was perhaps even more foreign to the ideals and prejudices of the rural aristocracy in the Old South than it was to the citizenry of New England. Here again there was no clear division between the rural and the urban elements.

Neither was there any general alignment of the rural classes as a whole against the people of the growing cities with regard to the questions of public policy to which reference has been made. The agricultural South opposed the tariff, but the equally agricultural West strongly supported

it. The urban manufacturing interests and the urban commercial interests were similarly at odds on this question. Again, there was similar division of sentiment among the rural classes with respect to the policy of participation by the general government in internal improvements: the South opposed, the West approved. Moreover, while the corporations that undertook internal improvement enterprises were quite willing to receive aid from the general government they were naturally not favorable to the execution of these enterprises by the government itself. The urban commercial interests were at first eager for the early and rapid construction of internal improvements by any means whatsoever.

The issue of popular government was more closely allied, however, with the struggle over a national bank; and here it is commonly believed that the rural elements were aligned against the city population in opposition to a national bank. Admittedly there was greater unanimity among the rural population with respect to this issue than with respect to the tariff or internal improvements; and admittedly the fear that the establishment of a national bank might threaten the liberties of the people had a wider currency among the rural classes than in the cities. Catteral points out that the Bank of the United States was, in its day, "the one great monopoly in the country" and that there was concentrated against it "all the passionate opposition and fear" that today are distributed among a variety of corporations.[4] There can be no doubt, either, that much of the opposition of the rural elements to a national bank—and to banks in general—was associated with the traditional hostility of the rural dweller toward the urban resident.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these anti-monopoly views were confined to the rural population. Their prevalence among certain elements of the urban population was especially evident during the later stages of the controversy over the issue of a United States Bank. But Pro-

fessor Sumner is authority for the statement that as early as "the first years of the century a little clique at Philadelphia became alarmed at the increase of the 'money power' and at the growing perils of democracy" and "attacked with some violence . . . the first bank of the United States, and . . . prevented its recharter." [5] The First Bank had exercised a restraining influence upon the activities of the State banks and the latter, certainly not a pro-rural interest, therefore had a strong motive in opposing the recharter of the former. And Matthew Carey, in a series of letters relative to attacks upon the First Bank and to opposition to its recharter, stated that the Bank had been vilified by newspapers in Philadelphia. "The passions and prejudices of every man in the community interested in the state banks," he writes, "have been enlisted in this controversy against the United States Bank, by declarations in the gazettes that the latter 'would, if it obtained a new charter, render All the State Banks *subservient to its views, and as thoroughly subject to its influence*'." [6]

Though citizens of Philadelphia, including both manufacturers and mechanics, petitioned for the recharter of the First Bank, citizens of Pittsburgh presented a memorial in opposition; and John Jacob Astor, of New York City, the wealthiest man in America, vehemently opposed its recharter. Again, the banks of New York City, with a single exception, also presented a memorial in Congress against a recharter, urging, in addition to various other reasons, that the capital was too large and that it was unfavorable to the local banks.[7] At the Bankers' Convention at Philadelphia in August, 1816, the banks in general refused to make efforts toward resumption of specie payments—a practice that the Bank of the United States had persistently tried to encourage and enforce, with the very natural result of arousing hostility against itself.[8]

If the debtor classes in the rural districts are to be re-

garded as democratic because of the mere fact that they were hostile to the interests to whom they were indebted, it is difficult to see why the urban State bank interests should not be regarded as equally democratic because they were thus inclined to evade their own obligations!

The opening of the attack on the Second Bank, in 1829, was begun by the merchants of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, who in a petition to Congress complained of the business methods of the Bank. Moreover, Theodore Roosevelt is authority for the statement that "All the state banks were . . . rabidly in favor of Jackson" in the campaign of 1832. And he points out that in Pennsylvania, where there was a strong sentiment in favor of the Bank, the sentiment was even more pronounced in favor of Jackson, so that that State by a decided popular majority gave its electoral vote to Jackson while instructing its senators and representatives in Congress to support the Bank.[9]

Lastly, to the other urban elements who contributed their sympathy and, so far as possible, their support to the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian movements, must be added the rising laboring classes in the industrial and commercial centers. Denied the privilege of suffrage at the beginning of the century, they yet were "ardent champions of all reforms" and thoroughly entered into opposition to banking and other monopolies—and particularly into the opposition to the Bank of the United States. This attitude in general was vigorously set forth on the occasion of the strike of the Journeymen House Carpenters in Philadelphia for a ten-hour day, in 1827; and later these same laboring interests organized the "first labour party in the world" and formally, at least, withdrew their support from the party of Jackson. By 1829 this political awakening of the laboring classes in Philadelphia had extended to New York City; and the Working Men's Party in that center condemned banks, and especially the Bank of the United States, more severely than was done by

the party in other parts of the State, where some of the farmers had joined in the movement. Banks, these workingmen of New York City declared, were "exclusive privileges"; and bankers were characterized as "the greatest knaves, impostors, and paupers of the age . . . who swear they have promised to pay to their debtors thirty or thirty-five millions of dollars ON DEMAND, at the same time that they have, as they also swear, only three, four, or five millions to do it with." [10]

As judged from the point of view of the electoral vote in 1832, Clay may appear to have seriously miscalculated the sentiment in favor of the Bank of the United States. But the popular vote, which went in Jackson's favor by only 687,502 votes to about 554,000,[11] presents a materially modified basis for judgment—and the one that must be accepted for our present purpose. On an anti-Bank, anti-monopoly issue Jackson thus scored no really overwhelming victory on a directly popular basis. Considering that about eighty per cent of the employed population of the country, in 1830, was occupied in agriculture and that but 6.7 per cent of the total population lived in places of 8,000 population and over at that time, it is evident that Clay must have received a very large proportion of his vote in the rural districts. Moreover, he actually received a considerable number of his electoral votes from States that were overwhelmingly rural. Massachusetts, with Boston, was carried decisively by Clay; and the Clay ticket was also successful in Connecticut and Rhode Island. Maine and New Hampshire went for Jackson, but Vermont went Anti-Mason. Clay also carried Delaware and Maryland by small majorities, though Baltimore went decisively for Jackson.

On the other hand, Jackson carried both New York and Pennsylvania. New York City voted for him by a very heavy majority—furnishing, indeed, well toward one-half of the total Jackson majority in the State though comprising but

about one-seventh of the total population of the State. It had continued Democratic from 1800—thus swinging definitely away, as its fringe of rural population diminished, from the supposedly less popular party. Albany went anti-Jackson, but by a very slender majority. Philadelphia voted decisively against Jackson; and Pittsburgh and the borough of Allegheny voted similarly by moderate majorities. But Lancaster "City District" voted overwhelmingly for Jackson, though the eminently rural county of Lancaster went as a whole for Wirt by over 1,000 majority. Cincinnati voted for Clay, or for Clay and Wirt, by a majority of 712 in a total vote of probably 4,500; Louisville, by a majority of 538; and St. Louis by a majority of about 100.[12]

Urban support of Jackson in 1832 was materially less evident than in 1824 and 1828. But the decisive character of his victory in New York City and Baltimore, the largest two cities in the country, in Lancaster and in other less important centers, and the fact of the comparative closeness of the vote in still other centers, that went for Clay or Wirt, forbid any wide generalization to the effect that the urban population in general was hostile to Jackson.

In 1824 and 1828, however, when the candidacy of Jackson probably afforded, on the whole, a better touchstone of democratic or undemocratic sentiment than in 1832, inasmuch as his arbitrary acts had led to disaffection on the part of some of his earlier supporters, there was no doubt of overwhelming urban support for him. For in his first two campaigns Jackson carried not only New York City and Baltimore but Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Louisville as well. In Ohio, in 1824, the "thinly settled" and "distinctly rural" counties voted for Clay or for Adams, while the more populous, urban, counties went for Jackson.[13] Nor is it likely that this was an isolated instance, either in 1824, in 1828, or in 1832.

It should not be forgotten that the Jacksonian movement

was denied the character of a genuinely democratic movement by its opponents in its own day, just as it has been denied this character by some of its critics since.[14] One of its most marked features was the tendency to enlarge the powers of the executive at the expense of the legislative branch of the government. This tendency found a sympathetic exponent, of course, in the arbitrary and masterful Jackson and was welcomed by many of liberal tendencies who felt that the legislative branch was not truly representative and failed as an effective agency for the expression of the popular will. On the other hand, it was insistently maintained by the opposition that real democracy, or preferably real republicanism, consisted in the unrestricted exercise of their constitutional powers by the legally elected representatives of the people—as, indeed, Jefferson himself had held. And these opponents fiercely resented the asserted autocratic and tyrannical acts of the executive, much as we have recently seen and heard complaints with reference to the administrations of Roosevelt and Wilson, and called for a restoration of the original liberties of the fathers.[15]

Moreover, Jackson through his energetic action against the nullification movement in South Carolina in 1832–33 gave a decided check to the extreme state rights doctrine, which traced back to Jefferson and Madison in its ultimate origin and which has been identified by some with the popular and democratic sentiments of the rural constituency whom these two men led. This emphasis by Jackson upon nationalism as against local self-government represented another development away from the type of democracy that characterized the period of the Revolution and the Confederation. Moreover, the spoils system, the introduction of which in a thoroughgoing way was certainly associated with the Jacksonian movement even though it cannot justly be charged to Jackson himself, is anything but democratic in its essential character and ultimate influence.

The significant feature in the development of the slavery issue during the Jacksonian period lies in the fact that though rural and urban influences united in opposition to slavery the circumstances that were to identify the real and permanent pro-slavery interests with the great agricultural South were rapidly maturing. The abolition of slavery in all the northern States, which included of course the great majority of the chief commercial and industrial centers, was either accomplished by 1804 or was provided for by that date; and the abolition of the import slave trade from 1808 removed from every other section outside of the South the last vestige of direct economic interest in slavery. It thus came about that slavery was dying out in the more industrialized and more urbanized sections of the country at the very time that it was fast becoming, through the rise of the cotton-growing industry, the dominant economic, social, and political feature in the most purely agricultural section. The efforts of the Slavocracy to protect their cherished institution against attack and even to promote its spread into the newly organized territories and States naturally led to attempts to restrain freedom of thought, of speech, of the press, and of action, until this thoroughly rural interest became the most consistent and formidable antagonist of the principles of human freedom and of political liberty in the history of the country.

That mere party politics, apart from any alignment for or against the principle of democracy, played no small part in determining the attitude of political leaders and political groups relative to the Bank of the United States is evident from the fact that though the party of strict construction founded by Jefferson and Madison successfully opposed a recharter of the First Bank in 1811, in spite of the powerful efforts of Gallatin and Crawford in its favor, a charter for the Second Bank was given in 1816 by the very party which had refused it in 1811. Moreover, the granting of the charter in 1816 was strenuously opposed by many of the Federalists

under the leadership of Webster—together with a few irreconcilables from the state rights party. It is most interesting to note that the Federalists now criticised the proposed charter on the ground that the capital was too large and because of the proposed connection between the Bank and the government. They represented its power as "monstrous, almost irresistible"! It is difficult to distinguish between criticism such as this and that which has been ascribed more or less exclusively to the agrarian class. If anything were needed to complete the picture of an entire change of attitude on the question by the two parties as a result of the shifting exigencies of party politics, it was supplied by Calhoun in the rôle of defender against the charge that the capital of the proposed bank was too large! Clay, who represented both the manufacturing and the agricultural interests of the West, also changed from his position of early decided opposition to one of later warm support in the Bank controversy.

The développing alignment on the slavery issue during the period of the Jacksonian supremacy illustrates both the contradictory and complicated character of the influences that worked for and against democracy and also the same political *voltes-face* and apparently incongruous political alliances to which attention has just been called relative to the issue of a United States Bank. Rural and urban influences were combined for and against slavery, just as they were combined for and against Jackson. And though without any direct and positive economic interest in slavery, indeed often opposed to that system abstractly considered, important liberal elements, both rural and urban, north of Mason and Dixon's line, became tolerant apologists for slavery and supporters of the principle of non-interference with it through their association in a political way with the traditional party of liberal democratic thought and sentiment, which now became increasingly dominated by the masterful slave interests of the South.

Jackson himself, leading exponent of the sentiments of a democratic epoch, was most illogically pro-slavery in his sympathies and was weakest politically where anti-slavery sentiment was strongest, though probably not strongest politically where pro-slavery sentiment was strongest; and the partisans of Jackson shared his anomalous attitude.

Remembering that our ideals as to just what constitutes democracy change from time to time as conditions and circumstances change, it must yet be admitted that the Jacksonian movement was not wholly a democratic movement. But broadly speaking it may be characterized as essentially democratic; and with all the qualifications to which it is subject it nevertheless worked effectively toward the further democratization of public opinion and of the political system. With its measure of good and its modicum of evil it was, however, a movement to which both rural and urban influences contributed in due proportion and not one that had a virtually exclusive rural impulse as has too often been argued or assumed. It was, in general, the joint influence of the frontier rural element and of the liberal element in the rapidly growing commercial and industrial centers and not the influence of the agricultural class alone or as a whole that afforded the moving impulse.[16] The conservative party, on the other hand, must have received its main backing, numerically considered, in the older agricultural districts, though leadership doubtless lay in those masterful urban elements in charge of the large business interests, or in the members of the legal profession who were in no small degree the spokesmen and promoters of the views of the large business interests.

III

THE "LOG CABIN" AND "HARD CIDER" PERIOD

The period opening with the election of William Henry Harrison to the presidency, in 1840, illustrates particularly

well the contradictory and shifting character that diverse economic and political interests or that party feeling or political expediency gave to the forces that promoted, or opposed, as the case might be, democratic principles or policies. In the periods of Jefferson and of Jackson these contradictory alignments were comparatively subordinate and incidental to the main issues that divided men and groups. But now it was the contradictory alignments that were characteristic and the adherence to issues or principles from conviction the exception. If the period from 1816 to 1832 has been called the "Period of Personal Politics," the period following 1840 may be called the "Period of Party Politics." Political expediency and not political conviction dominated—and dominated decisively.

For this predominance of purely party politics the Whigs were not especially responsible. Indeed, it was the party of Jackson that had first worked out the system of effective party organization; and in this fashioning the skilled hand of Van Buren had been a decisive factor. But the Whigs were apt pupils and they were presently able to effect such a party organization and to create so clever a bundle of party and political shibboleths that they effectively turned the tables upon the Democrats, who, with the exception of the Southern slave interests, likewise had no particular end to serve except that of party expediency.

It is therefore significant of the times that the Whigs entered Harrison as a candidate for the presidency at this time. For he was a man of Southern birth, whose father as a member of the Virginia Convention had "actively opposed" the ratification by that State of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, who himself had a distinguished military record in that war with England that had been so thoroughly condemned in the sections where the Whigs were now particularly strong, and whose views on slavery were innocuous and those on the tariff equally indefinite—issues in which

the various elements that entered into the formation of the Whig party were supposed to be vitally interested. Putting Harrison, "the first presidential candidate to be selected upon the ground of expediency alone," forward without any formal declaration of principles whatsoever as a representative of the frontier democracy and contrasting him with the polished and urbane Van Buren, the Whigs completely stole the "political thunder" of the party of Jackson and triumphantly elected their candidate with the vote of every Northern State but two and of all the Southern States but three. Moreover, Tyler was even more conspicuously a candidate of expediency.

Van Buren was unpopular because of the business depression that had occurred during his administration; but his views with reference to the Bank of the United States and on other issues were much the same as those of Jackson and on this basis alone he should have won the support of the constituency that had rallied to Jackson and that had indeed won the former the presidency four years before. On the other hand, there was no reason, apart from the frontier simplicity of life more or less superficially ascribed to Harrison, that should have commended the latter to popular and democratic sympathies. In 1836, indeed, Harrison had received a large part of the Anti-Masonic vote in the Middle and Western States—a vote that was largely a frontier vote in general and that was yet both anti-Jackson and anti-Van Buren. In New York, where this party originated and where it played a particularly decisive part in the political sphere on different occasions, its strength lay "almost wholly in the agricultural interior." [17] And yet it presently became a component part of the National Republican party, and later of the Whig party, though these parties are supposed to have represented urban plutocratic interests in a special way. In Ohio, Democratic influences likewise appear to have predominated among the population of the cities subsequent to 1840 and Whig

influences among the rural population.[18] And Kentucky, a preponderantly rural State, not only voted for Harrison but remained steadily Whig throughout this period.

The Whig party commanded strong support from the business interests in the urban centers; but the Democrats showed their usual strength in New York City, among the industrial population in the suburban districts surrounding the old city of Philadelphia, and in many other urban areas. That Van Buren also must have shared largely in the rural vote is evident from the fact that he received nearly forty-seven per cent of all the votes cast in 1840, when the population living in places of 8,000 or over constituted but 8.5 per cent of the total population of the country as a whole. If it is impossible to prove the agricultural class as a whole democratic because Andrew Jackson, generally recognized as standing for democracy, received but about fifty-five or fifty-six per cent of the total number of votes cast in a country overwhelmingly rural, in 1828 and 1832, and also carried nearly all the important cities in 1824 and 1828, together with the largest two cities in 1832, how shall we determine the degree of democracy attaching to the rural population in 1840, when the rural vote was divided in so nearly equal degree between two candidates as to whose comparative devotion to democracy we are unable to arrive at any decision? The query leads inevitably to a *reductio ad absurdum;* and with this logical impasse there falls away most of the support that is advanced to prop the view of the asserted superior democracy of the agricultural class, in the earlier period of our national history.

Four years later, Polk, the candidate of the Democratic party, was elected president over Clay, the Whig candidate, by a minority popular vote. In 1848 the Whigs were successful, electing Zachary Taylor, like Jackson a southerner, a slaveholder, and a military hero, to the presidency—but again by less than a majority of the popular vote in conse-

quence of the large number of votes that went to Van Buren, now the Free Soil candidate. In 1852 the Whig candidate carried but four States; and it is significant that three of these were agricultural States.[19]

The outcome of the presidential elections during this whole period well illustrates the fact that party differences throughout our history have in no small measure been based on other than real political issues—often on issues that involved merely the personal interests and rivalries of the politicians who manipulated the platforms and the choice of candidates and quite as often on questions of mere party or political expediency. The Whig party was divided against itself, like the Democratic party, on the question of slavery and was destined even sooner and more irretrievably than the latter to be wrecked on this issue. But the really significant fact is not that the Whig and Democratic parties were wrecked over the slavery issue but that, though including very diverse and often contradictory elements, they were able to hold together effectively for so long a time and, in the case of the Democratic party, ultimately to gather together again in an effective manner the disparate constituent elements. Again, it is not so surprising that the Republican party should have originated in 1854–56 through the unification of certain elements that had little in common except opposition to slavery and, in a qualified way, to the doctrine of state rights, as that it has held together so long and so well in spite of diverse elements and contradictory issues.

All this goes to show that party divisions and political decisions normally are based largely upon the existence and continuance of party spirit or party loyalty and upon accidental or fortuitous circumstances. It is, for the most part, only at the time of the origin of a political party, or in its early history, that real differences of opinion with respect to important issues exert a really decisive influence. At other times party expediency and habitual party affiliation are

dominating factors. There is danger, therefore, of ascribing too much significance to the fact that this party or that party, professing devotion to this or to that body of political principles or to this or that line of public policy, receives the support of this or of that class or of this or of that section of the country. For it is only under exceptional circumstances and at infrequent intervals that these seeming differences have any considerable significance or reality.

IV

THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD

When the issue of slavery came to a decisive test at the time of the Civil War, that event was associated with a change in party alignment and in party affiliation that was, for a time, really significant, as had been the case in the days of Jefferson and of Jackson. And it is worthy of note that the Republican party, which united the anti-slavery forces at this time, was neither a rural nor an urban party preponderantly but drew its elements from all sections and all classes in the North—urban as well as rural.[20] Moreover, the same statement may be made with reference to the Liberty Party and the Free Soil Party. The latter party, taking as its motto the words "Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, and Free Man" and nominating prevailingly urban candidates for president and vice-president, in 1848, polled a larger proportion of the total vote in Massachusetts than in any other State;[21] and in 1851 Charles Sumner, perhaps the most distinguished among the founders of the Free Soil Party, as also among the founders of the Republican Party, into which the former was later merged, was sent from Boston as United States senator from Massachusetts and did valiant service at the national capital for the anti-slavery cause.

Though the people of the West naturally reacted more quickly to the repeal of the essential provision of the Missouri Compromise by the Kansas-Nebraska Bill in 1854 and though the first steps in the formation of the new Republican party from the various anti-slavery elements were taken in Wisconsin and Michigan, everywhere in the North "large elements of the existing parties came together and agreed to unite in resisting the extension of slavery." John C. Fremont, first candidate of the new party for president, in 1856, was a man of urban birth and rearing; and in the election of that year, in spite of the proportionally greater strength of the Democratic party in the cities and in spite of the comparative lack of sympathy with the anti-slavery cause on the part of the large foreign element in the urban centers, he carried a number of the important cities of the North—including Boston, Pittsburgh, Rochester, and Chicago—and all the more urban and industrial States of that section except Pennsylvania and New Jersey.[22] In the comparatively urban States of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, indeed, the vote for Fremont was proportionally heavier—in the case of the former decidedly so—than in the relatively new and rural States of Wisconsin and Michigan, though it was heaviest of all in highly rural and nativist Vermont. In spite of the vote of Chicago for Fremont, Illinois, as also Indiana, went for Buchanan. And though New York City, Philadelphia, and Brooklyn also went strongly for Buchanan, almost all the Fremont votes in Maryland came from Baltimore; and St. Louis gave Fillmore a heavy majority though Missouri as a whole went decisively for Buchanan.[23]

In the election of 1860, the great centers of population in the North, with the exception of New York City, as well as the rural districts in that section, were swept by Lincoln and the anti-slavery forces. It is particularly worthy of note, perhaps, that St. Louis provided more than one-half of all the votes cast for Lincoln in Missouri in 1860, though he

received the fewest votes, in that State, of any one of the four candidates.[24] And it is significant that in the great struggle that followed, in 1861–65, Massachusetts, which had the smallest proportion of rural to total population in 1860 of any State in the Union, with Boston, played much the same leading rôle that that State and City had played at the time of the Revolution.

Certain business interests in some of the Northern cities, especially in New York City and Philadelphia, interests that had commercial and financial relations with the South, were loath to see these jeopardized by war and at first manifested some disinclination to lend support to the struggle to restrict slavery and to preserve the Union; though it should be kept in mind that the rural population in the North had few economic interests that were threatened by the coming struggle. The momentary hesitation of the urban industrial workers in some of the Northern cities in backing the Northern cause has already been referred to. But this circumstance suggests, in general, the prevailing attachment of these urban laboring elements to the party of Jefferson and of Jackson rather than real indifference to the evils of human slavery and to the aristocratic and tyrannical sentiments of the slave element that had for a score of years dominated that party.

In short, if there was any indication of a difference between the rural and the urban population in respect to the attitude manifested toward the question of slavery at the crisis of the Civil War, it was that the Southern Confederacy, as already pointed out, represented the undemocratic side of the struggle and that it was overwhelmingly rural and agricultural.

V

THE GRANGER AND GREENBACK PERIOD

The revolt of the farmers in the Seventies against the railway and warehouse interests, and against the distributive

interests in general, was of course prevailingly a movement of the agricultural class; and it had important and permanent results in contributing to the general acceptance, in theory and in fact, of the subordination of railway corporations to public control. In fact, as representing an influential step in the direction of the subjection of corporations in general to public control, this result may be considered as the greatest single contribution of the agricultural class to the cause of democratic government in this country. The granger movement in its wider aspects also contributed much to advance the cause of woman suffrage.

The greenback movement, though perhaps doubtfully democratic in its relations to public policy, has usually been considered almost purely rural in its inception. As early as 1867, however, the greenback issue aroused the most intense interest among the delegates to the meeting of the National Labor Union, who had practically come at that time to abandon their own demands and identify their interests with those of the farmer and small business man.[25] And subsequent to the strikes of July, 1877, and their failure, there ensued a period of political activity on the part of the workingmen, with the organization of a number of local labor parties, which were speedily affiliated with the Greenback Party in various States and which during the following two years contributed a large proportion—in some States a majority—of the votes cast for that party. The Greenback Party later even came to be known as the Greenback Labor Party.

Though the bulk of the Greenback vote in 1878, when the movement reached its zenith, came from the agricultural States of the Middle West and Southwest, where the chief source of its strength had lain from the beginning, the urban labor vote was an important factor in New York and in some other States. And though labor support of the movement, except in Pennsylvania, rapidly declined—as indeed was the case with its support in general—when Benjamin Butler was

nominated for president in 1884 by the Anti-Monopoly or Peoples' Party and received the endorsement of the Greenback Party, a very large percentage of the 135,000 votes that he received was drawn from the ranks of the laboring class.[26]

To a certain extent there was fusion of the granger and the greenback movements. But in some cases the granger element definitely refused to join forces with the greenback interests. In States like Pennsylvania and Massachusetts rural support of the greenback movement had been slight, though in Maine it had been considerable. On the other hand, support was also slight in many of the large urban centers. Once again, then, there was no evidence of any general division of the rural from the urban vote. The rural vote was divided against itself and the urban vote was likewise divided.

VI

THE ALLIANCE AND POPULIST MOVEMENTS

Affiliation between the workingmen and the radical agricultural elements did not disappear with the decline of the greenback movement. Already this affiliation was manifesting itself along new lines. In 1889 the Knights of Labor joined with the National Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union, and with similar organizations, in political convention at St. Louis and in setting forth a list of demands; and in 1891 the preliminary organization of the Peoples' Party on a national basis was accomplished by the Citizens' Alliance and the Knights of Labor. By 1894 a "virtual connection" had been established between the trade unions and the Peoples' Party, and many labor candidates found a place on the ticket of that party. Even in States like Massachusetts, undoubtedly as a result of the support of the labor element, a very large influence was exerted in the legislatures through the regular party organizations.

The chief demands voiced by the Peoples' Party, and by the various constituting organizations that preceded it, included, on the more purely political side, the secret ballot, direct election of United States senators, of federal judges, and of the president of the United States, woman suffrage, the initiative and referendum, and the restriction or abolition of lobbying. On the socio-economic side there were included the abolition of national banks, the issue of all paper money directly by the national government, the free coinage of silver, government loans on land, the eight-hour day, the restriction of the use of the injunction in labor disputes, the income tax, tariff reform, rigid government control, or ownership, of railroads and of other means of communication, and trust legislation.

With scarcely an exception these more purely political demands were along the line of democratic development; and the subsequent establishment of a number of these proposed changes or reforms, either in whole or in part, as features of our political system has represented a notable contribution to democratic government in this country. The issue of democracy was, on the whole, less intimately involved in the success or failure of the second class of demands, though this qualification can not be said to apply in full measure in regard to the income tax, to railroad and trust legislation, and perhaps to tariff reform. However desirable or however doubtful the achievement of these other demands may now seem to be, or may have seemed to be in the past, they involve largely either questions of economic or social expediency or else merely class interests.

It is when a division is thus made between the more purely political demands and the socio-economic demands of this period of agitation and reform that the importance of the influence exerted by the laboring classes and by other liberal urban elements can be perceived. For apart from their support of the program for the eight-hour day and their cam-

paign against the use of the injunction, peculiarly labor's own issues, interest in and support of the more purely political reforms by the laboring and other urban classes were perhaps relatively more important than in the case of the farmers themselves.[27] By designating the movement in general "a farmers' movement," in consequence of class interest by that group in many of the socio-economic demands put forward, and then recognizing the importance of the contribution to democratic development embodied in the realization of the more purely political program of the same general movement, we are quite likely to overestimate the degree of credit that should go to the farming class and to overlook and underestimate the extent of credit that should go to the urban laborers, and to other liberal non-agricultural elements both in city and in country, for the promotion and realization of these important political reforms. Yet the movement is, in another sense, properly termed a "farmers' movement." For the leadership, as well as the majority support, of the movement was vested in that class.

The fact that Mr. Bryan carried a number of the agricultural States of the West, in 1896, while the East voted against him has obscured the further fact that he received strong support in many of the eastern urban centers while heavy majorities against him were in many cases rolled up in the rural sections of the East. In view of the fact that New York City was carried for the Republican candidate in 1896 by but a slight majority while the up-state vote went the same way by a decided majority, it appears to be somewhat misleading to assert that hostility to free silver and to Bryanism by the large financial and industrial interests in New York City was responsible for the decided Republican success in the State as a whole. Moreover, in the ebbing tide of democratic sentiment that temporarily ensued in 1900 and in the following years it is worthy of note that the rural and the urban districts were similarly affected. For in 1900 Mr.

Bryan carried but three Northern States and these were predominantly mining and not prevailingly agricultural in interest. If we omit the "Solid South" from consideration, it is substantially true to state that both rural and urban elements joined in voting against the liberal party and its candidate and against liberal issues in 1900 just as they had united in their support in 1896.

VII

THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

Mr. Bryan's assertion that if he had failed of election to the presidency his issues nevertheless had been elected has proved substantially true so far as the more purely political issues are concerned, as also with reference to some of the important socio-economic reforms championed under his leadership. For in very substantial degree the Progressive movement of more recent years has been but a revival or continuation of the popular movement of the Nineties.[28] Just as in the Nineties, there has been a liberal element in both of the old parties in recent years; and also, as was the case in the Nineties, these liberal elements in recent years have represented neither the rural nor the urban population preponderantly but a proportionate combination of both. As reflecting the striking industrial growth and the corresponding urban development of the country, however, it came about that the urban elements played a much more prominent place in the determination of the issues, and especially in the leadership of the new movement, than had been the case in the popular movement in the Nineties. By 1910, agriculture had become generally prosperous; and while the people of the rural areas in the West and Northwest who had been active in support of the popular movement in the Nineties became active again in the popular movement of a score of years later, they were

perhaps less interested than formerly in proposals touching their own economic interests and were acting more from political habit and were more influenced by traditional liberal and democratic impulses. The urban industrial elements, on the other hand, though likewise instinctively joining in the support of those more purely political reforms, yet were more interested, perhaps, in the achievement of certain aims of a socio-economic character that were designed primarily to further their own class interests but which were at the same time of importance to the cause of democracy in general. The position and attitude of the two groups were thus, in a way, mutually reversed in 1909–16 from what had been true in the Nineties. In the Nineties the rural elements exercised the leadership. But the men and women who were leaders of the Progressive movement from 1909 to 1916—Theodore Roosevelt, Hiram Johnson, Raymond Robins, Jane Addams, and others—were city men and women, with city interests primarily. And Woodrow Wilson, successful leader of the progressive elements of his own party, if not hailing from a large center of population had certainly been far more intimately associated with city life and with urban interests in general than with rural life and interests.

The issues that divided the conservative forces that backed Mr. Taft from the liberal and radical elements among whom Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Wilson found their strength need not be catalogued at length here. But the immediate occasion for the exciting character of the memorable campaign of 1912 was the question of popular control of the nominating machinery—the question as to whether the nomination of presidential candidates was to be controlled by a small group representing the old, and supposedly displaced, system of the congressional caucus or by the popular will as expressed through the medium of the direct primary. The challenge of this issue appealed, for the time at least, to the democratic instincts of the voters of all classes, rural and urban alike;

and it is of interest that the few electoral votes received by Mr. Taft, representative of the conservative and non-popular cause, were those of States that were predominantly rural, while the Progressive and Democratic tickets swept the large cities and industrial districts of the country without exception.

The period from 1912 to 1920 was one of notable fruition with reference to democratic development in this country. This is strikingly evidenced in the final success of constitutional amendments opening the way for the use of the federal income tax, providing for the direct election of United States senators, and granting woman suffrage, and in legislation for the establishment of the Federal Reserve system and for the further regulation and control of trusts.[29] However, just as in 1900 so in the inevitable conservative reaction that threw both of the old parties into the hands of small, illiberal, and ultra-conservative groups in 1920, in defiance of the popular will as expressed in the preferential presidential primaries, must rural and urban elements divide the responsibility; and it is not without significance that in the contest of that year both major candidates should have been men of rural birth. Moreover, the reactionary influences that still continue in the ascendancy have as their sustaining basis a union of these same ultra-conservative rural and urban influences.

It remains merely to point out that whatever may be our opinion as to the desirability or feasibility of socialism as a social and economic system, we must nevertheless grant that the socialist movement in this country, which has been overwhelmingly an urban movement, has been on the whole an undoubtedly democratic influence.

The results of this somewhat extended general survey of our political development must be admitted to lead to no very clear-cut and definite positive conclusions. But it is submitted that they abundantly justify the verdict "not proven" with reference to the claim that the rural or agricultural

elements have constituted substantially the sole moving force in the direction of democracy in our political development and that the urban centers have been the centers of conservatism and reaction. Both rural and urban influences have been exerted diversely both in support of and in opposition to liberal and democratic principles. And not infrequently the normally liberal and democratic influences, both in country and in city, have been exerted in support of reactionary and undemocratic issues and policies; while the normally conservative and undemocratic influences, both rural and urban, have occasionally lent their support to genuinely liberal and democratic policies and movements.

From this general survey of the source of the impulse toward democracy in our political development we turn next to a test as indicated by the attitude of the rural and of the urban population, respectively, toward a few great issues of outstanding importance and significance with respect to the growth of democracy in this country.

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17. McCarthy, Charles, *The Antimasonic Party*, Washington, 1903, pp. 372, 391, et al.

18. See *The New Constitution*, a periodical (bound in a single volume) published by S. Medary at Columbus, Ohio, in 1849, in support of the campaign for a new constitution, pp. 64, 83, 378, 400, 408.

19. They were Vermont, Massachusetts, Kentucky, and Tennessee.

20. Croly, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85. See also an article, "Horace Greeley and the Working Class Origins of the Republican Party," by John R. Commons, in the *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, which seems, however, seriously to underestimate the slavery issue as a factor in the founding of that Party.

21. Massachusetts cast 28.3 per cent of its vote for Van Buren, while New York and Wisconsin each cast 26.6 per cent, respectively, for that candidate.

22. McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, 1913, Vol. VIII, p. 273, states that in the campaign of 1856 the western half of Pennsylvania was "overwhelmingly" for Fremont while the eastern half was "just as enthusiastic" for Buchanan. And Rhodes, J. F.,

History of the United States, 1910, Vol. II, p. 227, gives a similar impression. But inspection of the election returns by counties, with an eye to the vote cast for Fillmore, appears to throw some doubt on the accuracy of this point of view.

23. Consult the New York *Tribune,* Nov. 5, 1856, and following dates, and the *Tribune Almanac and Political Register,* 1857.

24. *Tribune Almanac and Political Register,* 1861; Scharf, J. T., *History of St. Louis City and County,* Philadelphia, 1883, Vol. I, p. 597.

25. Commons, et al., *The History of Labour in the United States,* Vol. II, pp. 119-121; Wildman, M. S., *Money Inflation in the United States,* Chicago, 1905, p. 159.

26. Commons, et al., *op. cit.,* pp. 241 ff., 440.

27. See the following chapter for relative contribution of the farmers and of the laborers to the cause of the initiative and referendum, as well as to that of woman suffrage.

28. Croly, *op. cit.,* pp. 104-107.

29. Others would instance also the establishment of the basic eight-hour day in railway employment and the reform of the tariff; while some would perhaps even wish to include the prohibition amendment.

CHAPTER X

Rural and Urban Contributions to Democracy in the United States: Special Features of the Struggle for Democracy

If the relative devotion to democracy on the part of the rural and the urban classes in this country be judged from the attitude displayed by each class, respectively, toward certain specific issues of outstanding importance, such as the extension of suffrage, equitable representation, and the initiative and referendum, or as reflected in the development of certain outstanding forms of democratic local government, such as the town system, it is no more possible than on general grounds to demonstrate a superior democracy on the part of the rural population.

I

DEMOCRACY AND THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE

From a very early date the privilege of exercising the elective franchise was vested, in the English Colonies in America, in the owners of real estate; and in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Haven, to this requirement, which did not even admit all freeholders, there was added the further requirement of church membership. The result in Massachusetts was to exclude three-fourths of the male inhabitants from the privilege of the ballot; and Thorpe expresses the opinion that the American electors in general in colonial times never comprised more than a tenth of the popula-

tion. "The remaining nine-tenths were excluded from voting because of sex, poverty, slavery, or the refusal to subscribe to religious qualifications." [1] During the last century of the colonial period progress had been made in the elimination of religious and moral qualifications; and by the time of the Revolution the movement away from a strict real estate property qualification through the substitution of personalty, and then of the payment of a tax, had been begun. Yet, in the view of some authorities, even at the time of the adoption of the Constitution only about one person in thirty had a vote.[2]

In 1791 Vermont was admitted to the Union with a constitution providing for full manhood suffrage, and Kentucky followed with a similar provision in 1792. Later, other new States were admitted to the Union "with manhood suffrage specifically provided by law, or virtually established in practice." [3] Undoubtedly this constituted substantial proof of a sense of equality and of a decided democratic spirit in the newer States. But it must not be forgotten that a more liberal sentiment had already developed in the older sections; and it was manifestly easier to carry this liberal spirit over into the new regions and to embody it in the fundamental law there than it was to substitute more democratic provisions in the older States, where less liberal provisions that must first be discarded were in force.

The effect of the War of 1812, which was fought very largely on the American side by natives who were denied the right of suffrage in spite of the fact that that right was enjoyed not only by native freeholders but also by property owners of foreign birth who did not participate personally in the sacrifices of the struggle, was very great in contributing toward the substitution of manhood for restricted suffrage; and this influence was no doubt an important factor in the more liberal provisions of the newly admitted States from 1815 on. In 1818 Connecticut abolished the property

qualification; and, most decisive of all, the same step was taken by Massachusetts in 1821 and by New York in 1822. In the important State of Virginia, however, where in 1830 there were 80,000 white male inhabitants—mechanics, artisans, and others—not eligible to vote, Madison, Monroe, Randolph, Upshur, and Marshall fought as hard as John Adams and Daniel Webster had fought in Massachusetts, or Chief Justice Spencer and Chancellor Kent had fought in New York, to prevent the liberalizing of the suffrage franchise, and succeeded; and that State did not accept manhood suffrage for white males, even, until 1850.[4] Moreover, Louisiana had delayed taking the same step until 1845 and North Carolina did not take it until 1856.

In the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1820–21, in the debates relative to the abolition of the property qualification for suffrage, no evidence of a division between the rural and the urban population appears. But the appeal on behalf of the extension of the right of suffrage to the laborers, sailors, apprentices, to young men who had "spent all their money in acquiring an education," and to persons in general without property, was made very largely by delegates from Boston and from other urban or semi-urban centers in the eastern part of the State. On the other hand, the appeal against such extension was directed to the agricultural interests—doubtless because of the advantage that the existing property qualification gave that class and also because of the large number of votes which that class controlled with reference to any proposed change.[5] But a more decisive indication as to the attitude of the rural and urban elements toward this issue is to be found in the subsequent popular vote by counties on the acceptance or rejection of the proposed suffrage amendment. And it is significant that while Suffolk County, containing Boston, voted for the amendment more than twenty to one and Essex and Middlesex counties also supported it by heavy majorities, the western counties, in the

main, gave only moderate majorities—one, Hampden, even casting a majority against it.[6]

Clearly, the urban population in Massachusetts gave a stronger support to the movement for a more liberal suffrage franchise, in spite of the fact that considerable numbers of adult males in the rural communities were disfranchised under the existing suffrage provisions and must have been most warmly interested in removing their disqualifications.

The situation in the New York constitutional convention of 1821 does not appear to have differed materially, with respect to the attitude of the rural and urban classes toward suffrage reform, from that which prevailed in the Massachusetts convention of 1820–21. In the old constitution, adopted in 1777, the landowning and other conservative classes, who were largly in control, had inserted the requirement of a freehold qualification for suffrage for the election of governor and of delegates in the upper house, though any one who rented a tenement worth forty shillings and had been rated and had paid taxes to the State might vote for a member of the lower house. But these provisions, becoming progressively onerous in their effect, disfranchised large numbers of all classes—even many of the agricultural class itself;[7] and the opposition of the disfranchised classes, both rural and urban, was aroused. As early as 1811 a convention of delegates from Ontario County was held at Canandaigua to consider the question and a petition was sent to the legislature "praying for a convention to consider the propriety of amending the constitution by removing the property qualification" for suffrage; and a similar petition was presented by some of the inhabitants of Rensselaer County. The lower house passed a bill recommending such a convention. But opposition developing from the conservative interests and the War of 1812 intervening, nothing further was accomplished at this time.

Following the close of the War of 1812 agitation again arose, more active than ever. Especially active in this agitation

were the New England element in the central, northern, and western parts of the State, and the people of New York City. The Tammany organization at a great meeting in Tammany Hall, on August 25, 1820, championed the cause particularly of the disfranchised elements in New York City and demanded a constitutional convention "with unlimited powers to amend"; and the agitation "blazed into a flame" throughout the State.[8] The issue was finally resolved in favor of those who demanded a convention—the people of the State voting for such a convention by the tremendous majority of 74,000 votes.

When the convention assembled it was generally agreed that the property qualification should be abolished so far as it related to the election of governor and of members of the lower house; but the conservative element made a strong plea for its retention with respect to the election of the members of the upper house in order that the latter might be preserved as a body representing the property interest. The conservatives were led by Chief Justice Spencer and Chancellor Kent and by the group of Federalists in general from Albany, though the appeal against the extension of suffrage, as in Massachusetts, was directed to the class of freeholders—largely an agricultural class.

The campaign in favor of liberalizing the suffrage franchise was really led by Van Buren, whose residence was also in Albany; though Erastus Root, lieutenant-governor of the State, and Daniel D. Tompkins, vice-president of the United States, together with Philip R. Livingston of Dutchess County, "gentleman farmer" and native of New York City, were active in its support.[9]

It was asserted in the convention that nine-tenths of those who would later vote to accept or reject the amendments submitted by the convention would be freeholders; and it has thus been accepted as striking evidence of the disinterestedness of this class that it did vote to accept the amended con-

stitution and thus of "its own volition" gave up its "exclusive power of government." [10] But this view must be accepted with some qualification. For very many persons of the agricultural class who had practically the status of freeholders were denied the right of suffrage under the old constitution; and these persons may be assumed to have had the most lively interest in securing the privilege of suffrage for themselves. Moreover, the legislature in submitting the question of a convention, and later in providing for the election of delegates and for the acceptance or rejection of the amended constitution by the voters, in accordance with the custom followed by various of the States in such cases greatly extended the list of those who, for this occasion, were to be regarded as legal voters.

Of the nineteen delegates who voted in the convention against the proposal to abolish the property qualification for suffrage as it applied to members of the upper house, only those from Albany County came from a county that could be said to have a considerable urban population; while some came from counties overwhelmingly rural. On the other hand the delegates from New York County voted solidly in favor of the suffrage amendment, as did others with quite as large a commercial and industrial element as Albany County contained.

As the amended constitution was submitted for popular approval or disapproval as a whole and not by separate sections, there is no direct record of the attitude of the different sections and classes toward the suffrage amendment. But the latter represented the most significant feature of the amended constitution; and the vote in general for acceptance or rejection may thus be regarded as significant of the attitude toward the suffrage issue. It is of interest, therefore, that while many predominantly rural counties voted heavily in favor of the amended constitution, some that were overwhelmingly rural voted adversely. On the other hand, New

York County voted favorably five to one; a favorable vote in the city of Albany was offset by an adverse rural vote in Albany County as a whole; and the adverse vote was more decided in the rural townships of Schenectady County than it was in the city of Schenectady.[11]

The indications are, therefore, that as in Massachusetts so in New York the urban population was somewhat more favorably disposed toward liberalizing the suffrage franchise at this time than was the rural population.

The same observation holds for Rhode Island, though in a more unqualified way. In that State "a great majority" of the Revolutionary soldiers were among those disqualified for suffrage by the freehold qualification; and with the decline of agriculture and the rise of commerce and manufactures the numerical contrast between the narrow "landed oligarchy" which controlled the government and the disfranchised masses became more and more glaring. "Many of these disfranchised citizens owned large amounts of personal estate; among them were men of learning, enterprise, and character. In many of the towns they paid a large share of the taxes, and throughout the State they constituted by far the largest portion of the military." [12] Attempt after attempt was vainly made to induce this landed oligarchy to yield up its undemocratic privileges, though a certain number of freeholders affixed their signatures to the petitions and memorials for a changed constitution and an extended suffrage. The majority of the landholders clung tenaciously to their monopoly of the ballot; and though the rebellion of Dorr and his followers in 1841 led to concessions to the disfranchised elements with reference to suffrage and representation, the rural population of Rhode Island has continued to enjoy special privileges in both of these connections down to the very present.

A constitutional convention in Pennsylvania in 1837 submitted amendments which abolished the property qualifica-

tion for suffrage while retaining the requirement of the payment of a State or county tax, though suffrage was denied to Negroes; and the people accepted the constitution as amended in these and other respects. The vote in 1835 relative to the proposal to call a convention to revise the constitution probably represents, however, a clearer test of the alignment of the democratic and conservative interests of the State. Inspection of this vote by counties seems at first to indicate a more favorable attitude by the rural, than by the urban, elements toward a convention, seeing that the western and more remote counties voted strongly in favor while the older counties in the eastern part of the State voted adversely in a more or less decisive way. But closer inspection shows that the line of division was not between rural and urban but between the older and newer parts of the State. For in the western part of the State the urban population voted more decisively in favor of a convention than did the rural population; while in the eastern part of the State the rural population voted more decisively against a convention than did the urban population.[13]

The further developments relative to the extension of suffrage since the early struggle for manhood suffrage for the white population likewise fail to prove any greater measure of devotion to that cause on the part of the rural population than on the part of the residents of the cities. The evidence is often contradictory on this point—for the rural as for the urban elements. Thus it was in the States of the agricultural South, of course, where the limitations on suffrage so far as Negroes were concerned were at the maximum. But in the northern and border States a very illiberal attitude on this issue was often manifested by the very elements, rural no less than urban, that were most insistent upon extending suffrage to a manhood basis for the white population. This statement holds with reference to the New York convention of 1821,[14] as well as for the Pennsylvania convention of

1837. And in the Illinois and Michigan conventions of 1848 and 1850, respectively, though the principle of alien suffrage was rejected by only a narrow margin in both cases, the bare mention of Negro suffrage raised a storm of protest in the former and the proposal was overwhelmingly rejected in the latter. Moreover, the situation in Wisconsin and Indiana was almost identical with that which prevailed in Illinois and Michigan. In fact, previous to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment Negroes could vote in but six States of the Union, and these were the six New England States—the former stronghold of Federalism and the reputed conservative section in general.

As has just been intimated, the newer, western States were favorable toward the extension of suffrage on easy terms to aliens. Doubtless this fact was not wholly due to economic interest—to desire to build up the population in these sparsely settled States. In part this policy coincided with the democratic instincts of the frontier agricultural population—even though those instincts were not liberal enough to include the Negroes as well. On the other hand, in New England, where the prejudice against the Negroes was at a minimum, foreigners were perhaps less welcome at this time, with the possible exception of the States of the Old South, than in any other section of the United States; and it does not appear that this anti-foreign prejudice was by any means confined to the urban districts of that section, though it was in the cities where the situation was more acute—as a result of the high proportion of aliens there. In Rhode Island, indeed, very much of the sentiment in favor of withholding the vote from the propertyless classes and of continuing the monopoly of the suffrage franchise in the landowning class was associated with prejudice against the alien elements, which made up a large proportion of the urban industrial population. New York City and Philadelphia were great centers of organized nativism; and conflict between alien and native ele-

ments led to many riots in these large centers. At the same time these two large cities were also important centers of pro-alien influence; and Tammany Hall, at first anti-foreign in policy, after about 1822 came to represent mainly the interests of the foreign-born elements of New York City.

It is evident that taking the country as a whole prejudice against foreigners was neither a characteristically rural nor a characteristically urban feature. The cities were the centers of agitation and the scenes of outbreaks in this connection simply because they were the places of agglomerated population, where foreigners were relatively very numerous and where natives and foreigners came most intimately into contact. It has been reserved for the agricultural South to become and to remain the great center of nativism in this country.

The movement for the extension of suffrage to women has been, of course, but one phase of the feminist or woman's rights movement in general; and to this general movement there have been both a rural and an urban impulse. The rural impulse has proceeded, in the main, from the rural frontier, springing partly from the democratic and liberal attitude in general among the frontier population and in part from the chivalrous attitude developed toward women in a community where they have been relatively few in number and where they have thus been prized in unusual degree and their presence desired. The urban impulse has proceeded both from the democratic and liberal sentiments prevalent there and also from the position of comparative economic freedom that the urban environment affords and promotes for the female sex. It is not strange, then, that the forces that have made for the independence and rights of women have been jointly rural and urban in origin. The feminist movement was also closely associated with the anti-slavery movement in early days—a democratic movement to which, as we have seen, there were both rural and urban impulses.

This joint rural and urban impulse is also reflected in the origin of the notable leaders of the suffragist movement in this country. Rural representatives include Margaret Brent, Hannah Lee Corbin, and Lucy Stone, while urban representatives include Abigail Adams, Mercy Otis Warren, Frances Wright, and Julia Ward Howe. On the other hand the Grimké sisters, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Lucretia Coffin Mott and her sister, Martha C. Wright, represent joint rural and urban influences in their origin and rearing.

In colonial days Massachusetts permitted property-holding women to vote, from 1691 to 1780; and New Jersey was the only State which gave any degree of suffrage to women following the Revolution. Kentucky conferred "a very limited" school suffrage on women in 1838. But the first step actually accepting the principle of woman suffrage in the fundamental law in this country was taken by Colorado, a mining State, in 1876 with a constitutional provision permitting women to vote in school elections and containing a clause authorizing the legislature to submit the question of full woman suffrage to referendum vote; though full woman suffrage was not granted in that State until 1893. Massachusetts also granted school suffrage to women as early as 1879. But the territorial legislature of Wyoming, where mining interests also predominated, had already granted full suffrage to women, including the right to hold office, in 1869; and when that Territory came into the Union as a State in 1889 full woman suffrage was continued in the constitution. Utah, Idaho, Montana, North and South Dakota, and Washington all followed sooner or later in granting a larger or smaller degree of suffrage to women. It was thus the frontier mining, rather than the frontier agricultural, population that took the lead in the actual establishment of full woman suffrage, though the latter presently seconded the movement.

As already pointed out, the leadership of these frontier

States in respect to this movement is not wholly to be ascribed to the prevailing spirit of democracy and equality, though it is substantial evidence of the prevalence of such a spirit. For in these States women were decidedly in the minority and this circumstance not only debarred any fear of political domination by the female sex in case full woman suffrage were granted but it also led, as already stated, to an exceptionally chivalrous and generous attitude toward women. Much less is the precedence of these States in this respect to be accepted as proof that the agricultural class in general, or even the rural population in general, was more liberal than the urban residents relative to this issue. The grange, indeed, consistently declared for woman suffrage, as did other farm organizations. But this is far from proving that the mass of the agricultural population in the East and in the South lent its support to the cause of woman suffrage.

On the other hand, labor organizations were probably not behind those of farmers in officially declaring in favor of votes for women; and it is also probable that that cause received quite as much support, on the whole, from the rank and file among the laboring class as it did among the farm population. In the cities the liquor interests consistently opposed woman suffrage; and there is no doubt that these interests carried with them in this attitude no small proportion of the workers there, who permitted themselves to be persuaded that the battle against the saloon was an attack on their liberties and thus an undemocratic movement and who recognized that the great majority of women would be against the saloon. Nevertheless, the proportion of city workers who thus lent their support to the opposition to woman suffrage was probably no greater than that among the conservative element of the farming population in the East and South, and to a certain extent in other sections, in spite of the official pronouncements of farm organizations in its favor.

It is of interest, in this connection, that later progress

and final success in the achievement of woman suffrage in this country showed, on the whole, no special predilection in its favor by the agricultural population. Woman suffrage was overwhelmingly defeated in a popular vote on that issue in Illinois in 1912. But there was also a heavy adverse popular vote on the same issue in Iowa, West Virginia, and South Dakota in 1916; and Maine voted adversely nearly two to one in 1917, though the urban vote was even more unfavorable than the rural vote. Ohio voted adversely in the same year by a considerable margin, though prohibition was defeated by a very small majority at the same election. On the other hand, New York, which had decisively defeated woman suffrage in 1915, voted favorably in 1917; and this victory, which was perhaps the most really decisive event connected with the recent stage of the struggle for the ballot for women, "was practically won in New York City." [15] However, it was the adverse vote in New Orleans that defeated woman suffrage in 1918 in Louisiana, which was the first Southern State even to hold a referendum on that issue.

Action with reference to the Federal constitutional amendment showed a somewhat similar distribution of support and of opposition among the rural and the urban elements. Out of the 136 adverse votes in the House of Representatives, in January, 1918, on the question of submitting the suffrage amendment to the States, 83 came from the South. Alabama, which in spite of considerable industrial development contains proportionally a smaller urban population than Texas, was the first State in which the suffrage amendment was defeated; and Maine, a comparatively rural State, was the first in which it came perilously near to defeat. Moreover, by August, 1919, but two States west of the Mississippi River had ratified the amendment. On the other hand, the "thirteen original suffrage States," so far as ratification of the nineteenth amendment was concerned, included Michigan, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Massachusetts, Penn-

sylvania, and Missouri—seven States that are not only predominantly urban but that also contain nearly all the great cities of the nation. Rhode Island, indeed, the most highly urbanized State in the Union, voted adversely on the amendment. But both in this State and in Connecticut, another urban State that voted adversely, the rural element exercises a notably great disproportionate influence in the legislature. Moreover, all of the other States that voted adversely on the suffrage amendment are in the South.

As a result of this general survey of the attitude of the rural and of the urban population, respectively, toward the liberalizing of the suffrage in this country, it is submitted that there is no warrant whatsoever for claiming a more favorable attitude on the part of the former. Indeed, it may fairly be claimed that if there was any difference in this respect it points toward the conclusion that the urban population displayed a more favorable attitude toward this reform.

II

DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION

It is certain that the rapidly expanding frontier in this country did frequently suffer from inequality in representation. But it is equally certain, and far more typical of the situation as a whole, that our rapidly growing city populations have continuously fallen short of the representation to which their proportion of the total population has entitled them. Both agricultural frontier and the cities have suffered in this respect to the advantage of those older agricultural districts where the population remained stationary or, in many cases, decidedly declined. But the former regions soon attained their maximum population; and when once they had been granted a representation proportional to their numbers they were able without difficulty to retain it or even to

preserve a representation disproportionately great if, as very often occurred, they too presently fell into decline with the further movement of the rural population into the interior or with the drift to the growing cities. The cities, however, constantly adding to their population as constantly found their representation falling behind their just measure—even when, as was very far from being the rule, they were able to secure a reasonably prompt adjustment.

In some of the States representation in the upper body of the legislative assemblies continued for a time to rest upon a basis of wealth instead of upon a basis of population; and here the newer rural sections, having materially less wealth in proportion to population than the urban centers and the older rural districts, sometimes suffered disproportionately small representation. This condition, however, tended speedily to be relieved with the elimination of property qualifications for suffrage; and at any rate it did not always work to the disadvantage of the rural population as a whole.

On the other hand, there were a great number of cases where a very different situation prevailed. Thus the editor of *Niles Register* asserted in 1821 that he could name certain counties in the United States where the representation was quite as inequitable and favored certain scantily populated rural districts quite as flagrantly as was the case in the notorious "Old Sarum" borough in England. These were counties that had decayed—embracing "large tracts of country that were cultivated a century ago" but which in 1821 were "covered with new growth of stunted timber, the haunt of deer and other timid animals of the forest." From these sections the population had mostly departed for new and better lands; yet the full power of representation remained, and one freeholder in one of these sections exercised a power equal to that exercised by several voters in the urban centers.

This condition prevailed in especially flagrant form in Maryland and Virginia, but prevailed also in others of the

older States. In Virginia, Loudoun County, with a population of 15,577 free whites, in 1820, had but two representatives in the State legislature; while nine other counties, with a total population of but 16,165, together had eighteen representatives. Baltimore, city and county, with a total population of 85,000 free whites, had six representatives in the Maryland house of delegates in 1822–23; while ten other counties, with an aggregate of 84,000 free whites, had forty representatives. A still more flagrant contrast showed that Calvert County, with 852 voters, sent four members to the house of delegates; while Baltimore, city and county, with 16,899 voters, sent but six. Had the latter had the representation possessed by the former they would have had at least seventy-nine delegates instead of but six. Out of a total number of eighty delegates in the house, Baltimore, Frederick, and Washington counties sent but fourteen, though strictly in proportion to population these counties, with important cities, would have sent thirty-nine of the eighty. Similarly, Rowan County, North Carolina, with a population of 17,697 free whites in 1820, had but two representatives in the State legislature while seven other counties, having an aggregate population of but 17,270, had fourteen representatives. In Delaware the situation was less flagrant but still inequitable. For New Castle County, with a population of 20,000 free whites, had exactly the same representation as Kent County, with but 15,000 free whites.[16]

Moreover, these inequalities of representation that work to the disadvantage of the urban population have continued down to the very present time. We have already seen how in Rhode Island a combination of continued restriction of the right of the franchise to freeholders and their eldest sons and of inequitable representation had made the State government "a landed oligarchy" and had finally led to the disturbance known as "Dorr's Rebellion," in 1841. In 1842 a new constitution was submitted and adopted which partially cor-

rected the inequalities of representation and liberalized the suffrage provisions of the fundamental law of the State. But up to the very present the urban centers of Rhode Island are grossly discriminated against with respect to representation, in both branches of the legislature; and within very recent years we have seen a recurrence of political disturbance in that connection. Each "town," or "township," in the State is entitled to one senator in the legislature; and country districts with a few hundred inhabitants, such as the town or township of West Greenwich, with but 367 inhabitants in 1920, enjoy equal representation in the upper house with the City of Providence with its more than 250,000 inhabitants! Six cities, with eight-ninths of the total population of Rhode Island, have one member each in the upper house; while the remaining one-ninth of the population together has thirty-three members, chosen from the various rural townships. Moreover, similar discrimination exists with respect to the lower house.

In Connecticut, where each "town" without regard to population enjoys representation in the lower house, Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven, and Waterbury, with a combined population of more than 535,000 in 1920, have the same number of representatives as the four "towns" of Colebrook, Hartland, Killingworth, and Union, which had a combined population of less than 1,800 persons in that year. In New Jersey, where the counties range in population between 20,000 and 33,000, approximately, for the four least populous, to considerably more than 600,000 each for the two most populous, the system which permits to each county one, and only one, member in the upper house is manifestly grossly inequitable in the treatment of the counties which contain the large cities. In Maryland, the single senator from Calvert County has approximately 10,000 constituents, while each of the four senators from the City of Baltimore has more than 180,000 constituents.

Similar discrimination against the urban centers in respect to representation in one or the other or both of the two branches of the State legislature prevails in New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri, and other States. State constitutional provisions arbitrarily limit, or otherwise inequitably disproportion, the representation of New York City in both the upper and the lower house, and that of Philadelphia and Chicago in the upper house. In the down-state districts in Illinois, in the fall of 1919, many of the candidates for delegate to the coming constitutional convention based their campaign largely upon the asserted necessity of securing a continuation of the existing limitation of representation for Cook County in the proposed new constitution; and for months the convention, when it convened, was practically deadlocked over the question. In Missouri, St. Louis has a delegation of but sixteen members in the lower house while really entitled to one of twenty-six members—even on the basis of population previous to 1910.[17]

Moreover, the scant rural population in a number of the counties which contain important cities is grossly over-represented in the county boards which control the government of these respective counties, with their vast urban populations.[18]

Whatever may be the attempted justification for the existence and continuation of these numerous inequitable provisions and arrangements by which the urban population is penalized with respect to representation in the various legislative bodies, there is not the slightest doubt that they directly violate the fundamental principles of democracy. And persistent and long-continued unwillingness to give up these grossly inequitable privileges palpably demonstrates failure on the part of the rural population, and of the population of the smaller towns, to measure up to reasonable standards of democracy in this respect.

III

DEMOCRACY AND THE USE OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL

Though there may be difference of opinion with reference to the wisdom of utilizing any one or more of these three devices under a given set of conditions or with reference to the form and scope of their application when utilized, there can be no doubt that they are, in principle, thoroughly consistent with democratic ideas; and wisely used they correct, with a large degree of effectiveness, the disadvantages associated with the transfer from the direct to the representative form of democracy. At any rate, the attitude of the different classes toward these forms of popular intervention and control affords a comparatively accurate test of the democracy of these classes. It is of interest, therefore, that a survey of the introduction and use of these political devices does not appear to show that there has been, on the whole, any particular difference between the attitude of the rural and urban classes, respectively, toward them.

The fact that the statutory referendum with reference to particular measures, together with the initiative in rather primitive form, was in early use in the colonies of Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth, in Rhode Island, and probably in the Connecticut groups also, would appear to justify the view of urban precedence relative to these devices at that period. Urban precedence is also indicated in the early use of the constitutional referendum in this country, the definite employment of which began with the creation of independent colonial or State governments in 1776. It has been stated that the first formal proposal for the application of the referendum to a State constitution came from Thomas Jefferson, in Virginia, early in June, 1776.[19] But the Mechanicks in Union, for the city and county of New York protested, as

early as June 14th of that year, against the plan of putting the constitution proposed for that province into effect without first submitting it to a vote; and the same determination was also widely prevalent among the people of Massachusetts and New Hampshire even previous to this time.[20] At any rate Massachusetts afforded the first example of the actual use of the referendum in this connection, in the years 1777–78, when the people of that colony voted adversely upon a constitution framed by the Assembly and submitted for popular ratification. To Massachusetts, too, belongs the credit of having given to the world the first popularly ratified constitution —the famous constitution of 1780. Moreover, all of the six State constitutions thus ratified in the period 1776–1821 were those of the four New England States of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Maine; and shortly after the close of this period popular ratification became general.

To Massachusetts, too, was due the revival of the use of the statutory referendum. For in 1816, and again in 1819, that State gave permission to the people of the District of Maine to vote on the question of separation from the mother State. The Massachusetts constitution of 1820–21, too, contained a provision permitting the establishment of municipalities "with the consent and on the application of the inhabitants . . . present and voting" in town meeting; and in 1821 the General Court passed an act establishing "the city of Boston," provided the people of "the town of Boston" approved the proposal by vote. When the issue was thus referred to the voters of Boston they acted upon it favorably and thus substituted the municipal for the town form of organization; and the same method of procedure was followed by other towns in Massachusetts, and in New England generally, to achieve the same result.

In view of the presentation just made, the statement by a very reputable authority that the initiative and referendum in this country "first originated with the grange and that the

first States to adopt it were the agricultural States of the Northwest"[21] can not be accepted as conveying a very accurate impression. For not only was there the use of these devices in colonial times, and that prevailingly by constituencies relatively urban, but there is also indubitable evidence of precedence, for the more recent period in this country, on the part of the industrial elements in the acceptance of these devices and in the advocacy of their use in the political sphere.[22] In connection with the management of trade union affairs the use of the initiative and referendum, or of devices closely allied to these in principle, has long been practiced—perhaps for as long as a century in the case of the labor organizations of England.[23] And since their use had been introduced into trade union affairs in this country—notably by the Cigar Makers' International Union of America at about 1880, there had thus been prepared a relatively numerous and influential constituency already habituated to their employment in practical affairs.

Moreover, the first formal demand for the general introduction of these two devices as regularly accepted features in the political sphere in this country was not made, as has often been claimed, in the program of the Farmers' Alliance. For this demand, together with that for the introduction of the recall, was first voiced in this country in the platform of the Socialist Labor Party in 1885, whose members drew their inspiration indirectly from Swiss experience.[24] But far more important, the Knights of Labor also antedated the farmers' organizations in formal declarations in favor of the general introduction of these principles into the political sphere. For the former, on recommendation of Grand Master Workman T. V. Powderly in 1891, shortly afterward inserted an initiative and referendum plank in their platform. This step seems to have inspired similar action on the part of several State Farmers' Alliances; and on July 4th, 1892, the National People's Party, representing joint farmer and

laboring elements, adopted a resolution at their national convention at Omaha, Nebraska, which commended to "the thoughtful consideration of the people and of the reform press the legislative system known as the initiative and referendum." This formal accession of large groups of organized farmers to the cause of the initiative and referendum was, of course, an extremely important, probably even decisive, factor in the situation. But the precedence rests clearly with the laboring elements and not with the radical farmer groups.[25]

Again, the original impulse in this entire movement traces back to the interest and work of James W. Sullivan, a native of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and at that time an active member of the Typographical Union, who rightly has been termed, for this more recent period, "the father of the direct legislation movement in this country." Having become interested in the use of the initiative and referendum in Switzerland, Sullivan visited that country in 1883, and again in 1888, to study their operation there and to collect data as to their use. Returning, he published a series of letters on the subject in the New York *Times,* in 1889, and various other material in other journals; and in 1892 he published his volume, *Direct Legislation by The Citizenship through the Initiative and Referendum,* which subsequently was circulated under official auspices among the members of the American Federation of Labor and of other labor organizations with decisive effect.

Scarcely second in importance to the work of Sullivan was the contribution of Eltweed Pomeroy, a native of Newark, New Jersey, who as president of a manufacturing corporation in that city carried on for a number of years, together with his brothers, a business with profit-sharing features. In 1892 Pomeroy organized, in Newark, the first local Direct Legislation League in this country. Later he became president of the National Direct Legislation League, upon its organization, and editor of the *Direct Legislation Record,*

which Sullivan had established in 1894. Though the spread of the movement among the much more numerous, and more strategically distributed, rural constituency of the farmer organizations in the newer sections of the country was doubtless decisive, it is a matter of no small significance that the great trio of direct legislation advocates and leaders in this country, James W. Sullivan, Eltweed Pomeroy, and W. S. U'Ren, should have been of non-rural origin.

That the initiative and referendum were first actually introduced into the fundamental law in the newer States of the Northwest, beginning with the acceptance of the referendum in South Dakota in 1897–98 and including most notably of all the acceptance of both principles in Oregon in 1899–1902, is too well known to require emphasis here. But again it may be said that this fact indicates that the States of this section are new rather than that they are agricultural.[26] And though Maine, also a prevailingly rural State, was the first of the Eastern States to accept these devices, the support of the Grange in favor of the movement was secured by the State Federation of Labor. Moreover, direct legislation is opposed in the legislatures of States like Rhode Island and Delaware "because it would nullify rural control" in those bodies.[27] And Vermont, the most rural of the New England States, has remained almost wholly impervious to this democratic movement. Further, in Massachusetts the recent adoption of the initiative and referendum depended very largely upon the heavy affirmative majority in Suffolk County, containing Boston, Chelsea, and other cities, together with the favorable vote of Plymouth County, which contains the city of Brockton. "In the rural counties the vote was heavy against the amendment." Again, in Illinois in 1919, when a referendum mandate instructing the members of the proposed constitutional convention to introduce the initiative and referendum into the proposed new constitution was submitted to popular vote, it met with a decidedly adverse ma-

jority in the down-state sections and was carried only because of a heavy majority in its favor in the City of Chicago; and in the further controversy that followed over the subject, during the checkered course of the sessions of the convention, the strongest opposition that was offered, not only to an objectionable form of the proposed constitutional provision but even to the general principle itself of these two devices, came from the organized farmers of the State.[28] Lastly, it is a matter of interest that neither in the early history of the country, nor in the 90's, nor in more recent years, has the movement for direct legislation made any considerable appeal to the people of the Old South.

The use of the recall also had a considerable application in the early period of our history. The recall of judicial decisions was provided for as early as 1639 in Rhode Island. And there can be little doubt that the right, "freely exercised" by the voters "both prior to and following the Revolution," of instructing their delegates or representatives in the colonial legislatures and other assemblies included the practice of the occasional displacement of these delegates or representatives. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780, indeed, "expressly reserved" this right to the voters; and the Pennsylvania delegates to the Continental Congress actually were "recalled" when they refused to attach their signatures to the Declaration of Independence, and other delegates were sent in their stead. Moreover, Article V of the Articles of Confederation made the delegates to Congress subject to recall by the respective States, even though those delegates were chosen annually. And Patrick Henry stated in the Virginia convention for considering the question of the ratification of the adoption of the Federal Constitution that New Jersey had actually recalled her delegates on one occasion for having misrepresented, as it was charged, the will of the legislature of that State with reference to the right of the navigation of the Mississippi River.[29]

Failure to prevent the elimination, from Madison's original draft of the Federal Constitution, of a similar provision that the members of the popular branch of the proposed bicameral national legislature should be subject to recall by the respective State legislatures, was strongly deprecated by the prevailingly rural elements that comprised the opposition to the Constitution as finally adopted. And when the Constitution was submitted to the States for ratification, or rejection, in several of the conventions the subject was debated at length and attempts were made to secure the restoration of this provision through proposals for amendment as a condition to ratification—though the principle was now to apply to the members of the Senate instead of to the members of the House.[30]

The fact that the introduction and use of the recall in this country in recent years has been associated mainly with the development of the movement for the commission and city-manager forms of municipal government sufficiently attests its recent prevailingly urban sponsorship. And the championship, in 1912 by that eminent urban representative, Theodore Roosevelt, of the principle of the recall of judges is still vividly in mind.

The fact that the principle of the recall received the major part of its support, in the early national period, from the rural elements who constituted the bulk of the opposition to the adoption of the Constitution, though perhaps wholly offset by prevailingly urban support still earlier and in recent years, can not be disregarded in any attempt to assess the relative democracy of the rural and urban elements. It is of interest, however, that the sentiment manifested in favor of the recall in 1787 was closely associated with the sentiment in favor of state rights and of a loose confederation of sovereign States and with opposition to and fear of a real national Union as contemplated by the Federal Constitution. And subsequent developments have shown that the real na-

tional Union initiated by the adoption of the Constitution has been more favorable to the promotion and achievement of a genuine democracy than a loose confederation of sovereign States could possibly have been. However, circumstances have so changed since 1787 and such progress has been made in the establishment of a real national Union that there is no longer any danger of unduly weakening the central authority by a reasonable utilization of such a device as the recall. And in view of the difficulty that experience has disclosed in securing an adequate degree of popular control over elected representatives and executive officials and in view of the consequent decline of the system of representative government in popular esteem and confidence, there is little doubt that the sane and reasonable use of the recall today, in these two branches of government at least, is in accordance with the best current standards of democracy and contributive to the restoration of public confidence in constitutional representative government as the form of government to which we shall wish in the main to continue to hold.

IV

DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN SYSTEM

A special phase of the claim that urbanization has been, and still is, unfavorable to the maintenance and development of democracy is associated with the charge that the growth of large centers of population has rendered ineffective the town or township system of local government and has necessitated its abandonment in very many cases—a system which has been characterized as "distinctly rural" by one writer and which has also been lauded by James Bryce as "the most perfect school of self-government in any modern country." [31] Two features, especially, of the town system of

government in its worthiest days have been highly commended: first, that it represented an almost purely democratic form of government, which engaged the direct activities of the citizens and which functioned under their direct control; and second, and largely as a consequence of the feature just pointed out, that it was remarkably successful in the education of the citizens in the theory and practice of government. The conspicuous part played by New England, and especially by Massachusetts, in the contest with the mother country preceding and during the course of the Revolution, and in the shaping of the national government that followed, has also been emphasized frequently as closely associated with the town system of government that prevailed in that section.

To a very large extent the eulogies pronounced with reference to the town system of government appear justly to be deserved. But a few considerations will serve to show that this fact can hardly be accepted as conclusive evidence that the development of urban life is inconsistent with democracy. It may be recalled in the first place that the brilliant development of pure democracy in the Greek city-states was a thoroughly urban development. Again, the genuine town system of local government in this country has been, as a matter of fact, the least typically rural of all the forms of local government in the rural districts in this country, seeing that it has been associated with a village type of agriculture—a type that has had a relatively small development with us. The town system in the form in which it has yielded its most fruitful results and in which it has attracted the attention of students of government has been confined almost wholly to New England—and specially to Southern New England. But Southern New England has always been the least typically rural and the most typically urban section in the United States. Every physiographic feature—climate, soil, superficial contour, accessibility to the sea, water power—contributed to

produce a population living in concentrated settlements in New England.[32] The South, with very different physiographic features, developed a scattered population and the county system of local government; and in the Middle section and in the West the rural development has been almost everywhere that of the isolated farm homestead. But the town system requires a compact community life, with an agglomerated population; and the dispersed settlements of the typically rural sections of this country were quite as unsuited to it as were the large urban centers that presently sprang up.

It is not surprising, then, that the real town system never took real root outside of that narrow region in Southern New England where the population from the first settled in closely organized, compact communities. The frontier and the wide stretches of agricultural area characterized by the isolated farm homestead afforded a barrier to the spread of the town system long before its continued existence or usefulness was threatened by the development of cities.[33] Notwithstanding that the great majority of the people of New England—even of Southern New England—were at first occupied in agriculture, the urban viewpoint prevailed from the first and the political organization was from the first urban rather than rural. And today it is the matters that relate to the village life that mainly occupy the town meeting in the rural towns of New England and not the matters that concern the rural community in general.[34]

But there was another condition that contributed to limit the development of the town system in its purely democratic form long before the growth of cities in New England forced the adoption of municipal organization in the larger centers of population. For the system of the simple town meeting and of direct personal participation in and control of public affairs could not survive the time when it was necessary for a community to develop relations with other similar communities and to federate or combine with these other com-

munities into a state or commonwealth. For the people of all these communities—that is, of the colony or commonwealth as a whole—were of course unable to come together and to manage their general affairs directly, after the manner of the town meeting. It was out of such an exigency as this, therefore, that the purely democratic organization began to give way to the representative system—as it must give way always under such conditions if a really democratic government is to be preserved.

This development began at a very early date in New England and had proceeded to a very considerable length before the growth of population in the larger centers forced the abandonment of the town system in these centers entirely.[35] And it was the development of the colony or commonwealth at a comparatively early period and not the rise of cities that resulted in the material limitation of the powers of the town organization. It is also significant with reference to the view held by those who associate the development of democracy almost exclusively with rural life that the New England town system, which is universally admitted to have played a leading part in the development of democracy in this country, should have been so typically non-rural. Especially striking is the contradiction between the fact that the real town system, with these admittedly marked democratic features, was confined to New England and was thus sharply differentiated from the frontier, especially from the western frontier, and the view held by some that the development of democracy in this country has been identified with rural frontier life.

There can be little doubt that the town system was, and is, unsuited to the political needs of large centers of population.[36] And frankly the increase in population in these large centers has brought serious problems for democracy to solve—problems that we can not be said to have succeeded in solving satisfactorily, even with the remarkable improve-

ment in city government in recent years. But we see the failures of municipal government in the somewhat blinding glare of contemporaneous observation while the defects of the town system are concealed by the mellow light of tradition.[37] There is assurance in the fact that in spite of the decay of the town system and the large development of municipal government the general movement toward the democratizing of our political system has gone surely, if haltingly, forward. And there is good reason to hope that with the further perfecting and purifying of city government and with the sane and reasonable use of agencies such as the initiative, referendum, and recall, all the advantages of a pure democracy that were represented in the early town system, combined with those of the representative system, of which the town system could not so well avail itself, may be realized and a type of democratic organization be perfected in our cities that will be even more democratic and as much finer and more efficient than the town system as modern city life is richer and fuller than the simple life of the early New England village.

Thus neither a survey of the development of democracy in its general aspects, in this country, covering the various periods and movements that have been by common consent accepted as typically democratic, nor the more special consideration of the comparative attitude of the rural and urban classes toward certain outstanding issues or principles involving the democratic spirit in a fundamental way, show, on the whole, any superiority of the rural over the urban population with reference to the sentiment in favor of democracy or with respect to the contribution made to the development of democracy. The rural population of the newer agricultural regions has played a conspicuously notable part in the development of the democratic spirit and in the promotion of democratic institutions—a part equalled in importance by the rural population of no other country. But

in this high emprise the liberal urban elements have also played an honorable, often a leading part.

On the other hand, the rural population of the older agricultural districts in this country has often displayed a distinctly conservative, not to say positively undemocratic, attitude, in which they have had the support, often the leadership, of the ultra-conservative urban elements. In the struggle for democracy in this country, and also in a certain measure in Europe, parts of the rural and parts of the urban population have thus stood shoulder to shoulder in favor of democracy, while other parts, both of the rural and of the urban population, have joined forces in opposition. In the future, however, as the rural frontier population tends to disappear with the disappearance of the frontier and of its democratizing influences, the rural population as a whole in this country may be expected to settle down into that status of conservatism which it seems the part of the rural population everywhere in older regions or countries to reflect, leaving the urban population to exercise the predominating place among the liberal and democratic forces.

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24. In the earlier years of the use of the initiative and referendum

in Switzerland the rural population excelled the urban population in the employment of these devices. In recent times just the opposite situation has prevailed. See Rappard, *op. cit.*

25. It has been incorrectly stated that the People's Party included a demand for the introduction of the initiative and referendum, in the platform adopted at the formation of that Party in Cincinnati, on May 19, 1891.

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CHAPTER XI

The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Knowledge or Intelligence, and upon Political Initiative or Enterprise

The nature and extent of the influence of the cityward movement upon the political capacity of the population are of course subjects of the very first importance. The net result of this influence is a composite of the influence of city life upon a number of different phases of human competency in the political sphere. We are therefore interested in knowing how the growth of city life has affected these several more or less distinct qualities or aptitudes which, when taken collectively, determine the political capacity or political genius of a people. The most important of these several qualities that condition or determine political capacity in general are as follows: general intelligence, political knowledge, political initiative or enterprise, political inventiveness, political activity, political leadership, public spirit, including freedom from partisanship or party spirit and loyal assent to government by properly constituted authority, and political purity.[1]

I

General Intelligence

Buckle held that in human civilization the moral factors counteract each other, or, in the long run, remain static; and that progress therefore depends entirely upon the intellectual factor.[2] This, of course, is an extreme view and with-

out doubt an untenable one. But there is no gainsaying the vast importance of the intellectual factor; and the manner in which it is affected by the growth of city life is a matter of prime importance.

The general intelligence of the population of a country depends first of all upon the efficiency of its schools and of its formal educational agencies and institutions in general. And there can be little doubt that the city community is more favorable than the rural community for the establishment and development of the formal educational institutions and agencies. The same advantages that the city affords for many other enterprises it similarly affords for the great enterprise of education—the advantages of concentration and proximity, of superior human coöperation, of large-scale organization and operation, of complex division of labor, and of superior financial resources. It is thus not surprising that city schools and other formal educational agencies are almost universally recognized as superior to country schools and educational agencies in general. The city schools possess, in general, markedly superior plant and equipment, enjoy the advantages of better-prepared and better-paid teachers, of better curricula of study, of better supervision, and of a greater number of school days in the year, and secure a better average attendance of pupils.

On the other hand, proportionally more effective use is probably made of the school facilities in the rural districts by the rural pupils than of the ampler facilities afforded by the city schools because rural children, more habituated to work and with much less to distract their attention from school duties, apply themselves more seriously than their city cousins.

Perhaps the clearest proof of the superior facilities that the city affords for the agencies of formal education is to be found in the higher percentage of literacy that almost everywhere prevails in the city, and in the decreasing percentage

of illiteracy for a country as a whole as urbanization proceeds. Thus in our own country in 1920 illiterates constituted but 4.4 per cent of the total population 10 years of age and over in the urban communities while the corresponding percentage of illiterates in the rural communities was 7.7. And the declining trend of illiteracy in the country as a whole is emphatically demonstrated by the percentage of illiterates 10 years of age and over as reported at the different census periods since 1870, as follows: 1870, 20.0; 1880, 17.0; 1890, 13.3; 1900, 10.7; 1910, 7.7; 1920, 6.0. Moreover, for each separate class of the population of the same age in case of the country as a whole, as also in all the different geographic divisions except for foreign-born whites in certain divisions, the percentage of illiterates was greater in 1920 in the rural communities than in the urban communities.

Due to the heavy concentration of the relatively illiterate foreign-born whites in the cities of the New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, and West North Central divisions there was a very considerable excess of illiteracy for the population in general in the urban districts of the first three divisions and a slight excess in the urban districts of the last division, in 1920; while there was also a slight excess of illiteracy among foreign-born whites in the urban districts in the New England States and a very considerable excess for the same element in the urban districts of the two North Central divisions, in the same census year. Without doubt the excess of illiteracy among foreign-born whites in these three divisions is to be explained by the shorter period of residence in this country for this element in the urban centers than in the rural districts, as the percentage of illiterates among native whites of foreign or mixed parentage was greater—in most cases very decidedly greater—in the rural districts than in the urban centers in every geographic division, as also in the country as a whole.

Again, while the high percentage of Negro illiteracy con-

tributes materially to swell illiteracy in general in the three Southern divisions, it is significant that the percentage of Negro illiteracy is much higher in the rural districts than in the urban centers.

A similar condition exists, as it has long existed, in European countries. Vaughan in 1843 cited the British and Foreign School Society and the National School Society to the effect that nearly one-half of the agricultural population over the greater part of England was unable to read and write—a condition by no means confined to the rural *laboring* population. Conditions in this respect were no better among the mining population—also largely rural at that time. In the towns and in the manufacturing districts in general, conditions were better, though sufficiently unfavorable according to the standards of today. Illiteracy has rapidly diminished, however, with increasing urbanization; and for the period 1901–10 but 1.8 per cent of the persons applying for licenses to marry in that country were unable to sign their names.[3]

According to the Census of 1911 the counties of Dublin and Antrim, containing the cities of Dublin and Belfast, respectively, had the lowest percentage of illiterates among all the counties of Ireland; and Belfast, the largest city and the chief industrial center and seaport of Ireland, had a percentage of illiterates amounting to but 3.6 in 1911 as compared with a percentage of 5.2 for the County of Antrim as a whole. Moreover, without exception where data are given separately the percentage of illiteracy in Irish cities in 1911 was less than in the counties as a whole within which they were located.

Germany, the most highly urbanized and industrialized of the countries of Continental Europe, has an extremely low percentage of illiterates; and in general illiteracy increases on the Continent in passing toward the rural and agricultural countries of the east and south. As in England, so in Ger-

many illiteracy has rapidly decreased as the country has become industrialized and urbanized, and persists chiefly in the remoter rural districts.

Illiteracy is also highest among the agricultural population in France, as the following figures show:[4]

Occupation	Percentage of illiteracy, 1911: Male	Female	Occupation	Percentage of illiteracy, 1911: Male	Female
Industry	7.8	8.4	Agriculture	15.4	20.7
Commerce	2.7	7.2	All occupations	9.7	13.2

In Italy, the lowest percentage of illiteracy is found in the district of Piedmont—a circumstance that appears to be closely associated with the existence of important industrial development and urban life on the one hand, and with the exceptional prevalence of village or communal agricultural life on the other. The majority of the population thus living in close and intimate association, a condition which favors schools and literacy prevails. Conversely, the highest percentage of illiteracy is found in the mountainous and relatively inaccessible districts of Calabria. In Italy also, industrial development has coincided with a considerable reduction in illiteracy.

That the urban population also enjoys superior advantages with respect to the voluntary and indirect agencies of education is as apparent as that it enjoys superior facilities for formal education in the schools. It suffices merely to mention, in this connection, the educational advantages that the city possesses in its libraries, art galleries, museums, zoölogical and botanical gardens, aquariums, and other similar agencies. The vastly larger circulation of newspapers and of periodical literature among the urban population constitutes at once the evidence of a superior intellectual and mental activity in the city and the effective means for the further promotion of urban superiority in this respect. Much has been said and written of the degradation of the manufacturing population of England in early days. But Vaughan in 1843

quoted John Bright, of Rochdale, to the effect that the publishers of Chambers' *Edinburgh Journal* sold 59,000 copies, of the 60,000 copies issued weekly, in the manufacturing districts of Great Britain and Ireland while a bare 1,000 copies found their way into the agricultural districts. Manchester alone was said to have read more copies of this publication than the whole population of Ireland. Moreover, it was said that "book-travellers" or representatives of other publishing houses never even went into a farmhouse to deliver tracts or to distribute numbers of periodicals.[5]

Vaughan's statement that while ignorance and wretchedness characterized the peasantry of Europe, the agriculturist of that day in the United States was not inferior to the townsman in intelligence, must be accepted with some reservation in respect to its latter part. Assuredly the bulk of the agricultural population in this country, outside of the Negro belt in the South at least, has never constituted a class characterized by a decidedly inferior intellectual status. And the agricultural communities of New England, together with some of those in other sections, enjoyed many educational and cultural advantages in addition to superior school facilities. The rural white population in this country has therefore always been more eager, as well as more able, to read and write than the mass of the rural population of Europe. In connection with the rise of the early agricultural societies and of other associations among farmers there sprang up agricultural periodicals and there developed an agricultural literature; and the fairs and other annual meetings and gatherings became the occasion and the means for mutual contact of an educative character and afforded the opportunity to hear the foremost men of the day. The most valuable feature of the Grange movement has been its educational program. Later still came the organization of farmers' institutes, with a similar educative influence, and finally the numerous and widely diversified coöperative and other organizational features of farm

business and life today in this country. The introduction of the rural free delivery of the post-office department opened the way for a largely increased circulation of newspapers and periodicals in the rural districts; and the suburban auto delivery service puts the city newspaper at the gate of many a farm home today. Moreover, rural school and circulating libraries in many parts of the country have made increasingly accessible to the rural population books and other literature of an educational character.

Yet, great as has been the progress in these respects in the rural community there is little doubt that progress along educational lines has been relatively even greater in the cities and towns. And the individual, in town or city, possessing equal natural capacity and enjoying an equal status as to birth and fortune in comparison with the farm resident, undoubtedly still enjoys superior means of advancement along intellectual lines. The early New England cotton factory girls, with their literary clubs and lyceums where they repeatedly heard the most noted men and women of the country, and with their own journals, which they themselves edited and to which they contributed articles for publication, were undoubtedly farther advanced in mental and intellectual attainments than their sisters who remained on the farm. And the shoemakers of Lynn must have owed much of their reputed intellectual superiority to ready access to the best literature in periodicals and in libraries, to close touch with the trend of current events, and to the quickening stimulus of mutual contact of mind with mind in their hourly and daily association—in respect to all of which the men on the surrounding farms were much at a disadvantage. No doubt it is possible to find a large number of rural communities today where the mental and intellectual advantages associated with liberal access to good books and to the best newspapers and magazines are superior to those enjoyed by large numbers of the lower classes in our towns and cities. On the other

hand, there are very many rural communities where advantages of this kind are sadly lacking.[6] Moreover, opinion as to the relative educative influence of the rural and of the urban environment in this country has often been unconsciously prejudiced to the disadvantage of the latter because of the residence there of large numbers of the illiterate foreign-born, the vast majority of whom have been derived from the rural districts of Europe and whose ignorance and lack of mental and intellectual development must therefore be charged to the account of the rural environment there.

Less decisive must be the conclusion as to the relative educational and cultural value of rural and of urban work. Here it is especially necessary to compare people of similar station in life and to view rural and urban work in their general aspect if any significant conclusion is to be reached. Unquestionably the street laborer and other unskilled worker in the city gets as little education, on the whole, from his work as the man who digs a ditch or who grubs with the mattock in the country; and the excessive specialization of work and minute division of labor that keeps the factory operative occupied with the monotonous repetition of a single fragment of the process, whose relation to the process as a whole is often largely obscured, are rightly regarded as of small educational value.[7] On the other hand, the rural worker often suffers educationally for the opposite reason: he passes so constantly from one apparently unrelated task to another that he fails to gain that knowledge or skill in any one of the numerous tasks that is necessary if his work is to bring a mental stimulus or to develop within him the instincts of workmanship. It is a question whether the routine of mere chores is, on the whole, any less deadly in its effect on the mind of the rural worker than is the monotony of continuous application to a single phase of a process on the mind of the factory worker.

Moreover, there is probably less confining of knowledge

to the small part of the process with which an individual factory worker is engaged than is usually supposed; and in many cases where this situation really prevails it may be explained by the general ignorance of the worker or by the fact that he is often a newly-arrived immigrant whose confusion under strange surroundings and whose general illiteracy and lack of acquaintance with the language of his adopted country are largely responsible for the narrowly restricted view which he obtains of the work as a whole. Not the work but the worker is to blame in many instances. Again, to the weighty general educational influences exerted by labor organizations upon their members is to be added the fact that through the contact that they occasion between the members of the different trades they facilitate exchange of information as to the nature of the separate, though related, tasks. At any rate this outcome is encouraged by the circumstance that the process or processes as a whole are often concentrated within a relatively small area and thus not unlikely to come, in time, under the observation of the worker or to become familiar to him from the information which he picks up from his fellow-workers who have to do with other phases of the process.

Lastly, the processes with which the factory worker is occupied are usually of a tangible character and are thus comprehended without great difficulty, in contrast with the hidden and mysterious processes of animal and plant nutrition and growth with which the farm worker is so largely occupied. It is significant that less is being said today than in the past of the unfavorable educational effects of factory work.[8]

On the other hand, the city trades, the mechanical employments, the merchandising and commercial pursuits and occupations, financial and banking operations, and, most of all, the function of the business organizer and manager, are highly educative and call for an up-to-dateness and enter-

prise that afford a constant spur to the mind and involve a contact with the world at large that are in striking contrast with the narrow isolation of the farm worker and with the undeviating routine that too often fill the calendar of the latter and of the factory worker alike. The wealth of our resources in land long placed a heavy discount on any but crude methods of exploitation and prevented any considerable realization of the educative effects involved in a scientific agricultural production; though this condition has been relieved by the effect of an unparalleled use of agricultural machinery which the same circumstance has promoted and which has constituted for the male farm population an educative agency of high value. Assuredly, farm work does not lack in potentialities for valuable educative results. And the increasing development of scientific agriculture, to which the cityward movement has given impetus, will more and more serve to uncover the hidden processes and both invite and compel the attention of the mind of the rural worker, with the result of vastly stimulating his intellectual development. The more careful and more studied organization and management of the farm business, which the same disappearance of primitive conditions in agriculture has necessitated, may be expected to have a similarly favorable effect on the mentality of the rural resident—reinforced by the larger contact with the outside world toward which all these developments trend.

On the whole, therefore, there is probably no decisive advantage one way or the other with reference to the relative educative value of rural and of urban work today. It seems safe to conclude that urban occupations and employments in general do not suffer at present in the comparison; and there appears to be as much opportunity for an improvement in the educative value of urban work in the future as may be anticipated with regard to rural work. The city environment is thus left with the balance of educational advantages already pointed out in other respects unimpaired.[9]

It is the opinion of some that while the city environment tends to diminish illiteracy the various urban educational agencies are likely to promote superficiality, which, according to Weber, is "the peculiar danger of urban habits of life." "The city boy is taught to read, but not to think; the result is seen in the immense constituency of yellow journalism. Country newspapers are trivial enough, but they do not descend to the depths of moral degradation of sensational metropolitan journals, manufactured for city readers." [10] Doubtless there is truth in the view that some urban educative agencies tend to develop superficiality. But the recognition of this fact does not warrant the conclusion that the rural educative agencies have any positive compensating virtue in this respect. Whatever may have been true a score or more of years ago, the great majority of city and metropolitan newspapers today do not appear, on the whole, to suffer in comparison with the newspapers of the smaller towns, which in large measure serve the rural population, in attention to trivialities and to the degrading aspects of daily events. Superficiality and journalistic scandal-mongering are not confined to the large urban communities. Moreover, too often it is the cheapest, and the worst, of the metropolitan dailies that circulate in the surrounding rural districts today. On the other hand, the best city newspapers today are not only edited by men incomparably better educated than those who have in charge the newspapers of the smaller towns, but the management in general of the former have a greater sense of responsibility than that of the latter for the intellectual and moral enlightenment of the public and for the general moral tone of the community. By means of the space that they are able to devote to a wide variety of subjects of domestic, of national, and of international interest, the former afford the opportunity, at least, for a substantial mental pabulum, in comparison with the petty, and often sordid, recitals of personal and local news to which the columns of the latter

are largely confined. Urban superficiality is no more fatal to rational thinking than are rural narrowness and pettiness and prejudice. There is much room for improvement in these respects in both classes of communities. Moreover, complaint with reference to the press is by no means confined to recent times.[11]

The view that the rural community has suffered in its intellectual resources from the urbanizing movement itself, as a result of "folk depletion," does not appear on the whole to be warranted, though isolated rural communities have probably suffered in this manner. For the country loses not only the best but also the worst of its elements to the city through migration.

On the whole, the conclusion seems clearly warranted that city life and city growth are distinctly favorable to the promotion of general intelligence.

II

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE OR INTELLIGENCE

A high degree of intelligence in general is imperatively necessary to the possession of adequate political knowledge or intelligence; though possession of high intelligence in general by a people does not necessarily insure the possession of real political intelligence and thus of political capacity. No other country—certainly no other country of first rank—manifests so small a percentage of illiteracy or enjoys so high a level of general intelligence as Germany. And yet the people of that country are singularly deficient in real political knowledge or intelligence, however skilled the German bureaucracy may be with reference to political organization and administration.[12] But other things equal, whatever makes for a high intelligence in general makes for a large degree of intelligence relative to political affairs. And the same means that

so effectively promote intelligence in general in the city are fruitful also in the dissemination of knowledge and information with respect to matters of government and politics.

In the city community—and especially in the large city community—there are always local issues of importance to engage the interest and attention of the citizen; while the dearth of such issues in the rural community leaves the mind of the rural resident without a corresponding mental stimulus. As an early writer, already cited, puts it: "Cities are states upon a small scale, and are of necessity schools in relation to the policy most in harmony with the genius of a people. Political knowledge never diffuses itself more wholesomely among a people, than when it results, in this manner, slowly and steadily, from circumstances and experiences; and when its principles are to be brought out upon a larger scale, by men who have worked them successfully on a smaller scale." [13] It is still true, too, as the same writer has pointed out, that cities are "the centers of vast experiments in the history of society." [14] And this circumstance also stimulates the mind of the urban resident and prevents that falling into a passive acceptance of merely traditional ideas and forms that too often characterizes the resident in the older rural districts in his attitude toward government and politics.

The political stagnation that has often characterized the more purely rural states manifests itself in the mental attitude of the citizens quite as much as in the actual forms and processes in which the political life finds outward expression. Indeed, there is first stagnation of mind through adjustment to the relatively static economic and social conditions that normally prevail in the old and well-established rural community, and then, as a natural consequence, stagnation in the development and actual functioning of the forms of government. These two conditions react, of course, the one upon the other. The fact that cities lead in great social and political experiments is both a cause and a consequence of a quick-

ened mental state among city residents. And the slowness with which economic and political conditions change in the older rural districts is similarly both a cause and a consequence of the grooved mental state of the inhabitants in such districts.[15]

The contact that the intimate community life of the urban centers afford and enforce is also favorable to the discussion of political ideas and thus to the dissemination of political knowledge and intelligence.[16] Again, real political knowledge is conditioned by the extent to which the citizens are able to participate in political activities. And, as we shall see presently, the cityward movement has on the whole coincided with increasing popular participation in political affairs.

Yet there are some respects, perhaps, in which conditions are less favorable for the promotion of political intelligence in these days of large urban development than in the days when rural communities predominated. For one thing, the citizens of a country are obliged to give more attention to matters of government and politics in the earlier history of a country, when its political institutions are taking general form, than is necessitated at a later stage, when these institutions have become in the main established.[17] And with the greater measure of attention to political matters in early days goes a more favorable opportunity to gain a knowledge of and acquaintance with the theory and practice of government current at that period or of the system that may be actually instituted at that time. Thus both the period of early colonial settlement and organization, the period of State organization and of united effort at the time of the Revolution, and the organization of a national political system at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution afforded especially favorable opportunity for the political education of the people of this country—opportunity that was repeated for the people of each newly settled and newly organized State that was eventually added to the Union. With

the advent of settled political conditions, however, both in the country as a whole and in the individual States, the people devoted less time, thought, and attention to political affairs and concerned themselves more exclusively with their material interests and with other matters having only an incidental political relation.

It is easy to show, however, that it was just the rise of the cities that afforded the needed new stimulus to the interest in political affairs under these circumstances. For the urban citizen enjoys an advantage in the fact that city government has been undergoing an active development, while rural government has tended toward a condition of stability or stereotyped form. The very urgency of political and governmental problems in our cities has in a measure compelled the interest and attention of the urban citizen and has thus promoted a state of mind that is favorable to the acquisition of political knowledge and to a heightened grasp of the principles of government in general; while his rural fellow-citizen is likely to vegetate, politically and governmentally, except so far as he may be aroused by the political issues and problems that continue to rise in the sphere of the State or nation.

Another difficulty with reference to the political education of the citizenry arises from the increasing complexity of government within the urban community as it increases in size and in the number and scope of its political activities. For urban development is the result, very largely, of centralizing forces; and political organization and development in the cities has naturally reflected this tendency toward concentration. As Professor Fairlie has pointed out, with the concentration of a large population the local government becomes "a mass of details most of which require specialized knowledge and are of little general interest." Popular knowledge of the government thus disappears with the decline of popular participation and control.[18] Yet this development is

admittedly associated with a movement in the direction of more efficient government and is but one phase of the movement away from pure or direct democracy in the direction of representative government—a development already indicated as bound to occur entirely apart from the growth of cities. Moreover, the rural districts themselves are also reflecting in a measure this same centralizing tendency in government and administration and with the same object—that of securing more efficient government. The result in both city and country, then, is to diminish the contact of the ordinary citizen with public affairs and thus partly to close those two important gates to political knowledge—interest and participation.

Yet it would appear that the urban resident after all is able to avail himself in this connection of compensating agencies of an educative character along political lines in a degree not possible to the rural resident. For centralization of government has been associated with an increase in political activities in the cities while in this process the rural communities have lost in the exercise of political functions. The urban resident still remains in comparatively close contact, therefore, with important processes of government, even though his relation to these processes has become less direct. Moreover, with the increasing use of the initiative, referendum, and recall in the city communities the urban resident is regaining his contact with and control over, and therefore his interest in, governmental agencies and policies. He may know less than he used to know about the actual machinery of public administration. But in this respect he is little or no worse off than his rural fellow-citizen. And it is probably necessary, and in accordance with political evolution, in these days of specialization that the object toward which political knowledge must be directed should be shifted from the machinery of administration to matters of public policy and to the character and efficiency of representatives and administrators.[19]

This is also true for the rural citizen. But, as already pointed out, the latter suffers from a dearth of local interests to engage his attention.

A great many persons point to the extraordinarily effective manner in which the New England town system educated the population in the theory and practice of government and conclude that the urbanizing movement, since the town system has proved inapplicable to urban life, has had an unfavorable effect upon the political education of the people of this country through the decline, in the town system, that has been associated, or that at least has coincided, with the rise of cities. That the New England town system was remarkably successful in effecting the political education of the citizens is quite generally admitted. Jefferson lamented the absence of the system of town government and of town meetings in Virginia—doubtless quite as much because of its educative value as because the system lent itself so admirably to the development and expression of democratic sentiments. When he became president he endeavored to promote the establishment of similar agencies of local government in the new States that were set up in the Northwest. And it is significant that after he had retired from the presidency he coupled "the subdivision of counties into wards" with "public education" as two subjects which he claimed a right to further as long as he breathed, since he considered "the continuance of republican government as absolutely hanging on these two hooks." [20]

This feature of the town system also attracted the attention of De Tocqueville; and James Bryce has already been quoted as characterizing the town meeting as "the most perfect school of self-government in any modern country." One of our own writers calls the town meeting "a political school, in which every elector received instruction"; [21] and another has described its most characteristic feature as "the lively and educating debate." [22]

So much importance, indeed, have some authorities assigned to the educational features of the New England town system that they have somewhat extravagantly concluded that if it has been effective in this respect it makes very little difference whether it has been able effectively to accomplish the ends that government is ordinarily supposed to accomplish.[23] It certainly makes a good deal of difference, ultimately at least, whether a system of government secures good government. But there is not a little warrant for the view that a system that works effectively toward the political education of the citizens is likely to function effectively in the end and broadly speaking, whatever may be the immediate outcome. In spite of the fact, therefore, that the town system and town meeting have been a good deal idealized and have not, even in New England, quite measured up to the estimate of some who have never actually seen them function,[24] yet in New England at least they have played a distinguished part in the education of the people of that section in political matters.

It is very doubtful, however, whether the view that urbanization has affected the political education of the American people unfavorably through an unfavorable effect upon the town system has any considerable justification. For the town system, in the highly educative form that it took in its native habitat, never extended outside of New England. Among the vast majority of the rural population of the country, then, this superior educating agency never has functioned. In the most purely rural section of the country in early days—in the South—it has never existed at all in any form. It has not been possible, therefore, for urbanization to destroy what never existed over a very large part of the country.

Moreover, as has already been pointed out in another connection, the town system was perhaps more urban than rural in its origin and in its environment; and where it still pre-

serves something of its old-time vigor it is the problems of the village, that is, of an aggregated population, that constitute in the main "the vital subjects of discussion." [25]

In considering the extent of political education on the part of our population today as compared with that which characterized the fathers who developed and laid the foundation principles of our political system, we are in no small danger of error through the natural, and in many respects laudable, tendency to idealize these early builders of our political structure. So colossal has that social and political structure become that we are very likely to see the fathers as reflecting much of the political greatness that was to be, and thus to magnify them beyond their real desert and to ascribe to them a knowledge and capacity with respect to things political that they did not really possess. Our early progress appears to have been due more to the splendid resources of the country, to the enjoyment of a relatively large degree of political freedom, and to the absence of injurious restraints and limitations than to any positive political principles or institutions that our fathers were enabled to work out through superior knowledge of statecraft. They possessed a large measure of the instinct for freedom and they were pretty well saturated with the prevailing political philosophy, which rather denied the utility of organized government than inculcated a sound knowledge of the principles of government and of public administration. A few men there were, so well known as not to need mention in this connection, who possessed a deep knowledge of the history and of the principles of politics and of government.[26] But of the great mass of the colonists of the Revolutionary period—particularly those in the remoter rural districts—it has been well said that "Their ideas upon government were not a little crude." [27]

Sumner, pointing out the chaotic conditions that prevailed in the colonies both before and after the Revolution, as well as during the period of that struggle, has emphasized the

crassness of ideas relative to the management of public affairs and the futility and ineffectiveness of many of the measures by means of which an attempt was made to execute the public business. Discussing Congress during this period, he says: "They were under the dominion of pernicious prepossessions. . . . They were afraid of one-man power. They held personal, provincial, and sectional ideas. They were afraid of the army. They were afraid of the States. . . . They seem to have gone upon the doctrine that nothing should be done against which any objection could be raised, and that the duty of the good citizen was, not to throw himself with all his might into the great business on hand, but to raise objections. John Adams says they held undigested notions of liberty. They would not do anything which had ever been done in England in connection with which any abuses had ever been perpetrated. Hence it took six years, and the personal authority of Robert Morris, to introduce contracts. If it had not been for the personal weight and reputation in finance of Robert Morris, it is doubtful if heads of departments could have been put in place of boards. All the mistakes were stubbornly defended, until bitter experience put them down." [28]

A no less prominent representative of the fathers of the Revolution and of the Constitution than Thomas Jefferson has characterized in so remarkable a way the group of which he himself was a member, and their work, that his words command a place in this connection. In a letter to Samuel Kercheval, Jefferson refers to the sanctimonious reverence with which some men look at constitutions. "They ascribe to the men of the preceding age," he says, "a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I know that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present but without the experience of the present; and forty years of

experience in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves were they to rise from the dead." [29]

Professor Ford has affirmed that there are still isolated districts, especially in the South, which "exhibit to a notable extent" these prevailing ideas and conditions of the Revolutionary period. "One finds among people of this sort an abundance of political prejudice combined with very little knowledge." [30] The clear implication of this observation is that there has been an evident advance in political education among the great majority of our citizens since Revolutionary times, except in the remoter rural districts. Relative to the comparative attitude of the urban population, particularly the population of New York City, and of the rural population of New York State toward ratification of the Federal Constitution in 1788, Theodore Roosevelt has said: "The townsmen were quicker witted, and politically more far-sighted and less narrow-minded than the average country folk of that day." [31] Another proof of the increasing knowledge of political principles on the part of our population coincident with the growth of cities lies in the fact that we have materially modified in a number of its phases the political system that our fathers set up—and, on the whole, to its very considerable improvement.

In comparing the political intelligence manifested in city and in country in the United States, it is necessary to keep in mind the handicap that the cities in all sections suffer from the marked concentration of the alien elements, and that the cities outside the South suffer from a similar concentration of the Negro element. In the South the large Negro element in the rural districts has likewise long seriously complicated the problem of political education. In that section, indeed, the Negro is largely excluded from participation in political affairs. Considering the way in which this

is accomplished there can be little doubt of its unfortunate effect ultimately. Yet political conditions are doubtless temporarily alleviated in the South through such a policy.

In the urban centers outside of the South, however, the Negroes freely exercise their right to participate in political affairs and actually do participate to a larger extent than considerable numbers of the more highly educated citizens, though they represent beyond comparison the most ignorant, corrupt, and partisan element in the population of these urban centers. It does not change the situation materially to recognize that these Negroes are to a large extent not responsible for being what they are politically. Unscrupulous politicians nevertheless make use of them and of their ignorant and vicious tendencies, as well as of the ignorant and corrupt elements among the foreign-born, to serve their own selfish and anti-social purposes. Participation in political activities undoubtedly has an educative effect on these elements; and, as we shall see, there is substantial reason to believe that political education, certainly the Americanization, of the foreign elements takes place more rapidly in the urban centers than in the rural districts. But the manipulated participation of citizenry of this type goes far to explain the corrupt and inefficient government that has far too commonly characterized our cities; and government of this character, in turn, affords a bad training for the citizenry in general.

Moreover, changes relative to the distribution of both foreign and Negro elements of the population since 1850, and relative to the origin of the former since 1890, have tended to alleviate conditions in this respect in the South while at the same time tending further to handicap the industrialized and urbanized sections of the North. Particularly to be noted in this connection are the replacement, among our immigrants, of the races from Northwestern Europe by those from Eastern and Southern Europe,[32] and

the recent heavy migration of Negroes from the South into the Northern cities.

In view of these various retarding influences, especially those that operate in the urban centers, the progress that has been made in the direction of a higher level of political intelligence in this country may be regarded as really surprising. There is thus good reason to believe that urbanization has been, on the whole, distinctly favorable to the acquirement of political intelligence by our citizens.

Study of political conditions, and of the course of political development, in Europe even more decisively justifies the conclusion just stated—a conclusion quite in accord with the fact, already stated, that it was in the cities of ancient Greece and Rome that both the art and the science of politics and government were born.[33] The comparatively more active part played by the city population in general in Western Europe, with the possible exception of England in the Middle Ages, in promoting political and constitutional development has already been placed in evidence on many pages in this study. And this fact, together with direct evidence as to the superior political aptitude of the city elements, may be accepted as proof that city life in the countries of Western Europe has exerted a favorable educative effect in a political way.

The superior political fitness of the urban propertied classes in these countries no one doubted; and objection to the extending of the suffrage franchise to the urban artisan population was based more upon their asserted restiveness and alleged lack of an independent status than upon any lack of individual political capacity. Evidence has already been presented showing the superior intellectual activity in general among the industrial population in the cities of England. But the successive attempts to redistribute representation and to liberalize the suffrage franchise in that country disclosed convincing evidence of specific preparation and fitness for

political activity on the part of these same classes. In the debate in the House of Commons, early in 1859, on the "Representation of the People Bill," it was brought out that the artisans of Birmingham had their debating clubs, where they discussed political matters together; and they were said upon one occasion to have decided by a single affirmative vote the question whether John Bright actually and truly represented them! Bright himself, in the course of the same debate, refused to admit the claim for special political superiority on the part of the people of Coventry, declaring that the populations of the other manufacturing towns were their equals in independence, intelligence, and virtue. Characterizing the bulk of the population of the great manufacturing towns as very orderly and imbued with respect for law, he pointed out that these classes had already conquered the "arts and manufactures and all that tends to wealth and civilization," and predicted that they would also in the future conquer "a much larger share of their political rights" than those who were hostile to their aspirations were then determined to allow them.[34]

Later, in 1884, when Gladstone introduced the bill for enlarged suffrage and changed representation whose passage finally placed the British system upon a broad, democratic basis, except for the disqualification of sex, he found it necessary to argue only on behalf of the agricultural laborers relative to the matter of political fitness; and the only material objection that his political opponents could urge to the bill was based upon the alleged unfitness of this class, which constituted so large a proportion of the strictly rural population, to exercise the right of the ballot. Lord Randolph Churchill, who once had sat for a small borough composed very largely of agricultural laborers, granted the fitness of the class of miners. But the former he declared "absolutely unfitted for the exercise of the franchise." "The ordinary agricultural labourer outside the boroughs," he declared, "had no knowl-

edge whatever of the elementary facts relating to political questions, and he cared even less for them." Charging that the questions that interested this class were those relating merely to their own petty disputes and interests, he defied any member of the party in power to "go down to any of the agricultural counties and talk to the agricultural labourers upon political questions with the most remote prospect of arousing them to more enthusiasm than would be produced by reading to them from the Greek Testament." Another member of the opposition also declared that after close association with the class of agricultural labourers he deemed them unfit for the ballot, though he granted them "every virtue in the world except the virtues of political forethought and grasp of the relations of public questions." [35]

Very different and opposing views as to the political capacity and aptitude of the class of agricultural laborers in England, after a generation of experience with the use of the ballot, are offered today by different authorities. Some writers represent them as generally ignorant of political issues and even of persons prominent in public life.[36] But another writer declares: "I deliberately consider them the most sensible portion of the Body Politic. They know exactly the grievances under which they suffer, they have a shrewd notion of the possible remedies, and do not trouble themselves with idle speculations." [37] Somewhere between these two extremes the truth must lie—but in all probability nearer the former than the latter. For though there is no good reason to doubt the potential political capacity of "Hodge," as a class, his environment is not favorable to the developing and rendering active of this capacity.[38]

Lord Haldane, who "sat for a quarter of a century" for East Lothian, recently testified to the high political capacity and intelligence of the agricultural laborers in that district of Scotland. But he was careful to contrast them in this respect with the "South of England agricultural labourers." [39]

On the other hand, an admission some forty years ago by an apologist for the Scottish Highlander that the latter habitually "did not know the political time of day" probably still holds with more or less validity for today.[40]

Testimony as to a similar lack of political intelligence among the masses of the rural population in many of the countries of Continental Europe is overwhelming. A recent writer who claims that the Russian peasant is, "in his own way," highly intelligent and knows just what he wants, yet admits that the latter lacks "a crystallized political consciousness," "political experience," and the knowledge of a way to attain what he wants.[41] Political education may no longer be "entirely lacking" in highly rural Southern Italy, in contrast with a certain development in that direction in Northern Italy, as stated by an authoritative writer of a score of years ago.[42] But there appears to be little doubt that the latter section still enjoys a relative superiority in this respect. Still more discouraging is the testimony of a recent writer that "neither social nor general political education in Spain can be initiated in the rural districts" but must come from the "more instructed and mentally active town artisans and other workers." [43] And Friedrich Naumann's dramatic interrogation of some years since as to what power could cry awake the politically somnolent masses in rural Germany may perhaps not be so much out of date even today relative to the dependent rural classes of that country.[43a]

Reference has already been made to the educational effect of the divorcement of the urban citizen from direct participation in government, as a result of increasing complexity of government in the centers of population. But a second question arises in this connection. Granted that urbanization is favorable, on the whole, to the growth of political intelligence, are the cities after all able to produce the growingly higher political intelligence that is required to meet and solve the growingly complicated problems that their own existence

creates?[44] Looking to the experience of the cities of Europe and to the experience of those cities in our own country that appear to have made the most marked progress in the art of municipal government, a favorable answer may be ventured. More and more the actual administration in city government tends to pass into the hands of experts, whom the various governing bodies either comprise in their own personnel or, more commonly, are able regularly to employ or to call to their assistance as needed. It is thus more and more left to the ordinary urban citizen to reign but not to rule—that is, to exercise the ultimate sovereignty and to determine the general policy of municipal government rather than to participate in the actual processes of government as was formerly the case. Political intelligence, as already indicated, must become re-directed—turned from what is fast becoming a highly specialized art, the art of government and of public administration, toward the matter of the determination of the broad lines of public policy, toward the right choice of officials and the enforcement of responsibility upon them, and toward the forming of accurate judgments as to ultimate results.

But it does not therefore follow that the urban citizen will be deprived of the opportunities that make for political education nor that his political intelligence will prove unequal to the demands that will be made upon it. The delegation of government to experts can be made at least as really democratic as the delegation of power to representatives; and the combination of the two processes, checked by the necessary agencies of control in the hands of the electorate, bids fair to bring well within the political capacity of the citizens the effective solution of the difficult problems of government in the urban sphere.[45]

Moreover, it is very likely that entirely too little attention has been directed to the tremendous advantages that human coöperation makes possible in the political sphere in

the urban centers, and that have already been so strikingly manifested there in the economic sphere; while too much emphasis has probably been placed upon the political complications that the concentration of large numbers of people within a narrow area involves. It is altogether natural that these problems should manifest themselves in serious degree in advance of the means for their removal or satisfactory correction. Such an order of sequence appears to be in conformity with the law of social development, which consists not so much in the delicate and preconceived adjustment of means to ends as in a semi-visioning and half-conscious pushing out after patent advantages in response to the bidding of the deep-lying impulses of self-interest, with little anticipation of the difficulties that inevitably manifest themselves in due time and with a minimum of preparation in advance for their solution. But human ingenuity, when once faced with a stubborn and apparently insurmountable task, has again and again proved itself surprisingly resourceful and has time after time succeeded in solving these apparently unsolvable problems. This ingenuity and resourcefulness the people of our own race and nation have manifested in a degree excelled by no other; and we may therefore confidently expect the keen-witted citizens of our urban centers to develop the intelligence required to solve the problems of municipal government once they face the necessity of doing so and once they become fully aware of the tremendous potentialities that coöperation with their fellow-citizens places ready to their hand.

III

POLITICAL INITIATIVE OR ENTERPRISE

Initiative, or enterprise, which is both a typical urban quality and also a characteristic that attaches to a frontier population, is likely to be deficient among the rural population

of an old and maturely developed agricultural region. This condition appears, in part, to have come about as the result of a selective process by which the course of rural migration tends to carry away from the rural community the individuals who possess the quality of enterprise or initiative in high degree and to concentrate them in the urban centers and in the newer districts, thus leaving the older rural districts depleted in respect to this valuable quality. The same selective process also operates in connection with international migration; and the country that loses population to another country normally suffers a depletion in its stock of enterprise while the latter country gains in this respect.

Now, it is evident that a population that possesses or displays initiative or enterprise in general is very likely to possess and to manifest this quality in the political sphere, just as elsewhere. We are thus quite prepared to understand and to accept the view that it has been the population of our urban centers and that of our newer agricultural regions that have excelled in the manifestation of political initiative or enterprise. At the time of the Revolution it was the people of the cities and towns, and especially the people of Boston, and the population of the newer agricultural districts who displayed the greatest amount of initiative in connection with the struggle for independence, though there probably had not as yet come to be that marked contrast in this respect between the different elements of the rural population that manifested itself at a later period. With respect to the movement toward a stronger central government, including the framing and adoption of the Constitution and the initiation of the new national government, the urban population manifested a clear superiority along this line over the people of the rural districts, new and old.

After the opening of the national period, however, and the subsequent large expansion of population into the regions beyond the Appalachians, the manifestation of political

initiative became much more marked among the rural population in general through the influence of this frontier western element. And the important, though not exclusive, part which the people of the West and Southwest played in the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian movements has already been noted. Still later, at the period of the Civil War, rural initiative was likewise prominently, though not disproportionately, manifested in the political sphere; and again the superiority of the new over the old agricultural regions was evident.

In the farmers' movements of the Seventies and Nineties, under the impulse of economic depression, the rural population of the Central West and Northwest once more displayed a markedly aggressive spirit in the political sphere. But this agitation and activity did not extend in any considerable degree into the rural districts in the older and long-settled parts of the country, though it did meet with a very considerable response in the urban centers. Lastly, in the more recent Progressive movement that began about 1909 the population, both rural and urban, in the Trans-Mississippi States and in the Pacific Coast States, again reflected the high degree of political initiative possessed in the newer sections of the country. On the other hand, the people of the older agricultural districts remained comparatively inert with respect to this movement, while it claimed large interest and support among the liberal and progressive elements in the urban centers east of the Mississippi and north of the Potomac.

It may be observed that political initiative among the rural elements in the newer parts of the country, while reflected in a generally hospitable attitude toward the acceptance of the newer ideas and developments in the sphere of politics and government, appears to manifest itself more or less periodically in a series of "movements." On the other hand, contrary to ordinary assumption, the urban elements appear to manifest a comparatively high degree of political

initiative as a regular and normal feature; though in the urban centers this initiative finds expression and outlet less exclusively in the national sphere than in the case of the rural population.

Finally, it seems that the urban population, normally and apart from the effects of migration, is better able to preserve this characteristic of political initiative than the rural population, as a result of the varied and kaleidoscopic character of life in the urban centers, where change forces itself upon the attention of the population continually and thus constantly requires adjustment to new conditions. A like rapid flux of conditions in the new agricultural regions similarly makes for the promotion of this quality there. But in the older agricultural communities conditions are likely to assume a relatively static character, with little that is new or transforming to jar the individual out of the traditional and well-settled routine; and conditions such as these are unfavorable to the maintenance or promotion of initiative. For the future, then, dependence must rest mainly upon the people of the cities for this quality, seeing that the agricultural frontier tends everywhere to disappear. Our review of the contribution of the urban and of the rural population, respectively, to political development in Europe, where agricultural life has long since passed into a status of comparative routine, incidentally lends much support to this conclusion.[46] Professor Munro's observation that urban populations are "generally accounted to have more initiative than rural folk" thus appears to be fully justified.[47]

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13. Vaughan, *op. cit.,* p. 116 ff.

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16. See Abbott, *Women in Industry,* p. 161, for reference to the shoemaking shops in Lynn, Massachusetts, being centers of discussion in the 40's where political questions were threshed out.

17. Godkin, *Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy,* pp. 159-160.

18. Fairlie, J. A., "The Centralization of Administration in New York State" (*Col. Univ. Studies in Hist., Econ., and Pub. Law,* Vol. 9, No. 3), pp. 16 ff., 192, 196.

19. See below, pp. 264-5.

20. In a letter to Joseph C. Cabell, January 31, 1814. See also Forman, S. E., *The Life and Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* Indianapolis, 1900, pp. 408-412.

21. Thorpe, *The Const'l History of the U. S.,* Vol. I, p. 46.

22. Hart, A. B., *Actual Government,* N. Y., 1919, p. 171.

23. Adams, *Three Episodes of Masachusetts History,* Vol. II, pp. 730-1.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 966-7.

25. Above, pp. 233-4. The present writer has attended the town meeting in one of the States of the Central West; and nothing could be more farcical than to speak of educative features in connection with such a gathering!

26. Freeman, *History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*, pp. 110 n., and 249, states that Madison and Hamilton show, in their discussions in the "Federalist," that they "had not the least notion of the true nature" of the Amphiktyonic Council, and display very little knowledge as to what the Greek precedents in the form of federal government really were. But he credits them with great practical political sagacity.

27. By Charles Francis Adams—cited in Oberholtzer, *The Referendum in America*, p. 13.

28. *Alexander Hamilton*, pp. 84-85.

29. Holcombe, *State Government in the U. S.*, p. 480.

30. Ford, *The Rise and Growth of American Politics*, p. 11.

31. *Historic Towns. New York*, p. 15.

32. See below, pp. 263-4.

33. Above, p. 25.

34. Hansard, *op. cit.*, Vol. cliii, pp. 705, 775, 786.

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46. See "The Recent Development of German Agriculture," by T. H. Middleton, C. B., in *House of Commons Sess'l Papers*, 1916, Vol. IV, Cd. 8305, Appendix, p. 52; Lippman, W. A., *A Preface to Politics*, New York and London, 1913, pp. 187-9; Lowell, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

47. *The Government of the United States*, 1919, p. 577. In a report on the Philippine Islands, by Major-General Leonard Wood and W. Cameron Forbes, the statement is made that "outside the larger cities and principal towns the organization of society is very primitive and the people are generally unaware of their civil rights."

CHAPTER XII

The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Inventiveness: General Forms and Principles of Government

Political inventiveness is something more than political enterprise, or political initiative, though the latter quality is clearly a necessary feature of the former. There is implied in political inventiveness a degree of intelligence and a quality of genius that are not associated with mere initiative. Political inventiveness manifests itself, of course, both in the adaptation of the old instruments of government to meet a new situation or to accomplish a new end, and also in the creation of entirely new and improved instruments for political ends. It is thus far removed from the spirit of blind innovation that inclines toward merely destructive efforts but is wholly destitute of constructive ideas or qualities.

Though there were theocracies and kingdoms and empires during the millenniums that preceded the advent of the Greeks and Romans, these latter peoples in originating and perfecting the city-state system made the first great contribution to the machinery of government and politics. In the Greek and Roman city-states the machinery and processes of government were raised for the first time to the level of a well-fashioned art. Aristotle, indeed, thought that "no higher form of social union than the Greek city-state was possible." Moreover, the city-state represented the contribution of a maturely developed urban population to whom the state and political activity in general had become identified with the city and with the activities of the urban citizen in a degree perhaps never before nor since approached.[1]

Professor Burgess, who seems to find great political virtue in mere size and who appears to assume that a country with the glorious political history of Holland would have made a greater contribution to the political development of the world as a part of a great continental state, has characterized the ancient Greeks as manifesting "a low order of political genius" because they did not advance materially beyond the city type of political organization.[2] But this would seem to deny that there is any relation between the tree and its fruits, in the political sphere; and Professor Burgess freely admits the fruits in the case of ancient Greece. Freeman, however, credits the ancient Greeks with having perfected the federal system in a highly developed form; and Herbert Spencer, more doubtfully, declared his conviction that the ancients, Greeks and others, were not as ignorant of the representative system as had been supposed.[3] Moreover, not to speak of Solon and Lycurgus and Xenophon and Aratos of Sicyon, Sir Frederick Pollock has termed Pericles "one of the greatest statesmen who have ever lived"; and if the ancient Greeks were markedly deficient in political genius, it would seem impossible to agree with Sir Francis Galton that they were "the ablest race of whom history bears record."[4]

Again, Professor Burgess appears to overlook the large contribution made in the Stoic philosophy to the development of democracy, to the principle of natural right, and to the ideas of international law and universal empire. Moreover, it is no small contribution to have originated real political life on an admittedly high plane and to have made it a great outstanding fact.

The city-state developed in Italy in much the same form that it took in Greece and apparently independently of the latter, but at a later period. No one of the city-states in Greece, however, was able to secure any such precedence as Rome secured in Italy or to develop a world empire as Rome

did. After affording the basis for a brilliant civilization in Italy, the city-state system failed as it had failed in Greece, and for much the same reason. "The world had outgrown the city-state system and its political machinery, and as the notions of federalism (on any large scale) and representative government had not yet come into being, no solution of the problem was possible save that of absolutism." [5] Professor Burgess designates the "universal empire" as the institution peculiar to the Roman political genius and calls its creation "a majestic work of political capacity and power"; and in the opinion of Mommsen the imperial government in Rome, under Antoninus, challenges comparison with the best of the political systems of more recent times. On the other hand, Dunning holds that it was as a "republican city-state" that Rome "achieved her greatness" and that "in her decline she was in the fullest sense imperial and despotic." [6] These two points of view are, however, not as antithetical, for our present purpose, as might at first thought appear. And a tenable conclusion would seem to be that high political ingenuity is demonstrated in both.

Following the break-down of the city-state system in the attempt to make it the basis of world empire, political organization separated itself into a rural and into an urban phase. In many of the cities the city-state system maintained itself in a somewhat modified form; and later confederations of cities, such as the Hanseatic League, engaged in commerce and exercised many of the functions of a political state. But the general form of political organization succeeding the decline of the Roman Empire was the feudal system—a rural form of organization and one that was vastly inferior in character to the city-state system but that served to supply a political nexus of a general character for more or less widely extended regions until the gradual development of constitutional democracy in the form of the national state made possible the more or less harmonious and effective combination

of local government and of general government in such a manner as to secure and promote political liberty and serve the political purposes of the expanding economic unit. The feudal system reflected no great political ingenuity on the part of the rural constituency by whom it was gradually developed.

The ultimate perfecting of the representative system of government meant the taking of a great forward step because it made possible the establishment of political democracy on a scale that far transcended a merely local basis. Credit for the political ingenuity that devised this system is, however, hard to distribute as between the rural and the urban populations. In view of the very slow and gradual development of the use of the principle of representation into its mature and widely accepted form today, it is perhaps more accurate to say that its use was a matter of growth rather than of invention. In ancient Greece the people of Mantinea exercised a share in the appointment of offices "through representatives . . . elected out of the whole population." [7] And Freeman terms the Amphiktyonic Council "strictly a Representative body," which "makes a far nearer approach to the forms of Representative Government than anything which we find elsewhere in ancient Greece"; but he notes that its functions were primarily religious and only incidentally political.[8] In fact, the direct popular democracy of the city-state system would seem to afford but a limited field for the use of the true representative principle.

Professor Garner finds the beginnings of the modern representative system "in the folk-moots of the early Teutons of Germany"; and Montesquieu in giving expression to the view that England had derived her political system, embodying the representative principle in perfected form, from the early Teutons declared that this "beautiful system was first invented in the woods." [9] But Professor Garner admits that the Witenagemot of early English history was not a repre-

sentative body in the modern sense; and Montesquieu lived and wrote in the age of nature worship.

Stubbs has pointed out that the "early English jury system shows the germ of the true idea of representation in England"; William of Normandy and his successor made use of local representatives to gather information; Henry II, extending the system, made use of the local courts to ascertain the judicial and financial rights of his subjects; under Richard I these representatives were elected and not merely nominated by those for whom they acted; John was perhaps the first to summon a representative assembly, in 1213; Henry III's queen and Earl Richard of Cornwall, regents during the king's absence in Gascony, called "a new central representative assembly" in 1254, to which the counties were directed to choose and send two knights each who were to declare "the amount of aid which their electors were willing to grant"; Simon de Montfort took a great forward step in 1265 by summoning, in addition, to his second "parliament" "two citizens or burgesses from twenty-one cities or boroughs mentioned individually by name"; and under Edward I the final step was taken by 1295—possibly at a somewhat earlier date—of rendering the national representative assembly regular and complete.[10]

Freeman says of this process that it grew up by degrees, that it was the result of what might almost be called "a series of happy accidents," and that it is not necessary to think that those who contributed to its earlier development had "any conscious theories of popular representation."[11] There is doubtless much force in these observations. Yet it appears that it was the king's ministers in the days of Richard I, and especially Hubert Walter, chief justiciar and Archbishop of Canterbury, to whom the actual initiation of the system of summoning representatives from the shires was due; and certainly neither Hubert nor his kinsman, Ranulf de Glanvil, the great justiciar of Henry II, can be regarded as typi-

cally rural. Simon de Montfort himself, to whom Freeman declares "we may give all but the honours of a founder" of the English Constitution and whom he doubtfully describes as "the founder of the House of Commons," was born not far from Paris and throughout his career enjoyed in peculiar degree the backing of the urban elements and was in a peculiar sense their spokesman.[12]

Moreover, many of the towns through their charters had been afforded an opportunity to develop their own local institutions on something like a representative basis and were enabled, by means of the right of *firma burghi,* to collect through their own officials the sums that the king required of them. In this matter of the king's revenue, therefore, these officials already stood in a sense as representatives of the burghers. Doubtless this fact explains why representatives of the latter had not been summoned regularly in a joint assembly with the representatives of the other groups before 1265. Lastly, though the people of the towns were exempt from the ordinary sessions of the county court, they were required to be represented by twelve lawful men at "the greater courts held in the shires by the itinerant justices." [13]

It would be questionable, then, to say that the rise of the representative system of government in England signifies a distinctly rural contribution. There may be difference of opinion as to the relative importance of the part played by the rural and by the urban elements, respectively, in the development of parliamentary government in England in the earlier stages of the national period.[14] But there can be no doubt that urban influence was largely instrumental in the perfecting of that system during the Revolutions of the middle and of the last quarter of the seventeenth century, which definitely secured for "a great country-state that particular form of government by majority which is based upon the representative system" and which established the English Parliament as the "mother of Parliaments." [15] Nor can there be any doubt of

the great importance of the Calvinistic politico-religious influence, centering in Geneva and Paris, in working out in a practical way the principles of representative government and in giving them an actual vogue. Moreover, it detracts little credit, from the point of view of political inventiveness, when it is asserted that in the Hanseatic towns, in Switzerland, in the Italian free cities, and in "other republics," representative government "had no real existence so far as the common people were concerned." [16]

The other important feature of the British parliamentary system, the cabinet, owes its origin to the political ingenuity of the unscrupulous but brilliant Robert Spencer, second Earl of Sutherland, and dates from 1693; though William III himself "showed his own political genius in understanding and adopting Sutherland's plan." [17] Though nominally of the rural aristocracy, Sutherland was anything but rural, both in respect to his early surroundings and in respect to his later career. Educated in part abroad, he was successively ambassador at Madrid, at Paris, at Cologne, and again at Paris. Moreover, the leaders of the Whigs, to whom William presently committed the direction of the government in initiating the new system and who represented in the main the urban constituency, "stood far above their opponents in parliamentary and administrative talents." [18]

Though still another evidence of the political genius of the British people is manifested in their marked success in colonization and in the system on which they have organized their colonial administration, it was only within comparatively recent times, that is within the period within which England has become a land of cities, that her colonial system took on the outlines of its present highly ingenious and highly successful form. Very liberal charters, indeed, were granted to some of the early English colonies in this country; and it is worth recalling that these charters had, from the first, a commercial character that attested an urban rather than a

rural origin. And one British writer, in referring to the introduction, on July 17, 1619, of a "sub-constitution" for Virginia, upon the basis of which a modified form of representative government was set up in that colony, asserts that "To the genius of some company director must be given the credit of originating that policy of responsible government which has given freedom in the colonies when they have grown strong enough to bear it." [19]

But the lesson of the American Revolution was not fully learned until after developments in Canada and Australia began to point menacingly toward a similar culmination. In this crisis the broad lines of a new colonial policy of complete local autonomy for the colonists in respect to their domestic affairs, in the confident hope that there would develop on this basis a tenuous but strong bond of interest and of affection toward the mother country, were forcibly enunciated by one of a group of forward-looking English radicals, who were accustomed to call themselves "the theorists of 1830." Among this group were four men to whom the credit of originating and developing these new principles of British colonial policy may properly be ascribed—Lord Durham, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Charles Buller, and Sir William Molesworth. Of these men the first two and the last were natives of London, while Buller was born in Calcutta. It fell to Lord Durham, who had been sent to Canada to compose a troubled situation there, to voice most strikingly and comprehensively in his *Report on the Affairs of British North America*, in 1839, these new principles—principles "which have guided British colonial policy ever since." [20]

In the rounding out and perfecting of this modern system of British colonial policy, in more recent years, urban representatives have had at the very least their full proportional share. In Canada and Australia, indeed, the urban representatives in this field have overwhelmingly predominated. With the exception of Sir Henry Parkes, who was the son of a

small tenant farmer in Warwickshire, England, there was scarcely a man of leading rank in the movement for federation in Australia who was not a city man; and even Sir Henry was a migrant to the city of Birmingham in "very early manhood." [21] And the men who consummated the movement for federation in Canada, and fashioned the system of government in the Constitution of the new Dominion, were even more predominantly urban. For Sir John A. Macdonald was a native of Glasgow; Sir Alexander T. Galt, son of the poet, John Galt, was born in London; Sir Charles Tupper claimed the port of Amherst, Nova Scotia, as his birthplace; and George Brown, journalist and statesman, was also London born.

In recent years significant and changing developments in the relations between Britain and her colonies and dependencies have been reflected most strikingly in the Imperial Conferences that have dated formally from 1907 but that go back in reality, for their origin, a score of years earlier. In this series of Conferences there is manifested a phase of the outward phenomena attending what must be called the most notable political and constitutional movement in progress in the world today. And when we canvass the names of those who have been the creators and leaders of this movement [22] —W. E. Forster, Lord Rosebery, Lord Beaconsfield, Joseph Chamberlain, and others—we find them to have been prevailingly men of urban birth and rearing.

In general, the contribution made by our own country to the development of political institutions has consisted in the establishment of a national democratic republic which embraces the principles of popular sovereignty and of representative government in all the spheres of government, but especially in the State and national spheres, and of federalism within the latter sphere.[23] The principle of representative government the American colonists of course did not invent. They brought it with them from the mother country, or perhaps

had it bestowed upon them in the charters that they received from the king.[24] But they did develop it and adapt it in accordance with the new conditions that prevailed in the New World. There had been republics before the government of the United States was established. But they were either on a local scale or they were republics in name only. The United States represented the first instance of a real republic on a national scale.

John Fiske has characterized the skilfully elaborated system of federalism in our national government as "one of the most important contributions that the English race has made to the general work of civilization," and has asserted that "The working out of this feature in our national constitution by Hamilton and Madison and their associates was the finest specimen of constructive statesmanship that the world has ever seen." [25] The principle of federalism, as we have already seen, was no new idea in the political sphere. It may be accepted as almost a natural and universal political concept, which dates back in its crudest forms to a very early stage of development and which may be represented as holding in its primitive form somewhat the same relation to federalism in its modern perfected form that the digging stick holds to the modern plow. Political inventiveness is rather to be found, therefore, in the perfecting of the forms of federalism than in the origination of the idea itself. Too much significance must therefore not be ascribed to the fact that it was rather in the more rural parts of Greece and not among the highly developed city-states that the use of the system of federalism prevailed most generally during the period of Greek history as a whole. The real argument in favor of urban preëminence in connection with the development of the federal system in Greece is to be found in the fact that when the time came that conditions required some such development the urban Achaian League, which was largely the handiwork of Aratos of Sicyon, greatly surpassed in perfection of form and in

political effectiveness the rival federation of the rural tribes, the Aetolian League.[26]

Of the score, or more, of formal plans for union among the American colonies previous to 1775 the most famous were the New England Confederation of 1643 and Franklin's Albany Plan of 1754. The former, which was in actual operation for forty years, was drawn up by men upon whom urban commercial interests in the mother country and on the Continent had exercised an important influence and who were familiar with the government of the United Netherlands; while the urban lineage of the latter plan, which remained merely a proposed plan, is sufficiently attested through its authorship by Franklin. Franklin in 1773 vainly renewed his proposal for colonial union; and again, on July 21, 1775, he submitted to the Continental Congress his Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union. No action was taken at this time, however; and when such a plan was again taken up it was in the main the work of John Dickinson, that townish pseudo "Farmer." It is interesting to note, in this connection, that James Madison gave it as his opinion before the members of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 that Dickinson's original draft of the Articles of Confederation had been "excellent" but that "in its progress and completion it became so inefficient as to give rise to the present Convention." [27] It is important to remember, too, that it was the rural elements, and especially those of the remoter districts, who were the chief exponents at this time of a central government having a minimum of power.

Since the Federal Constitution of 1787 was an organic whole and embodied other features than the principle of federalism, either novel in themselves or else inwrought in a novel manner, we may content ourselves at this point with a brief consideration of the Senate, which was intended in one of its phases to reflect the federal principle. Designed variously to accomplish the introduction of a strongly conserva-

tive element into the Constitution, to give property a means of protection against popular tendencies, to act as a "check" upon the lower house, and to equalize the large and small States in one branch of the national legislature, the Senate is "a purely American product" [28] and must be admitted to have represented an extremely ingenious and effective device for the accomplishment of the objects for which it was designed. It was its form alone, however, that was novel, since the English system was followed in constituting the legislative branch of the new government in an upper and a lower house. The development of a more accurate knowledge of the principles of government and the fuller evolution of the idea of popular rule have already led to some revision of the feature providing for an upper house in our national legislature, and may lead to its still further, and more material, modification in the future. The modern trend seems to be toward the unicameral legislature; and it is of interest that Franklin and Paine, both city men, were the leaders of the unicameral party in that day of the fashioning of constitutions, State and Federal. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, however, the choice of the bicameral system was doubtless wise.

The Federal Constitution of 1787 reflects the perfecting of two other contributions which this country has made to political development—the constitutional convention and the written constitution; and it affords the basis for still a third contribution, the development of constitutional law. In fact, some writers regard the first as much the most valuable contribution that American inventiveness has made in respect to the machinery of government.[29]

The Mayflower Compact, drawn up and signed by the Pilgrim Fathers in November, 1620, has been accounted by some as the earliest written constitution in history. But it was in reality a preamble to a constitution rather than an actual constitution. Cromwell's Instrument of Government,

of 1653, would appear to have a better title to the claim of the first written constitution, though it was not of popular origin. For it was "a written constitution for the actual government of three kingdoms."[30] Some have classed the various "fundamental constitutions," concessions, agreements, and frames of government initiated by the proprietors of several of the early American colonies as true instances of the written constitution;[31] while others have made a similar claim with reference to the charters of the corporate colonies—especially that granted by the General Court of Virginia, acting for the London Company, to the people of that colony on July 24, 1621.[32] But a better claim to the title of the first American written constitution can doubtless be made for the Fundamental Orders of 1639, which included the two essential features of drafting and of submission for popular approval. This instrument was almost certainly drafted by that urban-born, lawyer scion of a paternal ancestry devoted to the law through several generations in the mother country, Roger Ludlow, and was adopted in a mass convention of the male inhabitants of the three towns of Windsor, Wetherford, and Hartford, at the latter center.

However, both the principle of the written constitution and also that of the constitutional convention found their first definite and actual introduction and utilization in fully perfected form—especially in that mutual relation to each other that we have come to regard as inseparable—following the beginning of the Revolution and especially during the period subsequent to the Declaration of Independence, when the colonies began to create on recommendation of the Continental Congress governments to replace those which the break with the mother country had abrogated. From the very great prominence, however, assigned by the colonists, during the controversy with the King and Parliament which led up to the outbreak of the Revolution, to the charters or compacts of government that had been granted to the colonies, it

is very plain that these recorded instruments of government, which were in fact sometimes actually referred to as "constitutions," were the immediate forerunners of the written constitutions presently adopted by the individual States and by the general government. But we must recognize also, as of first importance in this connection, the expanding growth among the colonists of the ideas of popular sovereignty, of political action through bodies consisting either of the mass of the voting population in the local unit or of representatives chosen by popular election, of the establishment of government as a result of a social contract, and of a clear distinction between certain fundamental principles of natural right and of government, on the one hand, and of ordinary legislative enactments inferior to and dependent upon these fundamental principles, on the other hand.

It must be admitted that it is extremely difficult to estimate with any degree of exactitude the relative contribution made by the rural and by the urban elements, respectively, in this series of developments. But enough is discernible to show that urban minds and urban influences were largely instrumental in the outcome. Apart from the urban contribution to the growing democracy and the growing political intelligence reflected in these developments, it is to be noted that the charters themselves, from which the later written constitutions undoubtedly developed, were commercial and associative in origin and thus of urban rather than of rural character. Again, it has been significantly pointed out that the class of lawyers, who certainly owed as much as the members of any other class in the colonies to the urban environment and who were themselves largely of the urban class, had been for years engaged in the vocation of making "old laws conform to changed conditions of life in the new world" and "were thus prepared, as no other class of men ever had been, for the construction of written constitutions." [33] With this group are to be associated, both as penmen and as active leaders in

the later movement toward independence, other distinguished names—particularly from among the clergy—men who were likewise either of urban birth and rearing or who owed their influence in greater or less degree to the advantages which they had enjoyed in connection with the centers of population.[34]

It is doubtful, however, whether any other one individual exercised a greater influence in promoting the development of the written constitution and of the constitutional convention than a man who was neither a lawyer nor a political pamphleteer but a physicist and a philanthropist and who was yet probably the most astute statesman and political leader, as he was certainly the most skilled diplomatist, among the fathers of the Revolution. This was none other than Benjamin Franklin, to whose tireless activities attention has repeatedly been directed and who was thoroughly and typically urban in every sense of the word. If Franklin did not have the lawyer's contact with the colonial charters, yet, as the agent at London of Massachusetts, the most active and politically the most conscious of the colonies, he had abundant opportunity to familiarize himself with and to reflect upon the form of these fundamental compacts. And that he actually tried his hand on two notable occasions at constitution-making has already been pointed out.

Another urban name that should be coupled with those of Ludlow, Franklin, Dickinson, and others in connection with the earlier stages of the development of the written constitution and the constitutional convention is that of Samuel Adams. For it was he who, in Boston, in 1772, revived the system of the committee of correspondence of the Stamp Act period and finally succeeded, with the able assistance of the British ministry through its repressive measures, in securing its wide adoption throughout the colonies. And it was these committees of correspondence that promoted conventions of delegates on the town and county basis to protest the acts of

the mother country, to urge and even to prepare resistance, and to agitate the subject of replacing the existing forms of government by forms resting upon popular consent and approval. These committees also promoted the organizing of provincial assemblies on a popular basis; and that of New York City was among the very first to propose the meeting of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia, in 1774, though the first suggestion for such a congress appears to have come from Adams and his associates in the fall of the previous year.[85]

The delegates from New Hampshire having asked, on October 18, 1775, "advice and direction" from Congress relative to the constituting of a new provincial government in that colony, Congress responded by recommending to the provincial Convention the calling of "a full and free representation of the people and that the representatives, if they think necessary, establish such a form of government, as, in their judgment, will best produce the happiness of the people, and most effectually secure peace and good order in the province, during the continuance of the present dispute between Great Britain and the Colonies." In pursuance of this recommendation, the provincial assembly of that province drafted and adopted a constitution on January 5, 1776—the first undoubted written constitution actually adopted and put into operation in America. This action met with serious objection, however, because it had been taken by an ordinary legislative body and not by a body specifically chosen and delegated for that purpose and because the constitution had not been submitted to popular vote for adoption or rejection. But later such a body specifically chosen was authorized and assembled; and there thus met, in June, 1778, the first regularly formed constitutional convention ever held in America, though the constitution which it framed and submitted was rejected by popular vote.

A constitution formed by the legislature of Massachusetts

and submitted to the vote of the people in 1778 was, like that similarly drafted in New Hampshire in 1776, not well received—was, in fact, rejected by popular vote, largely because it had not been framed by a body especially convened for that purpose. But a convention thus specifically authorized and constituted assembled in Massachusetts in 1779 and framed and submitted a constitution that was largely the work of Samuel Adams and that was adopted by popular vote the following year—the first full-fledged written constitution both framed by a constitutional convention and also adopted by popular vote. This instrument thus represented the first fully completed work of modern constitution-making in history. And it still constitutes, with numerous amendments of course, the fundamental law of that State today.

Some authorities have characterized the meeting of delegates from certain of the "towns" of the "New Hampshire Grant," at Hanover, in June, 1777, which demanded that any permanent plan of government should be framed by a convention convened solely for that purpose, as representing the first definite enunciation of the true principle of the constitutional convention.[36] But the "town" of Concord, Massachusetts, had declared for this identical policy as early as October 21, 1776; and Boston and several other "towns" likewise repeatedly declared for a separate constitutional body. Moreover, The Mechanicks in Union, for the City and County of New York, in an address to the provincial congress of that colony on June 14, 1776, objected to the drafting of a constitution by that body, although the members of the latter had been given express authority for that purpose; and the former also objected to the plan of putting the constitution into effect without first submitting it to a vote of the people.[37] Indeed, this attitude seems to have been pretty well disseminated among the people of the various colonies at this time; and there is little evidence tending to prove either rural or urban precedence in this connection.

The principles of the written constitution and of the constitutional convention were thus recognized and established in the sphere of the provincial or State governments before they were applied in the sphere of the general government in any thoroughgoing way. The Articles of Confederation illustrated the principle of the written constitution, but not that of the constitutional convention. The Federal Constitution, however, embraced both of these features.

The principle of the "separation of powers" and the closely related principle of "checks and balances" were both features, of course, of the Federal Constitution. But the former has usually been traced to Montesquieu; and the latter is said to have been derived by the colonists from the English Whigs. The makers of the Constitution did not regard themselves as the originators of these principles. For James Wilson asserted that in all the most celebrated governments of ancient and modern times—that of Athens by Solon, that at Sparta by Lycurgus, and that which flourished so long at Rome—the legislatures were composed of distinct bodies.[38] But there can be no doubt that these principles were wrought into the Constitution in a way to reflect great ingenuity and skill in their utilization. And they remain today, when we are perhaps beginning to grow somewhat distrustful of their advantage, a striking feature of our system of government.

Since various of the contributions to the machinery of government that have been specified were summed up and finally established in the Federal Constitution, it is of interest for our present purpose to inquire whether greater credit should be assigned to rural or to urban personnel and influence in the creation of "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man."[39] It has already been pointed out that the Constitution was supported and adopted very largely through urban influence and that the opposition was derived in the main from the agricul-

tural population. Not less marked was the predominance of the urban elements among the members of the Constitutional Convention which produced this great constructive instrument of government.[40] The Virginia, or "large-state," plan was largely the work of James Madison; and though modified in accordance with the principles embodied in the New Jersey "small-state" plan, in the Pinckney plan, and in the Connecticut "compromise" plan, it, together with the Articles of Confederation, served substantially as the basis of deliberation and became practically the basis of the instrument of government finally adopted by the Convention. Moreover, Madison was associated with Hamilton and Jay in the publication of *The Federalist,* was the leading exponent and defender of the new Constitution in the Virginia convention which finally ratified its adoption, and was a member of the First Congress, upon which devolved the all-important task of actually instituting the new government. He thus played a decisive part in the founding of our national political system and therefore has been very properly termed "The Father of the Constitution." [41]

But Madison, though of rural origin, was trained to public life and actively pursued that career practically throughout his life. Moreover, he was a member of that characteristically non-rural profession, the law, whose members have already been pointed out as owing so much to the urban environment and as having contributed in such a special way to the development of these new principles of government. Alexander Hamilton, whose part in the drafting of the Constitution was materially less than that of Madison but whose contribution to its adoption through his part in *The Federalist* and through his influence in the New York convention which finally accepted it for that State was equal to that of Madison in Virginia, and whose services in the actual organization of the new government certainly outweighed those of the latter, was definitely a city man. John Jay also was a

city man and a delegate, in the Convention, from New York City. And of *The Federalist,* which was the joint product of these three men, Guizot has said that "in the application of elementary principles of government to practical administration" it was the greatest piece of work with which he was acquainted.

Not less important in the present connection is the fact that of the five members of the "committee of detail," to whom was given the task of actually working out the final draft of the Constitution on the basis of the general principles previously agreed upon by the Convention, Randolph alone was predominantly rural. Oliver Ellsworth, whose further services, in the Senate, in connection with the drafting of the bill providing for a system of Federal courts were of the utmost importance and stamp him as having possessed a mind marked by great political ingenuity, had an origin and career somewhat analogous to those of Madison but with greater emphasis upon the influence exerted by the urban environment. James Wilson, who is thought to have been chairman of this committee, was born near the sea-port of St. Andrews, Scotland, was educated at that noted educational center and at Glasgow and Edinburgh, and, migrating to this country in 1765, resided variously in New York City, Philadelphia, Reading, and Carlisle. Nathaniel Gorham was born in Charleston, Massachusetts, and John Rutledge was a native of Charleston, South Carolina. Roger Sherman, joint author with Ellsworth of the Connecticut "compromise" plan for a constitution, was born in a village in the near vicinity of Boston and made his early start in life at the cobbler's trade, which he learned in his father's shop.

Lastly, John Dickinson, who after the adjournment of the Convention published a series of letters over the signature "Fabius" which favored the ratification of the adoption of the Constitution and which are regarded as not inferior to

the best papers of *The Federalist,* has already been noted as essentially a city man.

It is thus clear that the creation of the Constitution of the United States and the organization of the new government were largely the work of men from the urban centers or of men who in their make-up reflected in large measure the influence of the urban environment. For the control of the first and second congresses was also almost wholly in the hands of the Federalists, whose leaders were largely city men even though a very large majority of the rank and file of that party must have consisted of rural residents. The Constitution of the United States, then, stands as a striking monument to the political inventiveness of the city men who predominated in the body that framed it, and to the political insight of the urban elements in general who accepted it and who led in the fight for its adoption by the people of the various States and whose representatives then put it into actual operation.[42]

Finally, attention is elsewhere directed to the overwhelming urban predominance among the architects and promulgators of the Constitution of the French Republic, in 1875; while the joint rural and urban influences that attended the development of the genius of Bismarck, whose was the hand that framed, in the main, the constitution of the North German Confederation in 1867, as well as its more perfected copy, the Imperial German Constitution of 1871, are likewise pointed out in another connection.[43]

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38. Andrews, *op. cit.,* p. 355. It is interesting that Wilson traced these principles back specifically to urban sources.

39. Gladstone's characterization, of course. For a somewhat different appraisal of the Constitution of the United States by Gladstone, on another occasion, see Kelsey, D. M., *Life and Public Services of Hon. Wm. E. Gladstone,* Philadelphia, 1898, pp. 220-1.

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CHAPTER XIII

The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Inventiveness *(continued)*: Special Principles, and the Forms of Local Government

The use of the written ballot dates from the last century of the Roman Republic, having been introduced in Rome as early as 139 B.C. in connection with the election of magistrates. Balloting, however, by means of the use of little balls of stone or metal, as suggested by the word "ballot" itself, dates back still earlier to the classical period in Greece. The invention of this device, then, is due to the ingenuity of the same urban peoples who developed the city-state system of government. The written ballot was in use at an early date among the rather narrow electorate of the Dutch mediaeval city corporations, as also among the close corporations that ruled the cities of mediaeval England.[1] And its first use in this country appears to date from 1629, when the members of Salem church chose their ministers in this manner.

The written ballot has received, of course, its most notable development in recent years in Australia, in the form of the Australian or "blanket" ballot—first introduced into this country in Massachusetts in 1888. It was devised in about 1851 by Francis S. Dutton of South Australia, a widely travelled man of urban commercial birth and training who later became prominent in the public life of that province.

Almost without exception the different men who, from about the middle of the last century, in various countries and largely independent of each other, began to propose some form of the principle of proportional representation—

Thomas Gilpin and J. Francis Fisher, of Philadelphia, in this country, Victor Considérant and Emile de Girardin, in France, Naville, Roget, Morin, and Bluntschli, in Switzerland, Andrae, in Denmark, T. W. Hill and Thomas Hare, in England—were city men; though the last, who was a London barrister and perhaps the most influential of all in this connection, was probably of rural birth. The English system of preferential voting was first put into practical operation in West Australia, in 1907; while the American system was devised by James M. Bucklin, of Grand Junction, Colorado, who was chairman of the charter convention which in 1909 drafted a new commission government charter for that city and made this principle "a distinctive feature" of that charter.

The discovery, or re-introduction, of the principle of the short ballot in this country has also been predominantly the work of city men. The advantages of this principle were pointed out in an article in *The North American Review,* in October, 1871, by Charles Nordhoff, a journalist and author of German birth who was brought to this country at the age of five years and reared and educated in the city of Cincinnati. A few years later, in 1879, Albert Stickney, a lawyer and publicist of Boston nativity, set forth very similar views in a volume published in that year.[2] However, it remained for the ingenious authors of the Galveston plan for a commission form of city government, in 1900, who were three lawyers of that city, actually to introduce the principle of the short ballot into use as an essential feature of that epoch-making instrument.

The doubtful honor of originating the American gerrymander must be ascribed to rural sources, as it appears first to have been used in 1709 when the people of the counties of Bucks, Chester, and Philadelphia, in Pennsylvania, combined to prevent the city of Philadelphia from obtaining a legislative representation proportionate to its population. The

caucus, the general principle of which is doubtless very old and was illustrated at an early date in England in the Cabal of Charles II and in the Whig Junto of Wharton and his associates under William III, was on the other hand of urban origin in this country. For the term goes back to the first quarter of the eighteenth century to the name of a political club in Boston, where "public matters were discussed, and arrangements made for local elections and the choosing of candidates for office." The caucus, in its best use, clearly represents a legitimate feature of party organization; and notwithstanding the abuses frequently associated with its use its introduction and development constituted a real contribution to the machinery of politics and government. The gerrymander and the spoils system, however, are inherently vicious and have no legitimate place among the proper instruments of government, ingenious and effective though they may be as purely party instruments.

Like the principle of the caucus, that of the spoils system is doubtless very old; and its influence was potent in our national politics, certainly so in the other spheres of government, long before the days of Jackson. It took little ingenuity, perhaps, to devise the principle of the spoils system originally. But it required an inventive mind to organize it in a scientific manner as a distinctive feature of the party system. The caucus, the gerrymander, the nominating convention, the system of political patronage, and the principle of rotation in office, all became essential features of the general system of party organization perfected by the Jacksonian democracy. And their combination for this purpose was largely the work of the fertile mind of Martin Van Buren, "the most adroit politician of his time," and of Aaron Burr and the Tammany Society in New York City, with the able assistance of William Marcy and other members of the "Albany Regency." Inasmuch as our political system is one that seems to involve control of and responsibility for government through political

parties, the perfecting of the system of party organization must be accounted a notable contribution to the machinery of politics and government—however serious and objectionable may be the abuses associated with the party system. At any rate it attests the keen political ingenuity of its authors —who were not, however, of the great mass of rural voters who constituted the bulk of the Jackson democracy but were of the group of political and party leaders in the urban centers, whose ingenuity had been sharpened through long practice in the manipulation of party machinery.[3]

Credit is difficult to assign relative to the perfecting of nominating machinery in this country. But enough is discernible to indicate the important, perhaps leading, part played by urban agents and instrumentalities in this connection. It is known that the Boston Caucus club concerned itself with the choice of candidates for office as early as 1725. The system of nomination by State legislative caucus, which is regarded by good authority as the first definite and systematic form of nominating machinery developed in this country, appears to have originated, either in Rhode Island or in Pennsylvania, in 1790.[4] John Jay's nomination for governor, in New York in 1795, was effected in this manner; and subsequent to 1796 this method became "a settled practice" throughout the country.

Whether the origin of the congressional caucus for the nomination of presidential candidates is to be traced to the meeting in Marache's Boarding House in Philadelphia, in May, 1800, of a number of Republican members of Congress interested in selecting a running mate for Jefferson, or to the conference of Federalist members called by Alexander Hamilton, in the same city and in the same year and month, in the interest of the candidacy of Charles C. Pinckney as against that of John Adams, or whether it traces back to a possible Republican congressional caucus in 1796 in connection with the candidacy of Aaron Burr, it is clear that urban

men and urban influences were prominently involved. For a time the system of legislative caucuses in the States became more or less subordinated to the congressional caucus. But upon the demise of the latter in 1824 the former again came prominently into use and served as a means of transition in the nominating of presidential candidates until the final and definite adoption of the system of the national nominating convention, in 1831.

The rise of the delegate nominating convention is usually regarded as having been associated with the development of the system of organized political parties in New York and Pennsylvania.[5] In Pennsylvania the movement toward the development of popularly constituted nominating conventions appears to have resulted from the adoption of "methods prevalent in the two leading religious organizations" in that State —the Presbyterians, a prevailingly rural group, with their custom of sending delegates to a general synod, and the Friends, an urban group, with their custom of "sending out nominating committees." And these two groups were largely responsible, respectively, for the Harrisburg and Lancaster conventions, in 1788, which approached the character of State conventions for the nomination of party candidates for Congress and for presidential electors. Temporarily displaced by the growing use of the caucus method of nomination, this inchoate convention method of nomination was revived from about 1800, in Pennsylvania. And it is significant for our present purpose that the first "pure" delegate nominating convention in the United States, that which met at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on March 4th, 1817, and which nominated Joseph Heister for governor, grew out of the factional strife of two leading Democratic editor-politicians, William Duane and John Binns, in Philadelphia.[6]

The first proposal for a State nominating convention in New York had come from Tammany men early in 1813. In New York City, too, in September, 1812, was held what some

authorities term "the first national nominating convention" —the conference of Federalists, originated by three city men,[7] which nominated De Witt Clinton for the presidency. Moreover, the State convention held at Utica, September 21–22, 1824, which Thurlow Weed declared to have represented "the beginning of a new political era" because it inaugurated "the policy of nominations, emanating directly from the people," was originated by that faction of the Republican party, the "people's party," which favored the candidacy of J. Q. Adams for president and which is usually taken as representing the dominant business interests; though the convention itself, when it had assembled, was controlled by the Clinton Republicans, who were then for Jackson.[8] The leadership of urban men in both these factions, as also among the Tammany group of course, was strikingly manifest. The first State nominating convention in Rhode Island, that which met at Providence on October 26th, 1824, was also an Adams body and was engineered largely by urban groups.

Lastly, the "mixed" legislative caucus, the legislative caucus as supplemented by delegates from districts not represented by the party in question in the State legislature, which system paved the way for the adoption of the delegate nominating convention in the sphere of State and local politics, appears also to have owed much to urban influences and agencies for its initiation and promotion. Originating in Rhode Island at about 1807, it was introduced into Pennsylvania in 1808. But its use was most widely extended in New York, where it dated from 1811. Thus like the other forms of the nominating machinery, it developed largely in those parts of the country where urban life was most largely prevalent and not in the more rural parts, old or new.

The system of the direct primary was born, or at least re-introduced in its modern form, June 20th, 1860, at the Republican county convention in Crawford County, Pennsylvania, as a result of its proposal in a resolution offered by

Dr. C. C. Ashley, a physician who resided in a small and newly planted village that represented the only center of population in one of the townships of that county. Though much developed and improved in its later and more widely extended use, the general environment attending its original introduction and the fact that it first gained a strong foothold in the predominantly rural areas of the South, the West, and the Northwest, would seem to mark it as the most thoroughly rural, in origin, of any of the forms of the nominating machinery. Yet in fundamental principle it represents a return to the forms of pure democracy characteristic of municipal life.[9]

The principles of the legislative referendum and legislative initiative had independent origin in this country and in Switzerland, though at a much earlier date in the latter country. The use of the referendum in primitive form appears as early as 1339 in the mountainous and rural Upper Valais, in Switzerland; and it was also in vogue in the local confederations of Rhaetia, or the Grisons, and elsewhere in Switzerland, at an early date.[10] The referendum in the form of the plebiscite was also used "in very early times" in the large town cantons for the referring of important issues to popular vote for decision. And it was in this way that the cantons of Zürich and Bern, that is, substantially, the towns of Zürich and Bern, accepted the Reformation. This device also found an early illustration in the city of Geneva in a manner to suggest a constitutional referendum.

The modern principle of the referendum, however, as representing a direct though ordinarily merely potential check exercised through the popular will upon the operation of a definitely accepted and regularly functioning system of representative government, dates in Switzerland from its introduction into the constitution adopted by the industrial canton of St. Gall in 1831. One faction, representing largely though not exclusively the rural constituency of the canton, wished

for the adoption of the town-meeting or popular assembly type of government; while another faction, reflecting chiefly the views of the townsmen, declared for the representative system. As a solution for the resulting impasse, one of the delegates, the historian Antoine Henne, who was the son of a tailor of the town of Sargans, and who was himself inclined toward the representative system, brought forward a compromise plan which involved the acceptance of the representative system but which provided also for a potential popular veto through the referring of cantonal legislative acts which met with a specified amount of opposition to popular vote for final decision.[11]

In its earlier and more rudimentary form, therefore, it would appear that the major part of the credit for the origination of the referendum should be ascribed to rural sources; while in its later, fully perfected form the credit appears rather to be due to urban sources. Henne himself is said to have derived the idea of the popular veto from the use of the veto by the *tribuni plebis* in ancient Rome, though he can hardly have been ignorant of its use, in a rudimentary form, by the federal diets of the early Swiss confederations. However, the first Swiss confederation had a city member, Lucerne, as early as 1332, while the cities of Zürich and Bern became members in 1351 and 1353, respectively; and, as already noted, the city influence was clearly predominant in the acceptance of the representative system in St. Gall, which alone made it possible for the legislative referendum to take its modern form.[12]

The beginnings of the popular legislative initiative, in Switzerland, must be ascribed chiefly to rural sources. Prevailingly rural, too, were the influences associated with its development in the modern form in that country; though here again the urban influence in contributing to the introduction of the representative system and thus making possible the legislative initiative in its modern form should not be over-

looked. In France, the legislative initiative had been made a feature of the abortive Girondist constitution of 1793, on motion of Condorcet, who was a city man; and it had been proposed, though without result, in the constitutional convention of 1830–31, in St. Gall, by a delegate who had been an officer in one of the Swiss regiments in French service.[13] Its real introduction, however, in its modern, perfected form, in Switzerland, dates from its incorporation in the constitution of the essentially rural canton of Vaud in 1845.

No exact assignment of credit can be made as between rural and urban sources relative to the independent origin, in this country, of the legislative referendum and initiative—as also with respect to the exclusive origin of the constitutional referendum and initiative in this country. But enough has already been said to indicate the important, perhaps predominant, urban contributions in this connection.[14]

In the field of local government, especially in the strictly rural sphere, the American contribution has been materially smaller, until within recent years at least, than in the sphere of the national government and of the individual States. The New England "town" system, though it may not wholly deserve the prominence that has been assigned to it, has occupied first place as illustrating American political ingenuity in the local sphere. Its beginnings doubtless go back to English sources—in part to the parish meetings. But, as already noted, there were two other constituting elements, both mainly urban in origin and both more or less non-indigenous to this country—the system of the trading corporation and that of the Congregational or Independent ecclesiastical organization. The political genius of the fathers of New England is clearly revealed in the way in which they built these various elements into a well-rounded system that proved highly adapted to their purposes and to the comparatively simple collectivistic environment that characterized the early development of New England. But this system, which appears

first to have been perfected in Connecticut, was not only built up largely of non-rural materials; it was also fashioned, as has already been indicated, by a population and in an environment that from the first approximated the urban rather than the rural type.[15]

The county, which became the chief unit of local government in the rural colony of Virginia and then in the South generally, also goes back to English sources—and essentially rural sources—for its origin. But while it has been modified materially in its American environment, especially in the Middle and Western States, it appears that this outcome has not been so much the result of definite plan as the result of merely incidental adjustment to changing political ideas and sentiments in general. The two slightly differing forms of the representative township-county government originated in New York and in Pennsylvania, respectively. And this general type of local government, especially as developed in some of the newer Western States, has received high praise from some authorities. But on the whole the development of neither the Southern county type nor the Middle State township-county type of local government has reflected much credit hitherto upon the political ingenuity of the American people.

Success attending recent efforts directed toward the partial reorganization and more planful development of the county is, however, significant. For this recent impetus toward improvement has come largely from the urban centers. In counties containing such centers, indeed, the need for improvement has been greatest, because of the great importance of the interests that have come to be involved in city-county relations and that have been threatened by the failure of county government. Necessity is the mother of invention in the field of politics and government just as in the field of mechanics. Because of the great importance of the interests involved the city must exert itself to reconstitute and improve the agencies of government. And we have here

a main source of the superior contribution of the urban centers to the development of the forms and agencies of government—necessity coupled with large powers of human coöperation and supplemented by the impelling influence of civic spirit when once thoroughly aroused.

If urban political genius has been active from early days in the devising and perfecting of the machinery of State and federal government, in this country, there was long a dearth in respect to the devising and perfecting of adequate instruments of government and of administration for the urban centers themselves. Very probably this situation is to be explained by the fact that cities and their problems had not yet begun to develop on a large scale; and there was undoubtedly little adequate conception of the tremendous urban development that the future was to see or of the very important place that the city was to play in our political and governmental system. Not without justification, then, has reference been made to "our hastily devised municipal constructions." [16] So rapid has been the growth of our cities that plans for their government were for a long time as inadequate and as makeshift as were the plans for anticipating their physical growth. In both cases the plans were often outgrown and left behind before they were really put into effect.

Since about 1870, however, there has been a growing interest in this country in municipal problems and in municipal government. And a constantly increasing amount of attention has been devoted to the study of these problems and to the devising of the means for their proper solution, until the urban centers themselves have become fruitful in contriving and fashioning new and improved agencies in and for the cities themselves. "Beginning with the Galveston experiment of 1901 the first two decades of the twentieth century have accordingly witnessed the reorganization of American city government on a scale which would have been considered out

of the question a generation ago." [17] It is no longer merely a question of introducing into our municipal government features that have proved successful abroad. For out of the political laboratories of our municipalities have come in recent years ingenious and original contributions of great value to the machinery of municipal government everywhere.

Most notable, of course, among these ingenious and highly encouraging innovations are the various types of commission government for cities, and the different types of the city-manager plan of government, either in combination with the commission plan or as a transforming feature of the ordinary plan of government by a mayor and council. Analogies between these new forms of municipal government and the New England town system, the earlier forms of government in certain American cities for brief periods under exceptional conditions, the German type of city government, and even the "old Spanish Cabildo," have been claimed. But with the exception of the Lockport city-manager plan there appears to have been no conscious imitation of other and earlier forms of government, native or foreign. And in many and very important respects these new forms differ widely from the other types that have been mentioned—particularly from the non-democratic German types. For their creators have been city attorneys and other members of the legal profession, members of city councils and boards of trade, men professionally trained and educated in the principles of municipal government and administration, and others—men who have drawn upon their business, official, and professional knowledge and experience and who have learned how to combine certain existing but previously more or less separate and independent principles and methods into an effective and organic whole. And in this work they have manifested the qualities of political inventiveness in high degree.[18]

Nor have the results of this study and experimentation been confined to the problems of government in the sphere of

the city alone. As was to have been expected of such a development, this spirit of investigation, of criticism, and of reconstruction has entirely transcended the bounds of municipal government and has extended to the sphere of government in general. Very recently there has been a movement, specially in some of the urban counties, to extend the manager plan to county, or even to consolidated city and county, government. Indeed, it has even been suggested that the State legislatures might well be replaced by some form of commission government.

In recent years, therefore, the urban centers have matched their weighty contribution of earlier years, when they assisted so notably in devising and fashioning our scheme of State and federal government, by working out principles that point the way toward the reconstruction of our political and governmental scheme in general according to a wiser and more studied polity. Some even credit the cities almost wholly for whatever of progress in the science and art of government has occurred in the last half century. "Modern political science in this country," says a recent authority, "is largely the development of fifty years of ferment in municipal affairs, and the principles which have been worked out in the cities in the long struggle for better government are now pretty well established." "As a result of these long years of experimentation," he continues, "political science now discards certain ancient superstitions of ours. In particular the fear of conferring power on anybody to do anything; the theory that if you give to one public body the power to do something you must give to some other public body the power to knock it down when it is done. We have found by long experience in city government, county government, and State government that there is no safety in the theory of checks and balances, but, on the contrary, that divided responsibility is perilous and a serious and unnecessary obstacle to the efforts of the citizens to control their government." [19]

That the small, but extremely influential, urban interest worked effectually at the beginning and in the early days of our national period to establish these same "political superstitions" in our system of government does not, of course, condemn that interest as politically stupid. Political ingenuity does not connote political omniscience but is largely relative to existing conditions, to the stage of evolution in political thought and experience that has been reached, and to the prevailing political philosophy that sways men's minds. The political ingenuity of a citizenry may be strikingly illustrated in the devising of political and governmental instruments that the political ingenuity of the citizenry of a later and wiser period may replace with a more ably devised system. The all-important question is: Will the political inventiveness of a period be equal to the needs of that period for political machinery that is adequate to express the political ideals of the time and that will at the same time afford a workable system of government? Judged by the experience of the past, there appears to be good reason for believing that urban life warrants an affirmative answer to this question.

It will be objected, perhaps, that all this relates political creativeness in undue measure to the mere machinery of government and of politics and overlooks the features of administrative and judicial interpretation and the transforming and adapting effect of custom and of usage in making of written and formally expressed systems and principles something that is very different in reality from what they originally were designed to be and from what they still purport to be. A distinguished British jurist and statesman, in referring some time since to the probable future relations between the British Dominion or Commonwealth governments and the home government, voiced this view in the following words: "But it is not the machinery that matters: indeed the less we have of it the better. . . . What is wanted is such a sense of respon-

sibility and constitutional usage, checking the hasty exercise of legal power on the part of the Houses of the Imperial Legislature, as shall make its relationship to the distant subjects of the Crown become as easy as is that of the Crown itself. This appears to be the true notion of a closer Imperial connection, a connection the forms of which it is useless to try to define in advance or express in terms of abstract principles." [20]

Many British thinkers and writers, and others too, express a preference on these grounds for the British as compared with the American Constitution. Indeed, one of our own writers has recently asserted that the latter is "a striking example of this machine conception of government" and that it is "probably the most important instance we have of the deliberate application of a mechanical philosophy to human affairs." [21]

Now there undoubtedly is force in these considerations. The disadvantage and danger of undue dependence upon the machinery of government and upon rigid written forms are neither remote nor trifling. But adherence to custom and usage and to legal precedent, in the absence of written forms and of definite legal enactment, can be as blind and unreasoning as the devotion to the fetich of these latter forms where they exist. And the attempt to look ahead and in a measure to provide in advance in some more or less definite way for the future exigency is not without advantage. It is of interest that a prominent British writer has admitted, in spite of his decided preference for the British type of unwritten constitution, in so many words that "a federal instrument of government" is "of necessity a written compact"; and that in spite of his objection to drafted forms of government he should have referred with evident pride and approval to the "ponderous" and "elaborate" machinery of the government of the Commonwealth of Australia. And even from Lord Haldane these fresh and comparatively recent manifestations of

British creative genius in the political sphere win approval and the characterization of a "novel and original scheme"; while his impatience with the mere "machinery" of government does not prevent his suggesting the creation of a Court of Imperial Justice, which would consider and decide a few "great and governing principles" which concern the interests of the British Empire as a whole.[22]

The fact that creative genius in the political sphere is not confined to written forms and systems has already been recognized, of course, in the treatment extended to some of the great principles of government worked out in the political history of England and in the consideration devoted to the development of important extra-constitutional forms and principles of government and of politics in this country. And an attempt has been made, so far as may be, to assign the credit for these contributions as between the rural and the urban elements respectively. Less account has been taken, however, of the methods of judicial and of administrative interpretation as means for the effecting of changes, and even for the establishing of new features, in the forms of government, or of the results that have been realized in these ways. As a consequence of the unique place given to the Supreme Court in our system of government the former of these two methods has been of especial importance in this country; while in England, where the legislative and executive functions of government have been separated in smaller degree from the judicial function and where the latter has not been elevated to a place of supremacy over the former, the method of administrative interpretation has been relatively more important than in this country. The transformations have been effected in too gradual a manner, especially in the judicial sphere, to render feasible an attempt to take up for discussion in detail the instances where change has been effected and the course of political development modified through these agencies. It must suffice, therefore, to point out that

since the centers of population are naturally the spheres from which the courts and the governmental administrative staffs function and since it is in these same centers, for the most part, that the members of the judiciary acquire their education, formal or experiential, general or professional, one may not unreasonably posit, *a priori,* a close relation between the urban environment and the faculty of creative genius along these lines.

For this country one thinks first of all, in the present connection, of the work of John Marshall, eminent chief justice of the Supreme Court. The character of his work and its contribution toward the welding of the separate States into a real national Union are too well known to require anything more than mere mention here. Now John Marshall was a product, apparently, of the near-frontier—a Virginian who, as said by a recent biographer, had never been longer than a few months outside the crude environment into which he was born until in his twentieth year he entered military service at the time of the Revolution. And this writer, in the course of a description of the ancestry and native environment of the great chief justice, assesses the relation of that environment to the life work of the latter, in the following words: "Lucky for John Marshall and this country that he was not city born and bred; lucky that not even the small social activities of a country town drained away a single ohm of his nervous energy or obscured with lesser pictures the larger panorama which accustomed his developing intelligence to look upon big and simple things in a big and simple way." [23]

Now there can be little doubt that one of the large compensations that rural, agricultural birth and rearing bring or afford is the capacity for sustained and serious work. But after all the sweeping generalization thus based upon John Marshall's rural birth and rearing appears hasty and too greatly extended. For it is very questionable whether one can speak, in a general way, of the rural environment as con-

tributory to largeness of view. And what shall we say of a man like Benjamin Franklin, who also thought in a national way—almost beyond any man of his time? Are we, in view of his instincts of industry and of thrift, of his marked scientific and political ability, of his statesman-like vision and his priceless contribution to the cause of his country, to say, contrariwise and yet similarly, that it was "lucky" that he was *not* rural born and bred?

Franklin, of course, was not a lawyer. But this circumstance is entirely irrelevant. For Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall's famous relative, who was trained to that profession, was admittedly a product of the same environment as Marshall. And though Jefferson proved that he too could think nationally, on occasion, we may not forget that he was first of all the exponent of local democracy and perhaps the most distinguished among the leaders of the state rights school of government—that is to say, of the school that represented views diametrically the opposite of the nationalistic views held by the group to which Marshall belonged. Indeed, occasion is taken by this same biographer to point out that Marshall's father was a product of the settlement on the tidewater and that, though resident in the frontier environment, he represented a class that was distinctly different, in essential respects, from the characteristic frontier type. And it is admitted that he exerted a marked influence upon the character of his famous son.[24]

In short, while the case of John Marshall shows that the rural environment has certain advantages in connection with the origin and development of political genius in the creative sphere, it is very far from proving that the urban environment is not at least equally favoring to the same end and that the city does not possess, on its part, advantages not enjoyed by the rural community and yet of great value for promoting the fruition of genius of this type, as of other types. And in this country, as in England, in Australia, and in Canada, as

doubtless also in other countries, there is not the slightest doubt that the urban community has furnished its full share of those beneficent innovators in the field of judicial and administrative interpretation, and of extension *in novo,* whose contributions have been so important a feature of creativeness in the civil and political sphere in general.[25]

One of the most acute and penetrating of recent writers in the political field, approaching the problem of political creativeness from the psychological point of view and with the explicit purpose of contributing toward clearing the way for the development of new ideas in the political and social sphere, discusses the conditions under which the needed inventiveness may be expected to manifest itself. Broadly speaking, he concludes that "The inhabitant of a modern city is more fully conscious, 'has his wits about him' for a larger proportion of the twenty-four hours than the peasant, and acts much less under the subconscious influence of routine." More specifically, he finds the material upon which creative efforts must be based, in these spheres, in the data worked out in many laboratories, universities, and offices. "But in the formation of the original hypothesis," he continues, "the inventive moment on which successful action depends, must take place in the individual brain. If we wish to estimate the real possibility of using the ever-growing mass of recorded fact for the guidance of organized social action, we must think, not of the long rows of tables and microscopes in a scientific laboratory, nor the numbered stacks of books and maps in the British Museum or the Library of Congress, but of the minister or responsible official when he has put back his books on their shelves, has said good-bye to his last expert adviser, and sits with shut eyes at his desk, hoping that if he can maintain long enough the effort of straining expectancy some new idea will come into his mind."[26]

The evidence, inductively presented above, supports this assumption of the important place held by the "responsible

official" as a creator of new things in the political sphere—though not to the exclusion of others. But of more interest, for our present purpose, is the fact that the writer clearly implies the superiority of the urban environment and of urban sources in the field of political creativeness.

Another writer, who is skeptical about finding this all-important quality of political creativeness among the "philosophers," "because they have studied rather the form than the substance of the state," expresses the view that political reconstruction must be deeply rooted in historical knowledge. And the sources to which he refers approvingly in this connection are no less prevailingly urban than in the case of the previous writer.[27]

Still another writer, who has raised the question of the source of political creativeness even more prominently, rightly emphasizes experience, "the power of being aggressively active toward the world," the artistic sense, and the favoring influence of political movements and of fostering political leadership, as factors predisposing to that end[28]—factors to the development and encouragement of which, in turn, urban life appears to be favorable. Yet the Puritans were highly creative politically though lacking in artistic sense. And recent notable municipal reconstruction in this country was occasioned, or initiated, not so much by political movements as by a series of staggering disasters: a destructive hurricane and tidal wave at Galveston, a devastating flood at Dayton, a calamitous conflagration at Chelsea—just as the disaster of war, or of epidemic, had led to a somewhat similar municipal reconstitution in New Orleans and in other cities of the South a generation before.

Great emergencies, not less than political and social movements, jolt people out of routine ways, force them to turn their attention to matters of public interest, and unlock the barred gates of dormant creative genius. Emergencies are not confined, of course, to urban life. But emergencies that

involve important community interests in such a way as to produce possible transforming political results are in the nature of things more characteristic of the city than of the rural community. But, apart from emergency, there is normally more in the city environment to jar the exceptional individual from the groove of routine and to force him to exercise and to utilize his inventive powers than there is in the mature agricultural community, at least; while deficiency in respect to political knowledge limits political creativeness among rural frontier populations.

Again, the presentation already made in these pages justifies, it is believed, an exception to the charge of lack of creative ability on the part of the legal mind—in spite of the immovable adjustment of myriads of lawyer minds to the basis of things as they are. Nor is it permissible to accuse the Fathers of the Constitution, in view of their inheritance of the political philosophy of Locke and of Harrington, of the belief that they were building a political structure once and for all. The fault rather lies in the sons who have entered into the labors of the Fathers—and have rested there! It is the mass of us, and not primarily the devisers of the machinery of politics and government, who are the real proponents of the "machine conception of government"—the theory that government is self-acting and that all will be well if we but have well-fashioned instruments of government.

Lastly, the depreciation of "logical thought and scientific method" in their relation to inventiveness does not appear to be justified in view of the contributions of men like Condorcet, Franklin, and Andrea, and other urban representatives of the more exact sciences. The great discoveries may have been but "brilliant guesses on insufficient evidence." But they have been the guesses of those best prepared and best qualified to make an intelligent and scientific guess; and the evidence at hand has ordinarily been as nearly complete and adequate as possible under the existing conditions. The

results, therefore, by no means justify the view that "logical thought and scientific method," which are the legitimate fruits of the superior facilities in the urban centers for the promotion of intelligence, education, and scientific investigation, are without especial utility with respect to political creativeness.

It is significant that when the writer in question turns to a consideration of those men in recent public life who have shown in high degree the qualities of political creativeness, at least three of the five individuals named are, or were, men of undoubted urban birth and training, while the other two at least owe much to the advantages offered by the city environment subsequent to the period of early youth.[29]

Other writers have contrasted a later asserted long-continued prevalence of sterility in the field of political philosophy in this country with an earlier and highly creative period previous to about 1840; while still others, calling attention to the remarkable period of institutional creativeness in the political field in the early period of our history, assert that we have undergone a marked decline in this respect and that "For a hundred years . . . we have been borrowers, not originators, in government." [30]

These allegations, if shown to have a substantial basis of truth, at first thought might appear to prove that as we have passed from an early overwhelmingly rural status to a status that is today predominantly urban we have declined in creative ability in the political field. But such a conclusion is clearly untenable. It is controverted by the fact of the disproportionately large urban contribution in that same early creative period. Again, it overlooks the fact that great institutional creative periods in a nation's life necessarily occur at rather long intervals of time. When a country has succeeded in fashioning political institutions for itself, at a great formative period in its history, of such a character as effectively to express the genius and adequately to serve the needs

of its people, and has accomplished that work in such a manner as to win universal recognition for the result as an extraordinary illustration of political creativeness and wide imitation of its forms in a score of other states, it would be folly to assume the need or occasion for another such creative outburst in the near future. Having worked out the frame of a great federal representative democracy, it was quite to be expected that the people of this country would, for a considerable period, confine their efforts largely to the improving and perfecting of this system in its separate features and not to a thorough reconstitution of that which they had just fashioned in so notable a manner.

It appears quite certain, indeed, that we people of "these United States of America," having once upon a time fashioned this notable framework of government, have been somewhat too well satisfied with ourselves and with our work. In a certain degree the good is ever the enemy of the better and of the best. An excess of pride in our own handiwork has thus in a measure led to a restraint upon the functioning of our creative powers in the political sphere. In this attitude of complacency and self-satisfaction, however, both rural and urban classes have shared. Toward the system framed by the Fathers in 1787 important rural elements, as we have seen, were not at first well disposed. But when that system had finally been adopted and set into actual operation it presently came to have the substantial support of that part of the population. And from that time down to the present conservative rural elements have united with conservative urban elements to make something of a fetich out of the system the Fathers handed down to us.

Attention has already been called, however, to the contribution in recent years from urban sources, as incident to the reconstitution of municipal government in this country, toward the reconstruction of our scheme of government in general.[31] And though the population of the newer regions

of the West has also been disposed to welcome new ideas and principles in this connection and may even have excelled on this account, and because of its high average of political initiative, in *ripening* constructive ideas in government,[32] its actual creative contribution has been less than that of the urban element.

Professor Giddings' dicta that the country produces original ideas while the city merely "combines" ideas and that "genius is rarely born in town" thus appear not to be borne out in respect to political ideas just as they appear to be defective in their application to other spheres.[33] For it appears that the city mind has been fertile both in original ideas and in the combining of ideas in the political sphere. Moreover, it certainly would be a mistaken view to deny the quality of inventive genius to those who "combine ideas." In the field of mechanical invention such a theory could not sustain itself for a moment, inasmuch as the perfecting of most inventions has been the work of those who have "combined ideas." The city is the natural, continuing habitat of political inventiveness because it possesses, on the part of its leading political elements, a high degree of political intelligence and initiative; a progressive attitude toward new things that promises to be, on the whole, not inferior to that displayed by the population of the newer agricultural regions and that grows out of the constant necessity of facing new situations; and a familiarity with the actual machinery of government that is not possible to those whose contact relates to the relatively simple and routine political conditions that prevail in the typical rural community.[34]

It is mainly to the city, then, that we must look in the future for the political genius that will enable us to refashion and reconstitute our political institutions as the need develops for such transformation and further development in the political sphere. And the indications are that we shall not look in vain. Yet there is no reason to suppose that city born

and bred persons are to have a monopoly of creative genius in the political sphere or that we are not to have the advantage of that genius that the country will undoubtedly continue to produce along this line. For genius evidently originates under no set conditions or circumstances; and it fruits without regard to origin—provided it may take advantage of favoring conditions of development such as the city environment affords.

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23. Beveridge, Albert J., *The Life of John Marshall*, Boston and New York, 1919, Vol. I, pp. 33, 42.

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25. This has been notably true in Australia.

26. Wallas, Graham, *The Great Society*, N. Y., 1914, pp. 16-17, 133.

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29. The three urban representatives listed are Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Judge Ben Lindsey; the two rural representatives, Gifford Pinchot and Dr. Harvey Wiley.

30. See "Editors' Introduction," by David P. Barrow and Thomas H. Reed, in Brooks' *Government and Politics of Switzerland*, pp. vii-viii.

31. Above, p. 308.

32. Ross, E. A., *Changing America*, N. Y., 1912, pp. 163, 168.

33. It is of interest in the present connection that the great majority of the leading inventors in the mechanical field have been of non-rural, at least of non-agricultural, origin. And the same state-

ment holds, in large measure, relative to leaders in the creative field along other non-political lines.

34. Inspection of the names of the leading individuals in the various groups which are setting forth constructive ideas at present along political lines, both in England, in this country, and in France, shows a large predominance of representatives from the urban centers. There may be mentioned in this connection the exponents of the "pluralistic" theory of sovereignty—particularly the "guild" socialists, the regular political socialists, and the non-socialist exponents of gradual, but ultimately thoroughgoing, political reconstruction. Of particular interest is *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta, 1920, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb.

Of course there is no intention here either to endorse or to condemn any of these various theories, plans, or proposals.

CHAPTER XIV

The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Activity

Aristotle expressed the view that if the state *must* take the form of a democracy it would be desirable to have the agricultural class constitute the bulk of the population, seeing that the nature of their occupation leaves the members of that class without leisure or inclination to busy themselves about matters of government.[1] But a recent writer, and keen critic of democratic institutions, has declared that "The first postulate of democratic government is the active participation of the great mass of the citizens." [2] Needless to say, it is this latter view that commends itself today.

The circumstances that naturally favor a higher degree of political activity in the city than in the country are readily apparent. In town or city the voter can, with but trifling loss of time and with the expenditure of a minimum of effort, visit the polls and cast his ballot. And the same advantages facilitate the participation of the urban citizen in those processes of party organization and activity that are often of more practical importance in determining political decisions than are the ballots that are cast on election day. Many of the rural voters, on the other hand, are necessarily resident at some considerable distance from the polls and from the centers of organized political activity in general, which are usually located in the centers of population. Unfavorable weather conditions, or long hours of labor and the pressure of work in good weather, often keep large numbers of rural voters from the polls or hinder their participation in these other forms of political activity.

In spite of these manifest disadvantages under which the rural citizen labors there are some who urge that the rural population is really more interested in politics than are the people of the towns and cities and less inclined to neglect the performance of civic duties. And it must be admitted that it is easy to cite numerous instances that prove indifference on the part of urban voters to their civic duties at the polls.[3] Nor is the urban community, in spite of the advantages to which attention has been called, altogether free from conditions that may render extremely difficult, or even impossible, the discharge of civic duty at the ballot box or in other connections. Moreover, when the struggle for political freedom, the struggle that is often necessary in the earlier period of a country's history and that has kept the citizens actively interested in political affairs, has been carried to a successful issue, there is very likely to be a tendency toward a decline in such interest as people devote themselves more unreservedly to "domestic comfort, success in life, or pecuniary independence." It is strongly implied by not a few that this asserted decline of interest in political matters through becoming engrossed in the daily affairs of life is especially manifest among the urban population. At any rate this alleged decline has coincided with the urbanizing movement in many cases; and there are those who are inclined to attribute such decline to the contemporaneous growth of city life, once the declared fact itself of decline is admitted.

We have conclusive evidence in the case of our own country, however, to demonstrate beyond the peradventure of a doubt that interest in politics, as measured by participation in political affairs, has greatly increased, instead of having diminished, since early days. In Massachusetts, for example, during the ten years 1780–1789, a period which begins with the adoption of a State constitution by referendum vote, it is estimated that while sixteen per cent of the population was

eligible to vote, only about three per cent actually did vote. The excitement associated with Shays' Rebellion greatly increased the proportion voting in 1787. But even so only five or six per cent, as against the sixteen per cent eligible to vote, actually voted. The discussions relative to the ratification of the adoption of the Federal Constitution aroused only enough interest during the following two years to keep the number of voters up to five per cent—or less than one-third of those eligible to vote. Interest then declined and the proportion of voters diminished to between three and four per cent of the population, until in 1794 the agitation aroused by the activities of Citizen Genet and by other issues of the day raised the percentage almost as high as it was in 1787.[4]

Moreover, the careful historian who presents these estimates gives it as his opinion, based on such data as are available, that conditions were not different in the other States—a conclusion that appears conservative when we remember that Massachusetts was undoubtedly the most active, politically, of all the colonies or States during the Revolutionary and early national periods. It is of interest that Alexander Hamilton, speaking in the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia on June 21st, 1787, stated that in spite of a relatively great political activity that he claimed for the people of the State of New York "still we find great listlessness and indifference in the electors." [5]

Professor Beard likewise emphasizes the extremely limited participation by eligible voters in the States generally in the voting relative to the very important matter of the Federal Constitution. Though of the opinion that not more than one-third of the adult white males were disfranchised, by the property qualifications, from voting for delegates to the State conventions that were to decide for or against the ratification of the adoption of the Constitution, he estimates that not more than one-fifth or one-fourth of

this class actually voted. "Far more were disfranchised through apathy and lack of understanding of the significance of politics," than by the property qualifications.[6]

Though the proportion of those eligible to vote who actually voted materially increased during the "hot political contests of the Jeffersonian period," there appears to be no reason to doubt that the "hot political contests" of recent periods have aroused an even fuller participation on the part of those eligible to vote; while the extension of suffrage to a full manhood basis, and more recently to a basis which includes adults of both sexes, has greatly increased the proportion of the total population which participates in our elections today. Francis Lieber, writing in 1838, stated that there was one voter to each seventeen persons at the election for governor in Connecticut in 1830, whereas he estimated that there should have been one voter to every five or six—at least to every seven—persons. In the same year every tenth man in Pennsylvania voted; while at the presidential election in 1828 every eighth white man voted in that State—"which shows much interest," according to Lieber. At the quieter presidential contest of 1836, however, but one white man in eleven voted in Pennsylvania. It is of much interest, therefore, that at this early date, when the cityward movement had gotten but well started, this eminent authority should complain of apathy with reference to the duty of voting—especially on the part of "the industrious mechanic, the laborious farmer, the man of study, the merchant and professional man, in short all those who form the sinew and substance of the state."[7] And Harriet Martineau, writing a year earlier than Lieber, reflected the impression that she received during her sojourn in this country by including a chapter on Apathy in Citizenship in her famous *Society in America.*

The picturesque and exciting, though really meaningless, presidential contest of 1840 called out a large vote and thus

set a high mark against which pessimists, much after the fashion of their kind today, measured the vote at later and quieter elections. The intervening of the acuter phases of the struggle over slavery, from 1854, including the period of the Civil War and a part of that of Reconstruction, also raised political interest in the national sphere to a high level for a time and led to a large vote, generally speaking, at the presidential elections—a circumstance that was not paralleled, however, in the sphere of the individual States.[8] Interest in the presidential elections continued, on the whole, to be well sustained until after 1896—if we judge merely by the proportion of votes cast to the number of qualified electors. Since 1896, however, there has been apparently a considerable decline in this proportion; and at the presidential elections of 1920 and 1924 the number of votes cast totaled but about fifty per cent of the number of qualified electors.[9]

If we call to mind certain qualifying factors, however, this decline will be found in no small degree to be apparent rather than real. Moreover, there is no convincing evidence that such decline as really has occurred can be charged in disproportionate degree to a lapse on the part of the urban population, nor that it reflects any exclusive or peculiar decrease in political interest or political activity on their part. The diluting of the qualified electorate by the granting of suffrage to the Negroes, and especially by the granting of full suffrage to women in 1920, must be considered. Manifestly so high a proportion of voters to qualified electors can not be expected when the latter are virtually identical in number with the whole adult population. Especially is this true so far as immediate results are concerned. The progressive disfranchisement of the Negroes in the South must of course not be forgotten; and the introduction of bona fide educational qualifications for suffrage in certain States in other sections has had a similar, if less pronounced, effect in restricting the number of voters in later years. Moreover, the

safeguards thrown around the ballot in all sections by the wide introduction, in recent decades, of the requirement of registration as a prerequisite for voting, and by other regulations, not only have contributed toward diminishing the proportion of actual voters to qualified electors but also may suggest that the apparently fuller vote of some decades since may have represented in appreciable degree the results of fraud under the looser methods of control in vogue in those earlier days.

Again, the development of modern popular methods in the nomination of candidates has done much to reduce the significance of the vote at the final election in those States where nomination is equivalent to election, and thus to reduce the number of voters who go to the polls where the nominations are merely ratified. Yet it would scarcely be accurate to characterize the resulting decline in the proportion of actual to qualified voters at the final election in such cases as representing simply a decline in political interest and activity. Now that woman suffrage is a fact it must also be remembered that there are many anti-suffragists among women, and that these can hardly be expected to become ardent voters forthwith. And this anti-suffragist attitude is of especial significance in view of the fact that it is particularly prevalent among the women of the "new immigration"—that is, among the immigrants who have come to us since 1896 in disproportionately large numbers. Moreover, aliens in the early stages of naturalization vote less generally in this country today than was formerly the case. Lastly, the heightened demand upon the voter's time and attention because of more numerous elections in recent decades must also be considered in estimating whether a diminished proportion of actual to qualified voters really indicates a correspondingly diminished political interest and activity.

The extent to which the voting population of Britain participates in elections is a matter of much interest for our

present purpose in view of the fact that urbanization has proceeded farther in that country than in any other. According to James Bryce, parliamentary elections in that country bring out eighty per cent, or even a larger percentage, of the registered voters—a percentage that he regarded as very satisfactory in view of the fact that the register may have been made up as long as eleven months before the election, so that many electors are thus not eligible to vote on account of a change of residence within that period. He admitted that a much smaller proportion of the eligible voters actually vote at the elections for the choosing of local officials. But he gave it as his opinion that in France, in Belgium, and still more in Italy, all of which are much less highly urbanized than his own country, the proportion voting "at all sorts of elections" is less than in Switzerland, now a comparatively highly urbanized country, or in his own country.[10] Since these estimates were published woman suffrage has been introduced in that country. And yet at the parliamentary elections in England and Wales in 1923 eighty-two per cent of the electors are said to have gone to the polls; while seventy-six per cent voted at the parliamentary election of 1924. These figures compare very favorably with those of Bryce—as also with those given by Lowell, which extend back to 1895.[11] Manifestly the voting habit has not declined with increasing urbanization in Britain; while a larger proportion than ever before of the total adult population of that country votes today.

After Great Britain, Germany is the most highly urbanized country in the world. But there is likewise no evidence of diminished political activity in Germany with growing urbanization. Seventy-five per cent of the eligible voters of Germany, including both sexes of course, voted at the first Reichstag election under the regime of the Republic; while the percentage increased to eighty in the Reichstag election of 1924. Moreover, eighty-two per cent of the qualified voters

of Germany went to the polls at the presidential election in April, 1925.

It does not appear that the trend to the city in France has had any material effect either in promoting or in diminishing political activity in that country. In the elections of 1834 and 1837, though held so soon after the stirring events of 1830, but 75.6 per cent and 76.3 per cent, respectively, of the comparatively narrow electorate of that day actually voted.[12] And the general election of November, 1919, when the proportion of registered voters actually voting is admitted to have been "notably less" than in 1914, just about the same percentage of the registered vote went to the polls as voted in 1834 and 1837.[13] Moreover, it is not without significance that the number of registered voters in Paris alone in 1919 totaled nearly six times the number of qualified electors for the whole of France in 1834 and 1837.

The extent of political activity manifested by the rural and by the urban population, respectively, at any given time or period in a given country is a matter of more uncertainty, as there are serious complicating factors to be considered; while the subject has also been studied less carefully than that of the trend of political activity in general. But attention may be directed in this connection to the discussion in various places above, which tends to show, for the city population as a whole in Europe, a larger measure of activity in connection with the political movements of the later Middle Ages and early modern times than for the rural population.[14] On the Continent this superiority of the urban population was manifested in notable degree. But even in England, where the rural population played a more important political rôle, the urban population, taken as a whole and considering its numerical inferiority, clearly excelled in this respect.

The same generalization may be accepted, in an even more unqualified way, for more recent times in Europe. As already indicated, urban initiative and impulse were notably

preëminent in connection with the movement in England that led to the passage of the Reform Act in 1832, which for the first time opened the way for wide popular participation in the regular and orderly processes of government. Political intimidation was long decisive in the rural districts, however, in discouraging political activity among the class of tenant farmers; and the agricultural laborers, who constituted the great unfranchised mass of the rural population, were wholly dumb and inarticulate in a political way. But the political appetite of the various bourgeois groups in the urban centers, and presently that of the urban laboring masses, grew with what it fed upon; and the latter demanded and won for themselves, and finally for the rural masses, fuller and fuller access to all the political rights and privileges that pertained to popular government in general. They had long since provided themselves with books and periodical literature for their own instruction and intellectual improvement. They then proceeded to organize among themselves "reading-societies and institutions" for their further enlightenment. They came together in great meetings to voice their demands for political reforms and drew up, on behalf of these reforms, petitions to which signatures were appended by the tens of thousands. They organized political clubs where they debated the political issues and canvassed the political acts and the character of the political leaders of the day. They formed political unions or associations for the uniting of their strength in support of the reforms that they championed; and they thus contributed to the popularizing of the political party organizations. From the year 1874 the labor group in England has had members representing it in parliament; though the urban workers have had the powerful assistance of the large and compact group of quasi-rural miners in this connection. The more strictly rural agricultural laborers, however, have remained, after a generation's experience with the use of the ballot, singularly passive and

inarticulate in a political way, without a vital and possessory relation to any political party and practically without direct representation in the national legislature.[15]

Comparative figures for the proportion of actual to registered voters in the urban and rural constituencies of Britain, for the parliamentary election of 1906, show a small advantage for the English provincial boroughs over the English counties, a somewhat larger advantage for the Scottish burghs over the Scottish counties, and a very considerable advantage for the Welsh boroughs over the Welsh counties.[16] In the London, or Metropolitan, boroughs, indeed, the proportion of actual to registered voters was lowest of all. But this result may be due, in part, to the unusual severity with which a rigid system of registration operates under the conditions that prevail in London. The very considerable alien element in certain of the London districts may also be involved in this result—in addition to contributing to a low proportion of electors to the population, in those districts.[17]

Such investigation as has been made of the vote in the recent parliamentary elections in Britain likewise indicates, on the whole, some superiority in the urban over the rural constituencies in this respect.[18] Moreover, the number of uncontested seats is proportionally more numerous in the rural districts.

The local elections in England, though "not as thrilling" as the parliamentary elections, yet "often arouse a good deal of interest." This is especially the case in the centers of population, where the greater importance of the issues involved and the larger degree of political independence enjoyed are likely to stimulate a larger degree of interest and of activity than prevail with reference to the petty issues of the parish elections with their atmosphere of rather pronounced political constraint. In the North of England, where the country is highly industrialized and where the Labor and Socialist movements are strong, it is not uncommon for

seventy-five to eighty-five per cent of all persons entitled to vote to exercise that right at a municipal election, as compared with a poll of twenty-five to thirty per cent, or even with no contests at all, in the Poor Law election in the parish. It is easily possible, indeed, to find flagrant instances of civic neglect in British urban constituencies—especially in some of the London districts—with respect to the local elections. But still more flagrant instances can be found in respect to local elections in some of the rural districts.[19]

It appears that the urban departments were proportionally somewhat better represented on the list of departments with a high proportion of registered voters at the polls in the general election in France in 1919; and it is stated by one investigator, who has studied the returns for this election, that there was about the same proportion of absentees from the polls in Paris and in the provinces.[20] Over against the more severe results of the registration provisions in excluding voters in the urban centers, in France, must be set the fact that in the rural districts "a considerable number of voters may, by design or accident, be overlooked," in the distribution of the electoral cards.[21]

In contrast with the marked initiative and energy displayed by the people of Paris throughout the political history of France, it is in point to recall the traditional reputation for political inertia and political conservatism that the peasants of France, with all their splendid civic qualities, have acquired. It is not too much to say that the chief activity of the latter in the political sphere has centered around the effort to render political conditions inactive—to secure the maintenance of the *status quo*. In the sphere of local government, too, the rural population finds materially smaller opportunity and encouragement in respect to political action than their less circumscribed and politically more independent urban compatriots; for the highly centralized character of the system of rural local government and the rather menac-

ing pressure that the central government is able to exert in the local sphere leave relatively small room for local initiative.[22]

Considering the importance of rural political leadership in Germany, where the feudal traditions have persisted in emphatic degree in spite of large urban development, and the prominence displayed by the agrarian elements in the field of party organization, there is perhaps more evidence in that country for rural precedence in the matter of political activity than in any other great country in Europe. But it must not be forgotten that the urban proletariat of Germany, though laboring under a heavy handicap in their efforts in the political field because of the three-class system of voting, has built up the largest and most cohesive socialist party organization in the world; and this outcome abundantly justifies the opinion expressed by Lowell some thirty years ago that the small extent to which the urban working classes participated in the municipal elections at that time in Germany was not the result of mere apathy or lack of interest in public affairs on their part.[23] Moreover, the cities of Germany have also furnished a large number of capable political leaders. Finally, both rural and urban elements appear to have contributed in due proportion to the large out-turn of voters at the German elections in recent years. There is no reason to suppose that the development of urban life in Germany has had an unfavorable influence in discouraging political activity.

That the small urban element in Russia is extraordinarily active, in the political sphere, while the great peasant element remains strikingly passive and inert in a political way, may be accepted as true without the formal presentation of evidence.

Abstention of voters in unusual degree at the general election of 1919 in Italy is said to have been especially marked in the centers of population. But this civic derelic-

tion on the part of the urban voters in Italy at this time would appear to have been exceptional. For it is at variance with the commonly accepted view of the superior political activity of the members of the socialist groups, with the reputed apathy in general of the peasant class, and with the probably greater influence of papal disapproval of voting, in national elections, among the rural elements of the population.[24] Moreover, there is little in the history of Italian political development to disprove the general thesis that city life is favorable to political activity.

This same thesis is strongly supported by the fact that in Spain, with a comparatively small urban development, the people as a whole have shown scant interest in the exercise of "their now widely extended suffrage." [25] Catalonia, which contains the important city of Barcelona and which embraces the most highly developed industrial and commercial districts in the country, shows a marked superiority over the rest of the country in the extent to which the citizens participate in the balloting on election day. After Barcelona and the other large cities, voting is fullest in the Basque Provinces and in Navarre—regions where commercial and industrial interests are also comparatively large.[26]

Lowell, writing in 1896 and citing election figures of a score of years before which showed a deficient vote on referenda in the cantons of Bern and Zürich, as in Switzerland generally, yet admitted that the half canton of Rural Basle afforded the most striking example of non-participation.[27] And while he attempted to explain the larger vote in Zürich by reference to the provisions for compulsory voting and for voting by proxy in that canton, coupled with the character of the referendum law in Rural Basle, it is pointed out by other writers that compulsory voting in the enterprising and politically active canton of Zürich exists only in "attenuated form"; while voting by proxy, or by mail, must be considered as very different from downright abstention. The ex-

tension down to more recent years, by Lowell, of this record of referenda voting in Switzerland likewise appears to show a certain superiority in participation on the part of the urban cantons. For Zürich still makes, on the whole, the best showing, followed by the small canton of Schaffhausen—whose capital town comprises about one-half of the total population of the canton.[28]

Though New Zealand and Queensland, which have quite an even division of population between city and country but which are nevertheless among the more rural parts of Australasia, have been cited recently as leading the world in devotion to civic duty at the polls, this reputation seems to be of quite recent origin. For James Bryce, writing in his last great work of political conditions in Australia, said: "The average citizen cares less about public affairs than does the average Swiss or (native) American of the same class, and is less theoretically interested in democratic principles than are these two peoples. Civic responsibilities sit lightly upon him: nor does party feeling, except among the Socialists, do much to stir his interest." And pointing out that rural local government has "minor importance" in Australia, he declared that it had not done much "to cultivate the political aptitude of the people and vivify their interest in good administration." [29] Moreover, in view of the markedly accelerated trend cityward in both New Zealand and Queensland in recent years their current enthusiasm for voting would not seem to support the claim that urbanization is unfavorable to political activity.

The rural population in the newer agricultural provinces of Canada has habitually manifested a very considerable degree—at times, indeed, a marked degree—of political interest and activity. But the rural population of the older agricultural areas has displayed a far less active interest and participation in political affairs. On the whole, therefore, and as a regular and permanent feature of the political life

of the Dominion, it does not appear that the rural population has manifested any superiority in this respect.

In our own country there is likewise no reason to suppose that the rural population has, on the whole, manifested any superiority over the urban population in respect to the extent to which the two elements have participated in the political activities of community, State, and Nation. The highly active participation of the relatively small urban element in connection with the events associated with the Revolution has already been shown;[30] and the leading part exercised by the same element in connection with the framing, adoption, and ratification of the Federal Constitution, and with reference to the organization of our national system of government on the basis of the Constitution, is not only highly significant in itself but tends also strongly to support the conclusion that it was the default of the rural rather than of the urban elements of the population that resulted in so small a participation by the eligible voters in the important elections of that period.

Today we are accustomed to see more interest displayed in national issues than is usually manifested with reference to local affairs. But it is possible that at the beginning of the national period, when we were as yet not really welded into a nation, local issues may have attracted more attention, generally speaking, than national issues and that the rural population may after all have been more active politically than their non-participation in the great events just mentioned would seem to indicate. In New England, at least, a very large measure of political activity in local affairs would seem to have prevailed in early days. Otherwise it is difficult to understand how the town system came to achieve its reputation of being a form of local government that was highly successful in arousing and commanding the interest and participation of the citizens in community affairs. It is known, indeed, that measures were taken in the early days of the town

system to enforce such participation on the part of the legal voters. And though these Spartan methods were not retained in their pristine severity during the period of later development, it is certain that the town meetings long continued to command the interest and invite the participation of a large part of the community. So much was this the case that one of the causes that eventually led to the substitution of the municipal form of government for the town system in the large centers of population was the excessively active participation of the citizenry in the town meetings. A little later De Tocqueville emphasized the manner in which the town, or township, in New England to a great extent monopolized the interest and activity of the ordinary citizen in that section. And even today attendance at the town meetings in New England "usually includes a good proportion of the voters." [31]

Yet it may once more be pointed out that the town system functioned actively, if at all, only in the older and more densely settled parts of New England. Over the wide rural areas in the remainder of the country, therefore, there were no such local instruments of government to draw the ordinary citizen into active participation in local affairs; and remoteness from the centers where government and political control in the wider spheres were necessarily concentrated and from which they necessarily functioned denied to the rural citizen in very many instances a favorable opportunity to interest himself in or to associate himself intimately with political affairs of a general nature.

At various later periods in our history one finds over and over again expression of the view that in the past other elements—those in the towns and cities—had been more active in political affairs than the farmers had been; and that as a result of the absence of proper representation of the farming class legislation unfavorable to the interests of that class had been passed. But at that particular time farmers would be said to be learning their power and to be making

a start to exercise it for self-protection. Just such a condition of unwonted political activity on the part of the farming population in this country has recently been seen. And once again we have been told, as also for Europe, that the agricultural element is destined to assume active command of politics and government and to dominate in the political sphere for an indefinite period. But over and over again, after such a period of unwonted political activity, the rural agricultural element in this country has settled back into something of its normal condition of comparative inactivity in the political sphere, lulled into relative quietude by the return of more prosperous conditions and engrossed in the busy routine of farm operations, or discouraged by the failure of political action and political measures to bring the desired results.

Up to within the past few years, in spite of the pronounced activity of the rural element in certain of the newer sections of the country, there had been reports of decline or lack of interest and participation in political affairs on their part over wide areas in the rural sections of the country, in contrast with the activity displayed by organized labor and by various other groups; and this condition was noted with concern by publicists, by scientific investigators, and even by urban business men.[32] And there are very evident signs of a reflux in the tide of unwonted political activity that has characterized certain rural areas of the country in recent years but that never did stir a ripple in other great rural areas. There is thus danger of accepting these exceptional manifestations of political activity in comparatively narrow rural areas as typical, and thus of ascribing to the rural population in general a degree of activity in the political sphere that it normally does not reflect.

The statistical data bearing on the question of the proportion of the actual to the eligible vote in the rural and urban districts, respectively, in this country are somewhat uncer-

tain [33] and are subject to various qualifications and interpretations; and they have been cited by both sides to the dispute as to the relative activity of these two elements at the polls. But the indications are that when certain allowances are made the urban population makes, on the whole, a somewhat better showing. Yet urban superiority in this respect is less marked than it is with respect to political leadership and with respect to what may be called a managerial relation to the machinery of politics and of government.

It may be noted in the first place that abstention from voting on election day is, by far, most marked in the States of the agricultural South. Of the twelve States ranking lowest in the proportion of voters to total population at the presidential election of 1920 eleven were Southern States. Moreover, in nine of these eleven States the vote at the presidential election of 1924 was numerically smaller than it was in that of 1920; and it is a striking fact that one of the remaining two of these eleven States, the most purely rural State in the Union, after increasing its proportion of actual to eligible voters in a notable way in 1924 over 1920 yet cast but 12.8 per cent of its eligible vote in 1924.[34] At the same election South Carolina cast but six to eight per cent of its eligible vote; Georgia, but ten to twelve per cent; and Virginia, but seventeen per cent; while the percentage of the actual to the eligible vote for the country as a whole was a little over fifty-one.

Comparison of the fidelity with which civic duty at the polls is discharged by the rural and by the urban population is also seriously complicated by the disproportionately large number of aliens in the urban centers, by the fact that in some of the States of the South, Southwest, and Central West, aliens have been admitted to the ballot upon mere declaration of intention to become citizens, and by the fact that the women of the "new immigration," who are particularly averse to suffrage for their sex, are concentrated in the cities in

even larger proportion than the immigrant population in general. The first circumstance makes for a relatively low percentage of voters among the adult population in the cities; the second, though of much less importance now than formerly, has long contributed to swell the percentage of voters among the adult population in a group of States almost wholly rural; and the last through the mere accident of urban residence contributes to swell the number of non-voting women in the cities.

Again, the slight extent to which the system of registration is in operation in the strictly rural districts renders a comparison of voting there and in the cities on the basis of the actual to the registered voters non-feasible in many cases. Registration, through the requirements that it enforces, tends to limit the urban vote directly; while it tends to further limitation indirectly because of the extra burden involved in qualifying for the vote. Lastly, the probably greater number of elections in the towns and cities requires a more active citizenship there than in the rural districts in order that an equally high average vote may be polled in the two classes of areas.

In view of these various handicaps under which the urban population labors it is not strange that in some cases, especially in presidential contests, the crude election figures should show an apparently greater inclination to go to the polls on the part of the voters of the rural than on the part of those of the more highly urbanized States.[35] Perhaps it is due to these and other complicating factors that contradictory and uncritical notions should have developed relative to the voting habits of certain of the States. Thus Massachusetts a generation ago had acquired the evil reputation of having "a traditionally 'dumb' vote"; while the city of Boston only a little later had come to have a widely recognized reputation as "a standard and example of activity in state and municipal politics."[36]

It is with reference to the State and local elections, however, that the chief complaints as to remissness at the polls arise. And it is probably just here, too, where the rural population makes the most unfavorable showing in comparison with the urban residents. For while the proportion of non-voters at the municipal elections is thought to exceed one-third, which is also just about the record made by the voters in general at the State elections, such data as are available seem to point to even a poorer record by the rural voters, both at the local and at the State elections. Thus in the State election in Massachusetts, on November 4, 1919, in connection with which a very unusual interest was aroused, the proportion of the actual to the registered male vote in the 38 cities and in the 70 larger "towns" amounted to approximately eighty-one per cent in each case; while in the 246 smaller "towns" the actual vote amounted to but 77.2 per cent of the number registered. Again, the proportion of actual male voters to registered male voters in the 38 cities in the municipal elections in November, 1919, amounted to about sixty per cent; while the proportion of actual to registered male voters in the town elections in the spring of 1919, for the 316 "towns," amounted to but fifty-seven per cent. Moreover, in these elections the proportion of women voters to the number of men voting was highest, by a wide margin, in the cities, less high in the larger "towns," and lowest in the smaller "towns."

Similarly, New York City cast 93 per cent of its registered vote in the State election of 1922 and 94 per cent in the presidential election of 1924, as against 71 per cent and 81 per cent, respectively, in the up-state section of the State.[36a]

One authority of note asserts that the primaries are "better and more numerously attended" in the rural districts than in the cities, in this country.[37] But the available data do not appear to bear out this conclusion. In Crawford County, Pennsylvania, the home of the "direct primary," after forty-

five years' experience in the use of that method of nomination it was estimated that about sixty per cent of the voters in the townships, or rural districts, seventy per cent in the cities, and eighty per cent in the boroughs, were accustomed to attend the primaries. In comparatively urban California the vote for governor in the Republican primaries in 1908 exceeded the total vote cast by that party for president the same year; while in rural Kansas the primary vote some dozen or more years ago reached but fifty per cent of the vote at the general elections, and in Minnesota but twenty-five to sixty per cent of the regular election vote. In the city of Minneapolis the primary vote ranged from seventy-five to ninety-five per cent of the vote at the general election; and in Michigan the vote under the direct primary law "has generally been heavier" in the urban than in the rural counties.[38]

In highly industrialized and urbanized New Jersey fifty-nine per cent of the voters attended the primaries over a series of years. Hudson County, largely urban and the most populous county in the State, had the largest participation, averaging 68.5 per cent for the five years 1912–1916, among any of the counties; and though Hunterdon County, a rural county, ranked next in the proportion of voters at the primaries, Salem County, "almost entirely rural," was found to have much the lowest proportion participating—but thirty-eight per cent—of any of the counties investigated.[39]

By measuring from flood to ebb, or from ebb to flood, one may come to diametrically opposite opinions as to the trend of political activity over the years. And by choosing for comparison instances specifically favorable or specifically unfavorable to either the rural or the urban population one may come to very different conclusions as to the relative political activity of the two classes. Needless to say, results arrived at in such a manner are without value. There is, both in rural and in urban communities, altogether too much neglect of civic duty—both at the polls and elsewhere. But on the whole

and considering the disconcerting frequency of elections and the formidable list of candidates of whom the voter can often know little or nothing yet from among whom an army of officials must be chosen directly, a surprising interest and activity continue to be manifested at the polls and in political affairs in general.

That sympathetic though serious critic of our political life and institutions, the late lamented James Bryce, may have bestowed undue praise upon us when he declared that in the United States "more than elsewhere does one discover a people seriously interested in public affairs." His further assertion that in this country "the return of the more educated classes to activity in the field of state and municipal government began thirty years ago" may perhaps appear to suggest a previous serious and extended decline in political interest and activity on the part of the members of that class rather than the more probable temporary and periodic state of political indifference into which all classes are likely at times to fall. Yet both declarations of this expert student and investigator of things political tend strongly to support the view that the tremendous cityward movement in this country within the past generation has been, on the whole, favorable to a heightened political interest and activity on the part of the citizenship.[40] And a similar generalization may be made, with even less qualification, for other countries.

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CHAPTER XV

The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Leadership

Among the most pervasive and most persistent of the legends relative to the asserted superiority of rural life in general is the view which ascribes to the rural districts a marked predominance, disproportionate to the numbers of the rural population, in the production of leaders in the various fields of human endeavor. The accuracy of this widely accepted view, which long had the authoritative support of many men of science, has been effectually disproved in recent years by the careful investigations of Professor Lester F. Ward, of the French scientist, M. Odin, and of Cattell, Clarke, Davies, and others.[1]

That the rural environment is not inherently unfavorable for the origination of leaders is evidenced by the fact that very many of the leaders in all countries have been, in the past, of rural origin. But this circumstance is but a natural reflection of the further fact that until comparatively recent years the rural population has constituted, in all countries, very much the larger element in the population. Hence many of the leaders in all countries "could hardly have escaped country birth." But when considered in proportion to the numerical size of the population which has been its source and in relation to the surroundings under which it has matured, human leadership appears to find its most favoring environment within, or in the near vicinity of, the large urban centers. "The ablest race of whom history bears record," the ancient Greeks, arrived at its superlative fruitage in the Athens of the period from Aeschylus to Demosthenes.[2] "In

no other age or State," says Fowler, "has so small a population produced so many men of genius, whose rare taste and ability were not wasted or misdirected, but stimulated and called into healthy action by the very circumstances of the everyday life they lived." [3] And another writer of prominence negatives, in part at least, his own fears as to the future influence of city life upon the origin of leadership and of genius by citing, as "other instances of societies in which men of the highest distinction have been fairly numerous," "Rome from Lucretius to Juvenal, Florence in the time of Michelangelo, London in the period from Elizabeth to Anne, Paris in the latter half of the seventeenth century, and perhaps some circles in Germany for part of the eighteenth century." [4]

Moreover, the contemporary investigators to whose researches attention has just been directed, testify that the city is still exerting its superior influence in producing men of genius and of leadership as it admittedly has done in the past. Professor Ward, reviewing the data presented by M. Odin for France and for the adjacent Gallicized regions, asserts that these data show that on the average the cities of France in proportion to population "have produced nearly thirteen times as many eminent authors as the rural districts"; and he concludes that "Fecundity in eminent persons seems . . . to be intimately connected with cities. . . ." [5] Professor Visher, listing by place of birth the persons whose names are contained in "Who's Who in America," for 1922–23, found that in proportion to population the villages and the small towns up to 8,000 produced 8.5 times, the smaller cities of 8,000 to 50,000 produced 6.5 times, the large cities of 50,000 and upward produced 6.0 times, and the suburbs of the large cities produced 11.6 times, as many notables as the farm.[6] There is believed to be presented, too, substantial evidence in the pages above to prove that the urban centers of England have not only produced their own full proportion of

leaders in the various lines but that the urban environment has been a large, perhaps even an indispensable, factor in the development of leaders who sprang from rural sources in that country.[7] Lastly, it is not without significance that ten of the twelve men recently selected by Georg Brandes, the eminent Danish literary critic, as the outstanding creative spirits of the nineteenth century should have been of undoubted urban birth.[8]

One of the most important spheres for the exercise of human leadership is, of course, the political sphere. Political leadership represents the highest form of political activity and is closely associated with political initiative and political inventiveness. When we think of political leadership, however, we have in mind individuals or small groups while political activity applies rather to larger groups or classes. The sense in which the phrase "political leadership" is used here, therefore, is that which identifies it with certain individuals or small groups who by virtue of a combination of qualities of leadership in general stand forth prominently as leaders in respect to the political life and affairs of nations or states.

That the city is the center and sphere where political leadership functions in a country may be accepted without question.[9] The same advantages that the city affords for commerce, for industry and manufactures, for educational enterprises, and for many other activities, it affords also as a center in which and from which governmental authority is organized, political control exercised, and the actual business of government conducted. But this may mean that the city is merely the place or center from which political leadership functions and not that the city environment is favorable for the origination and rise of political leaders. In other words, does the city afford merely an advantageous sphere for the activities of political leaders whom the rural community produces or originates or is the city environment itself a natural and favoring home for political leadership? The cor-

rect answer to this question appears to be that neither the city nor the country is exclusively the fostering mother of political leadership. Both have produced great political leaders. But a survey of the names and careers of the great political leaders of the world affords abundant assurance that the city environment is not less favorable to the origin and rise of political leaders than the rural community. Indeed, there is evidence to support the view that the city surpasses the country in this respect.

As might be expected, the great political leaders in the Greek and Roman city-state period were almost exclusively city-bred men. In the Greece of this period scarcely a great political leader of rural origin can be cited—with the possible exception of the creators of the Aetolian League. Likewise practically the only great names among the leaders of Rome in the days of the Republic that are not those of men of city origin are that of Cincinnatus, about whom tradition has spun a web of uncertain romance, and Cato the Censor. The creators of the Empire, Julius Caesar, Augustus, Tiberius, were all born in Rome. Of the four "adoptive" emperors, under whom the Empire enjoyed domestic tranquillity and the blessings of good government and reached the zenith of its development, Trajan and Hadrian were born at the town of Italica, in Spain, but both were Roman in origin and training. Antoninus, whose father had been a Roman consul, was born in the near vicinity of Rome, and Marcus Aurelius was born in Rome. With the exception of Diocletian there is not a name of importance among the later emperors that is not that of a city-born or city-nurtured man.

The name of Charles the Great stands out prominently among the political leaders of the Middle Ages. But though the Carlovingian empire was substantially feudal in character and thus established upon a rural basis it would be difficult to claim Charles the Great as a typically rural statesman and political leader. Much the same observation may be

made with reference to William the Conqueror, of Normandy and of England, who was born at the town of Falaise, in the duchy of Normandy, the son of a tanner's daughter of that place. More typically rural was Alfred the Great, though he had been to the city of Rome twice by the time he was seven years old. Henry Plantagenet, born at the French town of Le Mans, and his son, Richard Lionheart, may also be regarded as good types of the rural leader during the feudal regime—as was also Edward I, perhaps, who was born at Westminster.

On the other hand we may not forget that this was also the age of the great doges of Venice, that Machiavelli was a native of Florence, that Jacques van Artevelde, "citizen-statesman" of Ghent, was a native of the latter city, that Heribert, Archbishop of Milan, should be included among the famous political leaders of this period, and that Jean Bodin was born in the French town of Angers. Neither would it be correct to regard William the Silent, hero of Dutch independence, who was sent by his father to the court at Brussels at the age of eleven years and who grew to man's estate there, nor Lamoral, Count of Egmont, and Philip de Montmorency, Count of Horn, martyrs of Flemish freedom, as true rural representatives though nominally of the rural aristocracy.

The landed aristocracy of England has been especially fecund in the production of political leaders and this fact is worthy of note in view of the important place held by that country with reference to the development of government and politics. Yet a surprisingly large number of English statesmen and political leaders, over long periods of time when the urban element represented an extremely small proportion of the total population, were of urban birth. And it must be remembered that many of the nobility of England were of commercial rather than of rural origin.[10] Of the distinguished line of "churchly statesmen," Dunstan and Langton may

probably be regarded as of rural origin, though the former was born at the town of Glastonbury. But Anselm was born in Aosta, Piedmont, and Lanfranc in Pavia, Lombardy; while Thomas à Becket was a native of London and Cardinal Wolsey was the son of a butcher in Ipswich. Neither Hubert Walter nor his purely secular kinsman, Ranulf De Glanville, was typically rural.[11]

Among the early secular political leaders, Simon de Montfort may perhaps be regarded as an urban representative, though nominally of the rural aristocracy, since he was born at the old Montfort seat near Paris and was the leader of the popular elements of London and of the other towns of England rather than of the rural elements. Earl of Warwick, the King-maker, was a famous representative among rural political leaders. But Sir Thomas More was a Londoner by birth and Thomas Cromwell, "the first great English Secretary of State," was born, the son of an iron-master, at Putney, a suburb of London. William Cecil, minister to Elizabeth, was a native of Bourne, in Lincolnshire, apparently as much urban as rural in derivation—a characterization that may also be extended to his son, Robert, likewise minister to Elizabeth. The early leaders in the revolt against the arbitrary government of the Stuarts, Sir John Eliot, Pym, Hampden, Selden, Strode, and the two Vanes, were mainly of rural derivation. On the other hand Sir Edward Coke was born at Mileham, Norfolk, of juristic parentage; and the later leaders in the struggle were drawn in much larger proportion from the towns. Oliver Cromwell himself was rural in his immediate origin and was for a time the manager of his own estate at Huntingdon. But his ultimate descent was from the same source whence sprang Thomas Cromwell, secretary of state to Henry VIII; and he was later a rural migrant to the city, where he acquired the occupational title of brewer, by which he is often described.

That the leadership of the popular party during the period

of the Restoration under Charles II was largely in the hands of the rural element is attested by the fact that this party came to be termed the Country Party. But with the events leading up to the Revolution of 1688 the cities began to divide this leadership with the rural aristocracy and the latter class itself came to have, to an increasing degree, a commercial origin. William of Orange himself was of urban origin and training; while two of the four members of the Whig Junto, to which he presently committed the direction of his government, were either directly or originally derived from urban ancestry. Moreover, Danby, head of the Tory party, was a near descendant of an apprentice to a prominent clothworker in London.

During much of the reign of Anne the actual political control was in the hands of the brilliant Marlborough, who was of ancient rural aristocratic descent, though the old Whig ministry of William III was in nominal charge of the government during a considerable part of the reign. Walpole, who dominated the reign of the first two Georges, was also a representative of the rural aristocracy; but the far more famous name of Pitt, father and son, which shed unparalleled luster on the England of the later years of George II and during the reign of George III, represented urban mercantile stock. Clive, founder of the empire of British India, was rural merely in birth though of an old rural family in Shropshire; while Burke was born in Dublin, the son of a practicing attorney of that city.

Lord John Russell was born in London, a descendant of a family of Gascon wine merchants which had settled at one of the ports of Dorsetshire at an early date. And of the two associates of the nobility, who shared with him the leadership in the struggle for the Reform Act of 1832, one, Baron Broughton, was a native of Bristol; and the other, the first earl of Durham, was a native of London and was reared in Bristol. Francis Place, also a leading promoter of the Reform

Act of 1832 and a man who has been termed not only one of the prophets but also one of the great statesmen of modern democracy, was a London tailor.[12] The other leaders of the Chartist movement, too, were overwhelmingly city men.

Peel, whose father and grandfather before him were calico printers, was born in Lancashire, "a scion of that new aristocracy of wealth which sprang from the rapid progress of mechanical discovery and manufactures in the latter part of the eighteenth century." Disraeli, a Jew by birth and thus a representative of a race of city-dwellers that has been especially fecund of statesmen and political leaders, was a descendant from a long line of merchants who traded in Spain, in Venice, and finally in London. Bright was born in Rochdale, and his father owned a cotton mill there; though Cobden was born in a farmhouse, his ancestry had been engaged in trade as well as in agriculture; the third Marquess of Salisbury was a descendant, through a long line of ancestors in the public service, from the Cecils who were ministers to Elizabeth; Gladstone was a native of Liverpool, born of a family occupied in mercantile activities over the hundred years previous to his birth; James Bryce was born in Belfast, educated there and at Glasgow and Oxford, and practiced law in London previous to his academic career at Oxford; Lloyd George was born in Manchester, his father, who thoroughly detested farm life, having migrated at an early age from rural Wales to London, then to Liverpool, and finally to Manchester; Herbert Asquith and Stanley Baldwin are both of urban industrial lineage; and Ramsay Macdonald, first representative of the labor group among the prime ministers of England, though perhaps of what may be called rural origin is scarcely of rural rearing.

Attention has already been directed in another connection to the marked predominance of urban leadership in respect to the movement for the establishment of a national constitution, both in the Commonwealth of Australia and in the Do-

minion of Canada.[13] On the other hand, the rural group in the British Empire has a most distinguished representative today in the person of Jan Smuts, of South Africa.

Neither have great political leaders been wanting in France among men of urban birth. John Calvin, to whom history has accorded the name of a great political, as well as of a great religious, leader, was born at Noyon—of urban origin through both parents. Jean Bodin, renowned publicist and political and economic scientist and philosopher, was a native of the ancient town of Angers. Sully was of immediate rural descent though derived from a family of Flemish origin. Richelieu, though of an ancient rural family of Poitou on the paternal side, was born in Paris and his mother was a Parisienne—the daughter of a magistrate and advocate of that city. Mazarin was of Sicilian descent and was born in the mountainous district of Southern Italy but was educated in Rome and never had any real connection with a rural environment. Turgot, one of the greatest statesmen that France ever produced, was born in Paris.

None of the chief leaders of the French Revolution in its early stages was typically rural. Rousseau was a native of Geneva, Switzerland, born of a Protestant refugee family —his father having been a watchmaker. Sieyès was originally a churchman and was born at the near seaport, Fréjus. The Mirabeaus, father and son, were of the landed aristocracy but the family had originally risen to wealth and prominence in mercantile pursuits in Marseilles. Lafayette was also of the landed aristocracy but was a soldier by profession—as was his father before him. Dumouriez was born at Cambray and his father was a commissary to the royal army. Mounier was a lawyer and was born at Grenoble.

The Girondists were almost exclusively urban in origin as well as by occupation or profession. Not less thoroughly urban were the leaders of the Terror.[14] And when the Revolution had run its course and had brought forth its master in

the person of Bonaparte, that master was the product of the city environment. For Napoleon, whose ability and leadership in political affairs were not less marked than his genius as a military leader, was born at Ajaccio, capital and chief port of the island of Corsica, of a family whose members "had long concerned themselves with legal affairs" at Ajaccio or in the other coast towns of the island and which had traced back "to ancestors who had achieved distinction in the political life of mediaeval Florence and Sarzana." Tallien, who precipitated the fall of the Terror, was a native of Paris. And when at the close of his extraordinary career Napoleon went down, with France, under the weight of the potent forces that he had raised against himself and against his country, it was to a city man again that there fell the task of saving as much as possible from the wreck. For Talleyrand was born in Paris and, like Sieyès, was originally a churchman of note. Metternich, too, whose was the hand in the main that settled the affairs of Europe at the Congress of Vienna after the final defeat of Napoleon, was born in Coblenz—son of a diplomatist in the Austrian service.

Casimir Pierre Périer and the historian-publicist, Guizot, the two most eminent statesmen and political leaders of the period between the Bourbon restoration and the Third Republic, were both typically urban in birth and origin. Thiers, who salvaged the wreck after the debacle resulting from the conflict with Prussia in 1870, was, like Talleyrand, a city man; and Gambetta and Wallon, who were prominently associated with Thiers in the founding of the Third Republic, were also of urban origin. Moreover, at least three out of four of the most prominent political leaders in France since 1875 have been of undoubted urban origin. Combes, Loubet, and MacMahon represent almost the only ones of these leaders who may be considered indubitably rural.

Of recent political leaders who piloted France through the Great War, Léon Bourgeois, Briand, Millerand, Poin-

caré, and Ribot all are unquestionably urban. Viviani was born at the very considerable town of Sidi-bel-Albes in Algiers and was urban in his associations and general career. Delcassé, whose was the diplomacy that promoted the entente cordiale between France and England, has been doubtfully called "a peasant." For he was born at Pamiers, the chief manufacturing town of the department of Ariège, and there was little in his career to suggest the rural. Clemenceau, one of the very greatest of contemporary political leaders in any country, is of village birth. But his father, who was "a medical man and country squire," had a strong scientific bent and had little in common with the Vendéan environment from which he sprang. And it is easy to see which of various tendencies the father communicated to the son. For the latter was trained at first to the profession of medicine, a calling that had been handed down for generations in the family; and he also inherited his aptitude for politics. After a brief educational career at Nantes, Georges Clemenceau migrated to Paris at the age of nineteen, where he was "from the first a Parisian of the Parisians," and where practically his whole life, up to within recent years, has been spent. Lastly, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, though of minor significance in the political sphere, was born at Tarbes, where his father held an administrative post.

In Prussia the landed aristocracy has had perhaps a more exclusive political leadership than in any other important country. Yet urban influences and urban representatives have been by no means wanting in the political development of Prussia and of Germany. Of the two men who were instrumental in rebuilding Prussia after the disasters of Auerstädt and Jena, Stein was thoroughly rural in origin and in early training; but though Hardenberg was a native of an unimportant town or village in Hanover, his surroundings were very largely urban and non-rural throughout. Bismarck was descended, on the paternal side, from the landed gentry,

though his father had held a captaincy in the army. But his mother, who seems to have influenced him more decisively through her great strength of character, was born in Berlin. In Bismarck's education and early training rural and urban influences were likewise combined. On the other hand, Treitschke, to whom has been ascribed a position with reference to the unifying of Germany somewhat similar to that assigned to Mazzini in connection with the unification of Italy, was born in Dresden; Fichte, who also exerted a powerful influence in the direction of German unification, was a son of a ribbon-weaver of Rammenau; the brilliant Savingy was a native of Frankfort-on-Main; the comparatively liberal Caprivi was born in Charlottenburg; and the socialist leaders, from Ferdinand Lasalle, who was born in Breslau and who was undoubtedly the greatest popular political leader in recent times in Germany, to Bebel and Liebknecht, have been preponderantly urban. For Karl Marx was born in Trier and was the son of a lawyer; Friedrich Engels, who was the son of a wealthy cotton-spinner, was a native of Barmen; Bebel was born at Cologne; and Liebknecht was a native of Giessen.

Of the more recent German political leaders, Delbrück was born in Berlin; Prince von Bulöw was born in a village in Holstein, sprung from a line of ancestry long engaged in the civil service; von Jagow, descended from "a long line of Prussian Junkers," is nevertheless a native of Berlin; Zimmermann's paternal ancestry traces to middle class sources and he is peculiarly a representative of the commercial interests; Helfferich was born at Neustadt-on-the-Havel; von Hertling, though of aristocratic origin, was a native of the city of Darmstadt; and von Bethmann-Hollweg was a native of "a remote village" of Brandenburg, though the origin of his family traces back a hundred years to a thrifty Frankfort merchant. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who have been as much political leaders as military commanders, are both

nominally of the Prussian landed aristocracy. But neither has been untouched by urban influences. For the former is of military descent on both sides of his lineage and was born at the ancient city of Posen; while the father of the latter was descended from a family of Pomeranian merchants and also lived in the city of Posen until after the birth of his distinguished son.

Erzberger, who negotiated the peace terms with the victorious entente allies and with the American military leaders, in November, 1918, was the son of a poor tailor in the town of Buttenhaus; the Bavarian leader, Kurt von Eisner, was born in Berlin; Ebert, who became first president of the new German Republic in 1919 and who was the son of a tailor and was an ex-harness maker and ex-editor by occupation, was born in Heidelberg; Schiedemann, leader of the moderate socialists and also prominent in the arrangement of the terms of peace in 1918, is of humble parentage and a native of the city of Cassell; while the late lamented Rathenau was the son of one of the greatest of the industrial leaders of Germany and was himself a distinguished member of that group.

In Italy, the great name of Cavour, who was born in Turin, strongly sustains the view that the city environment is fertile in the production of political leadership. And Gioberti, Balbo, and Azeglio were also natives of Turin. Mazzini was the son of a physician in Genoa. Garibaldi was born in the French city of Nice and for a time was engaged with his father in the coasting trade. And Crispi was a native of the small town of Ribéra in Sicily.

Of the political leaders in Italy during the Great War, Giolitti is a native of the small town of Mondovì, in Piedmont; and Salandra, whose resignation as Prime Minister in 1914 was an incident of the entry of Italy into the war, is a native of the similarly small Apulian town of Troia, or Troja. But the much abler Sonnino, who replaced Salandra, was born in Pisa; and the similarly strong Orlando, whom

the crisis of the Italian defeat at Caporetto in 1917 brought into power, is a native of the city of Palermo, in Sicily. Moreover, Mussolini is a completely urban representative.

It is thus evident that in modern and recent, as well as in ancient and mediaeval, Italy the city environment has proved distinctly favorable to the production of political leadership.

Eleutherios Venizelos, Cretan statesman and Greek political leader, whose master hand was manifest in the confederacy of the Balkan states in the struggle with Turkey in 1912–13 and who showed himself one of the foremost figures of the recent Great War, may fairly be claimed as an urban representative. On the other hand, Premier Eduard Benes, of Czecho-Slovakia, is of peasant birth; though former president Masaryk, of the same country, is a native of the town of Göding, or Hodonin, in Moravia, and began his remarkable career as an apprentice to a blacksmith.

In our own country rural and urban elements have divided the political leadership since early days. Winthrop and Endicott represented rural and urban influences, respectively, though urban influences on the whole predominated among the founders of the Puritan settlements in New England.[15] John Carver and William Bradford were both probably of rural birth. But William Brewster, who has been called the "Father of New England," was born at the small, but highly accessible and formerly much more important, village of Scrooby, in Nottinghamshire; and in his associations with William Davison and Sir Edwin Sandys he early came under influences that were the antithesis of rural isolation. Further, as is well recognized, the Pilgrim Fathers had a very considerable urban apprenticeship in Holland during the years previous to their migration to the New World. Captain John Smith was the son of a tenant farmer in Lincolnshire but wanted to run away to the sea at a very tender age and actually did begin his world-wide travels at the age of seventeen

years. And William Penn and Roger Williams were both London born.

The names of James Otis, Samuel Adams, John Hancock, Josiah Quincy, Joseph Warren, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, Robert Morris, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, Gouverneur Morris, Philip Schuyler, Robert R. Livingston, and others, eloquently attest the importance of the urban contribution to political leadership during the period of the Revolution and in the early national period. On the other hand, the great names of Washington, Jefferson, John Adams, Richard Henry Lee, Patrick Henry, and others, no less eloquently testify to the ability of the rural districts to contribute to the political leadership of their day.

It is perhaps not without significance that our early presidents were drawn almost wholly from the rural ranks; though on the other hand attention has already been directed to the predominance of urban leadership in the devising and adopting of the Federal Constitution, and in the subsequent organization of the national government. Moreover, a very important influence was exerted by urban men during administrations that were headed by men of rural origin. Thus Hamilton and Jay exerted a marked influence during Washington's administration; Gallatin was an influential factor in the administrations of Jefferson and Madison, as was Robert R. Livingston in that of the former; J. Q. Adams, whom we may properly accredit to the city as an urban representative, as secretary of state left an enduring mark upon Monroe's administration, and following his own term as president he pursued a distinguished career in the national House of Representatives; and Van Buren was really the power behind the throne during "the reign of Andrew Jackson."

Moreover, men like Marshall and Webster, and to a less extent Clay and Madison, having been trained to the law and habituated to public life, were thus subject to urban influences of great importance that in varying degree sep-

arated them from sympathetic relations with the rural element from whom they were derived.[16] Thus we find Webster acting as a spokesman for the commercial, and later for the manufacturing, classes of New England; and Marshall contributed notably to the development of those very ideas of government that were particularly objectionable to the typical agricultural interests of his native State, joining his efforts to those of Hamilton and Jay to give the administration of Washington a direction against which Jefferson vainly struggled. Madison had stood with the city group in the matter of the Constitution; and Clay had a very considerable following among the urban business interests. As a matter of fact there is no class that the rural elements have been more accustomed to recognize as apart from themselves and as representative of non-rural interests than the class of lawyers; and the former have frequently and bitterly resented the disproportionately large control which the latter element has exercised in politics and in government and have interpreted it, though not always correctly, as distinctly contrary to their own influence and interests. Only in exceptional cases like that of Jefferson have lawyers and publicists of rural origin been able to convince the rural population of their essential sympathy with and devotion to rural interests.

The Civil War marks the definite and final passing of national political leadership and control from the hands of the Southern planters and thus from the politically most conscious agricultural and rural group in the nation. But it is too much to say, as has been said,[17] that it marks "the definite triumph" of the commercial and manufacturing classes in national affairs. For the agricultural interests in many sections of the North constituted a very important part of the new political leadership and control that displaced the Southern planter element. Political leadership, at any rate, in both North and South, remained largely in the hands of

men of rural, or near-rural, origin—though, again, many of these leaders were of the class of lawyers and were in touch with city influences during the period of their professional training and throughout their participation in public life.

The urban element was naturally much more largely represented among northern political leaders at this time. But even there the great majority were of rural or small-town birth. Lincoln, of course, was typically rural in origin and early training—perhaps more characteristically so than was Jefferson himself. Greeley's father owned a small and sterile farm near Amherst, Massachusetts, but business failure and poverty forced father and sons into the position of day laborers; and Greeley, at the age of 14 years, became an apprentice in the printer's trade. Thaddeus Stevens was born in a rural neighborhood in Vermont; and Salmon P. Chase had a similar origin in New Hampshire, though education and the study of the law brought him into touch with the city environment and under urban influences at an early age. Thurlow Weed was born at the village of Cairo, New York, and had a career from early youth that was closely parallel to that of Greeley. Cameron was born in the rich agricultural region of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, but engaged from an early age in journalism and in business. Seward was of village birth, taught school for a short time, then studied law and was admitted to the bar. Douglas, however, was the son of a physician in the village of Brandon, Vermont, and was at first apprenticed to a cabinet maker—a pursuit which he soon abandoned for the law; Stanton was born in Steubenville, Ohio, in the early days of that town; and Fremont was a native of Savannah, Georgia, and grew up as a resident of that city and later of Charleston, South Carolina. In Sumner, who was born in Boston, the North had one leader of distinguished caliber who was unequivocally an urban representative. Andrew Johnson, in political ability and leadership

undoubtedly the superior of the rural-born Grant, was a native of Raleigh, North Carolina, and was apprenticed to the trade of tailor at an early age.

The new generation of political leaders that grew up subsequent to the Civil War period reflected increasingly the tendency toward the transfer of political leadership from the country to the city—a tendency that has become constantly more marked in recent years. Of the prominent men who were strictly political leaders, only Garfield was born on a farm and thus of strictly rural birth. Tilden, Blaine, Arthur, Cleveland, were all of village or small-town birth; and even Bryan was the son of a lawyer and judge, who had migrated from Virginia to Illinois, and was born in a small town in the latter State. Conkling, son of a man who had long been prominent in public life, was born in Albany, New York; and Thurman was a native of Lynchburg, Virginia, and grew up there and in Chillicothe, Ohio, whither his parents migrated when he was six years of age. McKinley was of village birth and both his father and grandfather were iron manufacturers. Roosevelt, certainly one of our most distinguished political leaders, was born in New York City, where the Roosevelt family had been prominent for generations; and Woodrow Wilson, not less distinguished as a leader in national and world politics, was a native of the considerable town of Staunton, Virginia—the son of a clergyman who was born in Pittsburgh and who was, in turn, the son of a printer who had migrated from County Down, Ireland, to Philadelphia and who later became an editor in Pittsburgh. Chief Justice, and former President, Taft, is a native of Cincinnati. And even John Sharp Williams, the "planter" senator, was born in Memphis, Tennessee, was educated to the law, and practiced that profession in Yazoo City, Mississippi.

Finally, the successful outcome, in England and in this country, of the long struggle for the political rights of women fittingly justifies the recall, in this connection, of the fact of

the large urban contribution, both by women and by men, to the leadership of this movement.[18]

The result of our survey thus clearly indicates that the cityward trend of the population by no means threatens the ability of a country to produce political leadership of a high order. The indications are, indeed, that the city environment is more favorable than the rural environment for the development of political leaders, as also for the development of leadership in general. *A priori* considerations point toward this conclusion and inductive investigation appears clearly to support it. But the apparent inferiority of the rural community in this respect may also be due in part to the fact that the average rural population is not made up of good "followers." Its members are too individualistic, too little disposed to coöperate. The petty jealousy and the narrowly individualistic spirit which prevail in so many rural communities have often been pointed out; and the resulting failure to produce local leaders to whom the whole community will rally has frequently been noted.

A rural *origin,* indeed, appears to afford no handicap in the race for leadership, provided the superior advantages of the urban environment for the cultivation and promotion of the qualities of leadership are later available. But in view of the notable leaders, in political life, produced by both classes in all countries, it would appear to be the work of supererogation to attempt to search out and assign reasons for any supposed marked distinction between the two classes of communities in this respect. For such a distinction, in marked degree, does not appear to exist. Perhaps the capacity for hard work and for sustained effort that rural origin and early training afford does much to compensate for the general disadvantages of the rural community and to offset the superior advantages that the city environment in general offers in this connection and leaves but a moderate balance in favor of the urban community. It may be recalled, however, that the polit-

ical leader, like any other type of leader, is more or less an exceptional person; and he may develop capacity for hard work and sustained effort in spite of his urban origin.[19]

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CHAPTER XVI

The Effect of Urbanization upon Public Spirit

Public spirit, which consists in the subordination of private individual and group interests and prejudices to the welfare of the community and in the active promotion of community interests and of the general welfare, is perhaps the finest and most precious of all the political qualities. It can be said with a good deal of accuracy that where public spirit prevails in goodly measure all the other political virtues will in time be added and that without it all plans for civic improvement must prove fruitless.

Public spirit is closely related to patriotism, though it is broader and more comprehensive than patriotism as ordinarily defined. For public spirit has to do with the attitude of the citizen toward the commonweal in times of peace as well as in times of war. To say that a great many people who are whole-heartedly devoted to the interests of the nation during a time of war unfortunately often fall into very selfish and anti-social attitudes and practices in time of peace is of course very trite. But it is also very true. To conclude, then, as appears to be justified,[1] that the urbanizing movement has not had an unfavorable influence relative to patriotism in the narrow sense is not to say that it may not have had an unfavorable influence with reference to public spirit —that is, with respect to patriotism in the broadest sense.

Again, public spirit is associated, in the minds of many persons, with political activity. But while the public spirited citizen will most certainly interest himself in public affairs by no means every interested or active citizen may be classed

as "public spirited." For the citizen may interest and actively engage himself in public affairs in the most sordid and selfish spirit. For he may be zealous for the success of unworthy candidates for office or active in the support of principles or measures that are utterly at variance with the public interest. It is reassuring to find that the urbanizing movement is not inconsistent with patriotism in the narrower sense and that it has not been attended with diminished political activity. But there is need of assurance with respect to still other phases of the subject before a final judgment may be pronounced as to the effect of the cityward trend upon public spirit in its widest and best sense.

Certain important phases or manifestations of public spirit may be described by the words "freedom from partisanship or party spirit" and "loyal assent to government by properly constituted authority." The two characteristics thus described are, in turn, intimately related to each other. For the prevalence of partisanship or party spirit is a most potent cause of the absence of loyal assent to government by properly constituted authority. Political partisanship, indeed, is the most unlovely, as it is also one of the most injurious, of all the political vices of the people of a democratic state. For it warps both the mental and the moral vision and shuts and bars the door upon intelligent investigation of men and of measures; and it offers the demagogic politician a ready opportunity to ply his nefarious trade.

It has long been a theory of the students of government that the party system is valuable, and even necessary, in a democratic state, not only in that it is alleged to afford a means for securing political responsibility but also in that it is said to insure a watchful criticism of the official acts and policy of the party in power by the party out of power, and a prompt recognition and denouncement by the latter of the political mistakes made by the former. In this way, it is asserted, a wrong or mistaken public policy is quickly made

manifest and corrective or remedial measures promptly insured. Moreover, the party in power, conscious of the eager disposition of the opposition to take advantage of every mistake, will be led carefully to consider every proposed policy or act before entering upon the same. Hence, improper or mistaken policies or acts will be avoided.

It appears very doubtful, however, whether the results of the party system up to the present have justified this line of reasoning. And hopes for the future depend much upon the possibility of repressing the excessive party spirit that the party system itself creates and promotes. The party system in its relation to the public interest appears to be involved in a vicious circle. For the party organization industriously occupies itself in creating and promoting an intense party loyalty; and this excessive partisanship works directly and strongly to defeat the very object which the party system is supposed to achieve, because it deprives men and women of their sane and rational intelligence and unfits them for the duty or function which, as members of parties, is supposed to devolve upon them—namely that of intelligent citizen critics. The supporters of one party persistently support and defend the policies of that party, however reprehensible and devoid of merit those policies may be and however little relation they may sustain to the public interest; while the supporters of the opposing party are as blindly and as stubbornly inclined to oppose those policies without respect to their merit and to support the policies of their own party with just as little real discrimination.

The net result of this condition of affairs upon questions of public policy we are accustomed neatly to sum up in the observation that in order to secure the intelligent consideration of such questions they "must be taken out of politics." This is equivalent, of course, to saying that these questions must be separated from their entanglement with the party system—a conclusion which constitutes an eloquent commen-

tary upon the claimed effectiveness of the party system as a political and governmental agency. The only reason that the party system in any measure serves the purposes which it is supposed to serve and does not break down altogether is due to the attitude of those, all too few, persons of independent mind who refuse to wear the party yoke or to subscribe to the frequently meaningless and contradictory tenets of party creeds. These hold the balance of power, on occasion, and are really responsible for ultimate decisions—a circumstance that constitutes a further commentary upon the usefulness of the party system as such.

So discouraging does the situation appear at times that one might well be tempted to conclude, in advance of a critical inquiry, that matters have been growing worse in this connection and that this apparent retrogression may have a logical connection with the urbanizing movement with which it seemingly has coincided in point of time. A distinguished historian of the city-states of ancient times, after pointing out the extraordinary devotion of the citizens in these cities —and especially in Athens—to the public interest, is yet constrained to declare that the intense spirit of faction which members of the opposing parties manifested toward each other was a prime cause of the decay of the city-state system with all its promise.[2] And another writer likewise chronicles the deadly havoc which party spirit wrought in the Italian city-republics of the Middle Ages.[3] It is a matter of much concern, therefore, to determine what the real influence of the cityward movement means in this connection today.

It is very difficult to determine at any given time whether political partisanship prevails more largely in the city or in the country. For this vice varies a great deal in intensity from individual to individual, and it varies also in different parts of the country for the same classes. It may probably be admitted that the Western section, with some exceptions, is politically the most independent section of our own country.

Yet political partisanship appears to be quite as weak in the three Pacific Coast States, which have a relatively high proportion of urban population, as in the more strictly rural States of the central and upper Mississippi Valley. And there is said to be proportionally a higher independent vote in the important cities than in the States in general in these latter sections.[4]

Again, the "Solid South" is essentially rural, and appears to be disposed to lose its single-mindedness in respect to party affiliations somewhat in proportion to the development of an urban population there. In New England, highly industrialized Rhode Island and Massachusetts appear to be comparatively independent in their voting; though rural Maine and Vermont also display a measure of political independence.

On the whole, then, we look to the cities today for the uncertain elements in the election returns. The statistics of voting "create the impression that the urban elector is in general more inclined to scratch his ticket than the rural voter." [5] In the majority of the older agricultural districts, while the total vote may vary much according to the degree of popular interest, weather conditions, and the pressure of work, the distribution of the vote as between the rival parties usually can be pretty closely estimated in advance. The independent character of the people of the Western States with reference to party ties is probably to be explained by the circumstance that these States are relatively new rather than by the fact that they are, in general, comparatively rural.

It is pretty generally conceded that the middle and upper classes in our urban centers manifest, on the whole, a greater degree of independence in politics than do our rural voters.[6] But agreement is less complete in this connection with respect to the urban industrial population—in spite of the development of radical ideas among a portion of this group. One writer, who holds that the Progressive movement in 1912 made no serious inroads among this class, asserts that

"Independence is a luxury the poor can ill afford." [7] But this judgment is probably somewhat inaccurate for 1912; and it was most decidedly not borne out by the events of 1924. The urban industrial population of the great English towns, at least, has long enjoyed a reputation for independence, not to say truculence, of spirit in respect to political affairs.[8] And the independence that organization has long assured to the industrial population in the British urban centers in respect to political matters is doubtless more or less closely paralleled in this country among the same group. Many of those of this group who have attached themselves definitely to one of the radical minority parties may be, indeed, the least independent voters of all. For they have become members of the cult of the *idée fixe* and are often even more blind in their partisanship, if possible, than the dyed-in-the-wool voters of the old party tickets. Yet one finds not a few persons, real independents, who vote the radical tickets—not from general conviction but by way of protest, on occasion, and who under other circumstances are quite likely to shift their votes to one of the old parties.

That the political ideal that appeals to "the mass of the city voters" "is that of an organization of like minded loyal friends who will all work for one another" [9] may be more or less correct. Yet it is difficult to see why the charge of a materialistic attitude with reference to matters of public policy may not be extended with a good deal of accuracy to other groups of voters, rural as well as urban. On occasion the rural population over wide areas has shown its ability to set aside party prejudices and party affiliations and to manifest a marked spirit of political independence as some class issue has strongly stirred that element of the population. But it would be grossly inept to regard the temporary subsidence of the party spirit under such circumstances as a manifestation of heightened public interest.

Another indication that party ties hold with somewhat

less rigidity in the cities—and especially in the larger cities—is the relative infrequency of the non-partisan newspaper in the small towns and rural districts. Assuredly, grossly partisan newspapers are not lacking in the large urban centers. And not every newspaper that assumes an independent form is really independent in character. For in too many cases the livery of independence is stolen in order that the devil of political partisanship may be served. But on the whole genuinely independent journalism finds a somewhat narrower field in the rural districts and smaller urban centers than in the larger cities.[10]

The most convincing indication, however, that urbanization has been associated with a declining emphasis upon political partisanship is afforded by the practically universal testimony of investigators that bad as conditions may still be today, party spirit was even more prevalent and of a much more virulent character in our early political history, when our population was overwhelmingly rural, than it is now, when the urban population has come to exceed the rural population in numbers.

Historians and political writers have frequently called attention to the extraordinary virulence of party spirit during Washington's administration; and Washington himself bitterly inveighed against the excesses of speech and of action into which political opponents were carried in the heat of their extreme hostility toward each other. Jefferson, who had declared early in his career that if he had to choose between the alternative of government and of a free press as a means to political liberty he would choose the latter, and who while a member of Washington's cabinet was inclined to the opinion that Washington was unduly sensitive to partisan attacks, was himself so goaded by excessively partisan criticism while occupying the presidential chair that he wrote, in a letter to John Norvell under date of June 14, 1807: "Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth

itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle." And Matthew Carey, writing in 1810, attacked the "insufferable tyranny and despotism" of the party press, both Federalist and Republican, of that day and gave voice to his conviction that unless the evil were put down it would "completely put down the freedom of the Country." [11]

A lull occurred in the tempest of party spirit during Monroe's first administration. But the fire only smouldered: it had not been extinguished. Presently it broke out with almost the old fierceness. And during the period of Jackson party spirit was almost as rife and well nigh as virulent as during the early years of the national period.[12] Thus the tide of party spirit has ebbed and flowed from time to time; and the demon of political partisanship is still, most unfortunately, far from being exorcised from our political life. And in view of its recent wide prevalence it is difficult for the ordinary observer to appreciate the extent of the improvement that has taken place in this respect. It is only by thus comparing conditions at present with those which characterized the earlier periods of our history that a notable softening of the asperities of party politics becomes evident.[13]

President Lowell has dated the beginning of the trend toward independent voting in this country back to the years between 1832 and 1840 [14]—which is just the time when the trend toward the city in this country began to attract attention. The willingness to change from one party to another has been said, not with entire accuracy perhaps, to have been a characteristic of the American electorate from the first. But ticket-splitting, or the discrimination between the several candidates of the same party at an election, is declared to be a recent manifestation in this country.[15] Others date the decline in political partisanship from the close of the decade 1870–80; while still others emphasize the increase in irregular or independent voting in the last quarter of a century.

But whether the beginning of the trend be dated earlier

or later, authorities are almost universally agreed as to the fact itself of the trend. "The disinterested public-spirited citizen is beginning to make his influence felt," said James Bryce a few years ago in an address before the City Club of New York. "Parties no longer monopolize the work of organizing and expressing public opinion," declared another authority still more recently.[16] In many of the more than five hundred cities and towns in this country that have adopted the commission form of government, party designations have been eliminated from the ballot in municipal elections and the party system largely excluded from local government. And a new and positive civic spirit, that promises ultimately to bring to the world once again something of that fine and whole-souled devotion that characterized the attitude of the Athenian citizen to the community, is springing up in the cities everywhere, both here and abroad [17]—an influence that can scarcely escape being largely beneficial in the sphere of government everywhere.

The city might be expected, *a priori,* to contribute toward the weakening of political partisanship. For, as already noted, the urban environment is favorable to the growth of human tolerance and to the dissemination of human intelligence—two qualities that are inconsistent with excessive political partisanship. And if the outstanding individualism of the rural population is unfavorable to the development of leaders within the rural community itself, it is at least not inconsistent with the disposition blindly and stubbornly to follow party leaders in political matters in the broader spheres of government. For the rural population is usually last in recognizing the situation when a once-popular and up-to-date political leader begins to lose contact with vital political issues and to approach the has-been stage.[18]

A similar decline in asperity in party politics and an extremely marked rise in the level of public spirit are to be noted in England since early days.[19] The excessive bitterness

of factional and party spirit in England in early days was reflected in excessive degree in the dynastic struggle between the rival houses of the Roses. But in this struggle the city population showed a minor interest and played a minor part. This element of the population, indeed, was often restive and turbulent. But its commotions related less commonly to disputes that centered around rival leaders or parties than to general principles of politics and of government. Something of the fierce loyalty of the country elements to the cause of the Stuarts during the period of the struggle against arbitrary government in England has already been suggested. And though the country squires withdrew themselves largely from participation in political affairs following the successful issue of the Whig Revolution in 1688, they did not therefore abate the intensity of their political convictions and prejudices.[20]

Party feeling has by no means disappeared from the England of today. Indeed, Lowell contends that there has been, in more recent years, a tendency toward greater party cohesion in that country, that party lines are drawn somewhat more rigidly than formerly, and that independent voting is not increasing there. James Bryce, too, had recently expressed the view that personal attacks in politics were latterly more malignant in England than they were some seventy years before.[21] But Lowell admits that the rival party leaders in England are normally on very friendly terms with each other and that a shift in party alignments is very common among these leaders.[22] And others point out that while the intervention of party machinery is common in English municipal elections, this intervention is largely formal in character and the national issues upon which party affiliation is based are rarely introduced into municipal campaigns. Party leaders from the outside rarely interfere in these local campaigns and their participation is rarely invoked; and the party whip is neither so generally applied in municipal elec-

tions as in this country nor so commonly obeyed when applied.[23] This practical exclusion of political partisanship from municipal affairs in England must be admitted to represent a very marked advantage and to afford a striking contrast with conditions in this respect in our own country—even though very appreciable progress in this direction is apparent in our own cities. Any really discernible growth in party cohesion in England in the recent past may reflect a certain influence exerted by our own highly organized party system upon the organization and functioning of political parties in that country—especially since the introduction of the American caucus there in 1868.

On the other hand, it is the judgment of some contemporary British students of government that signs may be discerned today of a renewed weakening of party government in that country. Apparently the effect of the Great War has been to give an impetus in that direction that has been entirely lacking in this country. Indeed, it is evident to the most casual observer that there has been in England no such marked outbreak of the partisan spirit in the recent post-war period as has occurred in this country; and that the great issues growing out of the war have been far less seriously complicated in this manner there than here.

The party system thus operates with a much saner spirit and method in highly urbanized England than it does in our own country.[24] And we have long been under the necessity of admitting that our own citizenship normally falls short of the high level of public spirit manifested by the citizenship of that country and of the other leading countries in Europe, where urban tradition is much more ancient than in our own land. Yet it is possible to go back in English history, to the good old rural days, when the mere idea of the manifestation of any degree of public spirit on the part of the public men of that country aroused the utmost scorn and contempt.[25] If it may not be said with demonstrable cer-

tainty that the cityward movement has been the cause of the decline in political partisanship and of the rise in the level of public spirit in England, it is at least demonstrable that urbanization there, as here, has not been inconsistent with these tendencies.

James Bryce has testified to the existence in comparatively rural France of "a warmth of partisan feeling which has for forty years been more intense here than elsewhere in Europe." And another authority, remarking upon this extreme bitterness of party spirit, such that it practically isolates the rival partisans from all friendly contact in the more rural parts of the country, adds that "In the larger towns and cities, the meaner aspects of political rancour and partisanship are much less perceptible." [26] Independence in voting, too, is supplied mainly by the urban electorate, in France.

Of the superb patriotism of the French people in general during the stress of great national exigency there can remain not the slightest shadow of a doubt after the stern and revealing test of the recent Great War. The people of Paris, too, normally display a civic spirit and pride that are perhaps more nearly analogous to those qualities as manifested by the cities of ancient Greece than anything that can be found in other modern cities. In view of the fact that the every-day political life of the French people has not usually been ordered on the same high plane to which they attain in periods of national crisis, it is encouraging to be assured by competent authority that France shares with other democratic countries the trend toward a higher level of public spirit in general.[27]

In a country with an autocratic political organization, such as that in Germany previous to the close of the recent war, there is less scope for party organizations of a political character and thus less opportunity for the manifestation of political partisanship. Therefore, though at times a marked

truculence characterized the tone of political feeling under the old regime in Germany, both among the proletarian and among the agrarian groups, it does not appear that political experience in that country throws much light as yet upon the present inquiry. All authorities agree that civic spirit is developed in comparatively high degree in the German cities. In view of the reputation that the German citizen in general has acquired for devotion to the public interest it is somewhat surprising to be informed by Prince von Bülow that "It is a characteristic of the German to employ his energy individually, and to subordinate the general good to his narrower and more immediate interests." [28] Perhaps this delivery is not to be taken too literally and but reflected the necessity felt by a paternalistic ruling group to prepare the citizenry for yet greater devotion to the interests of the fatherland and for yet higher sacrifices on its behalf.

Switzerland, now a prevailingly urban country, has justly acquired an enviable reputation for public spirit on the part of her citizens. And the nature of the federal constitution is such as to minimize political contentiousness among the electorate. Yet it would be a rash assertion to ascribe this fortunate outcome to rural impulses and forces. There is no reason to suppose that the recent rapid urbanizing trend in that country has exercised an unfavorable influence upon the quality of the public spirit.

James Bryce found a less serious and less active public spirit in comparatively urban Australia than could well be desired. But he testified to the purity, orderliness, and general good tone of the public life of that commonwealth. And he was very far from suggesting that the measurable deficiency which he detected was due to the limited development of rural life in that country.[29]

It will readily be admitted, perhaps, that the peoples who have been able to make the greatest success of government have been those among whom "loyal assent to government by

properly constituted authority" is a prominent characteristic.[30] By this is not meant, of course, the passive and indiscriminating acceptance of whatever authority may happen to be imposed, but the absence of an intensely factional and narrowly partisan spirit which refuses to submit to the will of the majority and which would rule or ruin and the manifesting of an active spirit of loyal coöperation for the promotion of all worthy public ends honestly designed. The English-speaking peoples have always prided themselves upon displaying this political virtue in large measure; and upon this quality, in no small degree, their success in politics and in government is reputed to be based.

In our own country we certainly have not yet arrived at a stage where reasonably loyal assent and support are given by the members of the party out of power to the administration of the party in control of the government—nor are such assent and support by any means always deserved by the latter. Political sabotage is still sadly prevalent among our political leaders and still receives the assent of far too large a proportion of our voters. But when we look back over our history it is easy to perceive that much progress has been made toward improvement in this respect. At least we have clearly passed the time when any considerable number of persons seriously consider open and positive opposition to the authority of government by the party in power, when the latter is duly and legally elected to office. And attention may be directed here to the fact, brought out more in detail below, that with but one exception every important instance in our past history of armed rebellion against the properly constituted authority of the government has originated among and has been supported by the rural elements of the population.[31] The most serious instance of this kind, the rebellion of the Southern States at the time of the Civil War, sprang from a background of stabilized rural population and found its immediate occasion in the election of an opposition can-

didate to the presidency. And though the struggle involved fundamental differences in theories of government and a difference of opinion as to the acceptability of certain social institutions rather than merely a conflict between parties as such, it is certain that party spirit did much to complicate the situation and to render armed conflict inevitable.

On the other hand, if we turn to those countries where revolution is almost the normal state of affairs and the election of the candidates of one party almost the inevitable signal for the resort of the partisans of the opposing party or parties to open revolt, we shall find that in practically every case these countries are essentially rural countries, with few important cities and with an insignificant proportion of urban population. Nor can this fact be adequately accounted for, as some have contended, by ascribing it to racial factors alone. For all of our leading countries have manifested a growing political stability coincident with growing urbanization.[32]

It is quite generally admitted that conditions in the rural districts normally make for an individualistic attitude. This circumstance is not without its advantages but it is also clearly unfavorable to the development of a high level of public spirit. Rural people are largely dependent upon themselves individually for the accomplishing of the objects in which they are individually interested. They are thus unaccustomed to working together for a common end and are thus likely to possess a comparatively faint consciousness of a common interest that is to be served by a common effort. It is therefore not surprising that there should often be manifested, in the rural community, a disposition to subordinate community interests to private ends and a failure to consider the common welfare.[33] Though there are many honorable exceptions, inadequate financial support of schools and of churches in the rural districts is proverbial; and this deficiency is by no means wholly to be explained or justified by

slender financial resources. What is true with respect to schools and churches is also true in greater or less degree with respect to roads, bridges, good health campaigns, and community activities and enterprises in general.

The "soulless corporation" is frequently no more self-seeking in its attitude toward the public interest than is many a comparatively honest but shifty son of the soil, within the limits of the narrow circle which embraces his petty interests. We are often deceived by the vastly larger scale upon which the former operates into thinking that there must be a difference in kind and not merely one of degree in the two cases. Indeed, it appears very likely that much of that selfish and particularistic attitude that often characterizes not a few of the citizens of our urban communities traces back, in its ultimate origin, to the rural environment from which many of these urban citizens have sprung, immediately or more remotely, and thus represents but another phase of imperfect adaptation to urban life on the part of a people who had long been habituated to a rural environment.

That urban life favors the development of public spirit is abundantly shown by the leadership long manifested in this respect by the people of the cities of Europe. The level of public spirit in the ancient city-states of Greece and Rome rose to a height to which the world has hardly since attained. It was maintained at a comparatively high level in the city-states and city-republics of the mediæval period.[34] Virtually every student of municipal institutions gives voice to his enthusiasm at the high standard of civic pride and spirit displayed by the population of the cities of Europe today. Attention has already been called to the outstanding civic spirit of the people of the city of Paris. The unwieldy and planless character of the development of the city of London has done much to destroy its unity of life and to impair its spirit of civic pride and patriotism. But Lecky, praising municipal

government in English cities in general, writes: "It is very doubtful whether the spirit of municipal and local patriotism was more strongly developed either in ancient Greece, or, during the Middle Ages, in the great cities of Italy and Flanders or along the Baltic, than it now is in Birmingham, or Liverpool, or Manchester. The self-governing qualities that are displayed in these great centers, the munificence and patriotism with which their public institutions are supported, the strong stream of distinctive political tendency that emanates from them, are among the most remarkable and most consolatory facts of English life." [35]

If urban superiority with respect to the prevalence of public spirit in its different phases appears to be less marked in this country than the situation in European cities would lead us to expect, allowance must be made for certain handicaps under which our cities labor. In the first place it must be remembered that our urban centers bear the main part of the burden of assimilating the vast number of aliens who have thronged our shores. In spite of some notable exceptions it is not to be expected that these aliens will equal, in their devotion to the public interest, the native-born element that so greatly predominates in the rural districts.[36]

Again, it must be recalled that our cities have grown at an extraordinarily rapid rate—a rate so rapid that the civic virtues have had scarcely a fair opportunity to be manifested. Even more important, perhaps, is the fact that our urban centers are comparatively new and were built from the foundation within a comparatively short period of time and without the advantage of the civic traditions that had developed and come down through centuries in European cities—traditions that were either entirely lacking among the early settlers in this country or that became dimmed in their minds by the frontier environment that pressed in upon them with overwhelming force in their new home. Moreover, the American colonists were engaged in the labor of developing

State, or provincial, and national government long before their attention was seriously addressed toward the creation of municipal institutions on any considerable scale; and it was natural that public spirit should find its early expression largely apart from municipal life. Yet in spite of these disadvantages the people of the cities played, as we have seen, a notable part in the early development of our national life; and even under the burden of a heavy alien influx our urban centers have developed a fair measure of public spirit and have given it increasing expression in their own municipal life and institutions, while continuing their honorable participation in the best features of the development of the life of the nation as a whole.

In spite of the discouragingly low level of public spirit that has often manifested itself in our cities, therefore, as indeed among our citizenship in general, we may not unreasonably hope for better things. What the people of European cities have been able to realize, our own urban residents can, and doubtless will, realize in time. For there is very much of idealism in the American character and that idealism needs but to be set free from its bond of party slavery and to be properly informed and directed in order to manifest itself with power in both country and city alike. Indeed, in the striking transformation in municipal government that has occurred in many of our cities within the past score or more of years there has already manifested itself, as an integral part of this movement, a notable enlargement of the civic spirit.

If, then, with greater extremes of high and of low levels of public spirit in our cities than in our rural districts today the general average is as yet not materially better in the urban centers, it seems not unreasonable to expect that in love and pride of community and of country, in wholesome political activity, in absence of political partisanship, and in loyal support of regularly constituted government, the latter

may in the future clearly point the way in these respects, as they have done abroad, to a rural citizenship that will itself be worthily redeemed from the defects that hold the plane of public spirit both for it and for the urban population at a level that at present often seriously discredits us as a people.[37]

The detached, and yet intimate and informed, view of the late James Bryce strongly supports the conclusion that the recent marked cityward trend has not been inconsistent with a rise in the level of public spirit in this country. Writing, in words that might almost be considered in the light of a Farewell Address to our people, of political conditions in this country, he said: "No Englishman who remembers American politics as they were half a century ago, and who, having lived in the United States, has formed an affection as well as an admiration for its people . . . will fail to rejoice at the many signs that the sense of public duty has grown stronger, that the standards of public life are steadily rising, that democracy is more and more showing itself for ordered progress, true to the principles of Liberty and Equality from which it sprang." [38] And the improvement in this respect which he believed himself to see in so marked degree in this country, he likewise recognized in greater or less measure in the other democratic countries of the world.

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CHAPTER XVII

The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Purity

Freedom from the taint of political fraud and corruption is also an important index of the extent to which public spirit prevails among the different elements of the population. At the same time this factor bears so direct and vital a relation to the efficiency of government and to public morality that it merits separate consideration. It is assumed by a great many persons—perhaps by the great majority—that as a matter of course political fraud and corruption are peculiarly urban vices; and that as cities multiply and increase in population and as the urban element grows ever more important in the total population, politics necessarily becomes more and more corrupt and fraud and bribery more and more common in political life. It is very doubtful, however, whether the direct evidence will justify the former of these two views. On the other hand, there is the most complete and convincing evidence of the inaccuracy of the latter view. And if the view that political corruption increases with growing urbanization is shown to be mistaken and that on the contrary the growth of city life is associated with improved and improving conditions in this respect, a strong presumption is created that the view which regards the rural environment and the rural population as essentially superior with respect to political purity is also untenable and based upon imperfect evidence and hasty generalization.

There is still enough of corruption prevalent in political life in this country to require the aid of an historical survey into past conditions in order clearly to disclose the fact that

there has really been much improvement in respect to this evil. Brief investigation suffices to show, however, that the fathers of the colonial period frequently displayed a low standard of political morality that is quite out of keeping with the high-minded virtue with which we have been accustomed to credit them. Soon after the introduction of the written ballot in Rhode Island, in 1629, it was deemed advisable, in order to combat the evil of ballot-box stuffing, to require each voter to write his name on the back of the ballot. And at an early date the Governor of that colony publicly complained that its assembly was unblushingly for sale.[1] In some of the other colonies, where white and black beans were used in the polls, "it was a common practice for a man to carry a few up his sleeve, which he slid into the box when he inserted his hand to vote." John Adams guilelessly recorded in his diary the defeat of a friend because "after voting for the first time the candidate's friends went over to the tavern and when they returned to vote again found the polls closed" —evidence that repeating was common and was accepted pretty much as a matter of course.[2]

Political corruption was also widespread during the period of the Revolution. De Kalb, who was in position to know at first hand of the conditions to which he referred, declared, in a letter to the Comte de Broglie, in France: "The war-fund pays a good many bills that could not be made public. I have no doubt that the contractors make fifty per cent on every contract, not to speak of other defraudations, the mere enumeration of which would be endless."[3] John Adams, in less specific terms but with greater vehemence, wrote to his wife under date of October 8, 1776: "The spirit of venality . . . is the most dreadful and alarming enemy America has to oppose. It is as rapacious and insatiable as the grave. . . . This predominant avarice will ruin America, if she ever is ruined. If God Almighty does not interfere by his grace to control this universal idolatry to the mammon

of unrighteousness, we shall be given up to the chastisements of his judgments. I am ashamed of the age I live in." And that he did not hold, in this indictment, to a standard that would be considered especially high today, is manifest from a communication to his wife a few months later in which he recommended trying the luck of their four children by the purchase of a ticket for them in a United States Lottery.[4]

In the State conventions and in the Federal Constitutional Convention a great many references were made to the possibility of political corruption in connection with the proposed new national government; and much misgiving in this respect was expressed by those who opposed the Federal Constitution as submitted for adoption and ratification. There appeared to be general agreement, however, that there had been little or no corruption in the government during the period of the Confederation;[5] though this opinion does not seem altogether consistent with the conditions described by De Kalb and John Adams so shortly before. Pelatiah Webster characterized the period in a very different way—declaring that the equity of the laws had been polluted and that they had been turned into engines of oppression, that the justice of the public administration had been corrupted, and that the morality of the people had been largely destroyed.[6] It is even claimed that ratification of the adoption of the Federal Constitution was secured, in Rhode Island, through the purchase of votes; and the charge was made, perhaps without justification, during the session of the Massachusetts convention that large sums had been gathered with the object of corrupting those of the delegates in that convention who were opposed to ratification.[7] On the whole, the opinion expressed by Jefferson that our government might be expected to "remain virtuous" so long as the population remained chiefly agricultural rather implies an unconscious acceptance of standards of political morality that would shock our sense

of propriety today than indicates a high level in this respect at that period.

In connection with the bitter partisan controversies that raged during the early national period there were charges and countercharges of corruption and corrupt bargaining; and doubtless these too were based to a greater or less extent upon fact. Hamilton appears, in part innocently and in part by connivance, to have permitted information relative to plans that the Treasury had for handling government obligations to leak out, to the profit of certain men in public life as well as to some of his own family connections.[8] In 1796 Jonathan Drayton, Speaker of the House of Representatives, is said to have used his office to secure the passage of a bill to locate military warrants, in which he was largely interested financially; in 1801, when the Federalists were displaced, Sedgwick, the retiring Speaker, was discovered to have speculated largely in paper certificates under the assumption laws; and Livingston has testified relative to the "notorious defaulters," such as Watkins, Robertson, Arnold, Rogerson, and others, who defrauded the government during the administration of John Adams.[9]

Yet Professor Fish has characterized the national civil service under the Federalists as "exceptionally honest" and has pronounced the defalcations to have been relatively few in view of the loose business tone that prevailed generally at that time.[10] Considering that the Federalist administration represented the ascendancy, or at least the leadership, of the urban elements, this constitutes important testimony to the relatively high standard of political purity prevailing among this class of the population at that time.

To these elements of downright fraud and corruption in our national government there was now added, as an indirect form of bribery and as a seriously complicating factor, the development of the spoils system in that sphere. The result

of this combination was highly unfortunate. Yet it is scarcely to be interpreted, as some have concluded, as indicating a descending level of political morality.[11] Rather does it represent the crystallizing and concentrating into a definite system of the elements of political corruption previously disseminated in the body politic, as opportunity was afforded by the change from the condition of political incoherence characterizing the colonial and revolutionary periods to the relatively systematized political organization that followed, in both State and national sphere, the adoption and ratification of the Federal Constitution, and by the growing interrelation between government and economic enterprise as industry expanded and took on more and more the associative form. It was the symptoms of the disease and not the disease itself that became more clearly manifest.

In the development of the pernicious spoils system both rural and urban influences were involved.[12] Professor Fish, in pointing out that New York was the first State in which offices were openly and continuously used for partisan purposes, shows that the royal appointments in that province in colonial times had been conspicuously bad and that its active politics had been in control of family groups or combinations based largely on land and old manorial privileges. Another writer describes the distribution of offices in Maryland during the French and Indian War as based on essentially the same principles as controlled the distribution of spoils a century and a quarter later. And Professor Henry Jones Ford concludes from reference to original documents that "the American state was corrupt and incapable from the very start."[13] When Pennsylvania accepted the spoils system, therefore, almost contemporaneously with New York and under circumstances growing out of the election of Thomas McKean, a partisan of Jefferson, as governor in 1799, one is not surprised to learn that the men appointed to office under that system were inferior, on the average, to those

appointed in New York; and that the amount of corruption there was greater than in the latter State—if exception be made of New York City, where the opportunities may be admitted to have been unusually great. For there had previously been official complaint of "the low standards of the holders of public office" in Pennsylvania.[14]

Though reference has already been made to the comparative purity of the federal civil service under the administrations of Washington and John Adams, the removal of Tench Coxe, commissioner of revenue, by John Adams in 1797 represented "the first case of removal for party reasons." When Jefferson came into office in 1801 he found, of course, mainly Federalists in office; and in displacing a number of these in order to achieve a "desired equilibrium" between Federalists and Republicans Jefferson became "technically" the author of the introduction of the spoils system into the national service. Under the administration of John Quincy Adams, a city man who represented a constituency that certainly included a large rural element but that was less typically rural than that of the administrations immediately preceding, the national civil service was lifted again to an almost irreproachable plane. With the advent of the administration of Jackson, however, with its ultra-democratic notions of the popularization of access to public office and of rotation in office, there occurred the full and frank introduction of the spoils system from the State sphere, where it had become firmly established by 1828, into the national sphere. The quality of the national civil service had been but little influenced by Jefferson's use of the patronage. But it now took on a tone that was palpably discreditable, and in no small measure positively corrupt, under Jackson. And from this time to the close of the Civil War, whichever party was in power, the spoils system continued to exert its debauching effects unchecked, in every sphere of government, national, State, county, and municipal.[15]

For the continuation of the spoils system and its vicious and corrupting influences, as well as for the prevalence of other forms of corruption in our political life, rural and urban elements were long jointly responsible. Comparatively urban New England and the almost purely rural Old South were relatively free from both forms of political corruption. But it is significant that in referring to improper dealings in the national land office under Jackson, Professor Fish cites a report by an agent of the treasury to Secretary Woodbury that in the West "the code of morality in general was lower than that acknowledged in the East." Defalcations in the customs department, which of course was largely localized in the East, were also less wide-spread than those in the land office—though the individual cases were naturally more striking.[16]

The low standards in the West at this time were also reflected in conditions within the State and local spheres of government. Lack of honesty was widely prevalent in official circles in Illinois, for example. There were defalcations on the part of two State treasurers; and certain other State officers used their official positions to benefit from the sales of land for taxes. "Evidences of corruption and inefficiency among local officials are even more manifest in the records than is the case with State officials." So frequently did absconding sheriffs run away with the public funds that Governor Ford declared in a message that "During all this time from 1818 to 1830, a very large number of sheriffs elected by the people were defaulters to the State or to counties for taxes, or to individuals for money collected on execution."[17]

Fraud and corruption were also rife during the period leading up to 1828 in connection with the operation of the freehold and personal property qualifications for suffrage in the various States.[18] Hezekiah Niles declared about 1821: "Party and partisans can make freeholders by the hundreds, without hazard or loss—and, when personal property is the

criterion, a single watch may make fifty voters a day." [19] In Rhode Island, under the old constitution suffrage was confined to freeholders of $134 and their eldest sons; and sham deeds were frequently resorted to in order fraudulently to qualify non-freeholders to vote. At times of great political excitement it was believed that as many as one-fourth of the votes in town meeting were thus fraudulently qualified.[20]

Repeating also continued to be very prevalent. Niles declared in 1821 that in Baltimore, where there was then no system of registration of voters nor any other means of checking up fraud of this sort, a man might vote half a dozen times or more if he were determined to carry his point. But elections were not less corrupt in the rural sections of Maryland. "Persons out of the State," he declared a little later, "can hardly form an idea of the demoralization caused by electioneering in some of the small and nearly balanced counties. I believe it may safely be said that many thousand well-disposed and industrious men have been reduced into vagabonds and paupers by it. It is a sorry fact that a great number of poor persons have been furnished with the means to lead a life of complete dissipation for a month or more before election, during which the constitutions of some have been destroyed, while others have contracted vile habits which they never after had the power to shake off." [21]

Betting at elections was also widely prevalent at this period—an unnamed son of a former president of the United States having been "shown to have had extensive operations along this line." It was not uncommon for the journals of that day to propose and accept bets on the issues of a political campaign; and in this way politicians sometimes "sold principles and every consideration of justice and propriety." [22]

As illustrating the time-worn fallacy that "the former times were better than these," the fact may be instanced that a man prominent in the public life of Rhode Island, apparently ignorant of the conditions cited above as existing from

time to time since the early colonial period in that State, delivered an address in about 1840 on "The Causes of the Decline of Political and National Morality." And in about 1854 the same individual, in connection with a meeting which adopted resolutions against bribery in a rural town of that State, adverted to the same subject. Apparently forgetful of the evils to which he himself had called attention in 1840, as well as of those prevailing immediately subsequent to that date, he asserted that while bribery was negligible in that State a very few years before and the legislators then above suspicion, he was reliably informed that some of the farmers —even those with ample estates—were now willing to sell their votes for a very paltry sum, and that the venality of some of the legislators was declared now to be a matter of jest. The outcome of the State elections, he said, was now well understood to depend almost entirely upon the respective ability of the contending parties to buy the mercenary voters.[23]

During the latter half of the last century political corruption came to be associated in peculiar degree with the activities of business corporations—especially railroad and public utility companies.[24] Perhaps many would be inclined to find, in the incidents described by Henry Demarest Lloyd in his *Wealth Versus Commonwealth* and by Charles Francis Adams in his *Chapters of Erie,* in the operations of Tweed in New York City, and in the Crédit Mobilier scandal, a culmination, in the 70's, of a previous growing movement toward political corruption. But there would doubtless also be pretty general agreement that the conditions involving corrupt political relations of corporations with individuals and with public officials have very materially improved within recent decades. And while the instances just cited were among the most spectacular and gigantic examples of political corruption in our history, they did not necessarily

prove for the country in general, or even for the urban population, an unprecedentedly low standard of political morality. The very scale on which these operations were staged and their spectacular character served to give an exaggerated idea of their importance as an indication of conditions in general. Political fraud and corruption, like the enterprises with which they were associated, were being aggregated and centralized. And when disclosed in such form they bulked large in the field of vision and possessed the quality of a markedly heightened publicity.

Moreover, the stakes were unprecedentedly large and the temptation extraordinarily great. After-war psychology, the influence of which we can appreciate better today than at any other time since, doubtless also played a part.[25] And it is significant that the early training of the men who were involved in these disgraceful activities dated back to the earlier period the political tone of which has been indicated above.

So much attention has been devoted to these stupendous and glaring examples of political corruption that were staged in or near the great urban centers as almost entirely to obscure a knowledge of contemporaneous events, in some remote rural sections, that reflected quite as flagrantly the active presence of the elements of political corruption. Elections for the choice of a United States senator in the Kansas legislature in the years 1861, 1864, 1865, 1867, and 1871 were tainted with fraud.[26] Moreover, impeachment proceedings were instituted in 1874 in this almost purely rural State against the treasurer for "high crimes and misdemeanors in office"—proceedings which significantly came to an end upon the resignation of the accused official; and in the following year it was discovered that the State school fund had been defrauded of a large amount by his successor, who also resigned under fire.[27]

Charges of fraud were also made in connection with the

Territorial election in Nebraska in 1866; and in 1871 the governor of that State was impeached and removed from office for embezzlement of public funds.[28]

Attention may also be directed to the manifestation of the vice of political corruption in certain rural sections in more recent years.[29] The payment of voters for their time and trouble in exercising their privilege of the ballot has been declared to have been especially prevalent in the rural communities.[30] And attention was called a score of years ago or more to the facility with which the farmer members of a certain State legislature were able, with a salary of but $500, to pay off the mortgages on their farms after but a single term in office.[31] A careful investigator has connected political corruption and the dominance of machine politics in the State of Rhode Island in recent years with the corruptibility of certain elements of the rural population—declaring that "there have been found with no great difficulty corruptible farmers in sufficient numbers to serve machine ends."[32] And a journalistic writer of prominence still more recently has pronounced, though doubtless rashly and without justification, the whole of New England decadent, extending the stain of political corruption to the rural districts of that entire part of the country.[33]

Most striking of all, perhaps, were the revelations a few years ago of wholesale political corruption among the old, native stock in a rural county in southern Ohio, where more than 1,500 voters, the most of them residents of country homes, were disfranchised by the court. And it seems by no means unlikely that these deplorable conditions extend in greater or less degree into the surrounding rural territory and into other rural sections of the great Central West.[34] An editor in an eastern industrial State has recently declared that "The average country newspaper is rotten as to morals —for sale to the highest bidder, bribed by a twelve-inch ad. or a big printing order." And another editor in the same

State asserted of a predominantly rural county in that commonwealth that it was "just as corrupt" as the leading populous urban county "is said to be."[35] Lastly, a recent writer and investigator of authority in the field of politics and government has uncovered evidences of corruption and graft in some of the rural counties of the Middle West that rival those associated with "the wicked urban districts" in everything "except in dramatic quality and the size of the sums involved." [36]

That these regrettable conditions in certain rural areas, though far too widely disseminated to be ignored, are exceptional and not typical of the rural population as a whole, or even of that of any given section of the country, is undoubtedly to be accepted. Political corruption is no more general among the rural population than is the rural decadence in general of which this evil is declared by some to be a phase and manifestation.[37] But if political conditions in what may be called the "rural slums" are not to be taken as typical of conditions among the rural population of the country as a whole, there also seems to be no logical reason why the existence of similarly bad conditions among certain elements of our urban population should lead to general condemnation of the great mass of the city residents as politically corrupt. Moreover, there appears to be quite as much justification for regarding these conditions of political corruption in certain rural districts as the survival, in isolated and backward regions, of a lower level of political morality that formerly prevailed in general, as there is for regarding them as a manifestation of a positive decline from an impeccability too hastily assumed to have prevailed formerly in these same districts. Likewise the more or less exceptional prevalence of political corruption in the urban centers may be regarded very largely as the persistence of a disease the seeds of which were planted many decades ago.[38]

Views as to a comparison of present with past conditions,

especially in the field of morals, are very often quite uncritical—either as a result of the fallacy of comparing a present lapse with abnormally favorable conditions in the past, or vice versa, or as a result of but partial acquaintance with conditions, or as a result of defective memory. Rarest of all is the adequate knowledge of past conditions that comes from patient research by means of all the avenues and agencies that may be available. Fortunately, we have the definite and specific conclusion of such an investigator relative to the very subject with which we here deal. Hear his comprehensive and unqualified conclusion: "In filibustering and gerrymandering, in stealing governorships and legislatures, in using force at the polls, in colonizing and in distributing patronage to whom patronage is due, in all the frauds and tricks that go to make up the worst form of practical politics, the men who founded our state and national governments were always our equals and often our masters." [39]

When we turn to the cities of Europe the evidence as to freedom from political corruption in recent times and today is clear and unequivocal. Writing a generation ago, Dr. Albert Shaw asserted that in Europe the honesty of municipal government was not in serious question anywhere.[40] And the great majority of recent writers endorse this view. Especially with respect to England, most highly urbanized of countries, is the testimony as to the purity of municipal government today full and convincing. James Bryce some time since stated that there were only a few constituencies in England, and none at all in Scotland, where political corruption survived. But even more significantly, the same high authority in more recently enumerating the major evils with which he believed great cities menaced the public interest entirely omitted any reference to a possible threat growing out of political corruption.[41] The virtual disappearance of corruption from the political life—and especially from the municipal political life—of the country in which urban develop-

ment has proceeded farthest affords most convincing testimony in support of the view that the urban environment is not inherently unfavorable to political purity.

The outcome in England is the more remarkable in view of the gross corruption that formerly permeated the whole political life of the English people. Corruption in connection with government is doubtless as old as government itself. The purchase of state offices was almost universal in early times. Edward I, like other rulers of the day, "had to contend with corruption in his judges, his sheriffs, and all officers who handled money." Political corruption was widespread in Tudor times; and bribery in the form of "treating" was so flagrant as to require official attention as early as 1571.[42] But political corruption in the modern sense and in the national sphere dates, in England, from the beginning of the large exercise of power by the House of Commons. Under the reign of Charles II, the last eight years of whose rule especially were "years of open and unblushing corruption," bribery first began to be "systematic." William of Orange found himself forced to resort to bribery in order to control the politicians with whom he was surrounded and who had developed the itching palm in the corrupt days that followed the Restoration. Wharton, leader of the first Whig ministry and the first of the modern political bosses, was notoriously corrupt. Walpole, who had been in the Tower for official corruption, made such use of parliamentary bribery that his name is almost synonymous with political corruption. But it was probably during the reign of George III that the system of corruption received its fullest and frankest acceptance, in proportion to the scope for its development; though the grosser forms of official corruption were discarded by Pitt upon the latter's accession to office.[43] One writer, who declares that parliamentary corruption first manifested itself in the "shape of retaining fees paid to the Scottish members," has characterized the political life of England as ex-

cessively corrupt for the whole of the period 1688 to 1832, without discrimination.[44]

Attempts had been made from the time of Edward I to check the flood of political corruption; and there had been a succession of resolutions, bills, and enactments directed to the same end in various subsequent reigns. Perhaps the evangelical movement of the Wesleys and of Whitefield, which came out of Gloucester and Oxford and London and Bristol and which was to bring a moral regeneration in England and thus pave the way for an immense improvement in the tone of political and public life, was the greatest single factor in the ultimate triumph of political purity in that country. But even this force was not immediately decisive toward that end. In the passage of the Reform Act of 1832 the "rotten borough" system received its first serious blow and the way was thus opened to the further progress of reform; though the immediate result was to increase the number of persons who were apparently unable to see any direct and vital relation between a definitive exercise of their suffrage in the parliamentary sphere and their own interest and therefore to increase the number of those who could be induced to shift their vote to this or to that candidate for a consideration. More immediate and much more marked were the effects in the municipal sphere. For the Reform Act of 1832 and the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, reënforced by a notable elevation in the level of civic spirit, led to an early rescue of the cities from a condition of affairs "undoubtedly far worse than that which has marked the administration of any American city even when things have been at their most critical stage."[45]

In the passage of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1854 a notable step was taken in the direction of the elimination of corrupt methods in politics in England. The introduction of the merit system in the public service in 1858 and the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872 represented further im-

portant steps toward the elimination of bribery and intimidation in elections. And the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883, with its much more stringent regulations and with a vastly increased public sentiment to support it, finally succeeded in transforming methods of electioneering in that country and in placing the purity of the ballot on a level which was indeed not wholly above reproach but which has perhaps surpassed that attained in any other country.

Relative to this evolution of a higher level of political purity in England, certain generalizations may be made with reference to the part played by the urban and by the rural population respectively. In the first place, it is evident that at any given time political corruption was more widely prevalent, on the whole, in the urban than in the rural constituencies.[46] But this distinction appears to have been due wholly to the greater prevalence of political intimidation in the rural constituencies. Had it been necessary to purchase votes in the latter it is entirely safe to say that it would have been done quite as freely as it was done in the towns and boroughs. Neither in the debates in Parliament on the subject of bribery, nor in the reports of the several parliamentary bribery commissions, nor in the accounts of those investigators who have studied the subject as a whole, is it seriously suggested that the larger nominal prevalence of bribery in the towns and boroughs reflected a superior political morality on the part of the rural population. In the second place, by no means all of the borough constituencies were prevailingly urban—a fact that is eloquently attested by the real meaning and significance of the term "rotten borough." Nor were all the county constituencies by any means exclusively rural—or even more largely rural than many of the "boroughs." Again, it was particularly among the city elements that the movement for the reform of the "borough" system and for a secret ballot and for purity of elections found support.[47] Some even trace the beginning of reform to that not very ad-

mirable character, John Wilkes, son of a London distiller. The promoters of the Chartist agitation were also among the most active supporters of the general movement toward reform. Lastly, it is of the utmost significance that this rise to a higher plane of political morality coincided with the growing predominance of the urban element in the British population.

So marked and so rapid has been this growth in political purity in England that a man like James Bryce, whose life terminated but recently, was able to testify a few years ago that while it was within his memory when the corruption of the political constituency was treated as "a sort of joke," England and Scotland had come at that time to be practically free from political corruption.[48]

In spite of some evidences of political corruption in the southern part of France, "the giving and receiving of bribes is rare" in that country according to James Bryce. But more significant for our present purpose is his further statement that there were a greater number of scandals during the eighteen years of the rule of Napoleon III than the Republic has seen in fifty years.[49] In Switzerland, according to the same authority, "Neither against councillors nor against officials are charges of corruption brought even in the largest cities . . ." And "one hears no complaints of bribery in Australia," though that commonwealth is admittedly dominated by its provincial capitals. Bribery is mildly described as "not extinct" in Belgium and Holland and as being "found also in Italy"; while it is declared to be "pretty frequent" in parts of Canada. On the other hand, in the great rural empire of Russia pecuniary corruption is declared to have been "far more general and more flagrant . . . than it has ever been in any free country." Lastly, reference is made to "monstrous corruption" in prevailingly rural China.[50]

It is evident, therefore, that conditions in these various countries lend no more support to the view that political

corruption is peculiarly an urban vice than does the trend of developments in England.

It is not to be denied that political corruption has existed, and still exists in all too great measure, in our urban centers and in the country as a whole. This situation is so generally known and so generally accepted as being true that there is no need of the presentation of evidence to prove it. It is even not improbable that political corruption is proportionally more extensive in our urban centers today, as it is doubtless more open and flagrant there, than it is in our rural districts.[51] But it must be kept in mind that the agencies and instrumentalities of political corruption, like all other forces both of good and of evil, find a superior situation in the cities from which to work; and whatever may be the ramifications of the evil, its organized center and its controlling influences are likely to be located in the centers of population. But this no more proves that the urban population is especially corrupt, politically, than the location of the majority of the strong and wealthy churches in the cities proves that the city population is inherently more religious than the rural population. Not all of the political corruption in the cities is of the cities.[52] Moreover, while this centralization of the forces of political corruption in the cities increases their power for evil, all the instrumentalities and agencies for moral uplift and social improvement likewise have *their* power for good increased by the same centralization. And it seems likely that the latter have been strengthened in the larger measure.

If we consider the fact that our cities have had to contend with the problem of the presence of a large and illiterate alien element, that considerable elements of the urban population in this country have had, until rather recently, no very great degree of economic independence, and that the rewards that political corruption makes possible to its beneficiaries are so very much greater in the urban centers than in the rural communities, it is surprising that there is relatively so

little political corruption in the cities of this country and that with the tremendous movement of the population cityward there has been, in both city and country, an actual and decided improvement in this respect.[53] Though there is still room for improvement, we need also to be preserved from the fatalistic notion that our urban centers are necessarily and inherently the sphere of political graft and corruption. Such a view might lead us to condone that which we now thoroughly condemn. For such an attitude as this there is no justification in the discernible results of the cityward trend, either in this country or elsewhere.

Before dismissing the subject of political purity as it has been affected by city growth, we may advert briefly to the question of urban contribution to the development of the merit system in the civil service. For fifty years the spoils system went practically unchallenged in this country—debauching government everywhere and finally culminating, in the national sphere, in the assassination of President Garfield. As a combination of influences, rural and urban, had united to inflict this system upon us, so rural and urban influences, but prevailingly the latter, united to restrict or eliminate it. Men like Thomas Allen Jenckes, a Rhode Island lawyer, and George William Curtis, Dorman B. Eaton, Edwin L. Godkin, Horace White, Carl Schurz, and John Jay, all of New York City, were pioneers in the civil service reform movement in this country. In general, the professional and investing classes in the Eastern cities "struck at the spoils system while yet the plain people naïvely thought the 'offices ought to be passed around.'"[54] Even Senator Pendleton, who sponsored the Civil Service Bill of 1883, was of urban birth though a chief exponent of the Greenback idea and a prominent leader of the agricultural classes of the West in that connection. New York and Massachusetts, each with a large urban element and each including large cities, quickly followed the Federal government in enacting a civil service

law. And cities like New Orleans, Seattle, New Haven, and San Francisco presently introduced the merit system into their municipal government and administration. On the other hand, the merit system received recognition most tardily in the sphere of rural government. For the spoils system "has held its own in county administration long after successful inroads were made upon it in national, state, and city government." [55]

It is also significant that the principles of civil service reform came to us originally from highly urbanized England, whose rising standards of political purity we have just had occasion to describe. If, then, the minds of city men were keen to perfect the spoils system, other urban minds, no less keen, have been very largely instrumental in originating and perfecting measures to remedy the evils resulting from the spoils system.

Inasmuch as the influence of city life and city growth has been shown, in the discussion which this chapter closes, to have had and at present to exert a generally favorable influence upon the several more or less separate factors—political knowledge, political initiative, political inventiveness, political activity, political leadership, public spirit, and political purity—which together determine political aptitude or capacity, the conclusion that urbanization is favorable to the development of this political aptitude or capacity, or at least is not inconsistent with such development, seems clearly to be justified.

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CHAPTER XVIII

The Effect of Urbanization upon the Efficiency of Government

As the final test of the political capacity of a self-governing people is the character or quality of the government which that people enjoys, an examination of the manner in which the growth of cities affects efficiency in government would seem to be necessary or advisable. Such an inquiry naturally resolves itself into two general phases: first, the effect upon the efficiency of government in the spheres of the State and Nation; and second, the character or efficiency of city government itself. The first of these two phases involves two separate but related inquiries: first, the trend with reference to efficiency of government in the sphere of the State or Nation as a given country becomes more and more urbanized; and second, the comparative efficiency of government in the national sphere in those countries that have become in large measure urbanized and in those countries that have remained largely rural. The subject of the efficiency of city government, again, naturally involves an examination of the comparative efficiency of local government in the urban centers and local government in the rural districts.

I

URBANIZATION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENT IN THE SPHERES OF THE STATE AND NATION

When the fathers created the Federal Constitution they presented, in the form of a preamble to that Constitution

their idea of the purposes which a government might reasonably be expected to serve. As one examines this brief but comprehensive category of the functions of government and permits the mind to run back over the century and a third within which we have changed from a people almost wholly rural to one with a majority of the population urban, it is impossible not to conclude that with all our very evident present shortcomings and failures in the political sphere we have materially improved in respect to the success with which these functions have been discharged. Moreover, evidence of the growing success with which some of these same broad functions of government have been performed in other growingly urban countries has already been presented above.

With respect to that single one of the objects which our fathers thus set before them that might be considered, even though doubtfully, as exclusively germane to our own country, that of forming "a more perfect Union," it is abundantly clear that our urban population has had an honorable part in the notable progress and success that we have achieved in this direction. Urban contribution to the cause of liberty and democracy, as already pointed out, not only in our own country but in all the great countries of the world, strikingly testifies to the weighty contribution of the urban population to the fulfillment of the desire among people everywhere to secure the blessings of liberty for themselves and for their posterity.

Judicial administration in this country certainly does not function today with manifest efficiency and success. In the general sphere of the relations between man and man we have not yet succeeded in "establishing justice." But the reasonable student of our national development along judicial lines will be slow to admit that we have retrograded in this respect, in spite of the great complications that a highly developed social and economic life has brought. On the contrary, knowing that conditions in this respect were very far

from ideal in our early history, he will undoubtedly note improvement. There were some able lawyers and judges in colonial days; and this class rendered great service in connection with the developing and clarifying of the issues around which the Revolution turned and in connection with the creation and establishment of the new government. But there undoubtedly has been a great improvement in the legal training of the members of the bar and of the judiciary in general—not only in comparison with colonial days but also in comparison with the standards of a generation ago.[1] And neither the members of the bar nor the judiciary nor the courts as a whole commanded the respect, in former times, that they do today. Our courts and judiciary, though unfortunately not yet wholly divorced from political influences, can no longer be said to serve as "a kind of political mouthpiece" as they did before the Revolution, and even in the earlier decades of the national period in some of the States.[2]

There is justly great complaint today of the long, costly, and vexatious delays, of the myriad technicalities with which our court procedure is beset, and of the frequent miscarriage of justice. But these defects in our judicial system are by no means new nor recent. The markedly disturbed conditions with respect to the administration of justice during the troublous times of the Revolution and of the Confederation are familiar to every informed person. Even in the early years of the last century the newspapers, in some of the States, "teemed with letters reviling the lawyers, advocating the abolition of the common law, and complaining of the delays, the costs, the loss of good causes through technicalities, and many other things" in connection with the functioning of the courts.[3] Chief Justice Taft, some time before he entered the Supreme Court, expressed the opinion, doubtless correct, that it is in respect to the enforcement of public and private rights in our courts that we have fallen farthest short of ideal conditions in our whole government.[4] But an English

writer of authority lauds our system of courts—especially the Supreme Court—and believes that the system has functioned effectively and with increasing authority.[5] Other nations, at least, more highly urbanized than our own country, have notably improved the efficiency of government in this sphere coincident with the urbanizing trend.

That cities have become increasingly important factors in the "common defence" and that they are today intimately associated with those economic, social, and political factors that contribute notably to make a nation strong in war, is evident from the historical survey already presented and has been signally proven by the superior efficiency of the more highly urbanized countries in the recent Great War, as is pointed out in some detail below. The letters and reports of De Kalb to the French authorities are filled with references to the inefficiency and incompetence displayed in the management of the Revolutionary war, both by the military leaders and by Congress.[6] The marked inefficiency with which the War of 1812 was conducted, on our part, is acknowledged by every competent investigator and critic. And that our management of the war in connection with our participation in the recent great struggle was incomparably more efficient than the conduct of the Civil War by the Federal Government, both in respect to the method of obtaining recruits, in respect to the handling of the finances, in respect to the provisions for supplying the troops and maintaining their health and morale, and also in respect to the relations that obtained between the civil and the military authorities during the course of the struggle, is even more patently obvious.

Again, the theory of the inherent political turbulence and instability of the urban population is likewise refuted, for our own country and for all the other foremost countries, by the increasing extent to which "domestic tranquillity" has prevailed as these various countries have become increasingly

urbanized and by their growing superiority over many of the rural countries in this respect.[7]

The function of the "promotion of the general welfare" brings us to that sphere of government which may be considered as having to do in peculiar degree with the positive functions of government. Without becoming involved in the controversy as to the proper scope of government, it appears likely that there will be general assent to the proposition that the efficiency of government has very appreciably increased with respect to the performance of a number of functions of great importance, within this general sphere, which the great majority will admit to be within the proper competency of government.

The agencies of public education in all the advanced countries undoubtedly have improved greatly in recent times, coincidently with the cityward trend.[8] Even greater progress, relatively, during the same period has been made in the efficiency of the public agencies dealing with sanitation and the promotion of the public health.[9] The comfort and happiness, as well as the intelligence and efficiency, of the population have been greatly promoted through a marked gain in the effectiveness of the public postal facilities. Most striking improvements have been made in connection with the provisions and regulations relating to the coinage and the public currency—as indeed with respect to the whole monetary and credit system in general; and similar, if less striking, progress has been made with reference to the standardization of weights and measures. Much has been done to improve and extend the agencies for the promotion of trade and commerce; the statistical service of governments everywhere has been broadened and improved; and a notable advance has been made in the improvement and extension of the public agencies for the promotion of agriculture itself.

The system of penal servitude has been modernized and

humanized in all the highly urbanized countries; and although there is admittedly still much room for improvement with respect to public measures for the relief and for the financial and economic rehabilitation of the poor and with respect to the care and control of the feeble-minded, the insane, and other classes of defectives, there undoubtedly has been much progress along these various lines. The machinery designed to secure the choice of public officials and the determination of the public will with reference to measures of public policy and to insure the proper discharge of their duties by public officials and agents, as we have seen, has been purified and improved.

Thus holding ourselves for a time to a comparison of the efficiency of government, as reflected in its functioning, under the prevailingly rural conditions of earlier years in this country and elsewhere, and in recent times when urban life has exercised a constantly increasing influence, and holding in abeyance a recognition of the extent to which the functioning of government still falls short of a reasonable ideal, it must be admitted that the cityward trend has been attended by a widely distributed and clearly marked improvement.[10] And in view of the favorable influence of city life upon many of the other recognized indices of political capacity and upon intelligence and efficiency in general, we are justified in concluding that there has been more than a mere coincidence between these two movements—that the urbanizing movement has contributed materially toward increasing efficiency of government in the national sphere.

Not less convincing is the evidence that urbanization tends to promote the efficiency of government, when we turn to a comparison of the quality of government in those countries that have become highly urbanized and in those that have remained largely rural. Though comparative efficiency in government may not be strictly proportional to the degree of urbanization in these countries, it can not be doubted that

the relative efficiency of government in such countries as England, France, Germany, Switzerland, the United States, Australia, and Canada is, on the whole, much greater than it is in such countries as Russia, the Balkan countries, Spain, China, Mexico, and certain of the more rural countries of Central and South America. And if government has also reached a relatively high degree of efficiency in countries like Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Italy, Japan, Norway, South Africa, and Sweden, it must be recalled that the stage of progress represented in these countries is nevertheless more or less proportional to the development of city life in these countries, or is, through contiguity to the more advanced and relatively highly urbanized countries, proportional to the absence of those conditions that we consider typically rural.[11]

New Zealand and the Union of South Africa represent the best illustrations, perhaps, of comparatively high efficiency in government on the part of relatively rural states. But there is after all a considerable urban population in both of these countries. And there can be little doubt that much benefit has been derived in both countries from the political aptitude and efficiency of the urban-derived British element in the population, which is especially numerous in the cities of the latter and which constitutes almost the whole of the population in the former.

A comparison of conditions in the highly urbanized, and in the prevailingly rural, countries thus likewise supports the view that urbanization is favorable to the promotion of efficiency in government.

II

EFFICIENCY IN CITY GOVERNMENT

Attention already has been directed to the immensely superior efficiency, as judged by results, of the early Greek and Roman city-state governments in comparison with the other forms and types of government that prevailed during

that period. The superiority of the government, deficient as it still remained in many respects according to present standards, of the city republics of the Middle Ages and of the early Modern Period has likewise already been suggested.[12] Frederick Harrison has declared that "there was about the great cities of the Middle Ages a noble spirit of civic life and energy, an ever-present love of Art, a zeal for good work, and a deep under-lying sense of social duty and personal faithfulness" [13]—a characterization that obviously can not be extended to the crude feudalistic organization that prevailed outside of the cities during the same period.

This comparative excellence of government in an earlier period the cities of Europe have carried into recent times and have notably improved in many respects. In spite of many untoward developments and in spite of occasional pronounced political corruption and governmental inefficiency, such as marked many of the cities of England previous to the reforms of 1835, the cities of Europe display along many lines an excellence of accomplishment that far surpasses anything that the ancient or mediaeval cities have to offer in comparison. The eminent historian who has just been cited, in spite of a somewhat distorted and illogical antipathy to the modern large city, feels himself impelled to admiration by the progress that the large cities of today have been able to make in lighting and paving, in policing, in sanitation and the reduction of mortality, in the development of schools and other educational agencies, in the provision of museums, libraries, parks, hospitals, infirmaries, and other recreational, educational, and charitable agencies and institutions.[14] Another eminent English historian and publicist, already more than once cited in this volume, finds in the spirit, in the activities, and in the accomplishments of certain large cities of England much consolation in the midst of political developments in general that he is disposed to regard with no small measure of cynicism and distrust.[15] Lastly, there may be cited

the well-nigh universal testimony of students and investigators of municipal government to the efficiency, as well as to the purity, of government in European cities today.

Tested by the standard of civic efficiency and political achievement, the urban populations of Europe, where urban conditions have had their maturest development, have thus amply demonstrated their high standing in this respect. But in our own urban centers inefficient, and not infrequently corrupt, government long seemed to prove lack of political capacity among the city dwellers of a people who on the whole have manifested unusual political aptitude and have made important contributions to the instrumentalities of political development in general. There recurs to the mind the observation of James Bryce that inefficiency in municipal government represents the one conspicuous instance of failure in government in this country.[16] And the question arises whether after all the urban environment, in this country at least, is inherently unfavorable to efficient and pure government. In spite of all our favorable conclusions as to the influence of urban life upon the separate political qualities that go to make up political capacity in general, does the actual ultimate result as a whole in the form of the corrupt and inefficient municipal government with which we in this country so frequently have been cursed not prove something wrong or lacking in the arguments that have led up to the conclusions?

If the unsatisfactory achievements, in municipal government, that so long prevailed in this country and that still prevail in altogether too large measure, were to be taken as a necessary and final outcome of urban development, there would be indeed grave reason to mistrust the conclusions that were reached above and warrant for arriving at materially different conclusions. But it is believed that, as asserted by Dr. Albert Shaw more than a score of years ago with reference to our municipal failures, there are weighty reasons for

the conviction that "the present evils of city life are temporary and remediable," [17] that they are the result of adventitious causes and not of inherently unfavorable influences, and that they do not represent the characteristic and ultimate results of city development in this country.

In the first place, European cities—and especially the cities of England—have passed through the same, or even worse, stages of corruption and inefficiency and have yet arrived at their present high standard of purity and efficiency. The American people are on the whole second to none other in general intelligence, in political aptitude and capacity, and in ideals and morality. What the urban peoples of Europe have achieved, therefore, those of this country may not unreasonably be expected to equal or to surpass in time. Moreover, the implication that the inferior quality that has often characterized our municipal government marks our urban population as in contrast with the remainder of the population in ability to contribute to the development of efficient government is plainly fallacious. For it is contradicted by the conspicuous, often leading, part that the urban population played in the origination, initial adoption, and subsequent perfecting of our political system in the spheres of the State and Nation, and in the manifestly increased efficiency of government in these spheres.

Again, allowance should be made for the extremely rapid and hasty development of our cities, which prevented—or at least made difficult—the creation and introduction of a system of government adequate to their needs. Our "municipal constructions" were "hastily devised," in comparison with our State and national institutions, not only because cities and their problems had not yet begun to develop on a troublesomely large scale when our fathers put their hands to the task of creating systems of State and national government[18] but also because our cities grew so rapidly when once that growth had been entered upon.

It has been contended, indeed, that city growth has been less rapid in this country than it has been in Germany, and that in the latter country the existence of the mediaeval city complicated the creation of the modern city—a difficulty from which, of course, we were entirely free in this country.[19] But it is only in more recent decades that the rate of growth of German cities has equaled, or surpassed, that of our own cities. In the formative period the German cities certainly enjoyed a more leisurely development. But above all, perhaps, the urban population in Germany enjoyed the advantage of the great traditions of urban life that had come down comparatively undimmed from an earlier period and that still remained influential in the cities of modern Germany. Moreover, the tardy development of national unity in Germany long directed and confined the political energies of its population to the local sphere, and preserved for local objects and institutions the not unlimited stores of civic pride and patriotism which in this country were of necessity largely absorbed by the developing life of State and of Nation

The opportunity for a free hand in municipal construction does indeed have great advantages—if it be associated with substantial experience in municipal life and with adequate knowledge of municipal institutions. But unfortunately the conditions that present a free hand in municipal construction are usually associated with a dearth of the knowledge and an absence of the means adequate to the exploiting of the opportunity. The advantage of greater resources that our cities have enjoyed in comparison with German cities has been partially offset or discounted by the number and greatness of the tasks which the former have been obliged to assume because the country was new and these tasks in need of performance at once.[20] Nor should it be forgotten that in Europe the cities receive assistance from the central government with respect to the important feature of street improvement. American cities not only do not possess this advantage

but they have had placed upon them certain extraneous tasks which they are expected to perform as the agents of the State governments.

Our cities have really undertaken more, too, because of our inclination toward the introduction of all those devices or agencies calculated to increase comfort or to save time. And the assumption of these tasks has not only absorbed the available financial resources but has also burdened the municipal government and complicated the municipal administration, and has afforded the opportunity and basis for the flourishing growth of the elements of political corruption. In adjudging the efficiency with which American municipal government has functioned it is therefore pertinent to keep in mind the extent and character of the objects toward the accomplishing of which government was directed. We are perhaps not in danger of overestimating, in the absolute sense, the extent of the evils that have been associated with city government in this country. But there is danger that we may permit the recognition of these evils to obscure the really large things that have been accomplished in spite of the evident imperfections in the agencies employed. In comparison with the results achieved the manifest imperfections in our city government have been relatively small and unimportant.[21]

It may be observed, too, that while our cities are entitled to virtually the whole of the credit for the really great achievements that have been accomplished in the municipal sphere, they are by no means wholly responsible for the failures and imperfections that have attended their activities. For American municipalities have been peculiarly subject to interference in their affairs by the State legislatures and by other external authority; and some of the worst instances of inefficiency and corruption in American municipal life have resulted directly from this outside interference.[22] Unwise interference in municipal affairs would appear to have

contributed not infrequently to the creation of conditions so intolerable as to call for or occasion renewed interference. Where interest and responsibility do not coincide there can be no real and lasting responsibility; and the way is at once opened to every kind of dishonesty and inefficiency.[23]

In the face of marked developments toward legislative interference in municipal affairs on the broad grounds associated with the expansion of municipal activities and the growing use made by the State of the municipalities as its agents, not to speak of the desire on the part of spoils politicians to thrust their hands into the patronage of the cities and to share in the disposal of franchise privileges of large value, it is the work of extreme supererogation to base this interference and control simply on the asserted break-down of municipal government through its own corruption and inefficiency.[24] It is significant in this connection that municipal reform in England from 1835 was intimately associated with the policy of correcting, by constantly increasing the power and responsibility of the municipalities over their own proper functions and by discontinuing the practice of using the latter as agents of the central government in accomplishing certain objects of a general nature, an entirely similar situation that had developed there.[25] If these evils played so large a part in corrupting and destroying the efficiency of municipal government in England and if their elimination contributed so materially to its regeneration and improvement, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the same conditions in this country were largely influential in producing a similar unfortunate result and that their elimination here will be followed by corresponding benefits.

Still another reason for believing that the evils that have been manifested in our municipal governments are temporary, or at least not inherently associated with city government as such, lies in the part that the immigration of alien elements and the consequent lack of homogeneity among our

urban population have had in complicating our problems of municipal government. Paris, the most cosmopolitan of the great cities of western Europe, has only about one foreign-born person in twelve in the total population, and London one in thirty; while a very large number of American cities are, in their population elements, "world cities" with a great number of very diverse and often mutually dissident racial and national elements. Whatever may be the ultimate outcome of this mixture of races and of nationalities in our urban centers, it is clear that the primary result of the incursion into our cities of millions of immigrant people, alien in political and social traditions, unacquainted in many cases with the practice of self-government, relatively illiterate, and habituated to a low standard of life, must have been and must still be greatly to complicate the problem of attaining pure and efficient municipal government.[26]

Some of these foreign elements have reflected a docility that has made them peculiarly susceptible to the sway of the political boss, who has known all too well how to appeal to their prejudices. Other alien elements have introduced among us the seeds of political and social unrest, the fruit of political autocracy and tyrannical government abroad, and have thus disturbed the public order here and have contributed further to becloud the issue between good municipal government and bad. And the alien elements in general, through the impairment of the restraints of home and parental influence resulting from the unequal operation upon parents and upon children of powerful but little discriminating forces of national amalgamation, have contributed in disproportionately large degree to the lawlessness of our urban communities. In these, and other, ways the presence of alien elements in our urban centers "has profoundly affected the city's social structure, its attitude upon public questions, its political ideals, and its part in the national life." [27]

Finally, and most significant of all, we are justified in

taking an optimistic view of the future of municipal government in this country because of the marked progress that has been made in the past score or more of years. Our cities are both doing more and also doing better than ever before. For a long time the problems of municipal government in this country were virtually ignored, and up until as late as 1870 "seem to have been met in a haphazard way, with no adequate apprehension of the significance or importance of the new conditions produced by the large aggregations of urban population." Subsequent to this date, however, there gradually developed a growing appreciation of the importance of municipal problems and this in turn led to deeper study and more serious consideration of these problems. The way was thus paved for "the introduction of beneficial improvements in the municipal system." [28]

For nearly a generation the progress was so slow as to be almost wholly obscured by the glaring deficiencies that continued to be manifested in connection with our municipal activities. But by the turn of the century the less evident but deeper undercurrent of municipal betterment that had been running more and more strongly for a score of years began to manifest itself unmistakably. The growing opportunity for the practice of self-determination and the resulting weakening of the nexus between municipal and external politics, together with the decline of partisanship and the growth of a larger public spirit, brought about the repeated victory of reform movements in city after city. The dethroning of corrupt bosses and the considerable progress in the elimination of the spoils system reacted toward the securing of purity in elections and in administration and opened the way for improved efficiency in the functioning of municipal agencies in general. Marked progress was made in centralizing, or at least in coördinating, various municipal agencies that had previously operated independently of, often at variance with, each other, and in the creation and introduction of new and

improved instrumentalities of municipal organization and administration. The assumption of many additional important functions by municipal government and their performance in a thoroughly creditable manner was thus made possible.

As a result of these transformations students of municipal government in this country are now accustomed to speak with a high degree of approval of our municipal activities and achievements, in contrast with the tone of apology or of condemnation formerly adopted.[29] One writer, summing up the long list of these achievements, characterized the extent of municipal progress since the opening of the present century as representing "a greater advance than the whole nineteenth century compassed." [30] Another authority, an efficient and courageous executive and administrator of the metropolis of the New World, declared almost simultaneously that "the regeneration of our cities, and their rebirth in democracy" was "the most hopeful sign to be found in American life." [31] Another authoritative investigator and writer declares that the first two decades of the twentieth century "witnessed the reorganization of American city government on a scale which would have been considered out of the question a generation ago." [32] And still another student and recent writer in the field of government has characterized the striking change for the better in the following words: "Ingenious, complicated, inefficient, corrupt city governments have given way literally by the hundreds to a new system, the corner-stone of which is simplicity: one set of officials to elect and watch; one place to go to get things done; one source to which to direct criticism when things go wrong." [33]

An important phase of the criticism of municipal government is the charge of inefficiency and corruption in special degree that has been directed against the large cities of this country and of the world. Some civic reformers have said, in their haste, that the extent of inefficiency in city govern-

ment and the degree of administrative abuse existing in our centers of population have been in proportion to the size of such centers. Others have associated with various other objections to large cities the charge of political unwieldiness.[34] But in all this there appears to be no little exaggeration. Certainly these assertions are controverted today by the facts. Assuredly there is still much room for improvement in all great cities. But the great urban centers of the world—London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, New York—in spite of admitted defects in the organization and functioning of their civic life and in spite of the great evils associated with the concentration of immense populations nevertheless clearly point the way in very many features of the highest importance to the cities of smaller size and hold a position well toward the lead in other respects.

Each of these cities stands in the very forefront with respect to the most important and most significant tests of civic efficiency—sanitation and the public health, education, public order, recreational facilities. London has today a standardized death rate that is materially lower than that of the other large cities of England and that is but little higher than that for the country as a whole; and in respect to what has been called the most significant of all tests of social efficiency, the infant mortality rate, the County of London, comprising the heart of the City, recently attained the remarkable record of a lower rate than that for the country at large.[35] Paris has long stood as the preëminent model or type of the distinctively modern city. Official statistics dating from shortly before the recent war show that the city of Berlin had a lower infant mortality rate than the other large cities of Germany, while the latter had a slightly lower rate than the smaller cities and rural districts.[36]

New York City likewise has recently had an infant mortality rate not only less than that for the other cities in New York State but even less than that for the strictly rural dis-

tricts of the State.[37] And a recent writer has eloquently characterized the civic achievements in general of the great American metropolis in the following words: "He who studies at first hand the processes of Americanization and citizen-building finds work being done that would stir the heart of the most unemotional observer. He realizes that all of what is called New York's politics, stories of graft and the like, are but the froth and foam which fleck the waves of the city's life, while beneath runs a deep current of progress and public spirit, which takes form in carefully conceived and splendidly executed health laws, in a school system that has accomplished wonders, in a water system surpassing anything of its kind on earth, and in a hundred and one other ways not quite so dramatic as the printed stories of its politics and graft, but none the less full of human interest." [38]

On the whole, therefore, the great cities of the world appear to give no real indication of failure in civic efficiency. Increasingly difficult and complicated as their civic problems have become, with a rapidly growing and constantly shifting population, and in our own large cities the heavy burden of amalgamation of large alien elements, the resourcefulness and courage with which these problems are met and solved appear to indicate a relatively great ability with respect to the needs of the situation. Civic spirit and civic efficiency, indeed, almost appear to be stimulated in proportion to the needs that are to be met, while these qualities may often fail to manifest themselves in a smaller community where life is relatively simple and public requirements are of an elementary sort.[39]

It is doubtless possible for cities to become overgrown. Economic and political disadvantage, as the limit of maximum efficient size is reached and passed, may offset the factor of natural advantage which all the large urban centers of the world enjoy, and may thus automatically set a barrier to further growth. But at present it must be admitted that

there appears to be no convincing evidence that the great cities are approaching such a barrier.[40] And in view of the number and potency of the artificial agencies that man is able to command today, there appears to be no reason why cities of maximum size as to efficiency may not be multiplied in great numbers in locations that do not possess markedly superior natural advantages. There is thus no apparent necessity to assume the break-down of urban civilization, or of the urbanizing tendency, merely because there may be a limit to the number of persons who can, in the existing state of affairs, congregate satisfactorily in a single great city or in the present great cities in general.

With the notable trend toward municipal betterment in this country, and with the effective functioning of municipal government everywhere, the recent Great War has seriously interfered. The renewed arousing of national and racial antipathies among the diverse population elements in our cities through the passions of war have given a new lease of life to the old-time appeal to these prejudices by the political demagog. The privations and maladjustments associated with the war have aroused an unusual irritation among large elements of the population and have greatly stimulated the spirit of political and social unrest. Reaction from the comparative political truce of the war period has brought a sharp accentuation of the partisan spirit. The large winnings among certain elements, both of labor and of capital, resulting from the extraordinary fluctuation of the price level and the exigencies of production for war purposes have aroused the acquisitive instincts in unwonted degree and have created an atmosphere favorable to the recrudescence of political corruption. And diminished financial resources and the marked increase in the cost of services and of materials have caused the curtailment of municipal enterprises and improvements and have impaired the efficiency of the regular agencies of municipal administration.

On the other hand, there is advantage in this country, as a result of the war, in the national consciousness of a large task courageously undertaken and efficiently performed—a task in which, as we shall see, the cities played a conspicuously important part. This circumstance and other features associated with the struggle have united to open men's minds as never before to the consideration and acceptance of new and larger ideas and to lead to a break with custom and with tradition. Again, and not least, the surprisingly favorable outcome of the long struggle against the organized liquor traffic, an outcome to which the war directly contributed, promises largely to lessen if not wholly to remove one of the most degrading and corrupting influences in our modern urban life. Only time can tell, however, whether the Great War will eventually prove to have been a retarding factor or whether it will prove to have represented an ameliorating influence, with respect to municipal government.

III

THE COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENT IN THE URBAN CENTERS AND IN THE RURAL COMMUNITIES

So much has been said or written of our failure in respect to municipal government that it might appear as though inefficiency and corruption had never been manifested in the other spheres of government. Undoubtedly this is a mistaken view. The defects and inefficiency of the general government during the period of the Confederation ultimately necessitated the creation of a new system of national government. State government was palpably defective in early days in this country, nor has it since been uniformly superior to our municipal government.[41] The frontier agricultural States achieved a bad preëminence in the mismanagement of the State enterprises undertaken during the period of internal

improvements at the beginning of the second third of the last century. A similar marked inefficiency was manifested by the same States in the management of state-owned banks and in the regulation of banks under private organization. The activities of the notoriously corrupt reconstruction governments in some of the Southern States following the close of the Civil War prove that the disassociation of interest from control involves the same unfortunate results in the sphere of State government as in that of the municipality.

There is even less reason to suppose that rural local government in this country has normally reflected a higher degree of efficiency than has been evidenced in our municipalities. The New England system of town government, the most highly lauded if not actually the most successful of all our non-municipal forms of local government, has been, as we have seen, the least strictly rural of all. Yet even the New England town system has been much more successful as a school of democracy than it has been in actually accomplishing the practical ends of government. As one friendly critic says: "Insanity and pauperism could not be permanently hustled out of sight by a town-meeting vote; nor could the charge of the poor and insane be disposed of beyond the current year to those who would take the job at the lowest rate. Though excellent for certain purposes, it had yet to be made plain that the town-meeting was not adapted to every purpose; least of all could it work to results through what is now known as scientific method." Referring to the stress on the towns of New England during the Revolutionary period, when they were called on for men, money, clothing, and food, the same writer says: "There was no financial, as there was no military, folly which the New England towns did not commit. . . . Throughout they showed that the town-meeting is ill-adapted for war. They tried to make patriotism a substitute for the provost-guard. They issued false money. They regulated prices. They mobbed those who preferred not to

exchange merchandise for worthless paper. . . . As it was in 1757, so it was in 1777 and again in 1862. What New England did was to campaign interminably, under town-meeting inspiration, with infinite and unnecessary loss of life and waste of money."[42]

As early as 1708 a proposal was advanced by the selectmen of Boston to change from a town to a corporation form of government on the ground that as there was no head to see to enforcement the town system failed to secure the execution of the laws—certainly a fundamentally serious defect in any system of government. Repeated similar attempts in subsequent years afford abundant evidence that even under the simple conditions of those early days a considerable minority of the citizens were dissatisfied with the quality of government that was realized under the town system. The system in operation for the administration of the revenues was not such as to discourage fraudulent dealings. There were complications between town and county affairs, and dissatisfaction existed in the town with respect to county expenditures. Five distinct boards, jealous rivals who acknowledged little or no mutual obligation and upon any one of which it was impossible to fix responsibility, divided the executive power. For some thirty-five years previous to the substitution of the municipal for the town system in Boston in 1822 there had existed in West Boston a vice district not less shameless in character and much more defiant in attitude than those that have disgraced some of our cities in more recent times—a situation that was greatly ameliorated by the firm action of the mayor and by the creation of an efficient police service, within a short time after the change in the form of government. Under the municipal form of government New York and Philadelphia had, by 1825, systems of fire protection and water supply greatly superior to those that had grown up and persisted under the town system in Boston. In short, as Mayor Quincy said in his inaugu-

ral address in 1824: "If there be any advantage in the form of a city over that of a town government it lies in one single word—efficiency." [43]

Neither did the wholesale tendency of the towns in Connecticut to exchange the town system for a municipal form of government, when the legislature passed enabling legislation for this purpose at the close of the Revolution, indicate general satisfaction with the results previously attained from the former.[44]

Some difference of opinion appears to exist with reference to the quality of rural local government in the more recent periods of our history. A generation ago one writer, measurably deprecating the New England town system as "over-developed at the expense of the shire" and the county system of the Southern States as "over-developed at the expense of the parish," characterized the compromise "western township-county plan" as "superior to any other system which the Teutonic mind has yet produced" for "simplicity, symmetry, flexibility, and administrative efficiency." [45] A decade later Weber, in his *Growth of Cities,* discussing the evils and weaknesses so manifest at that time in city government in this country, contrasted these conditions with an asserted effectiveness in local rural government.[46] And Professor Hart has recently expressed the view that the town system "is still a practical, and on the whole an efficient, government in the rural parts of all the six New England states." [47]

In stating some years ago that little was known of the character of township government in this country, Professor Fairlie admitted that the relative lack of complaint as to its character may well have been due to a less active spirit of investigation in the rural districts; and he cautiously suggested that it was likely that there was "a good deal of carelessness" in the management of local affairs in the more sparsely settled districts.[48] But in the light of the fuller knowledge of more adequate investigation he has more recently written

in a very much severer tone. Declaring that township government in Illinois is now "of little and declining importance," he testifies convincingly to the confused and complicated character of the system of rural local government in general in that State. Examination of the financial records of town officers in one of the larger counties "disclosed not only an absence of any system of accounts, but also the lack of the most essential data even as to cash transactions, and frequent errors in the extension of figures." There was no record of the collector's commissions and no attempt at a classification of expenditures. Complaints with reference to the system of road management, in which the rural community has a peculiar interest, he finds to be even more numerous and general than with respect to other branches of local government. Other defects are reflected in the recommendation for a considerable reduction in the number of officials, including the total abolition of some offices, the transfer of the assessment and collection of taxes to a county basis, and the making of the supervisor more definitely the chief executive officer of the town.

Summing up the results of his inquiry, he writes:[49] "This general survey of town and county government in Illinois confirms the results of other investigations in particular fields that the present decentralized and unorganized administrative machinery produces inefficiency and waste in the transaction of the public business. Originating in a vague theory of local self-government at a time when, under frontier conditions, public business amounted to but little, it has proved entirely inadequate to the complex social and industrial problems of today. The existing arrangements do not secure home rule for local communities in local affairs; but form a heterogeneous congeries of officials, lacking anything like systematic correlation to each other or to the state, which vainly attempts to regulate their activities by an excessive degree of legislative centralization."

A well known investigator and authoritative writer in the field of social welfare, in presenting the damaging conclusions drawn from a study of juvenile delinquency in rural New York, presents also in that connection a most serious indictment of local justice in the rural districts of that State.[50] Another authority, noting that lack of means, the fact of a dispersed population, and the difficulties of transportation interfere with the efficient working of social welfare agencies in the rural districts, states that "Speaking broadly . . . there is no general policy or recognized standard for the care of disadvantaged children in the rural communities." [51] Still another investigator declares that "The problem of the care of mentally defective persons is neglected and generally little understood in rural counties in States making no provision for the care of such persons." [52] The marked inferiority of the rural districts in respect to matters relating to public health and community sanitation, as also with respect to provision for the great service and duty of education, is common knowledge to every informed person. And indisputably both public and private charity are organized and administered on a more scientific and more efficient basis in the cities and towns than in the rural communities.

It is small wonder that the county, which developed under prevailingly rural conditions in this country and which was seriously defective from the first, should prove itself gravely unsuited to the needs and problems of metropolitan city life —should prove, in fact, "the county at its worst" there. The city community itself can not escape a considerable measure of responsibility for the defects of the present urban county. But the anomalous situation created in counties virtually coterminous with the large urban centers which they contain, in consequence of the disproportionately large control exercised in county affairs by the frequently jealous and prejudiced rural elements, is readily apparent. Whatever be the defects of municipal government in cities such as Chicago, few would

argue that the functions performed by the government of the including counties "could not be better performed by municipal authorities." [53] That the county organization in great urban counties is capable, when properly organized and intelligently adapted to the urban environment, of functioning efficiently is shown by the fact that London County, containing the heart of the metropolis of the world, "has a record of which it has good reason to be proud." [54] And consolidated metropolis-county governments in this country are likewise making promising records.

The inefficiency and defects of rural county government have already been partially indicated in pointing out the default, nowhere more painfully evident than in those typically rural parts of the country where the county has been almost the sole agency of local government, in the satisfactory performance of those great primary services for which efficient government should provide. One duty that the State has committed in a general way to the county, that of affording protection to life, appears, according to one authority, to have been performed "tolerably well" in the rural counties. But this is admittedly due rather to the comparative simplicity of conditions in many such counties than to any asserted superior efficiency of the rural police service. There is, indeed, perhaps no branch of municipal government that has been so honeycombed with graft and so afflicted by the evils of politics as the police departments of some of our cities. And yet this investigator is constrained to admit the increasing efficiency of the police departments of our cities and their incomparable superiority over the sheriff and his posse.[55] Moreover, the highly efficient police service in practically all of the great cities of Europe affords convincing evidence that there is no inherent reason for municipal inefficiency in this respect.

The prevalence of a good deal of inefficiency in rural government is obscured by the circumstances of comparative

isolation amidst which rural local government functions and of the comparative diminutiveness of the scale upon which it operates. The same degree of inefficiency or failure, when manifested in the urban sphere, creates an impression of much greater incapacity and injury than when manifested in the relatively narrow rural sphere. A truer estimate of the relative efficiency of rural and of urban government may therefore often be obtained by a comparison of positive achievements in general rather than of manifest defects along certain lines. And when the comparison is made on this basis it is seen that to no small extent the good reputation that rural local government has often enjoyed has not been really deserved but has represented merely the negative virtues that are associated with the absence of anything but a very limited activity.

Nowhere has the striking deficiency in effective social and political agencies in the rural districts been more carefully chronicled than by one of our foremost investigators of rural life conditions. After pointing out the marked extent to which city, town, and even village communities have outdistanced the strictly rural township in the creation, development, and utilization of political agencies, he points with a sure hand to one of the fundamental causes of this deficiency: "The farm home trades at a village, but shares the invisible government of a township. This scatters and mystifies the community sense of the farmer. He has no certain, unambiguous rallying point. Community loyalty is atrophied. He responds to his neighborhood, to his state and nation; but he is as yet a man without a comprehensive community. This is a tremendous deficiency in the social history of the farm home." [56] But if we push the inquiry still farther toward ultimate causes we shall find that the logical conclusion from this analysis sounds very much like a denial of the possibility of any real community life apart from a center of population. And here we ground upon the fundamental cause of the com-

parative deficiency and inefficiency in the political sphere in rural life.

It is thus rural local government and not municipal government that appears to be approaching a crisis—to be in danger of falling into practical desuetude. In England some thirty years ago an attempt was made to revive and restore a failing local government in the rural districts by applying something of town or city government to the rural areas—thus municipalizing the rural local authorities, as a recent English authority puts it.[57] But this attempt has been only partially successful and that for the most part only in the sphere of the county and only so far as the traditional interests and prejudices of the ruling few in the rural community are concerned. Among the mass of the rural population there is a lack of interest, an absence of popular participation, and an absence of efficiency. Only in some of the great county councils, as in the "practically urbanized areas such as Lancashire and Middlesex," do the energy and interest manifested approach that displayed in the surrounding towns. The rural *district* councils, in turn, arouse very little interest and infrequently command the services of efficient men. "Still more lamentable" has been "the collapse of the attempt to revive the parish as an area of local government" in that country. For the attempt came a century too late, as in the majority of cases "there was nothing left to revive." [58] The default of rural local government in France is also a commonplace observation among political scientists.

The author of one of the most recent volumes on the subject of local government in this country is so impressed by the inherent weakness and ineffectiveness of the smaller units of rural local government that he is led to conclude that there appears to be no justification for smaller units of local government than the county except in the case of centers of population having "more than two or three hundred inhabitants"; and that "the strictly rural population can have its

administrative needs more effectively filled by means of direct state administration." Even the county, as constituted at present in this country, he considers an ineffective political unit which functions only somewhat less badly than the smaller units of rural local government. And though the present tendency may be to increase the powers of the county, he believes that it also is destined to disappear in its present form and to be replaced by a district unit which will be largely, or wholly, an agent of the State for local purposes.[59]

It can not escape our serious attention, however, that an outcome such as this would leave the people of the very small villages and of the open country entirely without the forms, and wholly deprived of the right of the direct exercise, of local self-government. The conclusions of the investigators in the more purely political sphere thus quite square with the analysis and criticism of rural conditions in general by many observers and investigators of rural life—that the rural communities are doing very little in an organized way in most sections of the country to improve existing conditions and to remove present deficiencies in rural community life. When we turn our attention to the matter of relative achievement, therefore, and away from the matter of mere imperfection or deficiency in the methods by which achievement is realized, our concern is almost certain to be transferred from the admittedly great faults of municipal government to the substantial default or desuetude of rural government in general. The faults of municipal government present every indication of being but the incidental and temporary evidences of activity and life and progress; but the mere absence of evident faults, quite apart from the existence of many positive deficiencies, in rural government constitutes in too many cases not the proof of pure and efficient government but of political inactivity and stagnation.

The efficiency of rural government has doubtless suffered from the loss, both quantitative and also qualitative, of popu-

lation in consequence of the rural exodus. Yet there has also doubtless been, on the whole, little or no positive decline in the efficiency of rural government. Its growing inadequacy to meet present needs and demands is rather to be ascribed to the higher standards set today in the field of government. Just as greater efficiency has been gained in the economic sphere, along many lines, by the organization of operations upon a greatly enlarged scale and by the concentration of management in fewer hands, so have centralized control and the enlarging of the administrative field made for economy and efficiency in the political sphere. And neither in the economic nor in the political sphere can these advantages of economy and efficiency be effectively realized among the dispersed population of the rural districts. The growing centralization of government, then, through its effect in making possible these advantages of economy and efficiency in government, has more and more limited the scope of political activities in the local rural sphere and has lifted the standard of efficiency above the level to which the rural community can attain.

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CHAPTER XIX

The Effect of Urbanization upon Economic Efficiency and upon the Health, Physique, and Natural Growth of the Population

I

EFFECT UPON ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

The city is very largely the product of economic forces. From very early times commerce and trade have been important city-building forces. And since the days of the industrial revolution, and even before in the handicraft period, the development of manufactures as a separate branch of industry and its expansion on an ever larger scale of organization and of production have contributed markedly to urban growth. Now the fact that the growth of cities has continued, at an accelerated rate, down to the present time and has been associated with enormous increase in wealth and well-being affords in itself strong presumptive proof that urbanization has been favorable to economic efficiency. Had it been otherwise there would have appeared by this time convincing evidence to the contrary and the cityward trend must long since have come to a halt.

The actual positive advantages that the city affords for industry are so palpably evident as hardly to require statement. The city environment offers to the branches of industry located in the urban centers the prime advantages of close and effective human coöperation, of opportunity for the utilization of mechanical power on a large scale, and of superior

agencies of transportation and communication. More specifically these advantages mean ready access to supplies of labor, of credit, of capital, and of raw materials, access to markets, and the opportunity to realize the advantages of large-scale organization and production and of specialization and complex division of labor.

Nor are the advantages that the city affords by any means wholly monopolized by the urban industries. For the city populations offer profitable markets to the farmer; and in this way, as well as through the occupational division of labor which the cityward trend embodies and which enables the farmer to give his undivided attention to the cultivation of the soil or to other branches of farming, improvement in the art of agriculture is mightily promoted. The city industries supply the farmer with superior implements and machinery; and urban facilities, as already suggested, contribute notably toward the ready marketing and distribution of his surplus products. Institutions of scientific experiment and research, and similar agencies, located in or near the urban centers and enjoying the facilities that are available there, assist in solving his technical and business problems and bring the results to his attention. The very farm journal that contributes to keep the farmer informed as to the latest and best methods along his line and in touch with his fellow producers and that facilitates his and their efforts at mutual cooperation invariably locates in some urban center in order to take advantage of the indispensable facilities that are to be found there.

On the other hand the rural environment appears to foster, in superior degree, the important economic virtues of industry and of thrift. Scarcely anyone can fail to note the leisurely manner in which work is carried on in the city, in contrast with the persevering industry with which the countryman applies himself to his task. And though the rural class of miners is notably lacking in thrift, there is no one char-

acteristic that is more typically agricultural than this same attribute. Yet cities are favorable to the establishment of the agencies and institutions that encourage thrift and they thus afford opportunities for its exercise. And it is worthy of attention that while in any given country the rural population may excel the urban population in the exercise of this trait yet the latter is, on the whole, most in evidence in those countries that have a considerable urban development. In this country, too, the proportion of savings bank depositors is notably higher in the population of the more highly urbanized sections.

Rural thrift also needs to be corrected by urban inclination to avoid the saving that is not worth the sacrifice and to expend largely for large ends.

The rural environment appears, on the whole, to be more conducive to the promotion of the valuable economic virtue of sobriety than does the urban environment. But, as we shall see later,[1] the difference is less in reality than at first appears to be the case. Not every form of rural society has shown itself conducive in superior degree to the promotion of sobriety nor does that virtue attach to every rural class.

Conclusions arrived at just below may be anticipated here in sufficient degree to point out that there appears to be no warrant for the view that the cityward trend threatens the health and physique of the population. Economic interests are therefore clearly not threatened in this way.

Some account should also be taken here of the charge that the cityward trend has contributed to increase the cost of production and the cost of living through diverting production from the less expensive rural community to the region of higher wages, profits, and rents in the urban centers and through such a drain of labor, capital, and managing ability from agriculture as has led to scarcity of and high prices for the means of subsistence. The highly urbanized countries, it is charged, have become over-industrialized—even from the

economic point of view. But this view, which has already been controverted in part, appears to mistake results for causes. High wages, high profits, and high rents in the urban centers constitute, in the main, the evidences of economical and not of uneconomical production there. Incomes are ultimately paid out of production values; and normally high incomes are at once the logical result and the proof of high production values. The high incomes that the factors of production in the urban centers are able to command therefore reflect high direct production values, coupled with superior ability to retain this advantage in the exchange of products with the rural producing community.

On the other hand little has been heard in the past few years of scarcity of foodstuffs and of other farm products. Indeed, the complaint has been of quite an opposite nature. Moreover, the higher price of food products and of the other commodities of agricultural production in comparison with early days when our population was almost wholly rural by no means proves a higher cost of living in general. What we are accustomed to call the "high cost of living" is undoubtedly to be regarded largely, so far as it does not represent merely a decline in the value of money, as "the cost of a more expensive standard of living"—something to which the development of city life *has* unmistakably contributed. It is not even certain that there has been an increased cost of *subsistence,* in terms of other commodities. At any rate man does not live by bread alone; and there has never been a time when the masses of the people everywhere have been so well fed and clothed as in the years just preceding the Great War.

Moreover, the comforts and the luxuries of life have never been so abundant in supply, so excellent in quality, or so reasonable in price, in comparison with incomes, as during this same period. The elevation of the agricultural class to a higher economic and social status, in spite of certain drawbacks that are more or less natural to the rural environment

and in spite of certain maladjustments that have grown out of the, as yet, imperfect adaptation of rural industry and of the rural community to the profoundly disturbing changes that the exodus to the cities has involved, afford indubitable proof that that class has shared in material degree in the advantages just specified.[2] It is of course possible for the urbanizing and industrializing movement to extend to too great a length, especially in a given country. But there are, so far as is discernible at present, no convincing indications that the movement has gone too far.

II

EFFECT UPON THE HEALTH AND PHYSIQUE OF THE POPULATION

The first, and most convincing, reason for refusing to give assent to alarmist views relative to the asserted detrimental effect of the cityward trend upon the health and physique of the population is to be found in the marked decline in the standardized mortality rate and in the remarkable increase in the average length of life that have accompanied the urbanizing movement, especially in more recent decades. In the light of these universally admitted facts the more or less inconclusive results of the comparison between rural and urban mortality and between average expectation of life and average longevity in the rural and in the urban districts are of minor interest and significance. The rapid transfer of population from the rural districts to the urban centers has at least not been found to be inconsistent with a coincident marked improvement in the physical health and vitality of the population as a whole as measured by these indices.

The trend of the death rate in England and Wales may be accepted as having particular significance in view of the fact that urbanization has had its extremest development

there. Two or three centuries ago in England, before the days of the industrial revolution, when that country was as yet overwhelmingly rural, the death rate was very much higher than it was at the middle of the last century. And yet official statistics show a continuous decrease in the standardized general mortality rate in England and Wales from a maximum rate of 21.6 per 1,000 population for the decade 1841–50 to a minimum rate of 14.4 for the five years from 1906 to 1910—a decline of thirty-three per cent in a period of sixty years of rapid urban development. Moreover, by 1919 there was a further decline to the remarkably low figure of 13.3. And notwithstanding the fact that the city environment is reputed to be peculiarly unfavorable to child life, there was a decrease in the infant mortality rate over the same sixty years from 152 to 117; and in the years 1916 and 1919 the rate fell in these parts of Britain to the unprecedentedly low figure of 90.

Typhoid fever has almost disappeared in England and Wales—there having been but two deaths from this cause for each 100,000 persons in 1913, while some districts had a sickness rate from this disease as low as 9 per 100,000. In the fifty years ending with 1901 deaths from tuberculosis declined fifty per cent in England and Wales; and there was a further decline of twenty per cent in this so-called "city disease" by 1912, with a further marked drop in the rate since the close of the recent Great War.[3]

The same tendency appears in other countries with important urban development. Between the period covered by the years 1881–85 and that covered by the years 1906–10 the annual crude death rate per 1,000 population diminished 33.2 per cent in the Netherlands, 31.9 per cent in Prussia and in the Australian Commonwealth, 30.8 per cent in the German Empire as a whole, and 13.5 per cent in France. In Austria the decline amounted to 25.9 per cent, as against but 24.5 per cent in Hungary, the more rural member of the

former dual empire. Moreover, the rate at the close of the last period remained ten per cent higher in the latter than in the former.

On the other hand, during the same stretch of years the death rate declined but 0.8 per cent in Serbia and but 3.9 per cent in Ireland; while in Bulgaria there was apparently a very decided actual increase.[4]

Comparable figures are not available for the United States. But Adam Seybert cited an estimate by Blodget of 164,000 deaths in this country in 1807, which would represent a crude death rate of about 24.6 per 1,000 for the country as a whole if we estimate the population at 6,660,000.[5] As the crude death rate in the registration area in this country amounted to 14.0 in 1916, the last year preceding the abnormal conditions caused by our entrance into the Great War, there had thus been a decline of more than forty-three per cent since 1807. If the comparison be made with the year 1919, when the death rate in the registration area reached 12.9, the decline since 1807 would be nearly forty-eight per cent. Moreover, there has been in this country also a notable decrease in the prevalence of certain great diseases which have long been the scourge of the human race. And recent morbidity surveys "show an economic gain to the nation of many millions through lessened disability and sickness." [6]

Though deficient birth statistics make impossible any dependable general expression of the trend of the infant mortality rate in this country except for very recent years, it is almost universally agreed that the decline in mortality in the United States has been especially rapid among infants under one year of age. It is significant that the infant mortality rate in the new birth registration area in 1915 was found to average but 100 per 1,000 births per annum, and but 77.1 for the birth registration area of 1923, as against 125.5 in 1911 and 161.9 in 1900 for the mortality registration area of 1900.[7]

In Prussia, the infant mortality rate decreased about twenty-seven per cent in the urban centers, as against scarcely twelve per cent in the rural districts, over the period 1876–80 to 1906–10; though the cities of that country, as also of Austria, have long had a lower infant mortality rate than the rural districts.[8]

In spite of the fact that it is a hoary belief that old age and long life, as well as good health and rugged physique, are characteristic accompaniments of residence and occupation in the rural districts, it is immensely significant that there has been a most remarkable increase in the average length of life in all of the countries with a notable urban development. Professor Irving Fisher, in his report on "National Vitality" some years since, set forth the following data illustrative of the increasing length of life:

RATE OF LENGTHENING LIFE (in Years, per Century)

Country	Periods		Males	Females
England	1838-54 to 1871-81,	or 30 years	5 years	9 years
England	1871-81 to 1881-1900,	or 20 years	14 years	16 years
France	1817-31 to 1898-1903,	or 76 years	10 years	11 years
Prussia	1866-77 to 1891-1900,	or 23 years	25 years	29 years
Denmark	1835-44 to 1895-1900,	or 57 years	13 years	15 years
Sweden	1816-40 to 1891-1900,	or 67 years	17 years	15 years
United States:				
Massachusetts	1789 to 1855,	or 66 years	7 years	
Massachusetts	1855 to 1893-97,	or 40 years	14 years	
India	1881 to 1901,	or 20 years	0 years	

During the half century following 1871 the expectation of life in England and Wales actually increased more than ten years; while London within the last half century has shown a lengthening of human life at the rate of forty-five years per century. One estimate puts the increase in the duration of life in our own country at five years for the period from 1909 to 1921—which seems very conservative indeed in view of the fact that Professor Fisher has recently stated that within the seventeen years that have elapsed since the issuing of his report on "National Vitality" "almost all" of

the fifteen years of extension of life then predicted by himself as attainable for the people of this country "have actually been attained." Most striking of all, perhaps, the average duration of life in New York City has actually increased from just over thirty years in 1800 to a little under sixty years at the present. In Germany the increase has been at the rate of sixty years per century in the last half century.[9]

These data not only show that the average length of life has been increasing notably over the period since the marked trend to the city began but they also show that the increase has been especially evident during the recent years of large urban growth. Whatever statistics may appear to show relative to the greater average expectation of life in the rural, as compared with the urban, districts, statistics relative to the much simpler problem of the trend of longevity for the population in general indubitably prove that the transfer of population from country to city has been accompanied by a striking increase in the average length of life for the population as a whole.

Some, in direct opposition to a view already stated, contend that this gain in average longevity has been due largely to the diminution of mortality for infant and child life and that the apparently increased mortality in this country in the age groups immediately following middle life is much more significant as an index of the trend of national vitality. But this condition is without significance in the present connection inasmuch as it is entirely lacking in the European countries that have a large urban development. Moreover, the statistics that are offered to prove this increased mortality from the organic diseases in the upper age periods in this country show a larger apparent increase in their incidence among the agricultural, transportation, and other groups leading an outdoor life than among the strictly city groups.[10]

That the urban environment is not inherently unfavorable to the health and physique of the population is also indicated

by the fact that while the cities in early days undoubtedly had a materially higher mortality than the rural districts, the mortality rate has fallen more rapidly in the former than in the latter until at present the standardized mortality rate in the urban centers is but little, or not at all, above that for the rural districts, when other important differences than those relating merely to a different distribution of the population as to age and sex in the two classes of areas are taken into consideration. Indeed, not a few urban centers today have both a standardized mortality rate for the population in general and also an infant mortality rate that are lower than those that prevail in many rural districts in the same State or country. Weber pointed out more than twenty-five years ago that the standardized death rate was lower in the urban centers than in the rural districts of Austria. And when allowance is made for the large number of non-resident deaths in the urban centers of that country there is good reason to believe that this condition still prevailed just previous to the outbreak of the World War.[11] In European Russia, with its marked predominance of rural population, the infant mortality has been, even under normal conditions, frightfully excessive—beyond that in any other important western country. And in 1912 more than eighty per cent of the population was officially reported as suffering from some ailment or other. Here too mortality exceeds in the rural districts.[12]

More remarkable yet, perhaps, is the fact that in 1913 the infant mortality rate in the County of London, comprising the center of the great metropolis, was lower than that for England and Wales as a whole. Though the rural districts of the South of England had the lowest infant mortality of all, not only the city of London as a whole but all the urban districts of the South of England had a lower infant mortality rate than the rural districts of the North in that year. And during the years 1911–14 there were five London boroughs whose average infant mortality rate was appreciably

less than that for the rural districts of England and Wales as a whole in 1915.[13]

A similar condition prevails, both for the general death rate and also for the infant mortality rate, in many cases in this country. New York City has had, in recent years, an infant mortality rate not only less than that for the strictly rural parts of the State but also less than that for many other rural sections in this country. Moreover, while the infant mortality rate averaged 79.0—itself a very creditable record—in 573 cities of more than 10,000 population each in this country in 1921, the rate for New York City for that year was but 71.0. And the rate was still lower in such large centers as Portland (Oregon), San Francisco, Seattle. and Los Angeles.[14]

Not only is influenza normally more prevalent in the rural than in the urban districts, but in the great influenza-pneumonia epidemic of 1918–19 both the rural population in general and also the men from the rural districts in military service, in this country, suffered more than the urban population and the urban soldiers. Typhoid fever, a vanishing disease in the cities, has come to be regarded as mainly a rural disease, either directly or as to the ultimate source of infection. The opinion that tuberculosis is, in general, more prevalent in the urban districts is far from unanimous and is becoming less so from year to year; and the evidence that the apparently unfavorable showing made by many cities in respect to this disease rests upon the operation of racial and of selective occupational factors and upon a less favorable age distribution of the population in the urban centers rather than upon the inherent character of the urban environment becomes ever more impressive.[15]

Malaria, hookworm, pellagra, and infantile paralysis are all more seriously prevalent among the rural than among the urban population; and in some States diarrhea and enteritis threaten infant life to a greater extent in the open country

than in our congested city districts. Even with respect to the bubonic plague the problem in this country today is to protect the urban centers from infection through contact with certain infected rural areas where the infection apparently can not be stamped out.

In short, good health and good physique are, in the open country as in the urban centers, to be purchased only at the price of the observance of the laws of health and are not the spontaneous results of life in the rural environment.

Yet it must be said that in general the rural districts still make a better *apparent* showing, both with respect to the general mortality rate as ordinarily standardized, in most countries, and also with respect to the infant mortality rate in Great Britain, in France, and perhaps in this country. But there are other important considerations than those of age and sex in comparing mortality in the rural districts and in the urban centers; and when these are taken fully into account it is very doubtful whether the death rate as thus standardized is at all higher, in reality, in the cities than in the rural districts. Among these extraneous causes that contribute to swell the apparent standardized death rate in the cities beyond that prevailing in the rural districts are the following: non-resident deaths of rural persons in the urban centers; deficient mortality statistics in the rural districts; the disproportionately large alien element resident in the urban centers in most countries; the generally higher accident death rate in urban industries; the migration of the vicious elements to the cities; and the trend of those who are constitutionally weaker in physique to the urban centers.[16]

The records of physical measurements, though of increasing adequacy, are as yet fragmentary and incomplete and are insufficient for conclusive generalization. But on the whole, contrary to common belief, careful examination of these data tends to support the view that while physical examinations abundantly demonstrate physical defects they wholly fail to

prove deterioration in this respect over former times or to show diminution in physical measurement. There is therefore no proof that the development of city life has injuriously affected the physique of the population.

The view that the generations of men and women are growing weaker is a very ancient one—one that traces back even to the literature of ancient Greece and Rome.[17] When one considers the antiquity of this notion of growing human physical degeneracy one is impressed by the conviction that either our ancestors in primitive times must have been extraordinary specimens of physical prowess and perfection or else we have declined to an extraordinary and unimaginable state of physical feebleness at the present! Yet a French scientist has assured us that an examination of the bones of primitive man, of prehistoric man, and of historic man, shows no trace of evolutionary degeneration in man's stature. "We are not a stunted posterity," he writes, "and we have a right to spurn the insult of the poet who says that 'we are dwarfs beside our fathers.' "[18]

In recent years, as careful investigation into the subject of the physique of the population has succeeded the former method of mere guessing, the conclusions of investigators have become more and more common that physical defect and malnutrition are actually less marked among the urban than among the rural population. For the last decade or more careful students of country life conditions have been assuring us that it is not unusual for people of good observation and in full sympathy with rural conditions in general to say that the physical health and development of farm people are lower than that of other people of comparable position in life;[19] and with increasing frequency have come the statements from the physical directors of our colleges and universities that country youth have been showing a physical development inferior to that of those who come from the cities. The rapidly accumulating data that have been secured in recent years

from the physical and medical examination of children in our public schools, while revealing large room for improvement in the physical condition of urban children, have yet disclosed the fact, surprising to many persons, that physical defects are sensibly more in evidence among rural than among urban children.[20]

Lastly, these results have been confirmed, on the whole, by the data secured in connection with the physical examination of the recruits and by the health records of those who actually entered the national service, in the recent Great War—data which demonstrate that the men recruited from the urban districts were superior to those recruited from the rural districts both in respect to freedom from manifest physical defects and also, in spite of an apparently greater prevalence of organic disease, in respect to resistance to disease and in general staying qualities.

The examination of recruits for military service in England at the time of the Boer War attracted much attention because of an asserted great decline in physique and vitality among the population of that country since the examination of recruits for the Crimean War. The agitation finally led, in 1904, to the appointment, through the Privy Council, of an interdepartmental committee on physical deterioration, which carried out a comprehensive inquiry into the trend of the national vitality and physique in the United Kingdom. The findings of this committee have been quoted frequently —probably by those who have never read the report—as though these findings confirmed the view of physical deterioration. But such is not the case. For the committee reached the conclusion that the charge rested upon altogether inadequate data, and that, though certain conditions existing in the cities were prejudicial to health and though there were altogether too many persons deficient in physique and vitality, there were no grounds for the belief that the British people were undergoing progressive physical deterioration. On the

contrary, there were found to be indications of improvement, on the whole, over conditions that prevailed in the past.[21]

The recent Great War resulted in such a taking of stock of the manhood of the British people and in such a test of the national vitality in actual war as were never before experienced, or even approached, in the British Isles; and the results, though again revealing abundant evidence of physical unfitness, afforded ample proof that there had been no such physical decline as had been feared and asserted. The eminent British eugenist, Sir Francis Galton, had shared in the apprehensions relative to the influence of city life on the physique and vitality of the population. But Dr. C. W. Saleeby, himself an eminent eugenist, writer, and publicist, who terms Galton his illustrious master, expressed his opinion of the early British armies in the recent war as follows: "Our new armies are wonderful in physique and morale. After many months of lecturing to the soldiers on their health, in many parts of the country, I am convinced, knowing what armies have been, that armies of such quality, bodily, mental, and moral, can never have existed before in history, and can have no equals now. . . . Their records of health are unparalleled. . . . The stale talk of our degeneracy was never based on knowledge, nor showed any attempt to remedy the voluble ignorance from which it echoed." [22]

These words were written at what proved to be an early stage of the struggle and perhaps represent a somewhat too favorable appraisal of the manhood of the British nation as revealed by the test of war. For it is very likely that those who volunteered were predominantly in the earlier age periods of life and that they thus represented a relatively high degree of fitness as compared with the man power of the nation in general. During the last year of the war, when a policy of qualified conscription was in effect, nearly two and a half millions of examinations of men of military age were made by the National Medical Service Boards in Great

Britain, with the result that in only about thirty-six per cent of the examinations were men found fit for strictly military service—the remaining examinations disclosing a varying degree of unfitness which in the case of some ten per cent or more was found to be complete.

In view of these later results, apparently so unfavorable and after all possible qualifications evidently presenting much room for improvement, and in view of the apparently marked superiority of the recruits from the class of colliers, who represent in some measure a rural class, and of those from the agricultural districts, over the recruits from the urban centers and from the industrial districts in general, the members of the Commission to whom was committed a study of these data reported that "There is . . . ample evidence to show the baneful effect of modern conditions of life upon the physique of youths and men of military age, which cannot fail to effect some degree of deterioration of the stock and militate against the health of succeeding generations." [23]

But it is by no means certain that the showing was so unfavorable as the members of this Commission appeared to think. In connection with the comparison of the data for the rural and urban classes they fail to take into consideration, or to give proper weight to, important qualifications that alter the situation very materially. In fact, so palpably did the distinguished men whose names are signed to this report disregard the evidence that is, in part, presented by the district medical commissioners in other parts of the report that it seems impossible that the former had read or adequately considered the data submitted by the latter. The practically total disregard of age distribution, especially with reference to the different classes of recruits; of the diverse effect of previous recruitment upon the human material left available in different sections and among the different occupational groups as a result of the operation of the volunteer system and of the plan of protecting certain vitally necessary occu-

pations from recruitment; of the varying influence, in the different groups and sections, of the presence of alien elements and of naturalized non-British stocks with a higher susceptibility to certain widely prevalent diseases of a serious character or with a mortality rate in general normally higher than that of the native British stock; the ignoring of the fact of a health record unparalleled in the history of the British army; and the easy dismissal of the highly important factor of the selective influence which the different occupations exercise in attracting certain types of physique, represent grave defects in this report and render its conclusions essentially untrustworthy and untenable.[24]

In our own country, while numerous instances of physical defect were uncovered in the examinations incident to the induction of men into military service in the recent war, there likewise appears to be no convincing evidence tending to disclose growing physical degeneracy or to attest the inherent superiority of the rural over the urban environment with respect to health and physique. Comparing the results of the examination of men at the time of the first Civil War draft with the results of the examination of men under the first selective service draft in the recent war, General Crowder said: "In view of the great advance since that date in standards of medical diagnosis and physical perfection, the . . . figures indicate a decided improvement in national physical condition during the past two generations." Moreover, comparison of the results of the examination of recruits from certain typical urban areas and of others from typical rural areas was reported as showing "virtually a tie for the country boy and the city boy." [25]

Later calculations, however, based upon examinations from the later as well as from the earlier drafts, appeared to show a different result as between urban and rural recruits. The Chief of the Statistics Branch of the General Staff, in discussing the subject of rejections for physical rea-

sons, reported that in general the best records were made by agricultural rather than by industrial States and that country boys made a better showing than boys from the city.[26] In his second report, General Crowder also published the results of comparisons between urban and rural recruits that were said to indicate that a considerable advantage accrues to the boy reared in the country.[27]

Still later a comprehensive study, by civilian experts, was made of the whole series of available data, including the results of the examination of 2,753,922 recruits of all classes, from age 18 to age 30 inclusive. And though the number of defects per 1,000 men was found to be 609 for the urban registrants and but 508 for the rural registrants, the authors of this study repeatedly warn that the former are believed to have received a more critical and thorough examination than the latter and that the recorded results are not necessarily to be taken as indicating that the urban population is inferior to the rural population in health and physique. This explanation carries the more weight in view of the fact that in almost every kind of patent or outward physical defect or deformity, easily discoverable without extended diagnosis, the rural registrants showed an excess; while the urban registrants showed an excess mainly in respect to the great organic diseases, where conditions are obscure and diagnosis very much more difficult.

Again, under-height and under-weight were two defects that counted heavily against the urban registrants. But urban excess in these nominal defects was readily shown to be due to the disproportionately large numbers of certain racial elements of alien derivation in the urban centers and not to any legitimate physical defect of this nature. As a matter of fact, malnutrition was found to be more prevalent among the rural registrants in the proportion of 1.41 to 1.0.[28]

Still further, as already noted, the rural recruits showed materially greater susceptibility to disease while in military

service. In the great influenza-pneumonia epidemic it was "the rural States, especially those of the South, with some few scattering ones from New England and occasional ones from the Middle West," that stood "at the head of the list"; while a few of the Mountain States of the Northwest and the highly urbanized States of the East and North showed the least susceptibility to its ravages. Doubtless this greater rural susceptibility to disease was due in part to the less thorough weeding out of the unfit at the time of the physical examinations—an explanation that is supported by the fact that a large number of those rural States that stood high in the proportion of registrants finally accepted for service stood also at or near the top in respect to morbidity and mortality in this epidemic.[29] But in the measure that this explanation is accepted it necessarily detracts from the apparently favorable showing made by the rural recruits with respect to examination and acceptance.

Lastly, the apparent showing as between urban and rural recruits is complicated and rendered uncertain through lack of definite data relative to the distribution of the recruits, in the two classes, as to racial derivation, as to age, and as to the influence of reciprocal migration between the urban and rural districts. Moreover, the wisdom of setting the dividing line between city and country at places of 25,000 inhabitants is seriously open to question.

In view of these various considerations it is submitted that there is not the slightest evidence afforded by the results of the physical examinations in connection with the operation of the recent selective service act in this country to support the view that the urban environment is inherently inferior to the rural environment in respect to influence upon the health and physique of the population. Moreover, in view of the showing made in health and endurance by the soldiery of France and of Germany under the prolonged and extraordinarily severe test afforded by the recent great struggle, there

would seem to be nothing to justify alarmist views of a similar kind that have very frequently found expression in these countries in past years. Manifestly, something more than merely "the spirit of the race" is required in order adequately to explain the strikingly successful meeting of this test by the armies of all the more highly urbanized countries in the recent war.[30]

It is important to note that the progress that has been made in both city and country in respect to the manifest improvement in health and in mortality, as well as the probable improvement in physique, are overwhelmingly the result of forces that have been set in operation in the cities and that have been carried forward by urban instrumentalities. Urban leadership in this respect has been so marked as to make any argument in support of this statement wholly superfluous. It has been the custom on the part of many to emphasize the view that conditions in the rural environment are naturally favorable to good health and good physique. But natural conditions may be or may not be favorable. And it is certain that conditions do not long remain natural where man appears on the scene. The farmer spends from one-half to two-thirds of his time within the farm home, his wife spends much the larger portion of her time there, and his children divide much of their time between the inside of the farm home and the inside of the rural schoolroom. Now the farm home and the rural school building are very far from "natural" in the sense in which the word is here used. For both, in the rural districts, may be and often are very far from affording a wholesome and healthful environment and certainly will not do so unless pains are taken to insure that result.

The unsentimental sanitarian and hygienist unfortunately have often severely criticised the farm home and its surroundings; and the little red schoolhouse in the country, together with the old oaken bucket and the famous home cookery down on the farm, has shared in the condemnation.[31] The

stagnant pools where *Anopheles* and *Stegomyia* breed are as natural as are these proved scourges themselves of the human race; and the infection of these insects with the germs of malaria and yellow fever through contact with the diseased human beings upon whom they feed is also perhaps not far removed from the natural. The typhoid house fly, that pre-eminent purveyor of filth and disease, which is fast becoming exclusively a rural pest and plague, hatches as naturally from the dung of the well-bred Percheron or English Shire as from that of the wild horse or buffalo; and the tetanus germ is not less natural, perhaps, than the dust in which it hides until it can enter the wounded limb of some unfortunate man or beast and there secrete its deadly toxin. Water may be natural as it descends from the clouds; but brief contact with human surroundings in the average rural community suffices to bring it under the severe strictures of the bacteriologist. Sunshine and fresh air are undoubted bactericides; but these redoubtable enemies of disease can not enter the farm home except they be bidden, and almost nowhere are they such unwelcome guests. "The old idea that the country is such a healthful place to live in is good only so far as the country is fresh from the hand of the Lord, for Man's make-over of the country is generally poor—very poor." [32]

On the other hand, the bacteriological laboratory, the septic tank, the water filter, the chlorine treatment, the pasteurizing process, the sterilizing of surgical instruments and the disinfecting of wounds, are equally artificial with the can of kerosene and the spraying device, and with the screen that as usefully excludes the diseased human from the fly or mosquito as it does the latter from the former and from those who are in health. And all these, together with the practical acceptance and application of the theory that fresh air and sunlight are healing agents and all the numberless processes and instrumentalities that the modern health movement has brought to the aid of the disciples of Aesculapius,

are preëminently urban products. Except for these it would have been impossible to chronicle the striking decline in mortality and increase in the length of life to which attention has been directed. The very improvement in health and longevity among the rural population itself is thus very largely the result of urban agencies and could not have come to pass except for the city, that made it possible.

There are still many features of city life that are detrimental to good health, sound physique, and long life. But the city is far in advance of the country in the acceptance, promotion, and utilization of the means and agencies that are necessary to these desirable ends. And it is clear that the urbanizing movement is thus not only consistent with the realization of these ends but is by far the dominating factor contributory thereto.[33]

III

EFFECT UPON THE NATURAL GROWTH OF POPULATION

The natural growth of the population depends primarily, of course, upon the excess of births over deaths. We have just seen that the urbanizing movement has coincided with a marked decline in the death rate and that it undoubtedly has been a very large factor in that decline. In so far, then, the cityward trend has contributed decidedly to increase the natural growth of population.

We have to inquire in the next place as to the trend of the birth rate in recent times and as to the influence of the cityward movement with reference to that trend. It may be said with regard to the first part of this inquiry that though the industrial revolution in England was at first attended, or followed, by an extraordinary rise in the birth rate in that country, there has been, with some oscillations, a subsequent decline both in that country and in other countries of North-

ern and Western Europe and in North America and Australasia—a decline that has been especially marked in the last fifty years or more and that has grown constantly more evident in recent decades. Birth registration statistics in England and Wales show, nominally, that the crude birth rate reached a maximum, since 1838 when birth registration first began there, in the year 1876. But the apparent rise over the previous thirty or more years is believed to represent merely improvement in the degree of completeness of registration. And, according to the English National Birth-rate Commission of 1913, the crude birth rate in England and Wales is thought to have remained about stationary from 1840 to 1880, since when it had declined approximately one-third up to 1912. The calculated decline in the corrected, or standardized, birth rate for a number of representative areas in England and Wales was from 34.65 in 1881 to 32.6 in 1891, 28.4 in 1903, and 24.7 in 1911.[34]

In France there was a continuous, but not wholly regular, decline in the crude birth rate from 32.2 in the decade 1801–10 to 20.6 in 1901–10; and by 1913 there had been a further decline to 18.7. The decline began in Germany a little later than in England but has proceeded in recent years perhaps even more rapidly there than in the latter country. The crude rate declined in Germany from 39.1 in 1871–80 to 27.5 in 1913. Figures are also presented by this Commission for a number of other European countries—all showing an apparent decline in the crude rate, though there is said to be "little or no evidence" of a real decline in Italy and in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.[35]

According to an estimate by Professor Walter F. Willcox, there was a decline of about forty-eight per cent in the number of children under five years of age to each 1,000 women 16 to 44 years of age, from 1810 to 1910 in the United States.[36] Both lack of dependable data and the influence of immigration make uncertain the accuracy of any calculation

for the movement of the birth rate in this country, though there is little doubt that there has been quite a marked decline.

The general result of the declining birth rate in all of these countries, however, has not been a decline in the natural growth of population—except in the case of France. For rapid as has been the decline in the birth rate the death rate has declined, on the whole, even faster; and the net result in the past century or century and a quarter has been the most remarkable growth of population in the western world of which we have any record.

In attempting to discover the real present influence of the cityward trend upon the birth rate it may be well first to set forth certain conclusions that meet with general assent on the part of students of the problem of the declining birth rate. For some of these conclusions will be found to throw some light upon the further problem of the relation of the cityward movement to that decline. In the first place, there is practically unanimous agreement that the decline has not been due to any diminution in potential reproductive fertility in the human species. Men and women are just as capable of begetting and bearing children as they have ever been. Urbanization has therefore not contributed to the decline in the birth rate through an unfavorable effect upon the vitality of the population. Spencer's hypothesis that higher development in man is associated with declining generative capacity also remains without proof and rejected by scientific men everywhere.

Again, though alcoholic indulgence, vice, immorality, and the social diseases are more prevalent in the urban centers than in the rural districts and though there is general agreement that natural generation is greatly diminished by the influence of these factors, it is almost universally admitted that they can have played no part in *the decline* in the birth rate inasmuch as their prevalence has diminished rather than

increased during the period within which this decline has been under way. Neither have mere congestion in the urban centers nor lack of subsistence nor even the increased cost of subsistence contributed materially to diminish the birth rate. For the birth rate remains highest in those sections where there is the greatest congestion; and with the exception of the period since the beginning of the Great War there has never been a time when people have been so well fed and clothed as in the last fifty years. Indeed, some ascribe the decline in the birth rate in recent times to the asserted effects of an overly-generous diet in producing an alleged procreative incapacity. Moreover, the birth rate has declined least among that element of the population upon whom the increased cost of subsistence has borne most heavily.[37]

Authorities are practically all agreed that the causes of the decline in the birth rate are social and economic and not physical. And the great immediate cause of the decline is almost as universally adjudged to consist in the voluntary limitation of births. But back of this immediate cause there lie the ultimate causes which have led to voluntary birth restriction; and in an analysis of these causes we must seek the nature of the influence of the cityward trend upon this phenomenon. Voluntary limitation of births is partly a matter of inclination and partly a matter of knowledge or information; and since the urban community is plainly more favorable than the rural community to the dissemination of information and intelligence of all kinds we are not surprised to learn that the knowledge of the means of birth control is more widely disseminated in the former than in the latter.[38] Here we have the most patent urban influence contributing to decline of the birth rate.

The *inclination* to restrict the number of births rests upon a number of more ultimate considerations, economic, social, and political, though these different factors are more or less interwoven with each other. The most general of the eco-

nomic causes is the narrowing margin between the expense of rearing children and the value of their services during the time that they remain contributing members of the family. This situation is due, on the cost side, to the prevalence of a more expensive standard of living rather than to an increased cost of subsistence. A larger sum being required to maintain each child according to this more expensive standard of living and a longer course of preparation for life being required, during which the child remains dependent and incapable of contributing a net surplus to the family income, parents are unable to rear as many children as formerly.[39] Restrictions on child labor also limit the opportunity of parents to profit from the labor of their children;[40] and the bearing and rearing of children also interfere with the opportunity of mothers for employment at gainful occupations. Moreover, the enlarged opportunities that women enjoy today of becoming self-supporting contributes to the postponement of marriage to a later age if not to eliminate it altogether.

Among the social reasons are included the growth of forethought or of prudential considerations, closely akin to thrift; the rising standard of life, which is a social as well as economic factor; greater emphasis upon education; social and philanthropic activities of women, which interfere with marriage and with the bearing and rearing of children; the rise of the feminist movement; the asserted growing fear of childbirth on the part of women; decline of the religious sanctions relative to the bearing and rearing of children; and increasing age at marriage.

Political causes include the growth of political liberty and of equality; laws restricting child labor and requiring attendance at school; and the growing participation of women in political life—that is, the political aspect of the feminist movement.

The fact that there has been a broad and well-defined decline in the birth rate in countries with growing urbanization

during much of the period over which the cityward trend has extended constitutes in itself strong presumptive proof that there has been a close connection between these two phenomena. And while there has been not a little ill-considered talk to the effect that the urban environment is anti-biological and that the rural districts are the natural source of population growth, yet it is clear that very many of the causes that have just been enumerated, of the decline in the birth rate, have received a strong impulse from city life. Clearly the city has led in the development of more expensive standards of living; child-labor laws are applicable mainly to urban industries; motherhood interferes with the gainful employment of women chiefly in the cities; and it is mainly the city occupations that have opened to women the opportunity of self-support that encourages delayed marriage or the avoidance of it altogether. On the other hand the child in the rural districts, on account of the nature of rural occupation and as a result of the simpler life of the rural community, generally arrives at an earlier age at the point where the value of its services exceeds the cost of its maintenance; and it probably remains a contributing member of the family up to a higher age.

It is mainly in the city, too, that participation in the activities of society life and of philanthropic effort interferes with marriage and motherhood. The rise of the feminist movement has been closely associated with the development of city life; the old religious sanctions probably exert a greater influence among the rural population; and the cityward trend has probably been responsible in no small measure for the material increase in the mean age at marriage in this country since the colonial and early national periods.[41] Lastly, the growth of political equality has encouraged the masses to strive to raise their children to a higher social and economic level than that on which they themselves have lived and has thus set into operation forces tending strongly to

restrict the birth rate; and, as we have seen, urban life has been favorable to the development of democracy.

Yet rural factors have played a not unimportant part in contributing to the decline in the birth rate; and it is almost certain that, as a result of the disappearance of the agricultural frontier, conditions in the rural districts will be much less favorable in the future than they have been in the past for early marriage and large families. Through the rural population has come in very large measure, too, that growth in thrift and in prudential considerations that has played so large a part in leading to a reduced birth rate in general. This is especially evident among the peasant proprietors of France, where the decline in the birth rate began a generation or more before the advent of the industrial revolution and the modern development of city life in that country and where an excessively low birth rate, coupled with a fairly high death rate, has led practically to a stationary condition of the population.[42] The frontier rural element, now a disappearing element in the population in our own country, has also contributed materially to the growth of democracy and to the political emancipation of women—factors that have been unfavorable to the maintenance of a high birth rate. Moreover, it is certain that very many of the young unmarried women who normally remove from the maturely developed agricultural regions because of more favorable conditions of employment and of livelihood in the urban centers would have remained similarly unmarried and childless in such rural districts had the urban centers not afforded the opportunity for removal.

Both in England and in France, and probably in other countries of western Europe, the birth rate in the rural districts is, in general, high only among the class of agricultural laborers and among the mining and industrial population which resides in the rural community. In England, in 1911, the figures for occupational fertility, taking 100 as the basis

for all occupations together, stood at 126.4 for coal miners, 113.4 for agricultural laborers, 110.1 for boiler-makers, and 100.5 for farmers.[43] In our own country we scarcely have a definite class of agricultural laborers to sustain the birth rate when it shall have declined generally among the class of farm owners and farm tenants. And the substitution in England of a system of small holdings for the system of employed agricultural labor would in all probability set into operation there many of the forces that have worked so potently to reduce the birth rate among the peasants of France, and would without doubt shortly deprive the rural districts of the former country of the small superiority that they now hold over the urban centers in respect to the birth rate.[44]

In general, the charge that the city population does not renew itself by natural generation nor contribute to its own growth by natural increase is no longer valid. A half century ago, even, nearly two-thirds of the annual increase in population in London was derived from the natural increase of its own inhabitants.[45] In 1913 the standardized birth rate was only about nine per cent higher in the rural districts of England and Wales than it was in London, and but slightly more than one per cent higher than it was in the County Boroughs—that is, in the areas including the other large cities. Moreover, London had a higher standardized birth rate in 1913 than the South of England as a whole.[46]

In the Netherlands the standardized birth rate appears to be higher in the urban than in the rural districts; and in France the "highest legitimate fertility figure" is found in "the nine departments with less than thirty per cent of agricultural population." [47] The cities of Germany continued to contribute materially to their own growth, through an excess of births over deaths, up to the beginning of the World War at least. And for most of the cities, as well as for the highly urbanized States as a whole, in our own country there is "a substantial excess of births over deaths." [48]

It is admitted that the Huguenot stock has demonstrated its capacity to survive in an urban environment; the Hebrew element, which has become a predominantly urban stock everywhere, shows no signs of racial elimination; and the persistence of the London Irish over several generations flatly contradicts the absurd notion that families die out within a few generations after removing to the urban centers.[49] Our vital statisticians agree that the small number of births reported annually from some of our urban centers indicates merely the excessively deficient birth registration in these centers; and in general there is reason to believe that in many instances statistics of births, contrary to the situation relative to statistics as to deaths, are less complete for our urban centers than for our rural districts.[50]

On the whole, however, as Tucker pointed out in this country more than three-quarters of a century ago,[51] the city appears to be somewhat less favorable than the country for the multiplication of the human species. But the significance of this fact is subject to varying estimate and interpretation. The disciple of Malthus, fearful of famine, disease, and war through overpopulation, welcomes the decline in the birth rate. The ardent nationalist, on the other hand, sees in this decline not merely a serious threat to the man-power of the nation, to the injury of the industries in peace and to the great danger of the whole country in war, but sees in it the evidence of national decadence. The humanitarian and sanitarian, noting that rapid multiplication is normally associated with high mortality, especially for infant and child life, are inclined to welcome the decline in the birth rate and thus to look with complacency upon the urban influences that on the whole favor it. The eugenist, who is interested in quality rather than in quantity, concerns himself only incidentally with the decline in general and inquires particularly as to how it affects the multiplication of the fit and the unfit. The strict religionist and moralist objects to any de-

parture from the biblical injunction to multiply and replenish the earth. And the social philosopher, with an eye to all these various considerations, adds the further inquiry as to how the practice of birth restriction and control affects the character of the parents and of the limited number of children who are reared.

There is little hope of harmonizing all of these varying and more or less diverging points of view. But an attempt may be made to point out certain considerations that appear to carry weight. In the first place, a high birth rate may well become a prime cause of war through pressure of population upon the resources of a country. Again, we may not forget that it has been but a few short decades since the spectre of overpopulation in its general aspects loomed up as an agitating problem, with wide approval of birth control and restriction as privately helpful and socially useful.

The eugenic influences associated with the cityward trend are not yet clearly evident. A favorable result is probably to be seen in the accepted view that the mixing of family stocks in the urban centers tends toward the elimination of physical and mental defects, while intermarriage among nearly related stocks in the more static rural community tends to perpetuate and establish these weaknesses. Some hold to the view that the strenuous character of urban life leads to the elimination of the unfit, while asserted easier conditions in the rural districts favor their multiplication—in which case the migration of the unfit to the urban centers is perhaps to be welcomed. If selective processes are at work that carry those who are, in general, constitutionally weaker to the city, the relatively lower birth rate in the urban centers would also obviously have a favorable eugenic effect. Lastly, the exponent of the view that the native-born element is physically and mentally superior to the alien element, in our population, may find a certain measure of satisfaction in the fact of the

lower birth rate in the urban centers, where the latter element is found in disproportionately large numbers.

On the other hand, it appears that the bearing and rearing of children are more largely avoided in the urban centers by that part of the population which is best fitted, physically and mentally, for this duty and service than is the case in the rural districts. And as there is more of luxury and of the superficial things of life in the cities, it is not unlikely that the avoidance of the responsibilities of parenthood exercises a more unfavorable effect upon the character of married people there than it does in the rural districts.

On the whole there probably has been a fair balance of gain attaching to decline in the birth rate hitherto. Without at all endorsing objectionable methods for the accomplishing of birth restriction and admitting that there are extremely serious aspects of the movement as it affects certain elements of our population, the conclusion seems warranted that its consequences have been, on the whole, fortunate. We do not so much need a higher birth rate in general as a better distribution of births among the different elements of the population and a larger emphasis upon better race breeding. A growth of prudential considerations and of such a larger sense of responsibility as will lead certain elements of the population to restrain the size of the family within reasonable limits is also not less needed. And as the realization of all these objects is largely a matter of education, there is good reason to suppose that the urban environment is not unfavorable to such an ultimate outcome.[52]

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CHAPTER XX

The Moral Consequences of Urbanization

Religion and morality are essentially important elements in the social and political structure. Since individual character is one of the most vital and necessary conditions to the perpetuation and effectual functioning of the state, its promotion thus becomes one of the supreme objects of wise statecraft. It is the moral and spiritual values that ultimately count, not only because these are supremely valuable in themselves but also because without them nothing else of value can be realized or conserved. In these ultra-modern times high-minded men—and women—still constitute the state, still remain the strength and bulwark of nations. Any condition that vitally affects human character must therefore be of the utmost concern to the student of political and social institutions.

If it be true, then, as asserted by many critics of city life, that the cityward trend has been associated with religious and moral decline and that the city environment is inherently inconsistent with a sound religious and moral life and sentiment, it is evident that the urbanizing movement carries with it the gravest threat to the welfare of society and of the state.[1] Moreover, it is also asserted that the drain of the best elements from the rural districts into the urban centers impoverishes the rural community itself and precipitates it and its ameliorative influences into decadence and decline and thus dries up the fountains of religion and morality at their source. And an illustration and menacing portent are found in the ultimate fall and ruin of ancient Rome,

as that empire passed from the dominance of the asserted pure and simple virtues of the rural population in its early days to the sway of luxury, corruption, and vice in its later, urbanized stage.

More specifically, it is charged that the corrupting and demoralizing influences of city life are manifest today in laxer moral standards for both sexes, in a growing immodesty in dress among girls and women, and in the growing seriousness of the divorce evil; in the asserted increasing prevalence of crime in the country at large and in the alleged greater prevalence of intemperance, vice and immorality, as well as crime, in the urban centers than in the rural districts; and in the loosening of the ties of religion and of the church in both city and country and the consequent elimination or serious diminution of the previously all-important rural contribution to the life and work of the church in general. Finally, it is claimed that the rural community constitutes a markedly superior environment for the rearing of the young and that the cityward trend thus threatens to deprive the community and the nation of the wholesome influence of a rising generation whose sterling virtues and character have been fashioned under this more favorable rural environment.

In the present chapter the moral consequences of urbanization are considered; while in the succeeding chapter the religious consequences and the effect upon the rearing of the young are taken up.

I

INTEMPERANCE

In any inquiry as to the effect of the cityward movement upon the evil of intemperance two outstanding, and apparently contradictory, facts at once arrest our attention. On the one hand there appears to be a wider prevalence of this evil in the urban centers, and the traffic in intoxicating

drinks appears to command a larger favor and support among the urban than among the rural population. On the other hand, the movement in favor of temperance, and even in favor of absolute prohibition of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks, has made steady progress coincidently with the rapid transfer of the rural population to the urban centers. Within the past few years, indeed, at the very time when the urban population in this country had attained a clear numerical predominance, we witnessed the astonishing fact of the nation-wide abolition of the legalized liquor traffic in this country. In view of these striking developments there could hardly be more forcible proof of the inaccuracy of the view that urbanization is necessarily and inherently favorable to the evil of intemperance.

There is far from adequate appreciation of the extent to which standards have improved in this respect. Charles Francis Adams has declared that "rum" was the bane of New England for the century and a half previous to the beginning of the great temperance movement in Boston in 1824. In those days the whisky jug, or the vessel of hard cider, was as much in evidence in the harvest field as is the water jug today; and drinking to excess was painfully frequent in all circles. That heavy drinking was practically universal and carried with it no social stigma is evident from the fact that it was not uncommon for clergymen to supplement their slender salaries by running distilleries openly and without protest on the part of their parishioners. It was not until about 1840, indeed, in this country, that the church formally pronounced its definite disapproval of the drinking of liquor—a date that corresponds closely with the first adequate recognition of the extent and significance of the trend to the cities in this country. Hitherto both parson and lay member had been accustomed in many cases to indulge without loss of caste in the cup that inebriates.[2]

Nor has the rural community always enjoyed its present

reputation for superiority along this line. A writer in the *Analectic Magazine,* in 1817, stated that the consumption of spirituous liquor in this country at that time increased as one went from North to South—that is to say, as one went from the least rural to the most rural section of the country. And in 1821 Henry Colman, who was not likely to slander the rural population, declared that the quantity of ardent spirits consumed in the cities was not disproportionate to that consumed in the rural districts. Painting a sad picture of the ravages of drink among the agricultural population, he declared that the farmer was no less in danger from this vice than any other person.[3]

Moreover, this trend toward higher and better standards with reference to the use of intoxicating drink is also to be marked in other countries where the urbanizing tendency has manifested itself prominently; while improvement has been least in those countries that have remained predominantly rural. In highly urbanized Great Britain, where the sentiment in favor of personal liberty has prevented much interference by public authority with the liquor traffic and where indulgence to excess still prevails among considerable elements of the population, there has yet been very great improvement over the condition that prevailed in earlier days when the population was predominantly rural. Though the Irish have shown a propensity for city life in this country and in England, it can scarcely be maintained that they originally acquired their equally marked propensity for excessive indulgence in the use of intoxicants in the city environment. Lord Haldane recently testified to the improvement in Britain, in the following words: "Our aristocracy used to drink heavily, but it is only a few of them who do so today; our middle classes used to be pretty great drinkers, but today their standards have greatly risen in this respect. It is the rise in general standards of value that has killed that vice, and has kept down, to a great extent, other vices; and it will be

so with the working classes too." And a representative of labor in Parliament has yet more recently voiced his conviction that the days of the liquor traffic in that country are about numbered.[4]

In the continental countries of Europe the campaign against the use of alcoholic liquors is also making headway, though not always in strict proportion to the degree of urbanization attained in the particular countries. Intemperance in Australia "has notably diminished," though the cities of that commonwealth have acquired a marked predominance in population and in influence; and in Canada "sobriety has become more general than it was thirty years ago." [5]

The group life of the city of course favors drinking habits; and this circumstance has contributed to draw to the city those persons of social and convivial inclinations who undoubtedly would have been inclined toward intemperance had they remained in the rural community. Moreover, in general the city draws the worst, as well as the best, elements of the population; and for this reason also it is to be expected that many who drink to excess will be found there. In addition to the smaller inclination among the urban population to interfere with personal habits, the entanglement of other important urban business interests with the liquor interests in the urban centers—an entanglement from which the rural population in the nature of the case has been largely free—has contributed to greater urban tolerance for the liquor traffic. The presence, in disproportionately large numbers, of the foreign-born element, with their traditional habits of drink in their former homes—which were predominantly rural homes be it noted,—has also been a large factor in urban excess in drinking and in the strong urban support of the liquor business in this country. Lastly, it should not be overlooked that the city contains a disproportionately large number of persons in the young adult age groups nor that under modern conditions the rural toper goes to town to

drink. By no means all of the intemperance that prevails in the city, therefore, is of the city.

On the other hand, there are features of city life that work strongly for the elimination of intemperance. The fact that intemperance is particularly incompatible with the delicately adjusted and highly coöperative aspects of modern industry in the urban centers has placed a decided premium on sobriety. Perhaps no other factor has exerted so great an influence in the temperance movement. Again, the urban environment is favorable to education and to the dissemination of intelligence and culture; and these qualities, in turn, as implied in the citation from Lord Haldane above, are favorable to the growth of temperance. Lastly, the temperance forces have utilized with great effect the immense strategic advantages that the cities offer as a base in the campaign against the liquor traffic.

On the whole, therefore, the conclusion appears to be warranted that there is no adequate basis for the charge that urbanization is inconsistent with the growth of temperance and sobriety.

II

VICE AND IMMORALITY

More than three-quarters of a century ago an English writer, who was favorably inclined toward the urbanizing movement, in discussing the relation of great cities to morals admitted that theoretically there were greater inducements to evil in the city. But he contended that investigation disclosed that in reality depravity was much less prevalent in large cities than had been supposed and that a large proportion of the immorality prevailing there had been nursed elsewhere but had been revealed through superior police vigilance in these centers. On the other hand he charged the poets, who had described English village scenes as so many regions of Arcadia and its village groups as so many models

of pastoral simplicity and innocence, with giving a false character to country life. And he proceeded to cite official sources in support of his contention that on the whole the exhibition of depravity was as great in the rural districts as in the manufacturing districts and in the cities and towns, with fewer redeeming features.[6]

While this conclusion may perhaps be regarded as somewhat too favorable to the city, it will be found upon careful investigation to be much more accurate for that date and much more nearly applicable to the present time than a great many persons who have not made inquiry would be disposed to admit. For reasons that are obvious upon brief consideration, it is extremely difficult to institute a satisfactory comparison at any given time between the rural districts and the urban centers in this respect. More dependable, by far, is a comparison of the trend of conditions in a country as a whole over a period of time as the urbanizing movement advances. And just as in the case of intemperance such a comparison will be found to be reassuring. Standards in this respect also have been slowly rising; and today we simply would not tolerate conditions that a century ago were either condoned or were accepted as a matter of course.

Comparison of the trend of illegitimate births does not afford a very satisfactory basis for estimating the trend of sexual morality. For prostitution, abortion, and infanticide, which are much more serious evils, may replace illegitimacy or conceal its external evidences. But so far as the trend of illegitimacy may be accepted as a real index of sexual morality it is significant that by whatever standard illegitimate births may be measured there was a considerable decrease in England and Wales from the period 1846–50 to the year 1907. Down to the period 1901–05, Scotland, Norway, and Finland also show a general decrease in the proportion of illegitimate to total births; and a similar trend is shown in Austria, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland from the period

1886–90, and in Belgium and the Netherlands since 1891–95.[7] On the whole, illegitimacy thus appears to decrease with growing urbanization.

Generally speaking, too, there appears to be a higher percentage of illegitimacy in the rural districts than in the cities of the various countries today; though the crude figures do not always point to this conclusion. In 1913, in England and Wales, the number of illegitimate births per 1,000 unmarried and widowed females, 15 to 45 years of age, was least in London and highest in the rural districts. And a recent investigator along this line, after comparing conditions in the urban centers and in the rural districts in Europe in general, writes: "Rural districts and metropolitan centers are after all not so very different in their sexual life, as Berlin, Vienna, Carniola, and Mecklenburg prove." That more unmarried mothers, in proportion to population, were found in the cities was rightly regarded as inconclusive, since many of these come from districts or regions outside because in the urban centers they can more easily conceal their condition or hide their identity or find maternity hospitals or similar institutions, or because they find a better opportunity for employment there.[8]

It is necessary, too, to take account of the fact that almost everywhere there is an excess of persons in the young adult age group in the urban centers. Moreover, the class of domestics, who everywhere make up a large proportion of unmarried mothers, is everywhere very largely of rural origin. And the feeble-minded, who are at the same time almost always below par morally and who likewise contribute largely to this class and to that of prostitutes, originate in disproportionately large numbers in the rural districts. In our own country, where the crude statistics in some States show a higher proportion of illegitimacy in the cities than in the rural districts, it is necessary still further to remember that the foreign-born, who are in excess in our cities, have come

in the majority of cases from countries with a strikingly higher illegitimacy rate than prevails among our native-white element, which in turn is in excess in the rural districts. A disproportionately large number of Negroes, among whom the illegitimacy rate is excessively high, also does much to swell the proportion of illegitimate births in some of our urban centers.

Not a few modern authorities agree with Vandervelde in holding the scales of the balance about equal, in this respect, as between the two elements of the population. But some authorities explicitly declare that illegitimacy "prevails more largely in the rural districts." [9]

European criminal statistics show that infanticide is more prevalent in the rural districts than in the cities, and that, as was to be expected, abortion prevails more largely in the urban centers.[10] The fact that abortion is practiced to a much larger extent in the cities than in the rural districts of course constitutes no proof that the condition that leads to the crime originates in the cities in the same excessive proportion.

Weber's statement of twenty-five years ago, with reference to the comparative prevalence of prostitution in city and in country, remains substantially valid today: "Prostitution, regarded as a profession, is certainly a city institution. But many social workers doubt whether the sexual morality of the country is on a higher plane, from their knowledge of the large proportion of prostitutes who were first corrupted in country homes." According to a French authority a large part of the clientele of prostitution in France, and particularly in Paris, is recruited from among the provincials and strangers who go to the cities for the purpose of seeking amusement. And it is highly significant that a recent eminent authority along this line judges conditions to be much better in highly urbanized England than on the Continent.[11]

The fact that the agencies and institutions of prostitution are centered mainly in the cities no more justifies the con-

clusion that prostitution finds its patrons exclusively, or even mainly, among city people than the fact that drug stores are located almost exclusively in centers of population proves that the rural population does not patronize drug stores. The decided excess of the feeble-minded in the rural districts should not be forgotten in view of the excessive proportion of this class among professional prostitutes; and the concentration of persons in the young adult ages in the urban centers needs again to be recalled at this point.

The concealment that the city affords for immorality and vice in individual cases, too, is merely a concealment of personal identity and not a concealment of the general situation. On the contrary, vice flaunts itself in the city; and though the proportion of those who participate may be comparatively small, concentration serves to give an unduly vivid impression of the prevalence of immorality and vice in the urban centers.[11a] The wickedness of the city is by no means in proportion to its visibility; while the virtues of the city population, like real virtues everywhere, are not conspicuously on parade and must be sought, as everywhere else, in the homes and in the lives of the great number who conform to good standards of conduct.

In the rural districts, however, isolation and decentralization give the impression of small prevalence, or non-existence, in respect to immoral conditions and practices, as in respect to other conditions. It is necessary to search diligently in order to discover the full extent to which any such condition may prevail in the rural districts. "Violence, either lustful or predatory, stalks abroad here with small chance of discovery." [12] And the researches of social investigators into conditions in the rural communities are beginning to disclose a degree of prevalence there, of vice and immorality, that was entirely unexpected by even these trained investigators, who have long suspected that all has not been well in the open country in this respect.

One such investigator some years since declared that entire hamlets in certain old rural areas were living in "unspeakable licentiousness." Another investigator declared, in presenting before the members of a learned society the results of his investigations into conditions in certain rural communities, that statements made to him with reference to the relations existing between boys and girls in these communities would be received by his audience "with a shout of incredulity." [13] Such "excessive wickedness and immorality" were found among the members of a rural group in one of the "young and vigorous" commonwealths of our great Northwest as to earn for these rural folk the characterization of "the grandchildren of the devil." [14] A rural woman from one of the Pacific Coast States wrote not long since to the United States Department of Agriculture that "Most of the country schools are hot-beds of immorality" and that "those parents who have learned wisdom have taken their children from the rural schools and are sending them to the graded schools . . ." in town. And a prominent educator, in discussing "The Schoolhouse as a Crime Contributor," comes unpleasantly near to an endorsement of this view.[15]

Admittedly, many of these conditions are exceptional and no more representative of the rural community in general than the city slums are of conditions in general in the urban centers; and some will contend that such instances are merely representative of rural decadence in certain sections that have been depleted of their best elements by migration. But the proponents of the former view must logically admit that the city should not be judged, any more than the rural districts, on the basis of exceptional conditions; while the exponents of the latter theory must explain both the prevalence of these conditions at present in the newer sections of the country, to which the superior elements have presumably migrated in part, and also the existence of conditions equally bad in some parts of the country in early days. Moreover,

these accounts, which might be enlarged materially, leave entirely untouched the condition of moral taint left among both races by slavery in the South.

The city kettle may be as black as it has been painted. But the rural pot is much too nearly the same hue to justify any invidious comparisons in its favor. It is easy to find, in both city and country, regrettable laxity in moral standards today among the members of both sexes. But on the whole, moral standards, while still susceptible of much improvement, are higher today than they have ever been before. There is perhaps a nearer approach to the appearance of immodesty in not a little of present-day female apparel than could be desired. But much of our instinctive disapproval of these styles of dress grows out of the fact that they represent a radical departure from previously accepted standards in dress. Modesty and immodesty are fortunately not vitally related to mere matters of dress. And our apprehension with reference to the significance of these outward appearances receives no little reassurance from the very evident fact that there is in reality much less immodesty among women today than styles of dress might seem to indicate. While there are always exceptions, there are no indications that women are in general less virtuous and clean-minded today than in former times; and there are many evidences of an advance to a higher standard on the part of men.[16]

III

CRIME AND CRIMINALITY

If one may make a distinction between crime and criminality, it perhaps justly may be said that while urban life may contribute to the increase of crime it does not necessarily contribute to the development of the spirit of criminality. Conditions in the city multiply opportunity for more

or less innocent and uncensurable offenses against law and thus contribute to crime in the sense of technical violation of the law. Because of the close contact among people in the urban centers and of the resulting great number of ordinances and regulations there, it requires a higher degree of virtue and of circumspection to avoid infractions of the law there than it does in the rural community. Moreover, the situation requires a more rigid enforcement of such regulations, in the urban community; and the publicity attaching to the committing of an offense in a center of population renders more difficult the escaping from detection and punishment. All of these circumstances contribute to swell the number of offenses technically committed in the urban centers and thus give an appearance of criminality that is quite out of proportion to the actual criminality among the urban population.[17] Moreover, as will appear below, certain other factors that are not inherent in the city environment contribute to swell the amount of crime in the urban centers.

On the other hand, there are some conditions in the urban centers that really make for serious violation of the law and that emphatically encourage the development of real criminality. In the first place, whatever may be the extent of rural responsibility for and participation in the immorality and vice of the city, the fact remains that the institutions and agencies that cater to vice and immorality are located mainly in the cities; and proximity to these institutions and agencies encourages the development of criminal tendencies. Again, excessive crowding and bad sanitary and social conditions in general in the congested sections of the large urban centers also conduce to the development of criminal tendencies. And the glaring contrast between poverty and wealth stirs up envy and arouses cupidity in excessive degree; while the enormous stores of wealth in highly mobile form irresistibly tempt to crime. Lastly, the obliteration or weak functioning of the neighborhood sense in the city contributes to the

encouragement of crime by releasing the individual from the restraint of public opinion.[18]

But the city also enjoys advantages that work powerfully, in the long run, toward the repression of criminal tendencies and for amenability to law and order. Among these are the superior sense of social solidarity and the refining and civilizing influences of gregarious urban life, in contrast with the unsocial influences of isolation in the rural districts; superior means for education and religious improvement; more efficient policing and superior judicial administration. The existence in the urban centers of a large number of mental, social, and recreational interests and activities, in contrast with the vacuity and poverty of life in many rural communities, also encourages a normal social development among urban dwellers and forefends the development of criminal instincts, which, in default of more wholesome influences, often make rapid headway among the rural born. Moreover, excessive poverty, bad housing, insanitary conditions, and other brutalizing environmental features, are by no means confined to congested urban centers.[19] Lastly, the urban environment appears to be less favorable than the rural community for the production of mental defectives, from among whom the vicious, immoral, and criminal elements are believed to be largely recruited.[20] If all these favorable urban influences have not been substantially effective as yet in the restraint or elimination of criminal tendencies among the urban population, their beneficial influence is doubtless to be observed in such progress in that direction as is to be discerned in those countries where the urbanizing movement has been longest in evidence. Time is required in order that these forces may exert their full influence upon the successive millions of rural migrants into the urban centers and effect the adaptation of the latter to the conditions of urban life.

Authorities on criminality are unanimously agreed as to the wide prevalence of crime in the United States. Many

persons believe that crime has been increasing in this country at a rapid rate—some dating the increase from about 1850, others dating it from the period of the Civil War, and still others fixing the date at about 1880. Several of these authorities believe that a climax was reached at about 1895, since when a moderate decrease is believed to have occurred. Others are of the opinion that the tide of crime is still rising in this country—and perhaps elsewhere. There are also some excellent authorities who believe that the statistics of crime in this country are so inadequate and unreliable that no trustworthy conclusion can be reached as to its trend. Still other good authorities, while admitting the lack of dependable data, yet believe that no increase in crime is indicated, even though enough is known or admitted to present us in an extremely unenviable light in comparison with many other countries.

The determination of the real facts with reference to the actual trend of crime in general is complicated not only by lack of accurate data relative to crime but also by variation from time to time and from place to place in the severity of the enforcement of the law, by the adding of new offences to the list of crimes, by the wave-like movement of the trend itself, and by still other circumstances and qualifying factors. An apparent increase in crime in general may not be inconsistent with a decrease, or stationary situation, with reference to the more serious forms of crime; and it has been well pointed out that an increase in arrests may be a sign of progress. Manifestly the outlawing of lotteries, of gambling, and of the carrying of concealed weapons, connoted progress even though it contributed nominally toward an increase in crime.

With respect to lynchings, the most atrocious and socially dangerous of all crimes of violence in the United States, there has been a clear and marked improvement within the last thirty years or more—though the record is still a shameful one. For in spite of the great increase in total population and coincidently with the marked trend to the city the num-

ber of lynchings in the country as a whole diminished from a maximum of 208 in 1892 to a minimum of but 16 in 1924; and the average figure for the twelve years, 1913–1924, has been very materially below the average for previous years. Our homicide rate in recent years has been truly shocking. And a recent writer, pointing out that the homicide rate in thirty-one American cities had increased from an average of 8.2 per 100,000 during the period 1909–13 to 8.8 in 1914–18 and 9.1 in 1919, concluded that "human life was never as insecure in the United States" as it was at the time when he was writing.[21] But some years ago statistics were collected and published by one of our large city newspapers which showed a homicide rate of 15.2 per 100,000 for the country as a whole, in 1895;[22] and in 1903, according to good authority, the homicide rate in this country was as high as 11.2 per 100,000.[23] Manifestly it makes a great deal of difference as to the periods that are chosen for comparison; and great care is required that inaccurate generalizations with reference to the trend of crime may be avoided. Persistent declarations, too, in recent years that juvenile delinquency is increasing in this country are met with quite positive denials—at least so far as the larger cities are concerned—from authoritative sources.[23a]

The charge is also frequently made that crime is increasing everywhere in other civilized countries. But such a charge is without adequate foundation. Aschaffenburg, indeed, has given the impression that crime was on the increase in Germany previous to the outbreak of the recent war; and other reputable authorities have made a similar claim with reference to France, and even in the case of Great Britain.[24] But other equally good authorities hold to a different view—at least with respect to Great Britain and France.[25] And the figures for 1906, which rounded out a full half century over which complete statistics of crimes and offences, and of

criminal indictments, in England and Wales had been secured, conclusively sustain this latter view so far as these two parts of the United Kingdom are concerned. For these statistics showed that while population increased 79.2 per cent during this period the number of persons tried for indictable offences increased but 8.1 per cent. Moreover, the decline was particularly marked in respect to the more serious offences—the serious crime of murder having diminished about one-third. "Crimes against morals" increased from 2.72 to 5.25 per 100,000; but new crimes had been included within this list. There was a slight increase in non-indictable offences; but this increase was entirely in non-criminal offences, which are not only less serious but are also to a large extent criminal merely in the technical sense. "Crimes known to the police" also diminished markedly. Moreover, statistics for the year 1913 showed a continuation of this downward trend of crime in England and Wales.[26] And analogous statistics for Scotland and Ireland show an entirely similar trend as to crime in the last half-century.[27]

Now this clear and convincing proof of the decline in crime—and especially in serious crime—in the United Kingdom, where the statistics of crime are highly trustworthy, where there is a very high proportion of urban to total population, and where the preponderance of urban population has existed a length of time sufficient to eliminate the effect of a rapid transfer of population from country to city in swelling the statistics of crime in a merely nominal way, must be admitted to be of the utmost significance. If the development of city life on a large scale inevitably contributes, as many claim, to the increase of criminality, that fact should be clearly revealed by the statistics of crime in that country which has led the world in the urbanizing movement. But since the outcome has been just the opposite of this, it is not unreasonable to conclude that urbanization, where sufficient

time has elapsed for it to work out its ultimate effects, is associated with decreasing and not with increasing criminality.

Statistics of crime in almost all countries quite regularly show, indeed, a much larger number of offences, at a given time and in proportion to population, in the urban centers than in the rural districts.[28] Yet with respect to particular crimes of a serious nature, it appears very doubtful whether the rural population enjoys any advantage in the comparison. In European countries the rural population displays a tendency toward major offences or crimes of a brutal nature; while the urban population has a lower proportion of major offenders and inclines toward criminal acts that involve cunning and finesse. In our own country, too, the proportion of male prisoners and juvenile delinquents committed for grave homicide from the group of farmers and farm laborers fully equaled the proportion of the former and appreciably exceeded the proportion of the latter in the total male population ten years of age and over, in 1910.[29] Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the two most highly urbanized States in the Union, have alternated in recent years in showing the lowest ratio of homicides to population; while comparatively rural States, such as Arizona and Montana, have ranked highest in this respect. By geographical sections, too, the homicide rate in this country is quite generally in inverse proportion to urbanization. And those of our cities that have the most excessive homicide rate are set in the midst of a quick-on-the-trigger rural population and have been built up almost exclusively by immigration from the surrounding rural areas.[29a] The States that lead in the number of lynchings are also conspicuously and predominantly rural.

Moreover, many of the serious crimes that are committed in the cities are *in* but not *of* the cities.[30] Many homicides in the urban centers are committed by rural residents, and many others that are committed in the open country are

listed from the centers of population where the guilty party is arraigned or sentenced and not from the place where the crime occurred. The jails from which the unfortunate, and by no means always guilty, victims of mob violence are dragged are invariably located in some town or city. A lynching almost invariably appears, then, as the act of the residents of that town or city, even if the personnel of the mob be almost wholly constituted from outside sources and the open country be the scene of the original crime and the home of its perpetrator. Other crimes less serious and other criminals less hardened though of rural origin are likewise charged to the urban centers, where they are handled through the urban courts. Further, official notice is less fully taken of many forms of delinquency—especially of juvenile delinquency—in the rural districts than in the urban centers; and the statistics of crime, in the rural districts already deficient through defective records or incomplete reports, are thereby rendered still less complete.[31]

Again, many urban criminals have had their origin in the rural districts, or have "received their first bad impulses from evil associations" there. Vandervelde has cited the judicial statistics of Belgium to show that while the number of infractions of the law is larger in the urban centers, the classification of criminals by birth reveals the fact that those districts that had as a center a large city produced a smaller proportion of the criminals than did the rural districts. He therefore concluded that cities are not so much crime-producing centers as favorable places to which criminals from all sources resort to practice or commit their unlawful acts.[32] Still further, the disproportionate concentration in the urban centers of persons in the youthful and in the younger adult age groups, especially for the Negroes and the foreign-born, makes for an excess of crime, inasmuch as it is mainly by persons from these age groups that criminal acts are committed.[33]

Lastly, the disproportionately large concentration of the foreign-born in general in the urban centers constitutes an unfavorable influence, though not inherently so, there. Unfamiliarity with our language, laws, customs, and institutions often involves them, many times unawares, in conflict with our laws and municipal regulations and makes them technically criminal though they may not be actually so. Thus handicapped and unable to enter into our ways of thinking and into sympathy with our customs and manners, they also lose sympathetic contact with their children, upon whom the national assimilative forces act with markedly greater force and rapidity, and so lose control over them. It is not strange, therefore, that juvenile delinquency should prevail in larger degree among this element of our population than among any other element. In the nature of the case, however, unfavorable influences such as these ultimately must greatly diminish, if not wholly disappear.

There is therefore very much justification for the view that the serious condition relative to crime in this country is primarily due to the persistence of the contumacious and refractory spirit of the frontier, where each man was very much a law to himself, and thus represents a rural rather than an urban influence cropping out in our American nature. In time we may hope that this primitive rural influence will become adjusted to the urban environment and be tamed and made tractable by it. In older countries this adjustment and civilizing process already have been largely completed.

It is significant that our population had acquired a reputation for a lawless and refractory spirit long before the city element became important in this country. Such a spirit not only characterized us as a whole: it was also recognized as prevailing in special degree among the strictly rural population. Restless, energetic, impatient of restraint, pressing on to attain their own objects with little consideration for the

rights or interests of others, and subjected to the rude and rough influences of their environment, our log-cabin ancestors had ingrained in them the disposition to brush aside all obstacles in their path and to obey no will but their individual own. Disputes were settled by personal encounter rather than by resort to public authority. Rowdyism and general coarseness of manners prevailed; and there was frequent occurrence of crimes of varying degrees of seriousness, stealing, assaults, disturbance of the peace, and not infrequently homicide.[34]

During the period of the Revolution lawlessness and crime were manifest in pronounced degree in many sections of this country; and following that epochal event a similar spirit of lawlessness, and even of semi-anarchy and rebellion, characterized the rural districts especially.[35] Harriet Martineau, cataloguing the instances of violence and lawlessness that she observed in this country in 1834, exclaimed "Here is a fearful list!" Horse-stealing, cattle-rustling, and outlawry in general have prevailed in every frontier section in this country; and the summary dealing out of rough, and at times doubtless blind and misplaced, justice to lawfully untried and unconvicted persons was by no means confined to the slave districts of the South.[36]

Buckle has pointed out how, among primitive and barbarous peoples, the lack of intellectual interests leads to emphasis on mere physical courage and prowess, and that a man is in consequence esteemed wholly in proportion to the number of enemies he has killed. It would be absurd, of course, to class our frontier population as a whole in any such category. But the almost daily encounter with the wild beasts of the forest and the not infrequent conflict with the scarcely less ferocious savages certainly did not serve to cultivate a sense of the sacredness of life. It is not surprising, therefore, to be told by a careful historian of our development as a

people that as the years passed and we evolved more and more from this stage we became a more humane and kindly people.[37]

The duel was, and still is, a feudal, rural institution. The feud is also predominantly rural in origin; and where it still prevails in this country, in remote rural districts, its vogue is in proportion to the degree of isolation from the centers of population. The *Mafia* traces back to its rise among the rural retainers of the feudal Sicilian nobility, and the society of the "Molly Maguires" was derived ultimately from rural Ireland. The ancestors of the infamous Jukes were squatters upon the soil and their ancestral habitat along "the forest-covered margin of five lakes" constituted one of "the crime cradles of New York." Another band of squatters, driven out of the same State, turned a veritable Canaan in a Northwestern State, where they settled anew, into a Vale of Siddim and became a fecund source of mental defectives, prostitutes, and criminals. And The Pines, notorious center of a rural district in a rural county of New Jersey, has contributed to make that county first in the State in the proportion of feeble-mindedness, insanity, and criminality.[38]

In recent years, too, there has been a large, if not growing, amount of lawlessness and crime arising from disturbing economic conditions and relations in the rural districts in this country—the widely distributed sabotage of the I. W. W. in field and forest and mine, the night-riding exploits of farm operators, both owners and tenants, in the South Central and Southwestern States, and the disorders in the fruit and vegetable areas of the Pacific Coast States. The development of farmers' unions has been associated, especially in the dairying and tobacco-growing districts, with the outbreak of violence at critical periods in their relations with other groups. And it is commonly recognized that there is a greater tendency toward violent, and even criminal, acts and actions in the mining industries, which are still largely rural in set-

ting in this country, than in almost any other group of industries.[39]

The virtual non-existence of a distinctive class of agricultural laborers in this country has preserved us, for the most part, from the disorders and acts of violence that in many countries have attended the introduction of labor-saving machinery in agriculture. Only the concealment of rural isolation, however, obscures the fact that we have not been wholly free from this form of crime. The slave, indeed, indulged in much petty sabotage on the Southern plantation. And there, too, the Negro race became thoroughly schooled in the art of "purloining"—a trait and habit that doubtless go far to explain the highly criminal cupidity manifested by this element of our population in the midst of the larger opportunities of our wealthy urban centers today. Moreover, this same rural isolation and the fear, on the part of the victim, of revenge by those who commit the depredations, result in the condoning or overlooking of many offences of a more or less serious character, such as thievery and the maiming and poisoning of farm animals, in the rural community.

The cities, through the vicious and criminal influences centered there, have undoubtedly contributed in a measure to delinquency among the rural population. But there is also good reason to suppose that the splendid law-abiding character manifested by a large proportion of our rural population today is due, in no small degree, to the refining and civilizing influence that the cities, in spite of these demoralizing features, both exert upon their own population and also extend beyond their own boundaries to work powerfully to the same end elsewhere. And with the encouraging progress that has been manifested in recent decades in the direction of greater municipal purity and efficiency, we may not unreasonably hope for a substantial increase in the net influence for good that is thus exerted by our urban centers, to the

end that there may be further elimination of the excessive inclination toward criminality that our population, both rural and urban, with all its good qualities appears always to have displayed.[40]

IV

THE DIVORCE PROBLEM

There has been a general tendency toward an increase in divorce in countries where the cityward trend has been in evidence; and, on the whole, divorce is more common, in proportion to population, in the urban centers than in the rural districts. It thus seems clear that the cityward trend has contributed toward an increase in divorce. On the other hand, both the urban influence upon the divorce rate and also the significance of the growth of the divorce problem in this country as an index of morality have been grossly exaggerated. In spite of the excess of divorce in the cities of highly urbanized England, the number of divorces in that country has shown only a very moderate tendency toward increase in the last sixty years when the growth of population is taken into consideration. Though France is much less urban than England, the divorce rate of the former country greatly exceeds that of the latter; and the divorce rate in the United States, which is also greatly less urban than England, exceeds in excessive degree that of the latter country. Moreover, the divorce rate in this country increases, in general, from the urban East to the rural West and Southwest; and over the period 1867–1906 the proportional increase in divorce in the South Central States, the most purely rural part of the country, greatly exceeded that for any other section. It is clear, therefore, that the excessive prevalence of divorce in this country and its great increase here in recent decades

have been associated only in part with the cityward trend, with which it has coincided in point of time.

Nor can the growing tendency toward divorce in this country be accepted as a convincing index of the trend of morality among our population, however much the trend may be regretted and however serious the problem may be. Surely the relative morality prevailing in this country and in England can not be estimated by a comparison of the divorce rate in the two countries. Such statistical data as are available, both in this country and also abroad, show that the primary object of divorce is not re-marriage to a third party and that transfer of residence to jurisdictions with lax divorce laws in order to establish grounds for divorce is, on the whole, exceptional. It is worth noting, too, that in this country during the period 1887–1906 less than one divorce in six, in 1916 less than one in eight, and in 1922 less than one in nine, was granted on the ground of adultery.

Whatever opinion one may hold as to the expediency of divorce as a means of cure for such a condition, the growing disposition of the courts to grant divorce and of the public to justify it has been largely the reflection of an increasing impatience with the acts that cause domestic infelicity or that represent a violation of the marriage vow. In so far, therefore, it represents the influence of higher and not of lower standards of morality. Behavior that is today regarded as altogether inconsistent with the marriage vow and thus not to be tolerated by the community nor endured by the innocent party to the union was once regarded with an easy tolerance and not thought to be particularly inconsistent with the maintenance of the regular marital relations. We are less satisfied than formerly to insist upon the sanctity of outward forms when the spirit that perhaps originally underlay and justified the form has disappeared. Particularly has the growing tolerance toward divorce been associated with an increasing consideration for the rights and feelings of women.

It is thus in large degree a feature of the feminist movement, which, as we have seen, the agricultural frontier and the urban centers have united in furthering.

No doubt the conditions that exist in the urban centers are less favorable, in some respects, than those that prevail in the rural districts for preserving the ties that bind the family together and that maintain its stability. Nor can the present situation with respect to divorce, especially in our own country, be looked upon except with grave concern. But there appears to be good ground for the hope that the present situation may prove to be but a transient phase and that the undoubtedly wholesome factors that are in large measure involved may yet prove effectual toward a more satisfactory outcome. The great number of splendid and happy homes that are after all the general rule and not the exception among the city population give promise that these favoring factors will prove adequate, in the long run, to the desired end. The city appears to be favorable, on the whole, to the promotion of the religious and moral sanctions, to the dissemination of intelligence, and to the elimination of poverty and economic dependence. And its influences appear favorable, too, to the development of those political and social sentiments and sanctions that are necessary to insure the well-being and survival of society and the state.

The attentive student of political and social development will be well convinced of the essentially constructive character of the urban contribution to modern civilization, and will have faith to believe that it will continue to supply in the future, as it has supplied in the past, adequate antidotes and correctives for the evils that it incidentally creates. He will have faith to believe that the city community, no less than the rural community, will find means to discourage that prime cause of divorce, the hasty marriage, just as it appears to work in the long run for the elimination of that other

unsocial factor in general and equally potent cause of divorce in this country, the spirit of lawlessness and of criminality. As has been well said, "one who knows anything of the family and home life of America will not readily despond of the outcome." [41]

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5. Bryce, *Modern Democracies,* Vol. I, p. 465, Vol. II, p. 255. Relative to the favorable trend in sobriety in recent years among the workingmen of France, see the comprehensive study, "L'Alcoolisme. Est-Il En Decroise Dans La Population Ouvrière?" in *Bulletin du Ministère du Travail,* 1923, pp. 39-117, et al. As to Brazil, see Nash, Roy, *The Conquest of Brazil,* N. Y., 1926, p. 345.

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7. "Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress" (1909), p. 51; *Statistique du Mouvement de la Population,* 1907-10 (France), Paris, 1912, pp. lxix, lxxiii.

8. *Ann. Rep. of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in England and Wales,* 1913, pp. xvii-xviii; *Journal of the*

American Institute of Criminal Law, Vol. IV, p. 212 ff.; Weber, *Growth of Cities*, p. 405.

9. Vandervelde, *L'Erode Rurale et le Retour aux Champs*, p. 237 ff.; Smith, Samuel George, *Social Pathology*, N. Y., 1911, p. 272. Cf. *Presbyterian Magazine*, Dec., 1921, p. 704; *The Scientific Monthly*, July, 1919, pp. 83-90; *Missionary Review of the World*, Dec., 1921, p. 944; Inman, S. G., *Problems in Pan Americanism*, N. Y., 1925, pp. 69-71.

10. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 406; Aschaffenburg, Gustav, *Crime and its Repression*, Boston, 1913, p. 63.

11. Weber, *op. cit.*; Guillon, *L'Émigration des Campagnes*, pp. 398-9; Flexner, A., *Prostitution in Europe*, N. Y., 1914, *passim*; *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections*, 1914, p. 160 ff., 1915, p. 267. See also the view expressed by Miss Lilian Barker, governor of the Borstal Institution for Girls at Aylesbury (Washington *Star*, May 18, 1925).

11a. See Washington *Star*, May 15, 1925, for statement made by Dr. Valeria H. Parker, president of the New York Soroptimist Club, before Washington, D. C., Soroptimists, at the Lafayette Hotel, in praise of the elimination of vice from the large cities in the United States—and especially from New York City.

12. Blackmar, F. W., and Gillan, J. L., *Outlines of Sociology*, N. Y., 1915, p. 485; Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 608.

13. See articles by Rollin Lynde Hartt, in the *Outlook*, March 3, 10, 17, 1900; and see *Papers and Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society*, 1916, p. 24.

14. Rogers, A. C., and Merrill, Maud, *Dwellers in the Vale of Siddim*, Boston, 1919, p. 20.

15. "Educational Needs of Farm Women" (U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary, *Report* No. 105, March 22, 1915), p. 20; *Bulletin of the American Academy of Medicine*, December, 1913.

16. See Washington *Star*, April 28, 1922, for views of Jane Addams in this connection. See also *Literary Digest*, May 14, 1921, pp. 9-12, 58-73. May 21, 1921, p. 27, et al. June 17, 1922, p. 38 ff. June 24, 1922, p. 34 ff.

17. Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 597; Stutsman, J. O., *Curing the Criminal*, N. Y., 1926, pp. 6-7, 13.

18. Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 608.

19. For England, consult Savage, W. C., *Rural Housing*, London, 1915, and Harben, H. D., *The Rural Problem*, London, 1913. For this country, see Bashore, *Overcrowding and Defective Housing in the Rural Districts*, and the annual *Proceedings* of the National Conference on Housing.

20. *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work*, 1919, p. 258; "The Practical Value of Scientific Study of Juvenile Delinquents" (U. S. Dept. of Labor, Children's Bureau, *Bur. Publ.* No. 96, Washington, 1922), p. 20.

21. *The Spectator* (N. Y.), Nov. 18, 1920, pp. 22-23. See *ibid.*, May 21, 1925, p. 3 ff., for an asserted further increase in the homicide rate in this country by 1925. The record as to lynchings was less favorable in 1926.

22. By the Chicago *Tribune*. See *McClure's Magazine*, Vol. 34, p. 117.

23. "Crime and Judicial Inefficiency," by Professor J. A. Garner, in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 29, p. 601 ff.

23a. See annual report of Presiding Justice Franklin Chase Hoyt, of the Children's Court, New York City, 1926; the views of Chas. L. Chute, general secretary of the National Probation Association, before the members of the Nebraska State Conference of Social Workers at Fremont, Nebraska, Oct. 5, 1926. See also *Presbyterian Banner*, Oct. 21, 1926, p. 20, for favorable view of Dr. H. H. Hart, consulting penologist of the Russell Sage Foundation, relative to current trend of crime in this country.

24. Aschaffenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 218; Meuriot, M. Paul, *Des Agglomérations Urbaines dans l'Europe Contemporaine*, Paris, 1897, pp. 346-350.

25. Levasseur, P. E., *La Population Française*, Paris, 1891, Vol. II, p. 455; Guillon, *op. cit.*, p. 458; *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 10, p. 609. Cf. Spencer, *Political Institutions*, pp. 623-4; and Howitt, *The Rural Life of England*, pp. 185-211, 284.

26. *Judicial Statistics of England and Wales*, 1906, pp. 28-41, 1913, pp. 19-20. See also Quinton, R. F., *Crime and Criminals, 1876-1910*, London, 1910, pp. 7, 11; Lowell, *The Government of England*, 1920, Vol. II, pp. 507, 524; and Washington *Star*, Sept. 5, 1925.

27. *Whittaker's Almanack*, 1917, p. 498; *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1917, pp. 37-38. See Bryce, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 254, for reference to similar trend in Australia, 1881-1912.

28. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 401 ff.; Aschaffenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62. See also Sutherland, Edwin H., *Criminology*, Philadelphia, 1924, pp. 93-97, and Gillin, John L., *Criminology and Penology*, New York and London, 1926, pp. 66-69.

29. *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law*, Vol. IV, p. 768 ff.; "Prisoners and Juvenile Delinquents in the United States, 1910," Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1918, p. 151; Aschaffenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.

29a. Cf. Redfield, H. V., *Homicide, North and South*, Philadelphia, 1880.

30. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

31. See Claghorn, Kate, "Juvenile Delinquency in Rural New York" (U. S. Dept. of Labor, Children's Bureau, *Bur. Publ.* No. 32, 1918), pp. 11-12; "Prisoners and Juvenile Delinquents in the U. S., 1910," *passim.*

32. *Op. cit.*, pp. 236-7; *Proceedings of the National Conference of*

Charities and Corrections, 1900, p. 120; Guillon, *op. cit.*, p. 339 ff. For a contrary opinion as to London, a generation ago, see Booth, Charles (Ed.), *Life and Labour of the People in London,* London and New York, 1892, Vol. III, pp. 82-83.

33. A comparative excess of women in the cities constitutes, on the other hand, a favorable factor relative to crime there.

34. Turner, *The Frontier in American History,* pp. 32, 240, 251-4; McMaster, *History of the People of the U. S.,* Vol. IV (1907), pp. 522-549; Dwight, Timothy, *Travels in New England and New York,* New Haven, 1822, Vol. I, pp. 335-8, Vol. II, pp. 333, 458 ff.; *Transactions of the Conn. Academy of Arts and Sciences,* Vol. 20, p. 376 ff.

35. Adams, *Familiar Letters of John Adams and his Wife Abigail Adams, during the Revolution,* pp. 12-13, et al.; above, p. 413.

36. *Society in America,* London, 1837, Vol. I, pp. 162-4; Chase, Salmon P., and Cleveland, C. D., *Anti-Slavery Addresses of 1844 and 1845,* London, 1867, pp. 116-7; *Iowa Journal of History and Politics,* Vol. 10, pp. 151-254.

37. McMaster, *op. cit.*, p. 98. Cf. Ward, Lester F., *Pure Sociology,* N. Y., 1903, pp. 448-453; *Edinburgh Review,* Vol. 157, pp. 162-3; *The Living Age,* Vol. 314, pp. 842-5.

38. *Dwellers in the Vale of Siddim, op. cit.;* Kite, Elizabeth S., "A Study in Degeneracy," in the *Nation* (N. Y.), April 17, 1913.

39. The Jacksonville (Ill.) *Courier* is cited in the *Literary Digest,* Oct. 14, 1922, p. 20, as having stated that the majority of the union miners indicted for participation in the massacre of non-union miners in the vicinity of Herrin, Illinois, in the summer of 1922 "came from the mountain regions of Tennessee and Kentucky." Cf. editorial, New York *Evening Post,* Feb. 2, 1925.

40. The recent report on the federal census of prisoners on January 1st, 1923 ("Prisoners, 1923. Crime Conditions in the U. S. As reflected in Census Statistics of Imprisoned Offenders," Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1926), throws little or no light upon the question of the recent trend of crime in this country or upon that of its distribution as between the rural and the urban districts.

41. By Professor W. F. Willcox, in article on "Divorce," in *Encyc. Britan.* The four government reports, published by the Bureau of the Census, of investigations relative to "Marriage and Divorce" (covering the periods and years 1867-1886, 1887-1906, 1916, and 1922, respectively), should of course be consulted.

CHAPTER XXI

The Religious Consequences of Urbanization

There are three main counts in the indictment often made regarding the asserted injurious results of the cityward movement upon religion and the church. In the first place, the rural community is esteemed to be inherently superior to the urban community from the religious point of view. In the second place, the rural church is asserted to be on the decline as a result of the widespread migration from the rural districts to the urban centers. And in the third place, the transfer of population from the presumably more favorable rural environment to the city and the asserted decline of the rural church are declared to be contributory to a religious and moral decline in general.

I

THE RURAL AND THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF RELIGION AND THE CHURCH

Life is simpler and plainer in the rural districts, it is said; and people are there brought more closely into contact with the realities of life. The rural population is therefore likely to be more austere in character and to take a more serious attitude toward life, and thus to have a greater inclination toward religion and the church.[1] In the city, on the other hand, the pleasures and diversions of life occupy a much larger place; and these influences contribute toward a less serious attitude toward life. A smaller place is consequently found in the city for the religious element.[2] More-

over, these differences are said to exert a selective influence in drawing off from the rural community those who are sociable and convivial by nature and thus naturally inclined to set more store by the lighter things of life. And this circumstance, in turn, serves to accentuate and perpetuate these differences. The church in the rural community therefore has fewer competing interests, as well as a constituency that is more favorably inclined toward the things it has to offer. Particularly are these considerations of importance with respect to the younger generation, to whom the things with which the church has to compete have a more persuasive appeal.

Evil associations and the opportunities for dissipation and the pursuit of vice, in the city, also not infrequently deaden, or even totally defeat, the appeal that religion and the church make; and the sceptical influences that the city not only originates, through its more active and intrusive intellectual life, but also disseminates, as it disseminates ideas of all kinds, are more in evidence in the urban centers and make a stronger challenge to religious faith there than in the rural community. The rural population is farther removed, too, from the liberal, if not positively irreligious, influences that are exerted by the immigrant population—one phase of which is luminously defined by the term "Continental Sunday." For these, and other, reasons the rural population has been very generally regarded as more attached to the religious traditions and more inclined to hold fast to the forms and practices of the religious life; while the urban environment is thought to be conducive to irreligion and unbelief.[3]

These considerations must be admitted to have weight. But it seems likely that they are fully offset by countervailing advantages that religion and the church enjoy in the urban community. There is, in the first place, the great advantage in the urban community of superior opportunity for effective

coöperation in religious life and work. As a result of this advantage we find there larger and stronger congregations, abler ministers, incomparably more adequate and efficient church plants, closer and more intimate touch with the great religious leaders and with the great religious movements of the day, a larger enthusiasm and a more earnest zeal for the promotion of the work of the church in general, and a challenge to an individual and associative religious and spiritual development that the rural community, with its simpler and more restricted outlook and means, can not hope to rival. Again, the urban population has succeeded much better than the country folk of today in combining the social side of life in its wholesome aspects with religion and the activities of the church. A faith that reasons, too, with due humility and reverence, is also likely—in a world that men profess to be a rational creation—to be no less firmly rooted in the long run than the faith that never faced a doubt; and it is far more likely to be effectual in lifting humanity to a better and higher religious and spiritual development. Religion and the church, in the urban centers, thus match the strong claim of other interests and activities with an appeal that appears, on the whole, to be at least not less effective than that which the former make in the simpler environment of the rural community.[4]

II

THE RURAL EXODUS AND THE RURAL CHURCH

The deficiencies of the rural church are painfully evident. They consist, in the main, in the brief, the fractional, and the non-resident pastorates of its ministry, in the inadequate and often unsightly and uninspiring church structures, in the inadequate financial support which is provided, in the irregular attendance, or non-attendance, of its mem-

bers, in the over-churching that results from the competition of rival sects and denominations, in the neglect of the wholesome play instincts of the youth of the rural community, in the failure to evangelize the surrounding unchurched population, and in the failure properly to relate the spiritual activities of the church to the secular interests of the rural community.

In the main these deficiencies are not the result of the rural exodus but have been much in evidence from the beginning. Yet they have affected the rural churches more unfavorably under conditions of declining rural population than in early days when the population in the rural communities was increasing. They have thus contributed to the elimination of numbers of the rural churches in more recent decades. But this outcome, in turn, which is the most patent result of the rural exodus, in the religious sphere, is in itself not really to be deprecated, though from the sentimental point of view it may be regrettable. For nothing is more reasonable than that the number of churches in the open country and in the small rural villages should decrease with the decrease of population in the rural community, with the growth of churches in the neighboring towns, and with the growing tendency to eliminate sectarian competition and over-churching. Moreover, many—fortunately an increasing number—of the rural churches are today making progress toward the amelioration or elimination of these defects; and, in the main, continued existence of these defects represents failure to advance rather than any positive retrogression.

III

URBANIZATION AND THE ASSERTED RELIGIOUS DECLINE

If the urban community be regarded as not less favorable than the rural community to religion and to the church and if

there has been, apart from the disappearance of a large number of churches in the rural districts and in spite of the continuance of many evident deficiencies, no actual decline in the rural church, there would appear to be no warrant, *a priori,* for assuming that there has been a religious decline in general. Moreover, an examination of the evidence in the case tends strongly to support the conclusion that there has been no such decline. On the contrary there is evidence of gradual improvement. We are naturally apprehensive with reference to those things that we have near at heart; and we are likely to see the defects of the present in wrong perspective in comparison with the past. There probably has come a changed emphasis and a different interpretation with reference to religious truth; and these changes may not all have been for the good. But on the whole, religious and moral standards are higher today than ever before. And though there is still a painful contrast between profession and practice, a larger proportion of the population than ever before acknowledges, openly or tacitly, the claims of religion and of the church, and there is a nearer approach than ever before to conformity to the religious ideals.

It is very easy for us to ascribe to early generations a degree of rectitude and of virtue to which they by no means attained. Increase Mather agonized repeatedly over the state of religion and morals in the New England of his day. Jonathan Edwards, referring to his own parish of Northampton, emphasized the extraordinary dullness in religion and the intemperate, licentious, and lewd practices that prevailed among the youth of the community, and Timothy Dwight, even though he declared that the first settlers of New Haven had brought with them "a collection of peasants and servants remarkable for their profligacy," was looking back even in his time to "the good old days." [5]

Then as now periods of backsliding alternated with periods of revival. By the time of the Revolution the good

effects of The Great Awakening of 1734, to which Jonathan Edwards and Whitefield had largely contributed, had abated and the country fell once again into a condition of religious and moral decline that manifested itself especially in the form of a spread of infidelistic views in the colleges and elsewhere and that took on an aggravated form in the West and South. The Awakening of 1800 led to material improvement again.[6] But the Protestant Episcopal Church was officially reported in 1811 as being in a state of "derangement and decay" in parts of Massachusetts, in a "doubtful" state in Pennsylvania, in a "deplorable" condition in Maryland, and in "danger of total ruin" in Virginia.[7] And John F. Schermerhorn and Samuel John Mills, investigating religious conditions in general in the West and South in 1812 and 1813, reported on the whole "a state of spiritual darkness," with drunkenness, profane swearing, desecration of the Sabbath, and gross neglect of religious duties as prominent features of the picture.[8]

Another writer states that some of the early settlements of Western New York were "notorious" for immoral habits and for contempt for and neglect of religious institutions; that many of the early settlers there were influenced by the flood of French atheism; that the Sabbath was a day of business, of visiting, and of pastime; and that drinking and carousing were common.[9] *A Narrative of the State of Religion,* published by the Presbyterian Church in 1822, stated that vast sections were "destitute of the stated means of grace." The Presbytery of Niagara, with 26 congregations, had only four pastors; while that of Genesee, with 19 congregations, had but two pastors, and but one of these congregations enjoyed services more than half-time. In some sections the infrequent regular services were "thinly attended." And the "gross vices of intemperance, profane swearing, Sabbath breaking, and gambling" were reported as being extensively prevalent, especially in the newer sec-

tions.[10] Caleb Atwater, writing of Ohio in 1838, testified that there was a prejudice "in this and all other states" against all preachers.[11]

Those familiar with life in the open country in early days not infrequently describe the church services of those days in no flattering manner: the preacher, with his "rawhide oratory," and the alternate who tilled the soil during the week, the old women who munched peppermints in church to keep awake, the young fellows who with their girls rushed for the horses or the wagon at the close of the services, and the journey homeward which "resolved itself into a rollicking horse-race." [12] Others tell us of the levity with which the sacraments, such as baptism and the communion, were sometimes regarded, and even participated in, by some from the very fold of the church.

So one might follow down through the years to the present and cite, in regular sequence, complaints of the low state of religion and of morals, of vacant pulpits, of the scarcity of ministers and of ministerial candidates, of churches declining or disappearing as a result of the migration of members, of rampant sectarianism, and of every other defect that is stressed today and, as in former years, regarded as evidence of religious decline! In his inaugural address as Moderator of the United Free Church of Scotland, in 1921, Dr. Andrew Philip, of Longforgan, a recognized authority on the church history of Scotland and himself a country minister, compared religious conditions in that country a hundred years before with those prevailing today and reached conclusions "wholly favorable to the present in contrast with the past." [13] And there is hardly the slightest doubt that a similar comparison in other parts of the United Kingdom,[13a] in this country, and in all the countries where the cityward movement has been in evidence, would result in a like conclusion.

The rural churches have indeed lost their most enter-

prising elements to the city churches and have thus contributed much to the building up of the latter. But the country has sent its worst as well as its best to the city; and, on the whole, in spite of much unwarranted talk of general rural decadence, those who have remained in the rural districts are not inferior in moral qualities to those who have migrated to the cities. Moreover, the contributive relation between the rural and the urban church has been mutual and not one-sided. The latter has given as well as received. It has furnished organization, leadership, inspiration, and generous financial support to the work of the church in general. Much has been said and written relative to the contribution of the rural community to religious leadership, and fear has been expressed lest the decline of the rural church should deprive the church in general of leadership. But it appears very likely that the city community is a creditor rather than a debtor in the matter of religious leadership. It would have been strange indeed if a majority of the ordinary leaders of the church had not come from the rural districts so long as the rural element in the population far outnumbered the urban element. But though many of the ordinary pastors and priests have come from the rural districts, the urban centers have been prolific of great church leaders, as they have been of great leaders along other lines.[14]

From the beginning, indeed, Christianity has been largely a city product.[15] The original Great Awakening occurred at Jerusalem on the Day of Pentecost, and from there as a center the gospel of Christ was disseminated by His disciples and by the apostles. At Antioch the followers of Christ were first called after His name. Saul of Tarsus, brought up at the feet of Gamaliel in Jerusalem and later converted into Paul the apostle, described himself as a citizen of no mean city. And the great work of founding the Christian church was accomplished through his organization of bodies of Christians in a number of cities, which he

visited and revisited in order to instruct the converts and to build up and strengthen the individual churches he had established.[15a] Polycarp was a native of Smyrna, as was also Irenaeus in all probability; Justin Martyr was born in Neapolis; Ambrose was born at Trèves and educated in Rome; Chrysostom, "the golden mouthed," was a native of Antioch. Origen is thought to have been a native of Alexandria. And Augustine, whose distress at the fall of the City of Rome led him to write *The City of God,* was born at Tagaste, or Tajelt, in Numidia, and was converted to the Christian faith at Milan, in Italy.

Of the four great Christian teachers of the twelfth century, Abelard, Anselm, Arnold of Brescia, and Bernard of Clairvaux, the first three were of town or city birth and the last was born, of noble parentage, in the vicinity of the French city of Dijon. St. Francis, founder of the order of Franciscans, was a native of Assisi, Italy, where his father was a leading merchant; Catherine of Sienna was the youngest of twenty-five children of a dyer of that city; and Savanarola was born at Ferrara, of old Paduan stock.

Among the great leaders of the Reformation period, Huss, Luther, and Zwingli were of undoubted peasant origin. But Peter Waldo, founder and leader of the Waldenses sect, was a rich merchant of Lyons; Wiclif and Knox were reared in the near vicinity of widely known and much frequented, if not large, centers of population; Calvin, spiritual father of Knox and of other great Reformation leaders, was wholly urban; and Melanchthon was born at Bretten, in Baden, where his father was an armorer and his mother the daughter of the burgomaster.

John Bunyan, though brought up among a company of poor countrymen, was the son of a tinker and was himself apprenticed to that trade. John Milton was a Londoner. George Fox, founder of the Society of Friends, had as father a weaver of Drayton, in Leicestershire. Joseph Butler,

Bishop of Durham and author of the famous *Analogy*, was the son of a linen-draper. And Bossuet, who has been called the greatest preacher of the reign of Louis XIV, in France, was a native of the town of Dijon.

There was no suggestion of the rural about the Wesleys, who came of a long line of churchly forebears; and Whitefield was the son of a Gloucester wine merchant and innkeeper. Alexander McLaren was born in Glasgow; the "saintly McCheyne," who died at the age of twenty-nine and who yet "profoundly moved the whole of Scotland, and indeed all Great Britain," was born in Edinburgh; Thomas Chalmers, who as a result of his extraordinary work in Glasgow showed how "to deal with the masses in our great cities," was a native of the seaport of Anstruther, Fifeshire; Henry Parry Liddon, who has been called "the Chrysostom of the English pulpit," was the son of a naval captain of North Stoneham, Hampshire; and Frederick W. Robertson, called by Dr. Currier "the most remarkable English preacher of the nineteenth century," was born of a military family in London.[16] Spurgeon was the grandson of an Essex pastor and the son of an Independent minister; Joseph Parker, former pastor of City Temple, London, was the son of a stone-mason; and Adolph Monod, "the foremost Protestant preacher of nineteenth century France," was born in Copenhagen.

That men of rural and men of urban origin shared in the leadership of the Pilgrim and Puritan fathers who laid the politico-religious foundations of New England has already been shown; and with the great names of William Penn and Roger Williams added, the urban group of religious leaders in general in colonial days does not suffer in comparison with the rural group, either in numbers or in ability. Among the eminent divines of native birth in the colonial period in this country there are no names of rural origin to match those of Jonathan Edwards, Increase

and Cotton Mather, and Timothy Dwight, who were all of urban descent.

Among the eminent preachers of the more recent period in this country, Phillips Brooks was born in Boston; Channing, the noted Unitarian leader, was a native of Newport; Talmadge was of village birth; Henry Ward Beecher was born in Litchfield and reared there and in Boston and in Cincinnati, and his father, Lyman Beecher, also a noted preacher, was a native of New Haven. Of two great American churchmen not long since deceased, a distinguished Catholic and a distinguished Protestant, one, Cardinal Gibbons, was a native of Baltimore, while the other, Dr. Frank W. Gunsaulus, was of village and not of strictly rural birth. And John Williams, one of the great preachers of the world and still more recently deceased, was a native of the seaport city of Tralee, Ireland.

It is significant that of the nine great preachers from the world at large whom Dr. Currier has included in his list not more than two or three can be regarded as of rural derivation, even under the most liberal interpretation of the word "rural."[17] Moreover, of the more than a score of eminent living preachers of Great Britain and of the United States whom Dr. Joseph Fort Newton, himself a distinguished preacher and former pastor of City Temple, London, considered recently in a series of articles in one of our religious journals,[18] less than one-third are of undoubted rural origin.

Among evangelists, Finney, "the greatest of American revivalists," should probably be considered of rural derivation though by his own statement he was "almost as destitute of religion as a heathen" until he went to Adams, New York, to take up the study of law.[19] But Edward Morris Kirk, who has been termed "the Chrysostom of American Evangelists," was a native of New York City; Moody, whose father combined the trade of masonry with that of brick-

making, was born in the village of East Northfield, Massachusetts, but was a salesman in a shoe store in Boston when seventeen years of age and was converted there the year following his arrival in that city; R. A. Torrey was a native of Hoboken, New Jersey; J. Wilbur Chapman was born in Richmond, Indiana, at a time when that city was already a considerable manufacturing center; "Billy" Sunday was born in Ames, Iowa, in its village days, but drifted from town to town until, as a baseball player in Chicago, he was converted at the Pacific Garden Mission; Jerry McAuley was of rural Irish nativity but was converted in New York City; Howell Harris, the eminent Welsh evangelist, and B. Fay Mills were of village birth; while "Charlie" Alexander and "Gipsy" Smith were of undoubted rural birth.

Among living religious leaders of prominence, who, as representatives of the Young Men's Christian Association, have carried all over the world the message of the gospel and the ministry of the organization with which they have been connected, may be mentioned the names of Robert E. Speer, John R. Mott, Fred B. Smith, and Sherwood Eddy—each of whom is either of urban or of village birth.

In the field of Christian missions, the especially distinguished place held by rural representatives is attested by the names of John Eliot, Robert Morrison, Robert Moffat, David Livingstone, Alexander Duff, John G. Paton, and probably Bartholomew Ziegenbalg, pioneer Protestant missionary to India.[20] But the apostle Paul, the greatest missionary the world has ever known, was a city man; the redoubtable Las Casas, the younger, the "Apostle of the Indies," was a native of Seville, Spain; Father Marquette, famous Jesuit missionary and explorer in the New World, was a native of the French city of Laon; Joseph Anchieta, the "Apostle of Brazil," was born at Laguna, seaport and former capital of the province of Teneriffe, in the Canary Islands; the parents of Junipero Serra, founder of

the line of missions along the California Coast, have been called peasants, though he was born at the town of Petra, on the island of Majorca; Raymond Tull, a Spanish nobleman of the thirteenth century who aimed at "nothing less than the subjection of the Moslem world to Jesus," was likewise a native of Majorca, born in Palma, its seaport and capital; and Matteo Ricci, noted Italian missionary to China, though of a noble family, was born at Macerata, chief town of the province of the same name, in the March of Ancona.

The names of William Carey, the "inspired cobbler," of Adoniram Judson, of William Laws, and of George Müller, further attest the substantial urban contribution to the Protestant missionary group. August Hermann Francke and the philosopher Leibnitz, early promoters in Germany of missionary enterprises, were urban born; Count von Zinzendorf, patron of the famous missionary Moravians, was a native of the city of Dresden; and Halle has been called "the home of Pietism."

In other special fields and lines of Christian work men and women of urban origin hold a clear preëminence. It was in Gloucester, England, that Robert Raikes, a city man and a printer and publisher like his father before him, with a few associates definitely established the Sunday School movement.[21] General Booth, founder of the Salvation Army, was born in the important manufacturing town of Nottingham, England. George Williams, who founded the Y. M. C. A. in 1844, was a London merchant; and a London woman a few years later developed one of the two lines of work which were presently united to constitute the Y. W. C. A. The quasi-religious boy-scout and girl-scout [21a] movements also trace to England for their origin, having been devised by Sir Robert Baden-Powell and his sister, who are nominally of the landed aristocracy but are in reality urban in birth and rearing. The Student Volunteer

Movement originated in Cambridge and Mt. Hermon, Massachusetts. And though Francis E. Clark was of village birth, the Christian Endeavor movement grew out of a revival in Dr. Clark's church in Portland, Maine. The Daily Vacation Bible School movement, which has had such a striking growth within the past few years among the Protestant denominations, especially in the churches in the urban centers, began in New York City; and the Week Day Church School has been no less predominantly an urban movement.[22] Lastly, and most significant of all, perhaps, Jean Frédérick Oberlin, universally regarded as the ideal type of "country pastor," was a native of the Alsatian city of Strassburg.

The city, as already suggested, has also been the starting point of great religious awakenings. *A priori* assumptions that the artificial and man-made character of the city environment excludes the consciousness of God from the human mind[23] are emphatically belied by the actual facts in the case. For from the Day of Pentecost, when three thousand souls were converted, to the tabernacle meetings of our modern evangelists where thousands "hit the trail," the city has fully held its own as a bona fide center of spiritual manifestation and power. And who shall say that those who tread the "sawdust path" are not as genuine converts as those who in earlier days "got religion" at the camp-meeting in the rural grove?

There is no reason to believe that the city populations did not share, in due proportion, in the religious revivals inspired in England by the Cistercians in the reigns of Henry I and Stephen, by the Franciscans and Dominicans in the thirteenth century, and by Tyndale, Wiclif, and the Lollards at the dawn of the Reformation. There is substantial evidence of clear urban predominance in respect to the profound religious awakenings associated with the origin and rise of the Quaker movement and of Methodism in England.[24] The work of the Wesleys and of Whitefield in London, and

Bath, and Bristol was paralleled by them in Savannah, and other towns in this country; and later in New York City, in the winter of 1806–7, there occurred a remarkable revival under Methodist auspices. The Great Revival of 1858–9, in this country, also began in New York City, spread thence to other cities and large towns, and finally visited the country churches.[25] The Keswick Movement began in London in 1873; and the Oxford-Brighton Movement of 1874 attests its urban origin by its title.[26]

Nor is it by any means true that the rural population has always excelled in moral and religious earnestness. It has been pointed out repeatedly that the Puritan movement in England was especially strong in the cities; while the spirit of Merrie England was primarily rural. The country clergy of the England of that day—at least the upper clergy—were a comparatively self-indulgent and loose-lived lot.[27] One authority has testified that the English rural dweller is, in general, not a very religious person and that in many cases the English villagers live their whole lives "without ever coming under the shadow of the church walls till they are buried there." And over against the frequent references to the decay of religion among the rural masses today in England may be set the current reports of lively interest in London in things religious.[28]

In France, too, the bourgeoisie, admittedly sceptical during the first half of the last century, have become more recently, especially in the cities, the strongest champions of the various religious faiths.[29] "While forty years ago in France," writes a distinguished representative of the Protestant faith in that country recently, "the country was more religious than the cities, and the clergy was recruited largely in the country, now the situation has altogether changed. In the towns one finds a great deal more esteem for the religious and social work of the churches and many more callings to ecclesiastical ministry. Moreover, many parts of

the French country have but very few Catholic priests or Protestant pastors, and are running the risk of returning to heathenism."[30]

Indifference to the claims of religion and of the church and essential disregard for their teachings and precepts are of course abundantly evident in our own urban centers, as in the cities of other lands. But this condition can also be fairly matched in our rural districts. So serious are the religious and moral conditions that have been found to prevail in a number of widely distributed rural sections that reputable authorities have expressed the fear of impending heathenism there. Near the end of the last century the governor of one of the New England States proclaimed a Fast Day on the ground that the Christian religion was dying out in that State; and an authoritative writer has characterized various rural districts of another New England State as heathen and as "handicapped by superstition, ignorance, and certain forms of immorality." [31] In a county in Central New York, among a population preponderantly native-born, thousands of persons were discovered a few years ago "absolutely unattached to any church and uninterested in any religious organization." For twenty years in one valley in this section there is stated not to have been a single attached Christian believer; and there were found there people who had never heard of Christ and children who had no idea of the significance of Easter. In another State of the Middle West whole rural counties have been found where religious and moral decadence are asserted to prevail.[32] Non-attendance at church and non-observance of the Sabbath are marked in the rural districts of the Pacific Coast region, as also in other of the newer agricultural regions of the country. And nowhere else are people so generally and over such wide areas without connection with the church as in the remote districts of the newer States in the West.[33]

These are without doubt grave conditions and call for

very serious consideration. But they do not justify the assertion of general religious or moral decadence in the rural districts nor of general decline of the rural church. In part these conditions are exceptional and in part they can be matched by the existence of similar conditions in early days. Neither does the existence of conditions such as these justify the claim of religious decline in general. Thin attendance at church, as already pointed out, was by no means unknown in the days of rural predominance. It should not be forgotten, either, that religious meetings and services were far less numerous then than they are today; and the burden of regular attendance was thus much less serious than it is at present. Moreover, the church and its services had enormously less competition then than today. Further, the church, and especially the rural church, has lost many of its social features in recent times. People no longer attend church, as once was the case, largely to hear the news or to meet other people. It would be a rash assertion to state that every person who attends church today does so with the sincere desire to participate in the worship of the service. But it seems very probable that this motive is materially more prominent among churchgoers today than it was in former times. Moreover, constraint plays a less prominent part in church attendance today than it did years ago. And on the whole this seems a change for the better.

The defects of the church today simply represent, as they always have done and as they doubtless will long continue to do, the imperfect appeal that religion makes to the human heart and the imperfect and limited response of the human heart to this appeal. But in spite of all this there are clear evidences of improvement—higher standards of religion and of morality, both in the pulpit and in the pew, a more accurate and more adequate apprehension of religious and spiritual truth, a closer adjustment of individual life and conduct to religious and moral standards, a fuller

application of the principles of religion to the actual conditions of everyday life, a sincerer response to the religious appeal, and a larger recognition than ever before of the claims of religion and of the church. Present imperfections in the religious life of peoples are thus evidence merely of continued failure to achieve the ideal and not of religious decline. On the whole, therefore, there is no substantial evidence in support of the view that the cityward trend has been unfavorable to religion and the church, either in the rural districts or in the urban centers themselves, or that there has been any tendency toward a religious decline in general.[34]

IV

THE REARING OF THE YOUNG IN COUNTRY AND IN CITY

The question of the relative fitness of the rural and of the urban environment for the rearing of the young has been so attended by the influence of preconceived opinions and so affected by ulterior motives as usually to prevent its straightforward consideration upon its merits. The truth of the matter appears to be that the urban environment is, on the whole, not inherently inferior or unfavorable in respect to the rearing of the young but that urban parents, and the urban population in general have been slow to recognize and develop the advantages that the urban community affords for this purpose. Perhaps this slow progress has been due largely to the fact that so many urban parents have themselves been brought up in the country and so have not been quick to recognize the need of positive action in the urban community to promote the end in view, and have been at a loss, too, as to a knowledge of the appropriate means to that end. Peculiarly striking, in view of the general disposition of the urban population to coöperate effectively in the achievement

of so many common aims, has been the marked absence of coöperation among urban parents in the handling of this important problem.

So long as conditions were thus left pretty much to themselves in the urban community there has been little doubt of the superiority of the rural environment from this point of view. This rural superiority usually has been overestimated and overemphasized. But its assumption long had a solid basis of fact upon which to rest. Now, however, it is a question whether the former rural superiority in this respect has not largely, or even wholly, disappeared. Just as in respect to the matter of health, so in respect to the rearing of the young the rural community began to lose its superiority so soon as the urban dwellers began to bestir themselves and to do something to remedy conditions.

Parents in the urban centers have materially less control, individually, over the immediate conditions that surround their children than do parents in the rural community. And this circumstance not only contributes to expose the youth in more serious degree to untoward influences but also makes the maintenance of parental discipline in general more difficult. Again, the rural community is still clearly superior in respect to opportunities for the wholesome influence of steady and regular occupation, in training children to habits of industry and in giving them capacity for sustained effort. When not pushed to excess this factor is valuable, too, in diverting the attention from undue emphasis upon the frivolities of life and in thus making for a more serious attitude toward life and giving a desired strength of character. In deficiencies along this line is to be found one of the most serious of the difficulties with respect to the rearing of children in towns and cities.

Less valid are certain other asserted rural advantages in this connection. Much has been said of the advantage of quiet living and of the absence of nervous tension in the

rural districts. But interpreted in other terms these conditions frequently spell isolation, which is usually regarded as perhaps the most serious deficiency of rural life. Chiefly rhetorical, too, is the emphasis upon rural occupation as consisting in partnership with nature and as being peculiarly of an elevating character. Young people are little influenced by partnership with nature; and some features of rural occupation are not calculated to exercise the most wholesome influence upon the growing child. The assumption of a superior degree of neighborliness and of a higher degree of genuineness among rural people also seems to have small foundation in fact. One of the chief advantages of urban life is the intimate contact that it affords with neighbors and friends. There is of course more moving about in the urban communities. But there are important advantages that offset the disadvantages associated with this fact. Freedom from group influence in the rural community contributes to the development of independence of character; though there is great danger that there may come, in the same way, an undue degree of individualism in the rural make-up. The prevalence of a simpler and less luxurious standard of living in the rural districts serves to mitigate some of the most serious difficulties that are experienced in the rearing of children and to facilitate training in the virtue of self-denial; though the urban contribution to a higher standard of life and of comfort must be admitted to have had much more of good than of evil in it.

On the other hand, the marked superiority of the educational opportunities afforded in the urban communities is to be noted. Moreover, the other social agencies of a conservational and developmental character, such as the church, the Sunday School, the juvenile court, function much more effectively in the urban centers than in the rural districts.[35] Very much more progress has also been made in the cities, through intelligent promotion and supervision, in the devel-

opment of the wholesome influences of the play and recreational life. Child labor in the rural communities very frequently interferes seriously with attendance at school, with normal desire for play, and even with the proper physical development of the country child; while the urban child has benefited materially from scientific physical training. The saloon has been outlawed and the moral surroundings of the young otherwise much improved in the cities and towns; and the development of suburban residence has done much to remove the urban child from proximity to vicious conditions. Through manual training, domestic science, home and school gardening, and supervised play, much has been done to keep the urban child wholesomely occupied; and very much more will doubtless be accomplished along these, and other, ameliorative lines so soon as urban parents have learned to act together as effectively as their children do.[36] Lastly, immobility among the rural population encourages intermarriage and thus serves in far too many cases to burden the rural child with the extremely serious impediment of hereditary defect.

It is necessary to recall that there are rural as well as urban slums; and the conditions in the former are not infrequently regarded by good authorities as worse and more hopeless than those in the latter.[37] One social worker has testified that the most flagrant neglect of children that had ever come to her attention was among children of American stock in rural communities; and similar testimony has come from other social workers all over the country.[38] Another expert states that the general impression that juvenile delinquency is peculiarly a problem of the cities is based on untrustworthy statistics that take no account of the gross official neglect of this condition in the rural districts nor of the fact that many rural juveniles are listed from the centers of population where they are arraigned and committed; and she adds that in some of these isolated farm homes "prac-

tically all good influences are wanting" and "almost the negation of social life is reached."[39]

There is little doubt that the children in many of our urban homes are being reared as carefully and under as favorable circumstances today as children ever have been reared in our best rural homes. A recent writer, who praises the French bourgeoisie family in the urban centers and emphasizes the careful rearing of the children in these homes, declares that French life is lived not only more strongly but as carefully today as at the beginning of the Second Empire and that the family in France is "the same strong unit it was before."[40] The Puritans, too, who accomplished such striking results along this line in early days in New England, lived in an environment that was emphatically associative.

The poet Cowley sang "God the first garden made, and the first city Cain." Cowper revised it into "God made the country, man made the town." A churchman further revised it, no doubt at the expense of its poetic merit but certainly in the interest of truth and accuracy: "I suppose this is true. But God also made man who made the town."[41] Lastly, some wag with the faculty of marshalling half-truths to the support of other half-truths took a further step in revision: "God made the country and man made the town, but the devil made the little country village." And the recreation expert says, of the final revision, "There is truth in it."[42]

Thus is poetry reduced to prose! But prose, especially if it be witty, can be as insidious in the propagation of half-truths as poetry. There is "truth in it." But there is also fallacy in it. Neither the open country nor the village nor the city appears to be incapable of producing men and women of such ability and character as to become great moral and religious leaders, nor incapable of being the source of great moral and religious movements and agencies. There appears to be no ground for concluding that the cityward trend has

been unfavorable to the interests of morality and religion nor that civilization is to come to grief through the wickedness and criminality of the cities. Rome, supported by successful war and subsisting its idle and vicious population largely from stores of food distributed gratuitously by the state, affords no real parallel to our modern cities with their overwhelming proportion of honest toilers. The "golden age" lies before us and not behind us. And, on the whole, we approximate that condition today more nearly than ever before.

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CHAPTER XXII

The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Preparedness for War

The effort of the individual state or country to survive and to preserve its identity, or to expand its boundaries, has of course very frequently involved it in struggle with other states or peoples. And so long as men are unable, or unwilling, whether through moral imperfection or through mental incapacity, to institute effective means for the preservation of peace, reasonable preparation for war must continue to be recognized as a matter of vital importance. It may prove to be true that "Nationalism as a God must follow the tribal gods to limbo" and that "a conscious struggle to establish or prevent a political world community" will constitute the next stage in human history.[1] But until such a consummation shall have been realized men can not safely neglect the question of national efficiency in time of war. Indeed, whatever substitutes for force may eventually be introduced, it still remains true according to the best thought of the present day that the necessity for military action can not yet be dispensed with even by such a world community.[2] Progress toward international peace must be sought through international concert and can not be furthered through the military impotence of individual nations. In fact, it is very generally recognized that military impotence on the part of individual nations has been almost as potent a cause of war as the assiduous cultivation of the war spirit and the excessive heaping up of armament by certain of the strong nations,

since the helpless condition of the former has repeatedly invited attack.[3]

I

URBANIZATION AND THE CAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Since it must be one of the dearest hopes of every lover of mankind that means ultimately may be found to ensure the peace of the world, it is eminently proper that the question of the influence of the cityward trend upon the movement for international peace should receive consideration. Now certain authorities, such as Buckle, Spencer, Ingram, and more recently Veblen, have contended that as we have passed from a primitive and essentially local and self-sufficing economy to a more and more highly industrialized economy we have progressed from a condition in which war was a normal feature to a condition of growing political interdependence and coöperation among the nations of the world and to a heightened spirit of international goodwill, which have been based upon the progress of invention and of the arts, upon growing interdependence in world economic relations, upon increasing intelligence, and upon the rise of the industrial classes to political power.[4]

This is to say, in effect, that urbanization is associated with a trend toward international peace.

It is apparent, however, that such a conclusion is subject to some qualification—especially in the light of the recent great struggle. Indeed, there are not a few who find in the development of these modern economic and industrial forces a chief cause of the perpetuation of war. Others, who recognize conflicting influences, some making for international goodwill and peace and some making for international hostility, are of the opinion that the latter class of influences has dominated hitherto.[5] Still others, though admitting the

essentially unifying influence of these forces, find a point of extreme danger in an asserted failure of the moral and political factors to keep pace, in their development, with the recent great developments on the material side of civilization.[6]

The expansion of commerce and the development of modern industry, with its surplus production and the resulting competition for the control of raw materials and of the markets of the world, have undoubtedly furthered a policy of economic and political penetration in the undeveloped areas of the world and have multiplied opportunities for international conflict. Yet on the whole, and considering the ultimate effect of these developments, it would seem that they make predominantly for peace rather than for war. The resulting contacts among the peoples of the world make for mutual acquaintance and thus ultimately for tolerance and good will, where formerly there existed the suspicion and dislike that lack of acquaintance always promotes. The growth of intelligence and the refining and civilizing influences in general of city life certainly diminish the innate love of fighting that manifests itself in so many predominantly rural countries.[7] City life has been shown to be particularly favorable to the origination of great forward movements in the religious field and to be not unfavorable to the religious revivals upon which earnest and thoughtful men everywhere base the hope for a wider recognition of the claims of universal brotherhood.[8]

The cities are also the strongholds of the radical groups and organizations whose shibboleth is internationalism and whose influence, when refined of its cruder aspects and tempered and rendered sane through the acceptance of the responsibility that is associated with accession to political power, may be counted upon to work effectively for friendly international relations. Moreover, though cities are on the whole nationalistic they are not narrowly so. Their popula-

tions are cosmopolitan and their relations with stranger peoples operate to bring about that contact between peoples and races that in the long run makes for international comity.[9] The development of city life is also favorable, on the whole, to the progress of freedom of trade and thus to the discarding of those restrictive and retaliatory trade regulations that have done so much to arouse and promote an active spirit of hostility between peoples.[10]

Again, industrial development affords employment at home for an expanding population and thus obviates the necessity, or occasion, for that swarming of the surplus population into the territories of other peoples which has long been perhaps the most fundamental and most influential of all the causes of war. The influence of city life also contributes toward the elimination of this cause of war through the strengthening, on the whole, of the forces that operate to restrain the birth rate. The pressure of population in Japan, which only industrial and commercial development and urban life may be expected ultimately to restrain or relieve, constitutes the most stubborn and intractable of all the causes tending to promote a militaristic policy in that country. The incursions of the Germans into southwestern and southern Europe were far more frequent in the days when they were yet merely a collection of forest tribes than since they have developed an industrial and urban economy that provides employment at home.

The expansion of our own agricultural population westward into the interior involved it in almost incessant struggles with the native Indians, brought us into conflict with other nations over territory and boundary lines, and afforded the occasion for civil strife between the North and the South in 1861–65. The Southern planter element, which urged us into war with Mexico and precipitated the crisis in 1861, undoubtedly has been the most militant element of our population. And it was the frontier elements in general that

afforded the main support to the policy proposed in the slogan "Fifty-Four Forty or Fight." [11]

Modern war, too, though certainly not more distressing than war has been for ages past,[12] is more destructive today than ever before because there is so much to destroy and because the agencies of war have reached an unparalleled effectiveness in destruction. Economic and industrial development have thus made war unprofitable—even to the victors. And when this fact is fully realized it may be expected to exert an irresistible influence for peace. Any single war today is likely, of course, to involve a wider area and a larger number of people than ever before. Yet war is no longer chronic, no longer the normal condition. Both dynastic and religious wars have practically disappeared; and in this outcome the development of city life, through its contribution to popular government and to religious toleration, has exercised an honorable though not exclusive influence. Civil war has also diminished with the unifying and stabilizing of the various political states in recent times—a development to which the cities also conspicuously contributed.[13]

Highly urbanized England is certainly more peaceably inclined today than ever before. France manifests at present much nervousness and uneasiness as to the possibility of experiencing another attack from Germany. But there appears to be little real evidence on her part of departure from the peaceful inclinations of pre-war years. In Germany, where agrarian mediaevalism has extended almost to the very present and where recently we saw it "wielding the whole material force of a fully conscious national machine-industry," [14] the industrial, anti-imperialistic elements are at the helm. The sentiment in favor of peace has made marked, if not continuous, progress in our own country.[15] And in Japan there is a considerable, if not altogether hopeful, liberal and pacific movement. The situation in Italy is obscure and perhaps not reassuring. But in highly rural Rus-

sia and Poland, as perhaps also in Hungary and Jugo-Slavia, militaristic sentiments and policies predominate; while prevailingly rural China reflects an aspect unprecedently warlike.

Lastly, the prospects for the institution of the positive agencies required to forestall or compose international disputes appear to brighten with growing urbanization. For the urban population, as it is less influenced by merely traditional ideas in general, is likewise less inclined to be influenced by merely traditional ideas as to the possibility or adequacy of a policy of national isolation as a means of avoiding war. It is also in closer touch than the rural population with world conditions and is thus in a better situation to judge as to the proper means to be employed for the achievement of world peace. In general, then, there is good reason to believe that city life and growth are conducive to the development of international peace and comity.

II

URBANIZATION AND THE DOMESTIC CIVIL AND POLITICAL FACTORS IN WAR

The question of the military efficiency of a nation must be treated very broadly today. The wise and economical conduct of government, the husbanding of the national resources, the production of food and of clothing for the civil population, the maintenance of the national morale in general, as well as the successful floating of war loans, the speedy and adequate fabrication of the material equipment for war and the regular and abundant supply of these at the front—all these, and other, matters have become factors of vital importance in war; and failure in respect to any one of these factors may mean losing the war, and national disaster.

Enduring military strength and ultimate success in war

manifestly depend largely upon the general intelligence and political capacity of a people and upon the efficiency of their government; and these factors, in turn, can be kept efficient only among those peoples whose moral and spiritual qualities have been maintained at a high level. Conclusions already reached as to the favorable effect of urbanization upon all these factors therefore go far toward justifying the further conclusion that the cityward movement has rendered the nations more efficient in war. There are, however, certain factors in the civil or political sphere, such as the sentiment of patriotism, the assimilation of alien immigrant elements, and internal political stability, that are of peculiar interest and importance in their bearing upon the question of efficiency in war. And to a consideration of the manner in which the cityward trend may have influenced these factors we first turn.

1. *Urbanization and Patriotism.*—That the city populations have contributed conspicuously, in the various countries, to the achievement of national independence has already been pointed out. In earlier days city dwellers did not fail in devotion to the sentiments of patriotism and nationalism. In the case of the ancient city-state empires and republics it was the city itself that constituted the very head and fountain of national power. During the Middle Ages, to be sure, it was the rural feudal system rather than the cities that afforded the nexus for the loose organization of separate communities. But nationalism, which succeeded feudalism, was primarily an urban system of organization—a system based upon commerce and manufactures. Through the extension of commerce and the consequent circulation of the precious metals the cities undermined the personal service relation that underlay the feudal system and initiated the displacement of the system of local economy by a system of national economy. This centralizing economic tendency was paralleled by a corresponding political centralization. Mer-

chants and traders, that they might know just the regulations to which they had to conform, exerted their influence to secure national, that is uniform, regulations. For a similar reason they contributed to the development of national law—a feature in respect to which the influence of cities was "especially strong." [16] Moreover, the development of colonies, which was incident to the expansion of foreign trade and commerce, was a nationalizing influence of the first magnitude. Economic interest thus combined with political interest and sentiment to make the cities preëminently the promoters of nationalism at this time.

It would of course not be correct to assume that the rural elements made no contribution to modern national development in Europe. The landed interest in England contributed political leadership; and historians have testified to the intense, though perhaps narrow, patriotism of the English rural middle classes in early Tory days.[17] Morever, the stubborn bravery of the English yeomanry sustained the national cause on many a hard-fought field. In the unification of Italy it was Piedmont and not Rome that led, though Cavour was born in Turin and other cities of Northern Italy bore an honorable part in the struggle that finally made Italy a nation.[18] And in early Switzerland, as in modern Germany, rural elements pointed the way to nationalization. Yet London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna all stand in a special way for the nations of which they are respectively the capital cities. And though in the United States and in Italy no one city stands so singly as representing the nationality of the country, yet here as elsewhere the issues and events that involve the interests of the nation at large find their earliest attention and adjustment in the urban centers; and there are set forth the earliest popular declarations for a national policy.[19]

Careful inquiry developed no grounds for esteeming one class of the population superior to other classes in respect

to devotion to the patriotic cause at the time of the Revolution, in this country. A similar conclusion was reached with reference to the Civil War—with the important qualification that the South, which was in rebellion, was on the whole the most typically agricultural part of the entire country.[20] At the close of the Civil War, Provost Marshal General Fry placed himself on record that it appeared beyond dispute that the crime of desertion was especially characteristic of troops from large cities and from districts which these cities supplied with recruits. But the statistics that he presents do not point certainly to such a conclusion; and allowance must be made for the disproportionately large foreign element in the urban centers and for the inequitable features of the draft laws, which made it impossible for the impecunious masses in the cities to secure substitutes for service.[21]

Classes, States, and sections, as well as individuals, frequently shifted in early days in this country in their attitude toward nationalism, if not toward patriotism. Urban Massachusetts and rural Virginia united to lead the way in the establishment of a new nation. The rural South finally declared for state rights, though there was a time when it stood as squarely as any of the other sections for the predominance of national interests. The Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1799 and nullification in South Carolina in 1832 were offset by the Hartford Convention in New England in 1814 and by Ohio's endorsement in 1821 of these same Kentucky and Virginia resolutions. Jefferson, who with Madison gave the latter to the world, a few years later consummated the Louisiana Purchase—a strikingly nationalizing event, both in the method of its accomplishment and in its subsequent influence. Calhoun, the exponent of nullification in 1832, had been a strong exponent of nationalism a score of years earlier. Jackson, who apparently believed himself the champion of state rights in his earlier years, emphatically declared in 1830–33 that the Union "must be preserved" and "shall be

preserved." Webster, who sympathized with the refusal of Massachusetts and Connecticut to furnish their quota of the militia authorized by Congress at the outbreak of the War of 1812 and who voiced his disaffection in Congress in 1814 in the midst of the struggle, could later rise to the heights of the sentiment "Liberty and Union, one and inseparable, now and forever." Even the West, which was subject to a peculiarly effective nationalizing influence in the public domain, was by no means free from separatist tendencies. It was in the Southwest that two conspiracies, supported if not initiated by supposedly nationalistic frontiersmen and designed to withdraw a portion of territory from the United States and unite it with a foreign power, were formed. Ohio was still typically western in 1821. And the Pacific Coast voiced separatist tendencies when California threatened secession because of the continued failure of the project for a railroad across the Plains to the Pacific Ocean.[22] Conservatively stated, the more urban sections of the country have been fully as loyal to the interests of the nation as the more rural sections.

While city populations have thus manifested a due measure of national loyalty in the past it is perhaps a question whether the urban influence is to be continued in the same measure in this direction in the future, or whether it is to be seriously weakened by the development of internationalist sentiments associated with the rise of the socialistic and communistic movements among the urban industrial population. As a result of the industrial revolution the urban laboring masses, whose patriotism and interest in national affairs appear occasionally to have exceeded, in former times, that of the dominant urban classes, have now come to entertain a feeling of class consciousness among themselves and of sympathy for workers in other lands—sentiments that cut across merely national boundaries. For many of these, therefore, foreigner no longer means enemy nor fellow-citizen, friend.

To such, love of country is a sentiment supposedly no longer to be cultivated and cherished but to be set aside in favor of the terms internationalism, class-struggle, and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But there appears to be a limit to the extent to which this more or less genuine antagonism toward patriotism and nationalism may be expected to develop in the cities. It is not likely to affect the business and propertied classes to any material extent. These are interested—too much so at times—in maintaining the *status quo*. Associated with these in opposition to anti-nationalistic sentiments are likely to be found the great majority of the members of the salaried and professional classes. And even a large proportion of the workers themselves are likely to remain outside the ranks of the ultra-internationalists. The present sharp conflict of economic interest between employer and wage-earner is not necessarily to continue; and as the workers continue to improve their condition through organization, or come through participation in the ownership and management of industry to have a larger economic stake in the maintenance of the present system, they are likely to prove less and less susceptible to the appeals of those who are disaffected. At the other extreme, too, are the most ignorant of the workers, who are also unlikely to become interested in the cult of internationalism.

Again, the internationalists are not likely to display cohesion among themselves to any marked degree. They are not even able to hold together where they remain merely an opposition party. And where they are placed under the necessity of doing something constructive, through accession to power, they are sobered by responsibility and lose much of their extremeness of view; or else there is an end to all agreement among them and they presently become as bitterly hostile toward each other as they formerly were to the so-called capitalistic and nationalistic elements.[23]

Moreover, the socialists and communists themselves, in contrast with the anarchist group, whom the city environment does not appear to nurture, set great store by the state as an agency for the accomplishment of social aims and are thus not likely, in the ultimate test, to permit it to be sacrificed on the altar of internationalism.[24] It is significant that though the philosophy of internationalism is, in general, much more prevalent in the urban centers than in the rural districts, the highly urbanized countries appear to be much more free from its manifestations in extreme form than those which are preponderantly rural—as present conditions in England and in Russia, respectively, eloquently attest. As a country becomes increasingly urbanized, too, its radical elements appear to grow more conservative—a fact that is convincingly illustrated by a comparison of France today with France of the Revolution, of the time of Louis Blanc, or even of the Commune of 1871.

Again, there is very much that is commendable in the internationalist philosophy in its noblest phases. Its ideals of world-wide human brotherhood can not but appeal to the lover of human kind; and where purged of its element of class hatred, which is in reality entirely alien to the sentiment of universal brotherhood, it has much of value to offer and can not threaten the sane and reasonable interests of the national state. It makes less difference, perhaps, *what* social and economic philosophy is held than just *how* it is held. Not so much socialism and internationalism as socialist and internationalist doctrinaires appear to be objectionable. And the influence of the urban environment appears to be such as eventually to purify internationalism of the devotees of the cult of the *idée fixe.* Again, the internationalist philosophy, in its pacifist phases, is dangerous to the state in proportion to the extent to which it fails to prevail universally. If it should affect all countries equally it would be somewhat equivalent to general disarmament. Moreover, if

we go back a few centuries we shall find that the sentiment of nationalism itself was regarded as a revolutionary and subversive doctrine—well calculated, in the minds of the conservatives of that time, to become a dangerous and upsetting factor in human society.[25]

Lastly, we must consider the strength of the deep-lying and instinctive sentiment of patriotism itself. In any conflict of a vital nature between internationalism of the cult type and patriotism, the latter as the stronger and more elemental force is quite certain to prevail ultimately. The latter is based on more real and more fundamental grounds. It is natural and instinctive where internationalism is a factitious and consciously fashioned belief. Patriotism and nationalism rest on the fundamental bases of the intimate contact and mutual participation in a common culture that proximity enjoins. Stranger is still likely, in a degree, to prove enemy. Blood is still thicker than water. There is a common property in national and racial habits and sympathies and antipathies and customs and beliefs and laws that binds the different classes together where property rights that relate to material goods appear superficially to divide. Since war always involves the attempt of one nation or group of nations to dominate or to impose its will upon another nation or group of nations, it rouses all the slumbering and instinctive desire of the human kind for freedom—for the opportunity of the citizens of a given country to live their own lives unfettered and to mould their own institutions as they see fit. It therefore arouses the instinct of survival; and patriotism is a necessary element in human life because it is an element necessary to survival. It is necessary in that it is an indispensable condition of that unity and common effort and purpose that are required to insure the substantial safety and security of all, and that thus make it possible for people to follow the ordinary pursuits of life and for the nation to work out its righteous destiny in accordance with

the ordinary processes which its citizens may determine, without interference from foreign enemy or from internal foe.

But around these purely necessary elements in patriotism there gather those other features that lift it above the level of the utilitarian, give it inspiration, and make of it an almost holy passion. For patriotism means abnegation of self and, if need be, the laying of every mental and material resource and of life itself on the altar of sacrifice. It thus becomes a kind of genuine religion that ultimately is bound to win disciples from the cult of internationalism. Patriotism, then, is very likely to persist; and there can be no patriotism under any conditions that we can see as at all probable that will deny a reasonable nationalism when issues vital to the nation are at stake. There may be a few here and there who, in such an exigency, will continue to worship at the shrine of an ultra internationalism. But the great majority will be found to be true to the instincts of patriotism when the ultimate test comes.[26]

These observations are quite in accordance with the trend of events in Europe and in this country during the recent Great War. The great majority of German socialists at once repudiated every tenet of internationalism and admitted every claim of an excessive nationalism when the day of decision came. No less decisively, considering the claim of the German socialists to leadership in the socialist movement in general, did the socialists of the allied countries declare for the national cause of their respective countries. The socialists of our own country presented an apparent exception in 1917–18. But in reality a majority of the socialists in this country were Germans and they declared as naturally for Germany as their comrades at home in the fatherland. The socialists in this country who were really American in allegiance soon separated themselves, for the most part, from the German majority; and also many non-socialist Germans

in this country at once acknowledged their real kinship with their socialist brethren at home. National and racial allegiance and not international sentiments prevailed. And to represent developments in Russia, which had never been a real nation but merely a congeries of disparate and unassimilable parts, as a victory of internationalism over nationalism would be manifestly absurd.[27]

The recent Great War revealed not only the impotence of the cult of internationalism in the face of threatened national danger: it revealed also the supreme love of country in the hearts of men everywhere. In the light of this revelation it may therefore be accepted as proven that the city-ward movement has as yet had no injurious effect upon the sentiment of patriotism. Men everywhere, in highly urbanized as in predominantly rural countries, from the congested urban centers as from isolated rural districts, rose as perhaps never before to meet the test of patriotism.[28]

Just previous to the fateful year 1914 an English investigator and writer, inquiring into the course of British patriotism, referred hopefully to the strong loyalty revealed among British soldiers during the South African War and expressed the conviction that British patriotism but smouldered and would burst into flame on occasion.[29] Never was prediction more promptly and more completely justified. The most highly urbanized of all countries, Great Britain afforded perhaps the most magnificent illustration of patriotism, as measured by the test of willingness to volunteer for national military service, in the history of nations. Within the short space of four days as many as 1,000,000 men were recruited for service; and before April, 1915, more than 5,000,000 men had been secured by voluntary enlistment. From every section and from every class men sprang to the defence of home and native land. Nor were the women one whit less patriotic and heroic. History records no more heroic name than that of Edith Cavell—nor a character more lofty or pure.

He would be a rash person, too, who would assert that Belgium manifested any evidence of the decay of patriotism, or that she did not fully equal rural Serbia in this respect. To Germany also must be accorded the distinction of a remarkable record of devotion to the interests of the fatherland, though having a high proportion of city dwellers. And France, representing a fair balance of rural and of urban population, displayed a spirit of devotion beyond all praise.

In our own country there is no reason to suppose that any smaller degree of patriotic devotion was manifested in 1917–18 than at the time of the Civil War, when the proportion of city dwellers in the population was very much smaller. Official discouragement of volunteering and the early resort to the system of selective service in the recent struggle render comparison on the basis of volunteering nonfeasible; but a record hitherto unequaled was made in 1917–18 with reference to desertion—the total number of deserters being "much lower than in any of our previous wars."[30] Most decisive of all, however, as an index of the patriotic spirit in which the people of this country acknowledged their obligation to the nation in 1917–18, was the remarkable manner in which the selective service act was accepted. The contrast with the attitude displayed toward the draft policy of the Civil War period was very marked—though it must be admitted that the provisions of the selective service act of 1917 were very much more wisely and justly drawn than were those of the draft acts of the Civil War period. It is significant, too, that such isolated and sporadic organized resistance as occurred in connection with the enforcement of the selective service act was confined almost wholly to typically rural districts.[31] The proportion of deserters was highest in the Southern and Mountain States; and Mississippi, the most purely rural State in the Union, had the lowest proportion of claims for exemption from service granted.

It also seems probable that the various conservation measures were somewhat more strictly observed among the urban than among the rural population.[32] Yet the greater dependence of the urban population upon markets and the greater publicity attending the life of people in the urban centers doubtless render more easy there the effective enforcement of such provisions and regulations; though on the other hand the higher proportion of native population in the rural districts must be admitted to have been a considerable advantage there in this connection. The most striking feature, however, in connection with the campaign for the conservation of food was the large measure of support extended by the people of all classes, native and foreign-born, rural and urban. The system of food administration and control in Great Britain, during the recent war, also achieved notable success.

There is also substantial evidence to sustain the conclusion that our various war loans of recent history were better supported in the urban than in the rural districts. This was especially the case with the earlier loans and with respect to the Victory Liberty Loan of 1919. In general there was a larger number of subscribers, proportionally, in the more highly urbanized States and sections; and over-subscriptions of allotted amounts were notably larger than in the rural States and sections.[33] If this circumstance of better support of the war loans is not to be taken as evidence of a deeper and more real patriotism on the part of the urban population it certainly may be accepted as demonstrating a quicker and more active response to the appeal directed to the patriotic impulses.

The view that "Patriotism cannot easily be bred in our satellite cities" [34] thus does not appear, so far, to be justified by the facts in the case. It must be admitted, of course, that there is no one test of patriotism—not even in time of war or other national exigency. It is difficult to judge as to the

strength of the different motives that may actuate an individual when he expresses a willingness, perhaps even an eager desire, to go to war. It may be that love of adventure or a primitive combative instinct or a highly developed sense of comradeship moves him or even that he is influenced by his economic condition or status. It is also a most melancholy fact that many persons who are altogether capable of making the ultimate sacrifice on the field of battle fail miserably in their duty to their country in the monotonous round of everyday living in the piping times of peace. So far short of our ideals do we habitually fall that we are prone to assert that patriotism and devotion to the public weal are on the decline. But he who scans the pages of history, though he may find himself disappointed in the unreal picture of pure and unselfish patriotism that he formerly had drawn of past times, will take heart in the assurance that there has been no actual decadence hitherto in this respect.[35]

2. *Urbanization and the Assimilation of Alien Elements.*—It has been charged as one of the most serious of the counts against the cityward trend that the city fails, in comparison with the rural community, in the work of assimilating the alien immigrant elements. In the urban centers the opportunity for the immigrants to settle in colonies is said to encourage and to enable them to retain their native language and customs—even their native diet—and thus to continue that feeling for their former home that makes a real transfer of allegiance difficult or impossible. The establishment of their own schools and churches by these colonies of urban alien elements, it is urged, prevents the members from being exposed to influences that would make for the gradual weaning of those of mature years from the old habits of life and from the old allegiance and that would speedily transfer the younger generation into patriotic nationals. But where the immigrants find their way into the rural communities it is asserted that they are unable to group with others of their

kind and thus unable to continue the old habits and associations. Forced into contact with the native population, in the rural districts, they soon acquire the new language and so lose their former habits and customs and are speedily won to a conformity to and sympathy with the customs and habits of the land to which they have come. They are thus readily assimilated; and their children, at least, grow up indistinguishable from those of the purely native element.[36] It is therefore urged that measures should be taken to prevent the settlement of these alien elements in the urban centers and to divert them to the rural districts. Especially since the events of the recent World War have revealed the possible dangers associated with the residence within our borders of great numbers of unassimilated persons of foreign extraction has there been complaint that the melting pot no longer performs its work. And the cities are either openly or implicitly charged with responsibility for the condition.

Now it is true that the land and the farm have constituted a great assimilating and Americanizing agency in this country with respect to millions of immigrants. In spite of the indifference and neglect, both of the government and of the native population individually, the natural and involuntary agencies of assimilation have operated with a fair degree of success; and the great agricultural regions have played hitherto a conspicuous part in accomplishing this result. Yet when all the circumstances are considered it does not appear that our cities have been any less effective as assimilating agencies than our rural districts. And it is a question whether the former are not today, with all their lack of success, more effective in this respect than the rural districts.

In ancient Babylon, where the cities all had a large number of resident aliens, there was a freedom of intercourse that made for the assimilation of custom in these various centers; and it was from the city of Babylon that Khamurabi

promulgated the famous code which enabled him to "weld together his vast empire by a uniform system of law." [37] It was the city of Rome and not the rural districts of Italy that constituted the center and source of the Roman tradition that drew together and held together the vast empire that practically encompassed the known world and that represented the most stupendous amalgamating agency that the world had ever seen previous to the immigrant influx of the last century into our own country. And it was through the provincial cities of the Empire that the Romanizing of the vast outlying provinces was accomplished.[38]

The extraordinary facility with which London, a city "with Roman traditions, Celt, Saxon, Danish, and other foreign elements" and "with commerce as the governing factor of life," made Londoners, and Englishmen, of the conquering Normans, as it had assimilated these other alien elements before them, has attracted the eloquent attention of the chroniclers of her history.[39] And that Paris has stood, and stands today, in a peculiar way for France and decisively sums up and expresses the national life and culture of that country and is the unrivaled agency, at home, for the colonies, and abroad everywhere, for the dissemination of the French influence, needs only to be called to mind to command instant and almost universal assent.[40]

Just so, too, in our American cities, the process of nationalizing and assimilating the alien elements has gone forward, and still goes forward today, with *comparative* success. Segregation and colonization of these foreign elements in the cities, with resulting failure to Americanize, have occurred and still occur. But considering the vastness of the work to be done and the almost total neglect until very recently of any conscious or positive efforts, either in city or in country, to further its progress, the results have been in general astonishing—and never more so than in recent decades.[41] The deficiencies in the work attract our attention; and it is

well that they do. But they attest the largeness, the almost superhuman character, of the task and our comparative neglect of it. They do not represent the failure of the city as an assimilating agency but rather the over-taxing of the assimilative agencies, rural and urban, as a result of the tremendous burden placed upon them and magnified by neglect. Had the enormous number of aliens who have poured in upon this country within the past three or four decades been dependent, for their assimilation, mainly upon the rural rather than chiefly upon the urban community, as has been the case, it is almost certain that the result would have been even more unsatisfactory than it has been. Unfortunately the assumption that the rural districts, even with their generally much smaller degree of saturation with respect to the foreign elements, are free from the evils of segregation and colonization is not borne out by the facts. Nor have the rural communities, either in this country or elsewhere, been uniformly successful in assimilating the foreign elements that have settled in their midst.

When the issues and events associated with our participation in the recent Great War roused us to a consciousness of our neglect of the problem of the assimilation of the alien elements in our midst and we began more carefully than had been our wont to inquire into the situation, we discovered that not only in the cities but also in many rural sections there were non-Americanized groups of alien derivation, with their own schools, churches, newspapers, and various other organizations and enterprises of their own; groups with leaders and advisers of their own nationality, where our native tongue was not only practically unknown to the older persons and unused by them but was also almost equally foreign to the knowledge and use of the younger generation. These groups were perhaps even more characteristic of rural than of urban communities; and, in spite of a longer average residence in this country, those in the former were certainly

less touched by the influences that make for Americanization.[42]

It has been well said that while the city foreign colony may be more in the public eye, "the attrition of city life" is more likely to promote a knowledge of the English language, and with that the ability to participate in the general life of the community, than is the self-centered existence of the rural community.[43] In the cities the public school, that unrivaled Americanizing agency for the children of the immigrant community, functions with superior efficiency and with direct intent toward assimilation; while for the older members the factory, the labor union, the evening school, the library, and the various other agencies, all too few and feeble but yet almost totally lacking in the rural community, that have been instituted in the urban centers to further assimilation and Americanization, perform their work with comparative success.[44] In the city, too, the more active community life, involving a hundred questions of public policy and community enterprise; the quick and intimate contact with the events of the day, both as they concern the local community and the nation and the world at large, through the agency of the almost instantaneous and well-nigh continuous editions of the press; and, more than one suspects, perhaps, the influence of the athletic games and contests played or engaged in by teams representing local or other interests:[45] all these break in upon the isolated life that the members of these alien groups are attempting to live in the urban centers, literally jar the individual loose from the old associations, and open up his life for contact with his American, or Americanized, fellow-residents and for a mutual sympathy with them that presently lead him and them into a common consciousness of a common country and into common participation in its national life and institutions.

Rural surroundings, on the other hand, are well adapted to permit the members of local groups, as of individual fam-

ilies, to live just about the kind of life they choose, with a minimum both of positive interference and also of unconscious deflection. When the native public school functions ineffectively or without definite Americanizing aim, as is so often the case in the rural districts, or its place is occupied by the foreign, and often positively anti-American, school, the children of these rural immigrant groups have very little to detach them from the manner of life or habits of thought established by their parents in the home and in the community.[46] It is highly significant that when the members of a pacifistic Russian sectarian colony, resident in San Francisco, were unable to prevent several of their young men from volunteering for military service during the recent World War, they "openly cursed the American schools and the city streets for ruining their boys spiritually" and declared that if they could not settle on the land in the rural districts they would "have to get out of America." [47]

One of the indices of the extent to which Americanization of our immigrant population has actually proceeded in the rural and in the urban districts, respectively, is the ability to speak English. It is significant, therefore, that in spite of the fact that the immigrants in the rural districts have been in this country appreciably longer on the whole than those in the urban centers, a larger proportion of the latter than of the former are able to speak English. Another index of Americanization is the extent to which the foreign-born have become naturalized in the two classes of communities, respectively; and here again the showing favors the urban districts when length of residence in this country is considered.

The most significant index, however, of the extent to which assimilation has proceeded among the foreign-born is the degree of loyalty manifested toward his adopted land by the naturalized citizen or the general attitude displayed by the alien resident toward the country in which he has chosen

to reside. As already suggested, loyalty is not to be measured wholly by the attitude displayed during a period of stress like that of war. But on the whole the test which war affords may be taken as a fair index of the extent to which the immigrant has given up the old allegiance and has committed himself to the new. And there is no more reason to suppose that the urban centers have proven inferior to the rural districts in power to inspire the immigrant population with loyalty in time of war than has already been found to be the case with respect to the population in general.

The Amish, and indeed the Mennonite sect in general, though almost exclusively rural represent perhaps the most striking example in our whole history of the failure, extended over a very long period, of assimilation and amalgamation. They were not regarded as loyal at the time of the Revolution; at the time of the Civil War they strove in every possible way to avoid service in the Northern armies; and in the recent Great War they not only strove to avoid military service but were also unwilling to assist with the war loans and had almost to be compelled to perform a tardy and incomplete duty in this respect.[48] In Canada, too, members of this same group of sects, which first made a settlement in that country in 1786, together with some of the other alien and unassimilated rural groups in the western provinces, have been negotiating in recent years for removal to rural areas in this country and in Mexico because of opposition to the not unreasonable "Canadianization" policy of the Dominion government. Again, the Canadian French, also predominantly rural, have remained almost wholly apart from the customs and habits and from the national life in general of that country. In general they were not even responsive to the claims and interests of the native France of their forebears during the recent World War, even though Canada and that country were allies. Though admittedly a difficult element to assimilate, there is good reason

to believe that appreciably more progress toward their assimilation has been made in our own country, where they are mainly an urban factory population.

At the time of the Civil War, when our foreign-born population was made up almost entirely of persons of Irish and German extraction, there were many of these persons of alien birth who loyally performed their full duty to the Union. But in some parts of the country, especially in the cities of the East where the comparatively recent arrival and the proportionately large number of the resident aliens combined to create a particularly difficult situation, both of these nationalities gave the authorities a great deal of trouble in connection with the enforcement of the draft act. The Irish were leaders in the serious draft riots in New York City, in July, 1863, as also in those that occurred at Troy, New York, and in other places. The examining surgeon from the Third Pennsylvania District, which included a portion of the city of Philadelphia, also reported that an immense number of foreigners, who had been naturalized or had exercised the rights of citizenship, fraudulently escaped the draft through the use of certificates of alienage secured from foreign consuls.[49]

But opposition to military service on the part of these foreign elements at this time was not confined to the cities. In certain mining, lumbering, and even agricultural, districts of Pennsylvania, bitter complaint was made with reference to the attitude and behavior of the foreign element, by the officials charged with carrying out the provisions of the draft law. Numbers of these rural persons of alien birth either failed to report at all, hiding themselves away in secluded and inaccessible regions, or banded themselves together and offered armed resistance, or, finally, deserted in large numbers after being drafted into service. Similar difficulties and disturbances occurred in essentially agricultural regions in New York, Ohio, Wisconsin, and elsewhere.[50] It does not

appear that the test afforded by the Civil War disclosed, on the whole, any relative deficiency on the part of the cities as assimilating and Americanizing agencies.

Our participation in the recent Great War put a severe strain, of course, upon the loyalty of our largest foreign stock —the German element. And our association with Great Brittain as an ally also involved us in the anti-British antipathies of a considerable number of our Irish, who represented the next most numerous foreign element in our population. Now the former are preponderantly urban, in the proportion of more than five to three; while the latter are urban in the proportion of four to one. Yet, as already indicated, there is no evidence to support the view that the city population as a whole was one whit less patriotic during the recent war than the rural population. Nor does there appear to be any evidence to support the view that these two important elements of our foreign population, or our alien residents in general, were any less loyal in the cities than they were in the rural districts. Indeed, at the crisis of the struggle officials who were in close touch with the situation declared that the most disturbing conditions were not those which existed in the foreign quarters in the congested urban centers but those that prevailed over wide rural stretches in some of the States of the Northwest and West, where foreign-language schools and churches held almost undisputed sway over whole tiers of counties. It is significant that "reported desertions" among the alien population were in strikingly higher proportion in the more rural than in the highly urbanized States.[51]

Certain of our newspaper paragraphers, possessing a closer acquaintance with traditional notions than with the facts, have enlarged upon the wonderful achievements of the frontier spirit as they recounted the heroic story of "The Lost Battalion" in the Argonne Forest in the fall of 1918. But in this they were apparently oblivious of the fact that the

members of this celebrated unit, a real New York "Four Hundred" and one not unworthy of comparison with the famous "Six Hundred" that rode into, but not out of, the charge at the battle of Balaklava, were drawn by the draft from the immigrant East Side of the Metropolis of America and of the Western Hemisphere. And while the frontier may justly claim a place of honor in this great national exploit, the story of "The Lost Battalion" is but one among many that might be told of patriotic and heroic deeds performed by citizen soldiers recruited from the immigrant quarters of our cities.[52]

This outcome is the more remarkable in view of our flagrant neglect to make intelligent and adequate effort to secure such a result. If so comparatively favorable a result can be achieved with so small effort, there would appear to be ample ground for the belief that materially better results can be realized when full advantage shall have been taken of the great facilities that the urban centers naturally afford for this purpose. Whatever attitude one may take with reference to the question of the desirability of the restriction of immigration to our shores or with reference to the proposal to promote the distribution of our immigrant population among the rural districts, there can be little or no doubt that under equal conditions the cities are much better adapted today to secure the national assimilation and amalgamation of these alien immigrant elements than are the rural districts. There is thus no adequate ground for the view that the problems that immigration brings, either in time of peace or in time of war, are rendered more serious by the cityward movement. As matters stand at present there is very much to justify the recent declaration of an Americanization expert that "If you want to become discouraged about Americanization, you should study the rural situation because there we have left in utter isolation the immigrant American."[53]

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CHAPTER XXIII

The Effect of Urbanization upon Political Preparedness for War *(Continued)*: Urbanization and Political Stability

Political stability is of course an exceedingly important factor in the life of peoples and of nations in times of peace. Yet a time of war is peculiarly a time of supreme test of internal political stability; and in the previous chapter political stability was coupled with patriotism and the assimilation of alien elements as of peculiar importance relative to national efficiency in war. Having just considered these last two factors, attention is directed in the present chapter to the effect of urbanization upon internal political stability.

In time of war those disaffected or subversive elements from which no nation is wholly free are likely to watch expectantly for a favorable opportunity to overturn the existing government or order and to set up their own authority or to establish their own system. It is manifest, of course, that the danger of such an eventuality is particularly great in case of a serious military reverse. As a result of untoward events of this character in connection with the recent great struggle that has scarcely yet come to a close, a full dozen of nations, some of which were formerly regarded as among the leading nations of the world, are today either helplessly adrift on the tide of political chaos and uncertainty or are sorely beset with perils that from time to time threaten disaster. Even those nations that have come out of the struggle victorious, or who may lay best claim to victory in a struggle that came so nearly engulfing both victors and vanquished in

a common disaster, find themselves seriously shaken and their political stability seriously tried. It must be considered one of the most serious of the counts against the cityward movement, therefore, that many students of government hold the view that the city population in any given country is relatively unstable, politically speaking, and inclined to be subversive of the public order.

Attention was directed, early in this volume, to the fact that in ancient times the view was widely held that the agricultural population had a larger interest than other classes in the maintenance of the *status quo* and thus constituted a strongly conservative influence in the state. And it was likewise pointed out that this view has continued quite generally to be the prevailing opinion down to the present.[1] Lecky, though not necessarily endorsing this view fully, has admirably stated it—saying that it has been urged that freeholders have a fixed, permanent, inalienable interest in the country widely different from the migratory and often transient interests of trade and commerce, that their fortunes are much more indissolubly blended with the fortunes of the state, and that they represent in the highest degree that healthy continuity of habit and policy that is most essential to the well-being of nations.[2]

That landed property is "symbolic of stability and permanence" and that the landed man "is in a special sense bound up with and interested in maintaining the fabric of society" is the view of another English writer.[3] And that "politically a country population is the more sober and cautious because it is in touch with certain fundamental aspects of existence that are hidden away from purely town dwellers" is the view, yet more recently expressed, of still another English writer, and authority in the field of agriculture.[4] As another writer has put it, for France: "The French peasant, no matter how small his holding is, will always vote for the *de facto government;* he will do this if

he only owns two acres, never tastes meat and works fourteen hours a day, while the Parisian workman, though he is better housed, better clothed, better fed and better educated, will always vote for upsetting it." [5]

That the farm house and the rural neighborhood are "the least favorable spots for agitation" and that "a well read and studious, virtuous yeomanry" is "the best security which any country can enjoy against the agitations to which society is exposed" represent the views of an early writer in our own country; [6] and similar views, expressed by Jefferson, by Chancellor Kent, and by others, have already been presented.[7] One of our more recent writers, in referring to the commonly accepted view of the rural population as a counterpoise, in political matters, to the artisans of the cities, based the conservatism of the former upon the isolation that prevents their being moved by a common impulse and upon "a property interest in the soil, such as secured by the general prevalence of land ownership or an equitable system of tenantry." [8]

On the other hand, the city population, because of less widely diffused ownership, glaring contrast in wealth and status, excessive mobility, and because of other reasons, is widely regarded as characteristically volatile and unstable and thus as peculiarly susceptible to innovating ideas and subversive movements. Mob psychology prevails among the city population, it is said; and therefore hasty and intemperate action is likely to be taken. Professor Ross thus finds in the city population "unanimity, impulsiveness, exaggeration of feeling, excessive credulity, fickleness, inability to reason, and sudden alternations of boldness and cowardice." Professor Munro, in spite of the view that the tendency of city life is toward "docility and the extinction of independence in thought and action," accepts the paradoxical conclusion that the city nevertheless "tends to be radical in its attitude toward political and economic issues." Another

writer of note, citing such authorities as Roscher, Tarde, Sighele, and Gumplowicz, in support of the view that in the crowd "the individual disappears in the multitude" and that "therewith disappear also personality and a sense of responsibility," implies a similar judgment relative to the city folk.[9]

That in the free Greek city-states the citizenship was "subject to quick fluctuations of public opinion and to the influence of eloquent demagogues" and that democracy there "led a rather turbulent life," [10] has attracted the attention, of course, of many students and writers in the field of government. And it has not infrequently been asserted that the city republics of the mediaeval and early modern periods fell into decay because of the increasing prevalence of the same mob spirit. Hobbes expressed the view that great capital cities are prone to insurrections; and London had early earned the reputation of being a rebellious city. The city of Paris, especially, has long had the reputation of being prone to popular revolt and the Parisian populace, of being eager to accept revolutionary ideas and to overturn the existing regime. The cities—and especially the great cities—are thus regarded as the potential centers of political disturbance, continually threatening to break out into eruption or to become the scenes of political seismic movements that jeopardize the existing order and bring political and social chaos in their train.

Such are the generalizations very frequently made, in this connection, with respect to the urban and rural populations. But a more careful analysis of the qualities of the two classes of population, including especially a recognition of the varying characteristics of the different groups in each of the two classes, and an appeal to that comparatively impartial resolver of moot questions of social import, history, would appear to point to a material modification of these sweeping generalizations. If these conclusions are to be ac-

cepted as valid, it must be admitted to be a most astonishing fact that England, France, Germany, and the United States, all admittedly countries of high political stability today, stand high among the countries of the world in the extent to which urban life has developed; while countries like Russia, Spain, Portugal, China, Mexico, and certain of the Central and South American countries, which have a comparatively small urban population—some, indeed, being almost exclusively rural,—are characterized by a marked political instability. Moreover, all of these more highly urbanized countries have grown increasingly stable, politically, as they have become more and more highly urbanized.[11]

To a certain extent, no doubt, account must be taken of the difference in racial factors in considering the relative political stability in these two groups of countries. But it is easy to overemphasize the importance of race factors. Attention has already been directed to the fact of racial miscegenation as a serious complicating factor in estimating the political significance of racial factors. Moreover, it makes a great deal of difference at just what period the comparison of races is to be instituted. Some twenty centuries ago, or more, when the Nordic ancestors of the present dominant peoples of the world were nothing but a congeries of warring, barbarian, wilderness tribes, they probably would have compared but poorly, both in general political development and also in political stability, with the contemporaneous Mayan and Toltec peoples of Central America and Mexico and with the Peruvians of the period of the Incas. Political instability in Spain and Portugal today has been ascribed, in part, to the admixture of Moorish blood in the population of those countries. But if we turn back a very few centuries we come to a time when the Moors were a more highly civilized, and a politically more highly developed, people than were the Nordicized and Alpinized Mediterranean peoples of South-

western Europe of the same period.[12] Neither do contrast and similarity in respect to political conditions always appear to follow racial lines closely. Lastly, as already suggested, the essential consonance between a growing degree of urbanization and a growing degree of political stability is amply demonstrated in the political development of these so-called superior races themselves.

Indeed, the very authorities whose generalizations with reference to the asserted relation between urban development and political instability have been presented above not infrequently give expression to observations of moment that are substantially at variance with these generalizations. De Tocqueville, in spite of his fear of city influences in the political life of this country, yet characterized the people who were in his day constantly peopling the valley of the Mississippi, as Dwight had done before him, as "in every respect very inferior" to those who inhabited the older, and more urbanized, parts of the Union. And Bryce largely negated his own fears as to the subversive influence of the city populations by fully admitting that the fears of De Tocqueville for this country had proven wholly groundless, and by ascribing in fact to the rural population in this country the very political weaknesses and characteristics that both had assumed theoretically for the dwellers of cities.[13]

Professor Ross, in turn, in no small measure contradicts his generalizations as to the city population when he elsewhere asserts, of this country, that as compared with the Middle West it is harder for popular discontent in the East "to find able leadership, break the surface, and enact itself," and when he asserts that "a powerful conservative element" in the latter section has yet been far in the lead in its promotion of good government and a wise public policy in general.[14] Moreover, Professor Munro's paradox resolves itself into something very like a contradiction when it is observed

that his generalizations fail to recognize the varying and often contradictory political characteristics of the different elements of the urban population as a whole.

No more can the rural population as a whole be catalogued in a single political category—even in that of political stability. For notwithstanding the undoubted conservatism of much of our rural population throughout our history, it is the rural element that has been responsible for almost every one of our serious political disturbances or outbreaks. Bacon's and Shays' rebellions, the Whisky Insurrection, and Burr's and Wilkinson's conspiracies were all rural outbreaks. Dorr's Rebellion, the only comparable urban outbreak, was certainly more nearly justifiable than were these other revolts. New York had serious rent riots as early as 1766; and over the years 1839–47, the anti-rent disturbances in that State at times assumed almost the character of insurrection. Anti-abolition, anti-foreign, and labor riots in Northern cities have been fairly balanced by slave insurrections and by lynching episodes in the rural South and by the operations of bands of outlaws in the rural districts of the West and Southwest. The activities of the Border Ruffians in Kansas in the years 1854–58 and John Brown's raid in Virginia in 1858 were a fair offset to the anti-draft riots in New York City and other urban centers during the Civil War period, from the point of view of political stability. And the Civil War itself was of course a great rebellion of the rural South against the national government. The railroad riots, too, in a number of cities in 1877 were less sinister than the atrocious crimes of the "Molly Maguires" in the anthracite regions over the period 1854–77.

Today it is scarcely possible, perhaps, to conceive of such uprisings among the rural population as the early rebellions enumerated above, or as the rebellion of the South in 1861–65; though the city population has also become less inclined in recent years toward disorderly outbreaks.[15] Yet

attention has already been directed to the activities of organized draft resisters in the rural Southwest and in certain other rural areas in connection with the recent war. Labor disturbances in the cities are offset today in very considerable measure by the disturbances promoted by the I. W. W. and by other lawless organizations in the rural districts; and in the series of "mine wars" in recent years we are having illustration of the fact that our most serious and most prolonged industrial disturbances are staged in some of the remoter rural districts and not in the urban centers. It appears not unreasonable to interpret this latter fact as tending to show a disposition, on the part of the rural elements, to go to greater extremes in such controversies, and as perhaps reflecting the absence in the rural districts of those civilizing influences that in spite of all the manifest deficiencies in the urban culture appear to spring from city life.[16]

It is also not unreasonable to suppose that the growing practice of collective bargaining on the part of the rural agricultural population may involve not a little of the turbulence and disorder that are now so frequently associated with its use on the part of the industrial population in both country and city. Indeed, in some of our recent rural milk-strikes farmer non-union victims of boycott, of personal violence, and of destruction of property, recognized farmer justices, and even executive officers, of the peace among those who had beset them.[17] Of a similar character have been the widely distributed night-riding exploits in our tobacco-producing districts.

The radical, and in the view of many persons decidedly subversive, inclination of a part of our rural population has also been illustrated in recent years by the fact that the farmers of North Dakota have instituted and set into operation, in the Non-Partisan movement, the most radical program that has ever been attempted in this country. And it is certain that this movement and program have won the sympathy

and more or less active support of a considerable element among the rural agricultural population in a number of the adjacent and surrounding States. The testimony of a Kansas banker, formerly a farmer in North Dakota, before the Commission on Industrial Relations at its hearings on the Land Question in the Southwest, at Dallas, Texas, a few years since, that though the farmers of this country "will stand a hundred times more persecution and injustice" than the wage earners, "before they start," when they do start nothing will stop them from applying the remedy and that "they will move so that institutions will go down like tenpins before them," of course does not represent a characterization that can accurately be extended to any very considerable proportion of the farmers of this country.[18] But the unsatisfactory conditions and the suspicion and bitterness of spirit that have been disclosed, both at this hearing and also from other sources, as existing among the rural population in not a few sections of the country, sharply remind us that the possible threat to the stability of our political institutions by no means finds its sole source among the industrial population of our urban centers. It is a question, too, whether political stability is not threatened more, ultimately, by the spirit that will endure a great deal for a considerable length of time but goes to extremes in the end than by the captious spirit that is quick and instant to resent any wrong, real or imaginary.

As we have already seen, there is much weightier evidence in the European countries than there is in our own country to support the view that the rural population has usually constituted the conservative element in the body politic; though this is by no means tantamount to saying that the rural population in Europe has made the largest contribution to the political stability of peoples and of states there. The rural population of Europe likewise occupies no small place in the annals of internal or domestic conflict in that

part of the world. And today there are abundantly numerous illustrations there of serious threat to the established order from rural elements of the population.[19]

It is thus evident that the political characteristics of the urban population in general, as well as those of the rural element in a measure, have been seriously misjudged or misinterpreted by those who have feared or have predicted a threat to political stability from the large development of city life. And an attempt may now be made to discover the reasons for this serious misconception of the influence of the marked cityward trend in recent times.

In the first place, as already indicated, the theory of the marked radicalism of a portion of the urban population has been mistakenly extended by many persons to the urban population as a whole—regardless of the strongly conservative influences, in the cities, that extend in large part to the middle classes and even to a very considerable proportion of the industrial masses.[20] Again, it is necessary to distinguish between political stagnation and true political stability. The former represents an apparently changeless condition. Political stability, on the other hand, is something very different. For the latter represents, not a static condition where all change is barred or eliminated, but a condition of gradual adjustment, with a minimum of shock on the part of the political organization, to the changing conditions of the times. There is in the long run no such thing as absolute lack of change in the political organization of a people or of a state. But there is a vast difference as to the manner in which this change is accomplished; and it is of course in this circumstance that the difference between a politically stable and a politically stagnant state lies. In the state characterized by political stagnation the time finally comes when the waters that have been so long barred burst the barriers, and the change that might have been made gradually and with a minimum of shock comes suddenly and

perhaps with a devastating sweep. And such a condition of stagnation is then very likely to be followed by a long period of marked instability.

The distinction that has just been made between real political stability and political stagnation is so simple and so clearly apparent that an apology seems almost necessary for referring to it here. But its significance and fundamental importance are so commonly disregarded or forgotten in the present connection that it seems imperative to call it to mind again. For it is just here that the city populations have played a highly important part in the political development of peoples. Constituting in the main the more progressive, and even more radical, element of the population, the people of the cities have almost everywhere led the rural population in the attempt to secure that adjustment of the political organization to changed conditions, upon which real political stability depends. It is therefore unwarranted to charge the city populations of the world with contributing to political instability. In England, where evolution has on the whole taken the place of revolution, in the political sphere, and where gradual and comparatively peaceful change has been one of the chief distinguishing features of political and constitutional development, it has been preëminently the urban population that has promoted the necessary changes that have kept the British state in the very forefront of democratic development and that have given the British political system at once that remarkable stability and that instant responsiveness to the popular will that characterize it.

The excesses of the French Revolution, again, doubtless would never have been manifested had not the old rural feudal forces of the ancient regime, supported or encouraged by the indifference of the peasant masses, dammed back the currents of political progress that made themselves felt among the bourgeoisie, until the political organization had grown too antiquated and too much incapacitated to serve

even as a makeshift while the necessary changes could be made. The whole structure therefore suddenly went down in spectacular and catastrophic ruin; and the lapse of a century was required before the basis for a reasonable political stability was finally attained. Similarly, the varying measure of political instability manifested in recent years in such countries as Russia, Spain, Portugal, China, and Mexico may be traced back in very large measure to the retarding effect of ultra-conservative or reactionary rural and feudal influences, by which needed changes or adjustments were prevented. It is of much interest in this connection that a recent writer, who describes the French people as among the most patient people on earth, paradoxically concludes that their political convulsions may in large measure be traced to this quality or characteristic of extreme patience. For the passive willingness, especially of the rural population, to endure misgovernment and tyrannical conduct on the part of those in authority encourages the latter to proceed to extremes that would otherwise not be attained. The causes of dissatisfaction thus accumulate until finally an intense feeling is aroused and "violent explosions are apt to occur, of which the shock may be terrific."[21]

But there are other considerations of importance. In spite of the presence of a considerable unruly element in our cities and in spite of the not infrequent prevalence there of no little disorder of an incipient sort, there is still probably less danger of political revolt on a large scale than there is among the rural population under circumstances when the latter is deeply stirred. For in the urban centers, contrary to the common assumption of unanimity of sentiment and a tendency toward unanimity and precipitancy of action, the diverse views of the diverse elements that constitute that population exercise an influence retarding extreme and hasty action. Strong forces making for law and order are at once set into operation in the ordinary city community, immedi-

ately the radical or lawless elements pass to extreme measures. But in the rural districts the comparative homogeneity of the population and the situation of its being affected in a similar manner as a whole by any condition tending to arouse it to action make it very likely to go to extremes once it is thoroughly aroused. Consent is much more nearly unanimous than under similar circumstances in the city and there is therefore less check upon the impulse to precipitate and extreme action. Similarly, in the rural mining communities the "isolation and segregation" of a population "wholly dominated by one point of view" lead to marked radicalism and a disposition to go to extremes when thoroughly aroused.[22]

This condition among the rural population doubtless goes far toward explaining why the great majority of our serious political outbreaks in this country have occurred among that element of our population. In Europe, on the other hand, because of the existence of marked social and economic barriers among the different rural elements and because of the resulting opposition of interest among these elements, unanimity of action on the part of the rural population as a whole is less likely than in this country; while in the cities in this country the clashing diversities of nationality, race, religion, and economic interest, which have contributed to many minor and local disturbances, have yet contributed to discourage any general political outbreak.

Still another circumstance that tends to weaken the assumption so generally made as to the tendency toward the manifestation of political instability on the part of the city populations is the fact that the urban resident lives his life every day among crowds and is accustomed to the manifestations of crowd pyschology and is therefore not so likely to be carried away by such a spirit. It is a case where familiarity breeds indifference if not contempt.[23] Rural folk, on the other hand, habitually live an isolated life and are not fa-

miliar with the manifestations of group psychology. While they may be reserved and passive as individuals, when once gathered together under circumstances when they feel deeply with reference to something that appears to concern them vitally, they lack this acquired inhibition, against the group impulse, that the urban population in large measure possesses, and are very likely to be carried away completely by a common impulse to action. Even though practically unanimous action may be taken by an assemblage of city residents, they take the matter less seriously than a like assemblage of rural folk; and when they disperse they are less likely to carry out, in an extreme manner, the action agreed upon. They take such a situation less seriously because they are more accustomed to it than the rural folk. Any one who has attended an assemblage made up of country people dealing with a subject that they feel to concern them deeply must have been struck by the emotional tendencies displayed by persons who as individuals are normally passive and self-restrained.[24]

With respect to the assertion that the rural population takes its politics coolly and calmly, in its isolated environment, while the urban population, with its surging crowds and noisy processions, goes wild with excitement, it must be remembered that these occasions draw many persons from the rural districts to swell the crowd; and these rural participants, as just pointed out, are likely to be more impressed than are the more sophisticated city dwellers. Moreover, as has been well pointed out, the declaration of the will of the electorate in the city today is not made, as in the ancient city republic or even as in the New England town meeting, by the assembled populace and under the immediate spell of the political orator or demagogue, where the group spirit may exert its full effect; for "the biggest crowd that gathers on election day consists of two or three policemen, half a dozen election officers, and a few citizens standing in line

for a chance to vote one by one in the solitude of the voting-booth." [25] And by the time the morning of election day dawns much of the enthusiasm, and practically all of the tumult, that attended the political meetings of the previous evenings will have disappeared. The fact that the American citizen "dropped out of torchlight processions thirty years ago" [26] is of great significance in view of the marked trend toward the city during this period.

The fundamental conservatism that underlies the superficial appearance of radicalism among the city population is strikingly illustrated in the case of England—long the most highly urbanized of countries. Time and again the turbulent elements in the English cities, in support of what they regarded as their rights and liberties, have brought about a condition of affairs that appeared inevitably to threaten the stability or perpetuation of the state. And yet at what seemed to be the critical moment the essential conservatism of these classes asserted itself and through some happy compromise the English people have been able to present "the exemplar of a progressive state, in which the principles of traditional authority and democratic liberty combined for the common good." [27] This was notably the case at the time of the struggle over the Reform Act of 1832, when the situation appeared so serious that the prediction was freely made by foreign observers that the British monarchy could not survive the crisis. We have likewise seen more than one acute crisis similarly subside, in that country, in these recent days of domestic unrest and turmoil that have followed the close of the Great War of 1914–18. The railroad strike in 1919, the epidemic of unauthorized strikes in general, the agitation relative to the demand for nationalization of the mines, together with the sympathetic general strike of 1926, the threat of "direct action," and the bolshevistic sentiment among the minority of the workers, all represent various phases of a troubled situation that some observers have viewed quite pes-

simistically. But others, pointing out "the decisive failure of the bolshevistic radicals to force their doctrines on the country," have declared that the great mass of the laborers in that country have been "swinging to the support of sane leaders." And Lord Leverhulme, aptly styled "The Unofficial British Prime Minister of Industry," asserted that there had never been known in history such a disturbance as that experienced in the past few years, in England and America, with "so little upset in social life" and that these two countries, at least, have nothing to fear from their workmen.[28]

There is no denying the radicalism of a large element of the city population of France. But even among these there are the counteracting conservative influences to which attention has been called repeatedly. And though the *government* of France continues unstable in the sense that there is frequent change in its personnel, there is every reason to regard the nation or state as more stable today than ever before. An American newspaper correspondent, who wrote from Paris shortly after the national election in November, 1919, in which the moderate elements triumphed, stated that "Inquiry among the small wage earning classes, such as clerks, waiters, and even chauffeurs, brought out astonishing answers indicating that these, who had been pictured as ready to overturn the government, voted for the government tickets." [29]

Two striking testimonials, from authoritative though greatly differing sources, relative to the substantial conservatism of the constituency represented by the trade unions in this country have been offered recently. Dr. Graham Taylor, in reviewing the annual convention of the American Federation of Labor in 1920, called attention to the great growth and vast numbers of the organization and emphasized its stability under the leadership of a man whom they had just re-elected as president, with but a single dissenting vote, for

the thirty-ninth time. Commending the proceedings as of a character that would have been creditable to any legislative or other assembly and noting the strong argument and decided action against unauthorized strikes and the ignoring of suggestions for extreme measures with reference to other issues, he pronounced the organization in the main conservative. On the other hand, there had occurred a few weeks earlier the resignation from connection with the I. W. W., in this country, of a former member, prominent official, and authoritative literary expounder and propagandist of the views of this organization, on the ground that the attempt to arouse our working classes to an acceptance of the views and program of the organization was hopeless. In a statement accompanying his resignation he declared that the working class in America is interested in "jazz, baseball, and Billy Sunday"; that it "prays to God and venerates the traditions of Washington and Lincoln"; and that its members "own liberty bonds and vote for the candidates of the great political parties."[30] In this picturesque language the former radical leader thus strikingly confirms the calm reasoning of the sociologist.

It is of interest, too, that Colonel Edward M. House, in describing conditions in post-war Germany a few years ago, made the statement that the general federation of labor, which includes nearly all the trade unionists of that country and which numbers more than 8,000,000 members, has been one of the greatest forces, if not the greatest single force, in all Germany in bringing about orderly conditions in critical times.[31]

The chagrined and disillusioned agitator previously cited also reflects a more adequate appreciation than many ordinary observers show relative to the importance of the property factor as a conservative influence among the urban population. There is force, of course, in the argument that the urban population, among whom ownership is less generally

prevalent than among the rural population in a country such as our own, is therefore more likely to entertain radical theories and to accept radical proposals than the latter. It is in point to recall, however, that ultra-conservatism, to which ownership may contribute, does not make for real political stability. Moreover, a large proportion of the rural masses in Europe, apart from France, parts of Germany, and a few of the smaller countries, and in other parts of the world, are largely propertyless—as much so as the urban proletariat. Seeing that not a few of the city residents who live in rented homes are business or professional people of the highest education and standing, it would be the height of absurdity to class urban non-owners of homes generally as likely to entertain ideas subversive of the public order. Many of these, and others who like them own neither home nor land, yet have accounts in commercial or savings banks, or own shares of stocks or own bonds in private corporations. Through the dissemination of these stocks and bonds the ownership, or equity interest, in these concerns is much more widely distributed than is ordinarily realized; and these securities are undoubtedly held by urban owners more largely than by rural owners. It has been estimated that there are probably as many voters who are stockholders in corporations in this country as there are members in the various labor organizations.[32]

In many of our large corporations the workers themselves have become owners to an appreciable extent of the securities of the concerns which give them employment, with all the rights, in many cases, that pertain to owners. The employees of the street railway company in one of our large cities were even able not long since, by buying up and voting a large block of stock and by influencing many of the small stockholders, to compel the retention of the president of the company, whom they held in favor because of his fairness to them, against the attempt of powerful hostile interests at

removal. And they were at the same time able to secure for themselves regular membership on the board of directors.[33] Nearly one-third of the shareholders in one of our large meat-packing concerns are employees of that corporation; and the extent of employee representation in this country is indicated by the statement that there are 1,000 plant assemblies, including more than 1,700,000 employees, in the United States.[34]

Lastly, the establishment of large and powerful banks by various of the labor organizations in this country has become so common that the announcement of another enterprise of this kind has almost ceased to attract particular attention.

There is thus a tendency, that may not unreasonably be expected to become more pronounced in the future, toward democratic ownership in industry—a tendency to increase the number of "capitalist-workmen" and to effect the fusion of the employing and the employed functions. And it is obvious that these "labor-capitalists" will not be likely to manifest an inclination toward a serious disturbance of the public order nor a disposition rashly to attack the laws and social arrangements under which these enterprises and their own interest in them are established and guaranteed.[35] When attacks are made by others upon property and property rights, therefore, the interests of a large number of persons whose relation to the situation is not ordinarily had in mind are threatened, and these persons presently make their influence felt for the maintenance of law and order.

Even more important as a factor making for political stability is the distribution of government, state or provincial, and municipal bonds among the so-called propertyless classes. Very many such persons are afraid to invest in the securities of private corporations but are quite willing to place their funds in the securities of the city or State within which they live or in those of the general government. With

the funding of the debt in England and the establishment of the Bank of England, toward the end of the seventeenth century, a class was established—and it was largely an urban class—whose interests were thus bound up with the government and who were therefore disposed to support the government, entirely apart from any conservative influence that may have grown out of the ownership of land or of a home or of other real estate. In the founding of our own national government, the assumption of the war debts of the individual States by the general government and the funding, at full value, of these and of the obligations contracted by the latter during the period of the Revolution went far to win the holders of these obligations, who were largely city residents, to the support of the Constitution and of the national government that was subsequently established.[36] A perhaps even more general distribution of national and of municipal bonds among the citizens of thrifty France unquestionably has been a stabilizing factor in the political sphere in that country in recent times.

In all three of these countries, as well as in the other warring countries, the enormous issues of war loans in the course of the recent struggle and their wide distribution among the masses of the population have very largely increased the number of those who have thus come to have a very direct and immediate interest in the political stability and public security of their native land. Already, by the close of 1917, at least one person in every four in England was a "direct holder of Government securities"—a situation that was rightly estimated as "of enormous significance in the future state" of that country.[37] And by the close of the last war-loan campaign between one-fourth and one-third of the entire population of our own country had purchased liberty bonds.[38]

The manifest trend both of industrial and of political evolution is thus seen to warrant the assumption of more

stable, rather than of less stable, political conditions. The view that "Commerce and manufactures introduce good order and good government, and guarantee the liberty and security of individuals in both city and country" [39] may therefore be as confidently accepted for the future as it has been palpably true in the past. And such a conclusion goes far to guarantee the essential political stability of the population of the urban centers, which commerce and manufactures have been mainly instrumental in creating.

After all the view appears to be fully justified that on the whole people err on the side of conservatism. "The great majority of men . . . when they admit the necessity of a change, move very slowly; they adopt a policy of conservative innovation or of preservative addition; they love to engraft the new upon the old." Locke and most of the thinkers and leaders in general of the liberal school, observing the inertia of society, judged the risk of revolution to be small.[40] Even Jefferson, who distrusted the city populations emphatically, yet thought that a revolution was necessary every generation in order that democracy might be preserved. On the other hand, there are those today who are hostile to class control by any single element but who nevertheless are of the opinion that the body politic may suffer more from rural indifference, not to say conservatism, than from the organized activity of the working classes.[41]

On the whole, the combination of rural conservatism and urban progressiveness, or radicalism, appears to have worked well. But if a choice were to be made, with respect to the attainment of true political stability, between a political society predominantly urban and one almost wholly rural, reference to the political development and present political status of a country so highly urbanized as England, in contrast with political conditions, past and present, in almost exclusively rural countries, such as Russia or Mexico, leaves no shadow of a doubt that judgment must be pronounced in

favor of the former. Some years since, the able but ultra-conservative Pobyedonostseff, Procurator of the Holy Synod of Russia, expressed the view that the time would come when the world must look to Russia for the political and social stability which he believed to be lacking in the other great countries of the world. From the lack of this stability he anticipated disaster, for these other countries, from which his own country would be called upon to rescue the latter.[42] Upon the total inaccuracy of this view the complete debacle which the Czarist regime in Russia has since suffered and the political chaos with which that country has struggled in recent years afford a commentary whose eloquence it would be wholly impossible to supplement with words.

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CHAPTER XXIV

Urbanization and the Ponderables and the Imponderables in War: The Gun and the Man Behind the Gun

Efficiency in war depends, of course, upon a combination of the human and of the material factors in war—upon the gun, to use the gun as representative of the material agencies, and upon "the man behind the gun." We shall now inquire a little more particularly how urbanization affects these two factors.

I

URBANIZATION AND THE MATERIAL EQUIPMENT FOR WAR

There has been much difference of opinion as to the relative importance of the human factor and of the material factor in war. In ancient times there was a disposition to interpret efficiency in war almost wholly in terms of the human factor. The importance of the various weapons of offence and defence was, of course, not altogether disregarded. But on the whole questions relating to the human factor were predominant. The physical strength and the courage of the individual soldier, his military training, and his devotion and loyalty to his country or to his leader—these were matters of supreme importance. Weapons were necessary; but they were a secondary consideration. The implements of war were comparatively few in number and simple in character; and the difference in efficiency, in respect to the material agencies of war possessed by the hostile warring peoples, was likely to

be correspondingly unimportant. One could cite plenty of instances, of course, in ancient times where decisive victory perched upon the banner of one rather than of the other of the contending armies because of some superiority in respect to the material instrumentalities of combat. But in the main victory fell to the side that enjoyed a superiority in respect to the human factor; and it was in this fact that the frequently expressed prejudice in favor of the agricultural population, from the political point of view, found a substantial part of its basis. The agricultural population was commonly regarded as physically superior, as personally braver and more courageous, and as having a more direct interest in the welfare of the state.

The time came, however, when the relative emphasis upon these two factors began to be changed. With the downfall of the feudal regime and the displacement of the personal service relation between men by the pecuniary relation, money came to be regarded as the great sinew of war.[1] Soldiers and the necessary supplies and equipment for war, which were formerly provided by the feudal lords who owed service to the king, had now to be hired or purchased; and foreign trade, shipping, and manufactures, which were thought to be contributive to a stock of the precious metals and which even in those days implied something of urban development, were elevated to a position of precedence over agriculture. Hume advanced the further view that the population engaged in manufacturing, being already supplied with sustenance by the agricultural class and being devoted to the production of commodities more or less superfluous, could be diverted to the purposes of war without jeopardizing the necessary supply of food.[2]

From this subordination of agriculture and the agricultural class during the mercantilist period there was of course a reaction in physiocratic days. But there was no return to the ancient predominating emphasis upon the importance of

the personal factor in war nor upon the importance of agriculture as a means to that end. For with the advent of the industrial era and with the development of the use of machinery in ever increasing measure in the arts of peace, it was a foregone conclusion that there would come a corresponding evolution, and revolution, in the application of improved material and mechanical agencies to the purposes of war.

This development was reflected particularly in the introduction of firearms and of artillery in war; and from this time the rise of the material or mechanical factor in war to a position of very large importance has been rapid. Napoleon, while certainly not disposed to under-rate the importance of the human factor, expressed the new view of the prevailing importance of the material factor in war by the famous, and much quoted, aphorism that God is always on the side that possesses the heaviest artillery.

Even so liberal and peace-loving an individual as the late James Bryce is on record as having given expression to very similar views. Noting that it was an old and favorite commonplace of political moralists that the rich nations, dwelling in fertile plains and enervated by luxury, became the victims of poor nations who, inhabiting barren mountains, were hardier and fiercer in fight, he continued: "It is not so now. Naval warfare is, above all things, an affair of scientific apparatus, of ironclads, of torpedoes, of guns with long range and quick fire. Land war depends on the best artillery, the best rifles and ammunition, the best commissariat. War is an affair of science, and science is costly. All the great nations can produce good fighting men, and all may happen to have a good general. But some have far greater pecuniary resources than others." [3] And the events, and even the final outcome, of the recent great struggle must be admitted to have lent much support to the accuracy of this view. For during its course these material agencies of war received a

development and use not only to an extent entirely unprecedented but even beyond all expectation.

The conclusion already has been reached that the health and physique of the population not only have not suffered but even have been materially improved as a result of the development of city life; and it will be shown presently, it is believed, that the other personal factors that make for military efficiency have not diminished as a result of the cityward movement. On the other hand, money and credit occupy a vastly more important place in the waging of successful war than they did in the mercantilist period. The outcome more than ever depends today upon which side, as Lloyd George phrased it early in the recent great struggle, has "the larger number of silver bullets." And the industrial and commercial nations, which are those in which urban development is most advanced, are those which have the greater wealth and those whose financial resources can be mobilized most quickly and applied most effectively to the end in view.

The highly urbanized countries also excel in the various means of transportation. Not only railway lines and equipment but vessels and shipping, motor vehicles and motor traffic and transportation, and the development of aerial transportation and communication, are all intimately associated with those features of a nation's life that make for the growth of cities. All these agencies mean a great deal, of course, for the speedy movement and concentration of troops, for the forwarding of supplies, and for the maintenance of the necessary lines of communication, as well as for the ordinary productive efforts behind the lines.

Manufactures, in turn, supply on a scale never before approached vast quantities of endless varieties of military equipment and of supplies in general for carrying on war—such a list of articles for military use that their bare enumeration would fill page upon page. For the fabrication of these articles in the vast quantities required, the non-indus-

trialized, non-urbanized countries are almost totally unprepared; and if dependence must be had upon their own resources, the armies of these countries are certain to be seriously deficient in respect to these highly necessary articles of material equipment.

Lastly, the business organization and management that are of the very essence of the gigantic military operations in modern war were first worked out in the large urban business plants in time of peace; and they can be carried out in connection with military operations only by persons trained in the business field, or by those who are familiar with modern business organization and management in the industrial centers.[4]

In respect to but a single aspect of the situation does there appear to remain any reasonable doubt that the urbanizing movement has been directly and largely contributive toward increasing the military strength of nations on the material side. During the mercantilist period all the various nations were still virtually self-dependent with respect to a supply of food. This was the normal situation of nations and the continuance of this situation appears to have been almost universally assumed. The possibility of dependence in large measure upon food supplies from a foreign source did not therefore come seriously within consideration; and this circumstance doubtless had not a little to do with the degree to which agriculture was subordinated in importance relative to the national defence at this time. But international division of labor has now been carried to such an extent that certain highly industrialized and urbanized countries like England and Wales, and Belgium, and, to a somewhat less extent, Germany and Austria, have come to be more or less largely dependent upon other countries for food. And undoubtedly there is great peril in such a situation in time of war unless measures can be taken adequately to provide against the danger.

The answer that England has chosen, until recently at least, to give to this question is the policy of maintaining such a development of her merchant marine and such a naval force as would seem clearly to assure command of the sea, during war with almost any combination of hostile powers, and thus a continuation of imports of the necessary food supplies in time of war. In pursuance of this policy, not without misgiving on the part of some of her statesmen, the urban industries and interests in England and Wales have been so expanded that four-fifths of the population reside in the urban centers; and it has been estimated that the population of Great Britain as a whole has come to be dependent upon imported food supplies, exclusive of the important article of sugar, to the extent of at least one-half of the necessary requirements.[5] Examining into this question in 1905, the Royal Commission on the Supply of Food and Raw Material in Time of War came to the conclusion that with an adequate navy and an effective merchant marine, and with some supplementary measures of a minor character that were recommended, the national security of the United Kingdom would be adequately assured in time of war, in spite of large dependence upon outside sources for supplies of food.

It is known, however, that the position of England was regarded as vulnerable in this respect, by the leaders of Germany, who on their own part insisted that the latter country must "keep under the protection of her guns the ground upon which her corn grows and her cattle graze."[6] It is well known, too, that the attack of Germany against England in the recent war was planned and directed, through the war fleet and especially by means of the submarine, particularly with reference to this apparently vulnerable point in the English defence. The favorable outcome of the war and the successful defence made by England and her allies against the unexpectedly effective attacks of the German submarines during the recent war might not unreasonably be taken as a

justification of the conclusions reached by the Royal Commission of 1905.[7] But many British leaders have refused to accept this view of the matter. With a somewhat more extensive and somewhat better planned attack with the submarine Germany might conceivably have prevented to such an extent the entrance of food ships into the ports of England as to have starved the British people, in spite of all their courage and devotion, into submission. Moreover, the United States might possibly have refrained from casting her lot with the entente allies and thus have refrained from putting into force the economies in the use of food that were so important a phase of our participation in the war; and the important direct contribution made by this country in subduing the menace of the submarine would also have been lacking in that case.

Within a year after the close of the war, Premier Lloyd George gave forcible expression to the extreme danger in which England had been placed by the submarine menace during the course of the struggle. Expressing the conviction that the neglect of agriculture in Great Britain had brought that country to "the very verge of a great disaster" in the recent war, he declared that he would "never forget" the year 1917—especially the early months—and that even in 1918 the anxieties were great. Comparing the English policy with respect to agriculture with that followed by Germany, he declared that if Germany had pursued the same policy that England had followed the former country "would have collapsed within a year." And he concluded by declaring that England could not take any such chance as this again: "We came too near disaster." [8]

These are strong words from an authoritative source; and they have commanded the assent of many other prominent men in that country.[9] Indeed, a comprehensive scheme, including a guarantee of minimum prices on grain, provision for the effective cultivation of the soil, provision for

land settlement, restrictions upon the arbitrary displacement of tenants from their holdings, the establishment of minimum wages for agricultural laborers, and reorganization of the system of agricultural education and of the government departments dealing with agricultural affairs, was designed to prevent the recurrence of the peril and was placed in part in actual operation. Though this scheme met with the opposition of the laboring population in the urban centers, to whom it meant an appreciable increase in the cost of living, and though the exigencies of the situation during the difficult post-war period necessitated material modification of the part of the scheme actually put into operation and prevented the carrying out of other parts of the proposed plan, the opinion expressed by the moderate socialist, Philip Snowden, that granting the continuance of a state of antagonism among the nations of the world then "it is perhaps a sound policy to make the country as far as possible self-sustaining in the matter of food," [10] would commend itself to many persons as not unreasonable.

Yet it is a question whether such a policy could be carried out in such a country as England, or indeed in any country, in the face of the opposing trend of strong economic influences and in the face of political difficulties. No material progress toward the desired end has been made so far in England. Nor is it certain that such a policy would be effective in insuring the national security in time of war, either in that country or elsewhere. In spite of the utmost efforts of the former Imperial German Government, and those efforts must be admitted to have been highly intelligent and to have been carried forward with decision and energy, the German Empire was already well on the road in 1914 toward dependence upon outside sources for a material part of its food supplies. Indeed, a recognition of this fact on the part of the leaders of Germany appears to have been a prime factor in their decision in 1914 in favor of war.

Middleton estimated in 1916 that Germany imported about ten per cent of the total energy value of food consumed in that country. But Starling has since pointed out that Germany, which is especially deficient in phosphorus, imports some forms of fertilizer in large quantities, as well as large quantities of concentrated feeding stuffs; and that in view of this fact the estimate of German dependence upon outside sources for food must be somewhat increased.[11] In a note handed by Count von Brockdorff, head of the German peace mission at Versailles, to the entente allies, on May 13, 1920, it was stated that Germany is no longer an agrarian state and can not feed more than 40,000,000 people from her own resources—though this statement undoubtedly involved a certain measure of purposeful exaggeration, as the object was to secure the lifting of the allied blockade.

All will agree that Germany displayed great effectiveness in the making of war in the recent great struggle; but there can be no doubt that this effectiveness rested very largely upon those features associated with urban development to which attention has already been called. The scarcity of food admittedly had something to do with the loss of morale on the part of the German population, civil and military, toward the close of the struggle; and this loss of morale, which also had other and more important causes, of course hastened the end. But it does not appear that a completely sufficient supply of food would have enabled Germany under the conditions then existing to win the war. For the war was really lost, for Germany, at the outset, at a time when food supplies were still plentiful, when she failed to put either France or Russia definitely out of the fight before England could come effectively to the assistance of France. If Germany had been able to accomplish this first step she could have drawn indefinitely upon the food supplies of Russia or of France and would never have faced food shortage at all. The crisis of the food shortage in Germany

came, indeed, in the winter of 1916–17, or nearly two years before the close of the war.[12]

On the other hand, if Germany had attained an industrial and urban development sufficiently greater than that which she actually possessed to have enabled her to rival the shipping and commerce of England and to develop a sea-power that would have made it possible for her to wrest the control of the sea from the latter, she would have been able, as England herself was able, to supply her need for food from the great surplus-producing areas of the world as well as to prevent aid from that country and from the United States from reaching France. Control of the sea thus might have enabled Germany to carry out with real success her plan of beating her opponents in succession. Or, larger industrial power, which connotes a higher degree of urbanization, might have enabled Germany speedily to give to her submarine campaign that larger scope and greater intensiveness that would have insured its complete effectiveness.[13] That is, reversing Lloyd George's comparison of the relative advantage of the British and the German policy with respect to agriculture, if Germany had pursued the same policy that England followed she might have won the war and won it in less than a year.

It is perhaps worth noting, too, that if Germany had been less certain that she enjoyed substantial self-sufficiency with respect to her supply of food in time of war, her leaders might never have precipitated the war that plunged the whole world into misery and that finally brought defeat and humiliation to herself.

Again, Belgium was not overwhelmed because of lack of adequate supplies of food. She was not starved into submission but was speedily over-run after her fortresses had been demolished by artillery of extraordinarily heavy caliber and her field guns completely out-ranged and out-numbered. It was thus German urban development, as reflected in this

superiority in the material equipment for war, and not the efficient development of agriculture in Germany that enabled the latter quickly to break the barrier that Belgium so gallantly offered. If Belgium had been less an industrial and urban country, she undoubtedly would have been overcome even more quickly—so quickly perhaps as to have been unable to afford France the priceless opportunity to complete the mobilization of her troops.

On the other hand, it is difficult to see how a condition of substantial self-dependence with respect to food on the part of England could have strengthened that country in the recent war. Indeed, such a condition might have been fatal. For the menace of the submarine was eliminated, not by the efforts of English agriculturists nor even of American farmers but by the urban industries of England and America where were planned and constructed the means and agencies to overcome the submarine and to make good a large part of the loss in shipping. By being able to draw upon outside sources for food England was able to divert the population, that otherwise would have been required to produce food, to the creation of the positive instruments for the prosecution of the war and even to fight in the line of battle. While food is necessary in order to fight, it is not an immediate and positive instrument of war. It has only a defensive value; and it has that only in case the actual instruments of war are at hand. It demolishes no enemy fortresses, breaks no enemy battle line, sinks no enemy dreadnaughts, puts no enemy soldiers or sailors out of commission. It is a negative means to positive instruments to accomplish the desired end. It was a very real advantage, then, to England to hand over, in large measure, a non-combatant task to the people of neutral countries and to be able to divert the labor of her population more largely to positive war work.

More serious, however, from the point of view of strength in war, would be the probable effect of a policy of attempted

self-sufficiency with respect to food supplies upon the ability of England to retain her naval supremacy. That supremacy rests very largely upon the expansion of her trade and commerce and upon the development of her manufactures, and is associated closely with the magnitude of her merchant marine. All these, in turn, are intimately related to that freedom of trade that has kept the English ports open to the abundant and cheap supplies of food and of raw material that have been drawn from the ends of the earth. The agriculture of England could scarcely be subsidized without placing a burden, directly or indirectly, upon her manufactures, commerce, and carrying trade. And an attempt to extend an "equalizing" protection to her manufactures would be both useless and injurious with respect to the foreign market for manufactured products; while such a policy, so far as it had any effect at all, would at once offset the advantage that had just been given, by assumption, to agriculture. For England to enter upon a policy of protection would thus be fatal to the whole system upon which the foreign trade and the merchant marine of England are based and would thus seriously undermine the basis of her naval supremacy.[14] The *general* acceptance, at least, of the principle of national self-sufficiency would of necessity largely eliminate international trade altogether, and thus largely destroy the natural basis of naval development.

Again, the policy of self-sufficiency is inadequate to insure the security of any single nation in time of war today because invariably there are some of the materials or commodities, entirely apart from food, that are necessary to the successful prosecution of war but that are not indigenous to a particular country or are no longer available there in adequate quantities. England requires from outside sources iron ore, copper, platinum, tin, lead, zinc, silver, gold, petroleum, cotton, hemp, rubber, lumber, and other commodities and elements necessary either to her agriculture, to her in

dustrial arts, or to the fabrication of the implements and munitions of war. France is largely dependent upon outside sources for coal, and Italy almost wholly so. Something can be done in the direction of the accumulation in advance and storage of these necessary commodities as against the chance of war. But it is significant that the various nations are giving far more attention to the question of the mastery of the sea and of the air and to the perfecting of political alliances that will permit the mutual supplementing of national deficiencies in time of war than they are to the question of the accumulation and storage of necessary supplies that would not be available at home in case of war. Even in the case of food supplies, crop failures, especially in some of the smaller countries where unfavorable weather conditions are likely to extend over the whole crop area, may render a country that is normally self-sufficing in this respect seriously dependent upon outside sources during war.

Seeing that all the nations remain individually more or less deficient in some important respect after all that can be done to render them self-sufficient has been done, it has been suggested that a nation and its colonies may be welded into a self-sufficing unit.[15] But the ships that are necessary to insure control of the sea and maintain communication between the widely separated parts of, for example, the British Empire would at the same time guarantee, so far as anything can be guaranteed in time of war, the continuance of the importation of food supplies into England. And if the starvation of the people of England and their consequent defeat in war would mean the dissolution of the British Empire, it is no less certain that the loss of her colonies through loss of control of the sea would also very soon lead to the overwhelming of the mother country and to the equally certain dissolution of the Empire. Moreover, the superiority, at times, of the ordinary military alliance to the imperial unit in supplying the deficiencies of individual nations in time of war is

well illustrated by the fact that because of remoteness England was unable to draw upon the surplus food supplies that existed in India and Australia during the recent war and found it much to her advantage to supply her needs in our markets and from the stores that were enlarged through our conserving policies as an ally.

Without the assistance of powerful allies, who supplemented her deficiencies, natural or induced by enemy occupation, France must soon have gone down to defeat in the recent war under the sheer weight of numbers and of superior resources, in spite of the substantial self-sufficiency that she possessed at the outset. And except for allied control of the sea, the soldiers that France required from her allies for her assistance could neither have been brought to her shores nor have been equipped and fed while there. It is significant that in rural Russia, in spite of a great surplus of food, military defeat and inefficiency of the means of transportation combined to bring about a situation where large numbers, both of the military and of the civil population, suffered from lack of food.

The question also arises, because of the danger of enemy occupation of vitally important sections of the territory of a given nation, whether it is not necessary to consider self-sufficiency on the basis of separate areas within the boundaries of the nation itself. To illustrate from the case of France, again, in the recent war her chief mining and industrial areas were speedily over-run by the enemy; and in this region, too, was produced three-fourths of all the sugar beets raised in France. It is significant that the people of France, which is normally a large producer of sugar, suffered much greater privation during the recent war from the inadequate supply of sugar than did the people of Great Britain, where practically all of the sugar is imported.

Many of the efforts made by Germany to assure self-sufficiency in time of war—her tariffs on agricultural prod-

ucts and on manufactured goods, her state subsidies to domestic industries that competed with foreign interests, her devious but unskilful diplomacy, and her saber-rattling and swash-buckling conduct in the carrying forward of all her policies—all combined to unite the world at large, outside her own puissant yet inadequate bloc, against her and to deprive her of powerful friends and allies in time of need. There has never been, in truth, a better illustration of the fact that the employment of many of the means to assure national self-sufficiency in time of war creates friction and hostility between nations, and itself becomes a potent cause of war and a potent agency for the ultimate undoing of the nation pursuing such a policy.

The way of national safety certainly does not lie in a narrow policy of national self-sufficiency with respect to food. It does not even lie in a policy which concerns itself meticulously with national self-sufficiency in general. No single nation can make itself wholly self-sufficient today, either in peace or in war. No single nation, however powerful, can stand today against any possible combination of other powers. The advantage today appears clearly to lie with that *group* of nations that can control the sea and the air—that is, with the group that is the most highly urbanized. There is no complete insurance against the risks associated with war today. Even groups of nations, when arrayed against each other in war, can not preserve an individual member of the group, or even themselves as a whole, from the most grave risk. For the agencies of war have become so destructive that victory is but little less serious than defeat; and individual members of the winning group are quite likely to be over-run during some stage of the struggle.

The next great war, if unfortunately there shall be a next great war, is likely to be as much more destructive than the one that came to a close in 1918 as the latter exceeded the wars of former times in this respect. In such a war the fac-

tory and laboratory are certain to play a much more predominating part than they did even in the recent struggle. Not the ability to subsist the population, not the ability merely to hold out, will therefore be decisive, but the ability to command the sea and the air and to carry the frightful destruction of poison gas and of devastating explosives and of other destructive agencies quickly and overwhelmingly to the other side.[16] The former without the latter would prove unavailing. But with the latter the former could be assured, and victory, precious though disastrous, could be achieved in the end.

II

URBANIZATION AND INDIVIDUAL MILITARY CAPACITY

After all has been done that can be done toward providing the material equipment and machinery of war, it still remains true that very much depends upon the quality of the individual soldiers. The former are comparatively worthless if the latter are notably lacking in the military virtues. An army is never finally defeated until its leaders and its rank and file are ready to acknowledge inferiority and to accept defeat. Superiority in guns and in the other instruments of war, even when backed by superior numbers, is not always decisive in wresting the victory from the enemy—as the failure of the Germans before Ypres and Verdun again proved. And that the strongest military positions are incapable of defence, once the morale of the defenders is broken, is attested by the comparative ease with which the German lines in France and in Belgium were broken in the fall of 1918, after resisting the utmost endeavors of the armies of the entente allies for four long years. Military equipment may do much to break, or to sustain, the morale of the soldiers and thus to win, or to preserve, victory. But defeat is always a thing of the mind before it becomes complete and final.

Perhaps as much responsible as any other factor for the loss of the recent war by Germany and her allies was that peculiar lack, often noted on her part, of what has been called a sense of the "imponderables" in war. There was an excessive emphasis by the Germans upon the external machinery of war. And no one who read the descriptions written by the war correspondents in the early days of the war will ever forget the vivid impression which the latter received, and communicated in turn to their readers, of the endless numbers of the German soldiers and the excellence and completeness, to the last detail, of their equipment. It would not be correct to say that the Germans were indifferent to the importance of the human factor in war. But it was an emphasis upon mere numbers and upon other of the grosser elements associated with the human factor rather than upon the really spiritual human factors. That is, the Germans recognized primarily only the more ponderable aspects of the imponderable factor, in war as in peace.

That the French greatly excel the Germans in capacity to appreciate the importance of the "imponderables," both in peace and in war, does not prove that the higher degree of urbanization in Germany than in France is responsible for this difference. For the English, the most highly urbanized of all peoples, also greatly excel the Germans in this respect. The difference must find other explanation.

We have already seen that the urbanizing movement carries no threat to the military efficiency of the nations because of any ill effect upon the national physique and national vitality. For the health and physique of the population in all the highly urbanized countries, while still deficient in no small degree, have shown a marked trend toward improvement during the progress of urbanization in these countries. And the severe test afforded in this respect by the recent war is distinctly reassuring.[17]

But even more important than these human physical

factors are those mental or spiritual factors that determine in the last analysis the fighting quality of the individual soldier—patriotism, personal courage, initiative, amenability to training and discipline, tenacity of purpose, ability to accept punishment, capacity to endure privation and hardship, ability to maintain good spirits and to resist despondency and defeatist tendencies, and the capacity for associated effort. And in respect to all these the urban soldier at least holds his own in comparison with his rural cousin.

The influence of city life upon patriotism already has been found to be on the whole favorable. With respect to the other qualities just noted, it would appear that the soldiers drawn from the cities are not inferior to those drawn from the country in personal courage, tenacity of purpose, and the ability to accept punishment on the field of battle. On the other hand, urban troops appear to excel in the readiness with which they respond to training and discipline, in the ability to maintain good spirits and to resist defeatist tendencies, and perhaps even in the capacity to endure hardship and privation.

In normal times of peace and with respect to the ordinary pursuits of life, the rural individual does indeed appear to excel his city rival in tenacity of purpose and in capacity to endure toilsome and unpleasant conditions. But in time of war and with respect to the achievement of some military objective, the soldier from the city appears to be fully the equal of the soldier from the country in these respects. This circumstance may be associated, perhaps, with the fact that the former is a better sportsman than the latter—more highly endowed than the latter with the sporting instinct. Superior ability on the part of the urban soldiers to maintain a cheerful spirit and to resist defeatist tendencies, as well as superior capacity for associated effort and superior amenability to discipline, also appear to be connected with the fuller development of the sportsmanship instincts among the urban

population, though these qualities are also promoted by other features of the urban environment.

With respect to initiative, we might expect to find the rural soldiery superior, as the conditions of city life are widely regarded as being unfavorable to the development and exercise of this quality. Yet evidence has already been presented to show the inaccuracy of this point of view as it relates to the ordinary civic and political qualities;[18] and no such assumed superiority on the part of the rural soldiers was actually manifested by them in the recent war. The British soldiers, though coming from a land of cities, were not lacking in this quality. Neither have the supposed repressing influences of city life diminished this important military quality among our own population, as we have become increasingly urbanized. It has also been noted, with some surprise, that the German soldiers appeared to show, in the recent war, a higher degree of initiative than was anticipated of them. May it not be possible that after all city life in Germany, and in other countries, has contributed to increase rather than to diminish individual initiative? Initiative is closely akin to the quality of individual self-expression. And in such a country as Germany, and even more in a country like England, with a large peasant rural population or a large class of agricultural laborers among whom there has been little opportunity for individual self-expression, it may well be that the drift to the cities, through the stimulus of urban life and the association with others of their own group, has afforded an impulse toward self-expression and toward the development of an increased initiative.

In view of the fact that the standard of life is simpler and less luxurious in the country than it is in the city and of the further fact that the rural population possesses a greater capacity for work in ordinary affairs, it is somewhat surprising to be told that the urban soldiers have shown themselves superior to rural soldiers in capacity to endure hard-

ship and privation in time of war. Yet an officer of the United States Army, connected with the recruiting service, has stated that the urban recruit fights longer on an empty stomach than the rural recruit and endures loss of sleep or irregularity in sleep better. "Place the city man on a battle field," he says, "and he'll fight for forty-eight hours without exhaustion. Give him a few hours' sleep and he'll return refreshed in mind and body, ready to fight for another two days without rest if need be. The country man, on the other hand, has a certain hour for retiring. He begins to yawn and stretch as soon as the hands of the clock reach that hour, and it is with difficulty that he can keep awake. A few nights of late hours and, to use a popular phrase, 'he is all in.'" [19]

This view of the superiority of the urban-born soldier, in certain respects, has been confirmed by others—some of whom not only helped to train our urban recruits but also led them on the field of battle "over there" under circumstances calculated to try their mettle and their endurance to the uttermost. An American newspaper correspondent, writing in the closing days of the war, of the astonishing spirit and dash with which the American troops were fighting, said: "No one would have believed you could take an East Side paper box maker, who had never been off Manhattan Island, and inside of a year make him into an expert modern soldier. It has been done. Bookkeepers have been transformed into some of the greatest machine gunners ever seen. Artillery men have been made out of Wall Street clerks." [20]

A story that well illustrates the astonishing aptitude for military affairs manifested by individuals whom the routine of city life had supposedly deprived of initiative and assertiveness and rendered unfit for military service comes to us from England. A certain man who had been a bookkeeper or clerk in an office in an English city entered the army in the recent war. At home he had been one of the meekest and least combative of men, always submissively taking orders

and carrying them out under the direction of a superior. In the army, however, he soon revealed a very different character; and when he finally reached the front he proved a very fiend in the fierceness and courage with which he joined in the fight. So reckless and daring did he prove in his desire to get at the enemy that the officers had great difficulty in restraining him within the bounds of a reasonable prudence. The extraordinary courage and intrepidity with which the regiments from London and from dozens of other British cities performed their duty in some of the most terrible battles of this most unprecedented war proves that the instance of this humble bookkeeper was in no sense exceptional. And few persons can read unmoved Donald Hankey's account of the glad abandon with which some who were regarded as "city wastrels" gave their all for England when the final test came.[21]

Assuredly the rural units, native or colonial, in the British army did not fail in the stern test. But there is no evidence to support the view that they in any degree exceeded their urban comrades in all that makes for military heroism and military efficiency.

What proved true with respect to the British and American armies likewise proved true in the case of the armies of the other countries. A noted war correspondent, referring to "the famous French Twentieth Corps, recruited from Paris —city men and therefore most affected by the soft influences of peace," asserted that from such as these we "might have expected cowardice, timidity—whole armies breaking at the first fire." But instead "We got unexampled heroism." And generalizing with respect to the record of human valor everywhere in the recent war, he declared that there were found "unexpected reservoirs of valor in the human spirit." "Every week along the great line, bodies of men performed acts of sacrifice which made Thermopylæ, the Alamo, and the charge of the Light Brigade seem poor and spiritless." [22]

Though two of the three persons officially designated in this country as the greatest individual heroes of the war hailed from the rural districts, yet the list of those American soldiers who won the Congressional Medal of Honor, the highest American military decoration, appears at the very least to include something more than a full proportion of representatives from the urban centers.[23] Particularly in the air service, in the recent war, do urban representatives appear to have predominated—both in respect to the number of superlatively skilled and successful fighters and also in distinguished and useful services rendered. If there be, as has frequently been asserted, a "flying temperament," the conclusion is inescapable that the urban environment tends strongly to produce such a temperament among its residents. One of the most superb of the French airmen, indeed, the marvelously skilled and highly redoubtable Fonck, was born in a small village in the Vosges. But the heroic Guynemer, probably unsurpassed in deeds of courage and prowess in a war where heroes were legion, was a Parisian by birth and the son of a retired army officer who later became a prosperous manufacturer in the city of Compiègne. A Parisian, too, was another superlative French ace, the airman Nungesser. Heurtaux, commandant of the famous Stork Escadrille, was a native of the city of Nantes. And the accomplished Guérin was "a clerk in a Havre business house," previous to his entry into military service.

Rural England perhaps had a most distinguished representative among British airmen in the gallant Rhodes-Moorhouse, though not unlike the great French ace, Fonck, who had been a racing automobilist, he had for some years previous to the war occupied himself largely with the promotion of aviation. But Warneford was born in the city of Cooch-Behar, India; and probably urban, too, was Robinson, who also was a native of India. The great Ball was the son of a prominent business man and alderman in the city of

Nottingham; McCudden, like his father a member of the Royal Engineers previous to the outbreak of the war, was born in the seaport of Gillingham, Kent; and the incomparable Mannock, the greatest of British aces, who when he enlisted in the flying service concealed the previous loss of an eye, was a Londoner.

Of the three great Canadian airmen, all of whom survived the war, Bishop is a native of the seaport of Owen's Sound, Ontario; Collishaw claims the city of Nanaimo, Vancouver Island, as the place of his birth; and Barker hails from the town of Dauphin, Manitoba.

The great German airman, Von Richthofen, stated that his family were "mainly country people—agrarians." But his father was a professional soldier and he himself was born in the city of Breslau and also had been trained to professional military life. Boelcke was born in a suburb of the city of Halle and was reared and educated there and in the city of Dessau. And both Immelmann and his victorious foe in his last encounter, the South African airman, McCubbin, were city men.

Urban precedence among American airmen in the recent war was most striking. The roving and adventurous Lufbery, regarded by some as the greatest though not the most successful of American aces, was a native of Wallingford, Connecticut. Among other prominent members of the Lafayette Escadrille, in France, was William Thaw, of Pittsburgh; Norman Prince, son of a Boston banker; James Norman Hall, son of a prominent business man of the town of Colfax, Iowa; and James Rogers McConnell, a native of the town of Carthage, North Carolina, who "had left a lucrative business position to join the French army in the first days of the war." Of the eight leading American aces, each with ten or more victories to his credit, including Rickenbacker, the most successful of all, Luke, Lufberry, Putnam, Landis, Kinley, Vaughn, and Schwab, all but Kinley were.

or are, urban representatives. Lastly, Colonel Bolling, whose distinguished services in practically organizing the American air service in the recent war are universally recognized, and who fell on the field of honor, was a city man by birth, by education, and by professional occupation.

Lastly, the same ability of the urban soldier to measure completely up to the standard of military aptitude and efficiency set by his rural comrade is manifest when one compares the soldiers of the highly urbanized countries with those of the countries that are predominantly rural. The soldierly qualities exhibited by the peasants of rural Serbia in the recent war were assuredly beyond all praise. But in these qualities they certainly did not surpass the soldiers from that most highly urbanized of all countries, England. France is much more highly urbanized than Russia; and yet it will probably be admitted that high as the military capacity of the individual Russian soldier may be it is surpassed by that of the average Frenchman. And in general there is not the slightest evidence to support the view that individual military efficiency in those countries where the cityward movement has proceeded to comparatively great lengths is one whit inferior to that manifested in those countries that have remained predominantly rural. On the contrary the evidence points rather to the opposite conclusion.

All those fears, therefore, that the growth of city life threatens the vital interests of the nations in time of war through the displacement of a virile rural population, with qualities assumed to be greatly superior for the purposes of war, by an assumed physically and morally deficient urban population are entirely without foundation. The test of the recent Great War has proved conclusively that men are fully as willing and as capable as they ever were to defend native land and the right, and fully as ready as at any time in the past unflinchingly to face the most frightful terrors that the mind of man can invent and to make the ultimate sacri-

fice with as brave an air as ever man approached his fate. Moreover, women have no less completely proved their continued possession of the traditional qualities that enable them to play their even more difficult part in war than have men.

It is now in place to call attention to the fact that those countries that are most highly urbanized today, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and France, have not only greatly increased their capacity to make war effectively as they have become more and more highly urbanized, but that they also rank today in potential military capacity, allowance being made for difference in the size of their population, in about the order of the degree of urbanization each has attained. Both of these generalizations are virtually self-evident, and call for no affirmative argument after the test of the recent war.[24]

If our urban civilization can measure as effectively up to the requirements of the times of peace as it appears to be able to meet the exigencies of war, we may rest assured that the future is safe.

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CHAPTER XXV

General Summary and Conclusions

The different counts of the indictment against the cityward movement, from the political and social points of view, are thus seen, in the light of the present inquiry, in general not to be valid. Civil and religious liberty, freedom of thought, of speech, and of the press, and personal freedom, as well as economic freedom and the development of political liberty, all appear still to be favorably affected, as they have been in the past, by the growth of city life. The urban environment also appears to afford an appreciable advantage over the rural environment in respect to the development of political capacity and political aptitude, in respect to the promotion of political initiative and political creativeness, in respect to political activity, and especially with reference to political leadership. Public spirit, in both its positive and negative aspects, also appears to be affected favorably by the urbanizing movement; and there is abundant evidence of a rise to higher standards of political purity as urbanization progresses—convincing proof of the inaccuracy of the charge that political corruption is inherently associated with city life.

There is much evidence of increased efficiency of government in the national and state or provincial spheres, as also in the municipal sphere, coincident with the urbanizing movement; and the charge that municipal government is inferior to rural government must be rejected, in spite of the reputation for inefficient government that our own cities long sustained. That the cityward movement has been favorable to increased economic efficiency will also probably be granted

by all informed students of the movement; and if proof be required it may be found in the fact that the movement itself has been fundamentally in response to economic forces and in the fact of its extraordinary scope and long-continued persistence.

In spite of the widely-voiced fear that the cityward movement threatens the vitality of the population through the alleged injurious effects of city life upon the health and physique of the city residents, there has been a remarkable decline in mortality rates and a marked increase in the length of human life coincident with the urbanizing movement; while such data as are available seem to point to an accompanying gradual improvement in the human physique. More worthy of credence is the assertion that the urbanizing movement has been responsible for the marked decline in the birth rate in the last fifty or one hundred years. But the extent of urban responsibility for this decline has been somewhat overestimated; while the charge that the decline has been due to an unfavorable influence of the city environment upon the physical virility of the population is wholly without reputable sustaining evidence or authority. Moreover, there appears to have been, hitherto, a fair balance of advantage and of disadvantage in the fact itself of a declining birth rate.

Also without foundation is found to be the charge that city life is, in general, unfavorable to the development and maintenance of a sound and vigorous morality and religion. The increasing prevalence of divorce in recent times affords ground for anxiety, though this trend can by no means be wholly ascribed to the influence of city life nor can it be accepted at all as proof of a declining level of sexual morality. The rural community today retains little of its traditional advantage with reference to the rearing of the young; though it must be admitted that urban parents, and the urban community in general, have not as yet really be-

gun adequately to utilize the favorable possibilities that the urban environment affords in this respect.

While we can not yet speak with definite assurance to the effect that city life is favorable to the development of international peace, the balance of evidence and of reputable authority appears to point to this view as a tentative conclusion which future developments may not improbably wholly justify. On the other hand, there appears to be no doubt that the urban environment is at least as effective as the rural environment in contributing to the national assimilation of alien immigrant elements and in thus assuring the substantial loyalty of these elements, both for the purposes of peace and also for the exigencies of war. Neither is there convincing evidence that city life is inconsistent with patriotism nor that it is peculiarly associated with lack of political stability. Lastly, examination of the influence of urbanization upon the capacity of states for war shows a clear precedence of the urbanized states with respect to ability to provide all the material equipment required for war; while the urban population yields in no degree to the rural population in the possession of those personal qualities and aptitudes that are valuable in time of war.

That there are in the cities extremely grave problems pressing for solution—problems whose solution will tax the best of human intelligence, ingenuity, and good will to accomplish—can not be denied. But the country, too, has its seriously grave problems to meet and solve; and by practically universal admission the city is making far more rapid progress than the country in the solution of their respective problems. However, with all possible improvement in both city and country, the former is likely to remain essentially what it is today—with all its extravagances and excrescences a superior center and sphere of human coöperation along the multifarious lines of industry and of political and social organization and activity for which the countryside is not

suited, and not least of all for those activities that are carried on within its limits directly in the interest and for the sake of rural life itself.

How much farther the cityward movement may go or when it may have gone far enough, no man nor group of men is wise enough to determine. It is a movement that represents a response to the operation of tremendously strong economic, political, and general social forces; and when men can succeed in changing their own natures and have become willing and able to control their own semi-conscious response to these forces, they can perhaps hope to do something consciously to control the movement. But this undoubtedly means that its control must be left, on the whole, to the further action of the same class of forces that have created and maintained it. For these forces may be depended upon to supply the needed correctives if and when they become necessary. Human intervention therefore will wisely confine itself to a careful anticipation and application of the means that are best adapted to the purpose of deadening the shock of adjustment that these forces may be relied upon surely, though perhaps somewhat rudely, to make.[1]

The disparagement and depreciation of urban life and much of the agitation in favor of the restriction of the cityward movement and in favor of measures for the promotion of a reflux to the country are therefore useless and unavailing as well as unjustifiable. But they are also in large degree positively harmful and injurious. They represent waste and misdirection of energy that sadly needs to be directed intelligently at the real remediable defects, whether in the city or in the country. This mistaken prejudice against city life is also made to justify much unwise and harmful interference in municipal affairs on the part of outside rural interests. But worst of all, perhaps, the anti-urban prejudice of pro-rural partisans blinds their eyes in a vast majority of cases to the serious defects of rural life itself and prevents that

frank recognition of the existence of these defects that is so necessary if adequate measures are to be taken for their cure or elimination.

Rural life and the rural population are highly valuable elements in the life of the community and of the state. But the rural citizen is more remarkable for what he is individually and for what he contributes in the civil sphere than he is for what he does in a political way; and he is indebted in no small degree to the city for the political ability that he does manifest. But if the rural citizen contributes less than might be expected to the state in the political sphere, it is his misfortune rather than his fault. For he is as good raw material for the purposes of citizenship and government as is the urban resident. But the city is the natural and superior habitat of men living together in political life; and the country is comparatively ill-adapted for human coöperation in the political sphere, just as it is ill-adapted for human coöperation in many other spheres of human activity. However, this generalization in its political aspects will undoubtedly command wider assent when based, as it should be based, upon conditions in the world at large and not upon those that are peculiar to a certain few countries, such as our own.

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INDEX

Abelard, Peter: origin of, 517.
Abortion: relation to sexual morality, 485; relation to illegitimacy, 485; urban excess (Europe), 487; rural, in urban centers, 487.
Achaian League: urban origin, 282; surpasses Aetolian League, 282–283.
Adams, Abigail: suffragist leader, 216.
Adams, C. F., Jr.: cited, 257; *Three Episodes of Mass. Hist.*, cited, 156, 160–161, 164, 234, 235, 256, 431–432, 481, 513; *Familiar Letters of John Adams and His Wife, Abigail Adams*, cited, 389–390, 499; *Chapters of Erie*, cited, 396.
Adams, G. B.: *Civilization During the Middle Ages*, cited, 106–107, 382, 541.
Adams, Henry: cited, 173.
Adams, John: lauds agriculture, 10; distrusts democracy, 97; origin, 164, 361; views compared, 163, 164; member of com. on Dec. of Ind., 164; opposes manhood suffrage, 208; Hamilton opposes, 299; as pol. leader, 361; attitude toward repeating, 389; participates in U. S. Lottery, 390; purity of admin. of, 391, 393; removes Tench Coxe from office, 393; cited, 160–161, 258, 389–390.
Adams, John Quincy: origin and anti-slavery services, 53; relation to nominating convention, 179, 301; influences Monroe's admin., 361; purity of admin., 393.
Adams, Samuel: reflects leadership of Boston in Amer. Rev., 161; early ideas on Amer. Independence, 163; opposes Shays' Rebellion and Whisky Insurrection, 167; led to favor adoption of Const. (U. S.), 167; contrib. to constitutional convention, 287; revives committees of correspondence, 287–288; author of Mass. const. (1779–80), 289; as pol. leader, 361.
Addams, Jane: Progressive leader, 201; origin, 201; cited, 490; *Newer Ideals of Peace*, cited, 536–537.
Administrative interpretation: a form of pol. creativeness, 309; importance in Eng. and U. S., 311; urban influences on administrators, 312, 313–315.
Aeschylus: mentioned, 346–347.
Aesculapius: disciples of, 464–465.
Aetolian. *See* Aetolian League.
Aetolian League: criticized, 122; origin, 282–283, 350; Achaian League surpasses, 282–283.
Age, old: tradition of, in rural districts, 451. *See also* Life, average length of; Life, expectation of.
Agricultural laborers: In general—lack individual liberty, 49; defenseless condition, 61, 86; unable to organize, 59–60, 73, 75, 76; econ. status, 67, 68; relation to crime and violence, 501. In Eng. and Wales—an isolated class, 31; made into small holders, 71, 472; econ. and soc'l status, 73–74, 80; pol. status, 331; politically inactive, 331–332; birth rate, 472; initiative, 606. In U. S.—good econ. and pol. status, 61–62, 65–67; qualifications, *id.*, 62–67; Negro croppers, 63; conditions of employment, 63, 65, 66–67; free land affects, 64–65; city employment affects, 64–65; social status, 65–66; hardly a definite class, 472; crime and violence among, 496, 500–501. In other countries—Russia, 70–71; Germany, 71, 146, 581, 606; Old Austria, 71; France, 71, 471, 581; Italy, 71; Belgium, 72; New World (other than U. S.), 88 (n. 15). *See also the various countries; and see* Rural population.
Agriculture: In general — employment in, renders rural, viii–ix; given predominance, 3–5, 588–589; lauded, 3–12, 14–18, 24; subordinated to manuf's and commerce, 5, 589–592; slavery and serfdom in, 50–51, 105, 130; self-employment a distinguishing mark, 58, 84–85; no longer a self-sufficing pursuit, 61, 77–78; qualifications as to self-employment in, 62–81, 84–85; relation to changes at opening of modern period, 116; freedom not vital to, 130; public promotion of, improves with urban-

ization, 415; urbanization promotes improvement in, 445; urbanization advantages, as to markets, etc., 445; econ. drain through urbanization, 446; productiveness of, 447; lack of adaptation to rural exodus, 447–448; importance in war, 589–590, 593–602. (*See also* Rural population; Rural districts; Agricultural laborers; Land; Rural environment; Rural life; Rural community; Tenancy, farm; Latifundia; Food, supply of; Economic freedom). In U. S.—Lauded, 9–12, 14–17; Negroes in agriculture, 62–64, 67; farm labor, 62–67, 78; farm tenancy, 67–70; conditions among operating owners, 68–69, 76–79; business depression, 76–77; complaints in, 77, 79; demands econ. justice, 77; ineffectively organized, 77; cheap lands promote competition, 78; elements of strength, 85; future developments, 86; proportion of pop. occupied in (1830), 183; prosperous (1900), 200; little of village type, 232. (*See kindred topics as above*). In England and Wales—loss of males in, v; agricultural laborers (*see* Agricultural laborers, Eng. and Wales); farm tenancy, 74; ownership not on commercial basis, 81; relation to class status, 136; landed aristocracy and pol. leadership, 351 (*see also* Political leadership, Eng. and Wales); neglect of imperils, 594; British vs. German policy as to, 594–597, 598–601; relation to defeat of submarine menace, 598; effect of subsidizing, 599. (*See also kindred topics, as above, and* National self-sufficiency).

Agriculture, Committee on (U. S. Cong., 1821); cited, 10–11.

Air: agencies for navigating, in urbanized countries, 591; mastery of, an aim, 600; control of, vital in war, 602–603; distinguished airmen (World War), 609–611; Colonel Bolling and Amer. air service (World War), 611.

Ajaccio (Corsica): Napoleon native of, 356.

Alamo, the: valor in, and in World War, 608.

Albany, city of (N. Y.): people favor adoption of Const. (U. S.), 166; votes for Clay (1832), 184; vote favorably on suffrage amendment (1822), 212.

Albany, county of (N. Y.): delegates oppose abolition of property qualification (1821), 211; votes adversely on suffrage amendment, 212.

Albany Plan (of Union, 1754): urban lineage, 283.

Albany Regency: members, 298; origin of party system, 298.

Alcoholism: prevalence in city and country, 8. *See also* Intemperance; Liquor traffic.

Alexander, "Charlie": origin, 520.

Alexandria, city of (Egypt): birthplace of Origen, 517.

Alfred the Great (Eng. king): as pol. leader, 351; urban influence on, 351.

Aliens: In U. S.—suffrage (*see* Suffrage, alien, U. S.); increase illiteracy, 241, 246, 247, 424; concentrated in urban centers, 241, 259, 383, 405, 423–424, 428, 474–475, 486–487, 497–498, 542, 554; new immigrants replace old, 260, 328; complicate problem of municipal govt., 260, 423–424; affect urban civic spirit, 383; relation to pol. corruption, 405; cause lack of homogeneity, 423–424, 428, 498; bring lawlessness and unrest, 424; relation to urban mortality, 455, 461–462; affect physique, 461–462; relation to birth rate, 466, 474–475; city checks natural increase, 474–475; intemperance, 483; illegitimacy, 486–487; crime, 497; irreligion, 510; patriotism, 542, 552, 554 (*see also* Patriotism, U. S.). In other countries—in Paris, 424; in London, 424, 553; relation to urban mortality (all countries), 455; relation to military records (Gt. Brit.), 460; in cities of ancient Babylonia, 553.

Aliens, assimilation of: In general—how city life affects, 20, 260, 551–553, 555–556, 616; how rural life affects, 552, 554, 616. In the U. S.—how city life affects, 15, 30, 260, 552–557; urban colonies, 20, 553–556; cities bear main burden, 383, 428, 554; unequal progress (parents and children), 424, 498; in N. Y. City, 428; relation to World War, 552, 554, 559–561; the land as an agency for, 552–553; largeness of task, 553, 554; comparative success of, 554, 555, 560–561; public school promotes (rural and urban), 555–556; ability to speak English, 556–557; naturalization, 557; case of Amish and Mennonites, 557; Irish and German elements, 558–559; rural situation, 561. In other countries—in ancient Babylonia, 553; in Roman Empire, London, Paris, 553; failure of, in rural Canada, 557–558.

Allegheny, borough of (Pa.): votes for Clay (1832), 184.

Alliance and Populist movements: activities, 197–199. *See also* Peoples' Party; Knights of Labor;

Citizens' Alliance; National Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union.
Alva, Duke of: Activities in the Netherlands, 126.
Ambrose, Saint: sketch, 517.
America: discovery mentioned, 116; venality in, 389; home life in, 505. *See also* United States.
America, Central: efficiency of govt. in, 416–417; rural, 568; unstable politically, 568; early Maya, 568.
America, North: planting of democracy in, 160.
American Federation of Labor: circulates Sullivan's *Direct Legislation,* 227; convention (1920) reviewed, 579–580; called conservative, 580.
Americanism: source of, 14.
Americanization. *See* Aliens, assimilation of, U. S.
Amer. Jour. of Pub. Health: cited, 6, 449, 450, 451, 454.
Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.: cited, 67, 327, 343.
American Social Science Association: mentioned, 14, 29.
Amer. State Papers: Finance: cited, 11, 26, 27.
American stock: deterioration, 15.
Amherst, town of (Mass.): mentioned, 363.
Amish: rural group, 557; remain unassimilated, 557. *See also* Mennonites.
Amphiktyonic Council: suggest representative principle, 276; Madison and Hamilton lack knowledge of, 271 (n. 26).
Amsterdam, city of (Hol.): Pilgrims take refuge in, 127, 154; for Protestantism, 127.
Anabaptist movement: urban, 43; contributes to religious freedom, 43.
Analectic Magazine: cited, 482.
Analogy (Butler's): cited, 517–518. *See also* Butler, Joseph.
Anchieta, Joseph: characterized, 520; birth, 520.
Andrae, C. C. G.: contrib. to proportional representation, 296–297; unites scientific ability and pol. creativeness, 316.
Andrews, E. B.: *Hist. of the U. S.,* cited, 156, 481.
Annapolis, city of (Md.): Republicans carry (1800), 173–174.
Anne (Queen of Eng.): mentioned, 348, 353.
Anopheles: agent in malarial infection, 463–464.
Anselm (Archb. of Canterbury): origin, 352, 517.
Ansgar (sheriff): at the Battle of Hastings, 109.
Anthony, Susan B.: suffragist leader, 216; origin and rearing, 216.
Anti-foreign sentiment (U. S.): *See* Nativism.
Anti-Masonic Party: holds nominating convention, 179; opposes Jackson, 179, 190; rural, 179, 190; carries Vermont (1832), 183; opposes Van Buren (1840), 190; votes for Harrison (1836), 190; strength in N. Y., 190; merges, 190.
Anti-Monopoly Party. *See* Peoples' Party.
Antioch, city of (Syria): Christians named at, 516; birthplace of Chrysostom, 517.
Antoninus (Roman emperor): imperial govt. praised, 275; birth, 350.
Antrim, county of (Ire.): illiteracy (1911), 242.
"Apostle of Brazil." *See* Anchieta, Joseph.
"Apostle of the Indias." *See* Las Casas, Bartolomé De.
Appalachians (Mts., U. S.): pop. expands beyond, 267–8.
Aratos of Sicyon: statesman, 274; author of Achaian League, 282.
Arcadia mentioned, 484–485.
Argonne Forest (Fr.): "The Lost Battalion" in; 560.
Aristotle: preference for agricl. element, 24–25, 322; view of democracy, 92, 97; view of Greek city-state, 273; cited, 4, 24–25, 323.
Arizona: voting, 346 (n. 34); rural, 496; homicides, 496.
Arkwright, Sir Richard: origin, 117.
Arnold of Brescia (Christian teacher); origin, 517.
Arras, town of (Fr.): birthplace of Robespierre, 139.
Artevelde, Jacques van: nativity, 351.
Arthur, Chester A.: origin, 364.
Articles of Confederation (U. S.): democracy of, 167; failure of, 167, 168; the recall in, 229; Franklin's contrib. to, 283; John Dickinson perfects, 283; Madison commends original, 283; a written const., 290; model for U. S. Const., 291.
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union (1775, U. S.): submitted by Franklin, 283.
Artistic sense: relation to pol. creativeness, 315; in cities of Middle Ages, 418.
Arts, fine: cities afford galleries for, 243; love of, in cities of Middle Ages, 418.
Arts, mechanic: condemned by Xenophon, 3; educative value, 247.
Aschaffenburg, Gustav: *Crime and Its Repression,* cited, 487, 494, 496.
Ashby, A. W., and Byles, Phoebe G.:

Rural Education, cited, 263, 377, 521, 572–573.
Ashley, Dr. C. C.: relation to direct primary, 301–302.
Asia, continent of: cityward trend, vii.
Asquith, Herbert H. (Earl of Oxford and Asquith): origin, 354.
Assisi, town of (It.): birthplace of St. Francis, 517.
Astor, John Jacob: residence and status, 181; attitude toward U. S. Bank, 181.
Athenians: contrib. to religious liberty, 42.
Athens, city—state of: checks and balances in, 290; separation of powers in, 290; Greek culture in, 347; party faction, 370; public spirit, 370, 375.
Athletic games and contests: as assimilating factor, 555; effect on radicalism, 580.
Atkeson, Thomas C.: represents Grange, 89 (n. 31); statement by, 89 (n. 31).
Attica (Grk. state): city life, 3.
Atwater, Caleb: *Hist. of the State of Ohio,* cited, 515.
Auerstadt, battle of: mentioned, 144, 357.
Augustine, St. (Church father): birth and conversation, 517; fall of Rome affects, 517; *The City of God,* cited, 517.
Augustus (Roman emperor): birth, 350.
Austin, John: defines democracy, 93.
Australasia: birth rate in, 465–466. *See also* Australia, Commonwealth of.
Australia, Commonwealth of: cityward trend, vi; concentration in state capitals, vi, 483; democracy, 34; origin of British colonial system, 280–281; leaders in federation, 280–281, 354–355; written ballot, 296; frame of govt. characterized, 310–311; pol. activity, 336; public spirit, 379; pol. purity, 379, 404; pol. stability, 379; efficiency of govt., 416–417; death rate, 449; birth rate, 465–466 (Australasia); intemperance, 483; England fails to get food from, 600–601.
Australian colonies. *See* Australia, Commonwealth of.
Austria (Old): World War reduces, v; cityward trend, v–vi; concentration in Vienna, v–vi; status of agricl. laborers, 71; death rate, 449, 453; infant mortality, 451; illegitimacy, 485; food supplies, 592.
Awakening of 1800: effect of, 514. *See also* Revivals, religious.
Ayr, town of (Scot.): Reformation center, 128–129.
Azeglio, Massino T. (Marquis D'): nativity, 359.
Back-to-the-land movement: favored, 8, 9, 14. *See also* Rural exodus; Urbanization.
Bactericides: sunshine and fresh air as, 464.
Bacteriologist(s): condemn rural water, 464.
Babylonia: authority of king limited, 100; urban factor in, 100–101; cultivation and settlement, 101; aliens in cities of, 553; City of Babylonia assimilates and unifies, 553.
Bacon's Rebellion: democracy of, 157–158; Illustrates rural pol. instability, 570.
Baden-Powell, Sir Robert: relation to boy-scout and girl-scout movements, 521; origin, 521.
Bailey, Dr. Liberty Hyde: characterized, 15; "A Statement on the Agricultural Situation in New York State," cited 15; *Cyc. of Agriculture,* cited, 15, 30, 552; *The State and the Farmer,* cited, 30; *The Training of Farmers,* cited, 456.
Balaklava, battle of: mentioned, 560.
Balbo, Cesare (Count): nativity, 359.
Baldwin, Stanley (Prime Minister, Grt. Brit.): origin, 354.
Balkan States: confederacy vs. Turkey, 360; efficiency of govt., 416–417.
Ball, Captain Albert: standing as airman, 609–610; parentage and nativity, 609–610.
Ballot: In general—safeguards for (U. S.), 327–328; purity (Eng.), 403. Australian (blanket)—origin, 296; introd. (U. S.), 296. Secret—secured (Eng.), 135; demanded (U. S.), 198; effect on pol. corruption (Eng.), 402–403. Short—early sponsors (U. S.), 297. Written—origin and early use, 296, 389. *See also* Voting; Registration.
Baltic (sea): civic spirit in bordering cities, 383.
Baltimore, city of (Md.): Republicans carry (1800), 173; delegate nominating convention (1831), 179; Jackson carries (1832), 183, 191; *id.* (1824, 1828), 184; Fremont votes (1856), 194; underrepresented, 221, 222; repeating and corruption, 395; mentioned, 519.
Bank of England: establ. of, a stabilizing factor, 582–583.
Bankers' Convention (Phila., 1816): attitude toward specie payments, 181.
Banks, State (U. S.): restrained 181; oppose First U. S. Bank

181; attitude toward specie payments (1816), 181; favor Jackson 1832), 182. *See also* U. S. Bank(s).
Barcelona, city of (Sp.): voting in, 335.
Barker, Lieut.-Col. W. G.: standing as airman, and nativity, 610.
Basque Provinces (Sp.): commerce and industry, 335; voting, 335.
Bassett, John S.: cited, 173.
Bastile, the (Fr.): stormed, 139.
Bath, town of (Eng.): work of Wesleys and Whitefield in, 522–523.
Baudrillart, M.: cited, 9.
Bavaria, Kingdom of (Ger.): mentioned, 359.
Baxter, Richard: as preacher, 519, 532 (n. 17).
Beaconsfield, Lord (Disraeli, Benjamin): relation to Brit. Imperial Conferences, 281; origin, 281, 354.
Beard, Charles A.: *An Economic Interpretation of the Const. of the U. S.*, cited, 18, 166, 290–291, 325, 583; *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*, cited, 18, 173, 174–175; *Amer. City Govt.*, cited, 53; *Loose Leaf Digest of Short Ballot Charters*, cited, 307; *Commission Govt. and the City Manager Plan*, cited, 307.
Bebel, Ferdinand A.: origin, 358.
Becket, Thomas à: birth, 352.
Beecher, Henry Ward: birth and rearing, 519; rank as preacher, 519, 532 (n. 17).
Beecher, Lyman: nativity and distinction, 519.
Belfast, city of (Ire.): illiteracy (1911), 242; birthplace of Jas. Bryce, 354.
Belgium: cityward trend, v, 72; status of dependent rural classes, 72; farm tenancy, 72; land ownership, 72; pol. corruption, 404; efficiency of govt., 417; illegitimacy, 486; origin of criminals, 497; patriotism, 549; food supplies, 592; basis of resistance (1914), 597–598; service to France (1914), 598; German battle line broken (1918), 603. *See also* Flanders; Low Countries.
Benes, Eduard (Premier of Czecho-Slovakia): origin, 360.
Berkshire region (Mass.): hostile to Boston merchants, 158.
Berlin, city of (Ger.): vote in, 345 (n. 23); mother of Bismarck born in, 358; infant mortality, 427; sexual morality, 486; stands for Germany, 541.
Bern (Switz.): Canton—abandons Catholicism, 121–122; uses plebiscite, 302; accepts Reformation, 302. City—abandons Catholicism, 121–122; joins League of Forest Cantons, 122; uses plebiscite, 302; accepts Reformation, 302; joins Swiss confederation, 303; referenda vote, 335.
Bernard of Clairvaux (Saint): birth, 517.
Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von: origin and ancestry, 358.
Beveridge, Albert J.: *Life of John Marshall*, cited, 312–313.
Beza, Theodore: Reformation leader, 129.
Bill of Rights: Virginia Const. (1776)—relation to religious liberty, 44. U. S. Const.—absence of, 167; introd. of, 176.
Binns, John: factional strife with William Duane, 300.
Birmingham, city of (Eng.): promotes Reform Act (1832), 134; pol. qualities of artisans, 262; Sir Henry Parkes resides in, 280–281; civic spirit, 383.
Birth control: relation to overpopulation, 474; objectionable methods, 475. *See also* Birth rate; Eugenic influences; Eugenist.
Birth rate: General considerations—relation to city life, 7, 9, 14, 16, 20, 465–475, 615; relation to rural life, 9, 14–16, 465–475; character of statistics (U. S.), 450, 466–467, 473; relation to growth of pop., 465, 467; urban contrib. to city growth, 472; urban survival of racial elements, 473. Trend—in general, 454–455, 456, 459, 460, 615; in Eng. and Wales, Northern and Western Europe, North America, and Austria, 465–466; in France, Germany, Italy, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 466; in the U. S., 466–467. Causes of decline—use of alcohol, 467; vice and immorality, 467; lessened reproductive fertility, 467, 615; urban congestion, 468, cost of subsistence, 468; voluntary limitation of births, 468–472. Level—in London, 6, 472; in France, 9, 471, 472; rural (Eng., Fr., *et al.*), 471; by occupational classes (Eng. and Wales), 471–472; in the County Boroughs (Eng.), 472; rural vs. urban (Eng., Fr., Netherlands), 472. Attitude toward decline—in various groups, 473–474; relation to war, 474; balance of gain, 475; relation to race breeding, 475.
Bishop, Lieut.-Col. W. A.: standing as airman, and nativity, 610.
Bismarck, Otto E. L. von (Prince): author of forms of govt., 293; origin, 293, 357–358.
Black death: relation to enclosure (Eng.), 6.
Black-list: use of, 59, 82.
Blaine, James G.: origin, 364.

Blanc, Louis: origin, 143; relation to internationalism, 545.
Blodget, Samuel: cited, 450.
Blue Ridge (Mts., U. S.): hostility to coast towns, 158.
Bluntschli, J. K.: cited, 296–297.
Boccaccio, Giovanni; origin, 117.
Bodin, Jean: birth, 351, 355; distinction, 355.
Boelcke, Captain Oswald: standing as airman, and nativity, 610.
Bolling, Colonel Raynal C.: origin, services, and career, 611.
Bologna, city of (It.): freedom of thought in, 42–43.
Bolshevism: in Gt. Brit., following World War, 578–579.
Books: sale of, rural and urban, 244. *See also* Libraries.
Booth, William (General): founds Salvation Army, 521; birth, 521.
Boots, R. S.: *The Direct Primary in New Jersey,* cited, 343, 371, 398–399.
Bordeaux, city of (Fr.): Girondist center, 138; returns Gambetta as deputy, 142.
Border Ruffians (Kan., U. S.): activities, 570.
Border States (U. S.): negro suffrage, 213.
Bossuet, Jacques B.: rank as preacher, 518, 519, 532 (n. 17); birth, 518.
Boston, city of (Mass.): physique (1820–70), 29; anti-slavery center, 52; founded, 155; antipathy of farmers to, 158; initiates the Rev., 161, 267; leading part in Rev., 161, 195; opposes Stamp Act, 161, 287; birthplace of B. Franklin, 163; town-meeting, 163; Republicans carry (1800), 173; Clay carries (1832), 183; Charles Sumner elected senator, 193; Fremont carries, 194; part in Civil War, 195; favors manhood suffrage, 208; becomes city, 225, 432; favors I. and R., 228; favors use of constl. conv., 289; pol. activity, 341; vice district (1822), 432; water system, 432; temperance movement (1824 ff.), 481.
Boston Caucus Club: origin of caucus, 299.
Boston Massacre: mentioned, 161.
Boston Port Bill: mentioned, 161, 162.
Boston, port of (Eng.): early importance, 155; Amer. colonists from, 155.
Boston Tea-Party: mentioned, 161, 162.
Bourbon restoration (Fr.): mentioned, 356.
Bourgeois, Léon: origin, 356–357.
Bourgeoisie (France): dominate States General, 137; econ. and pol. progress, 137, 574; intellectual, lead Terror, 138, 141; cause downfall of Terror, 140; relation to results of Rev., 141; joins with proletariat (1848), 141–142; religious conditions, 523–524; family life, 530. *See also* Girondists; Revolution, French; Terror, the; Religion.
Boycott: use of, 32.
Boy-scout movement: origin, 521.
Bradford, William: origin, 360.
Brandenburg, province of (Prussia): place in develop. of Prussia, 146; mentioned, 358.
Brandes, Georg: *Creative Spirits of the Nineteenth Century,* cited, 349.
Branson, E. C., *County Govt. and County Affairs in North Carolina,* cited, 381, 439.
Brazil, Republic of (S. A.): dinner to Dr. Pessoa, president-elect, 150.
Brent, Margaret: suffragist leader, 216.
Breslau, city of (Ger.): mentioned, 358, 610.
Brewster, William: characterized, 360; birth, 360.
Briand, Aristide: origin, 356–357.
Bridgeport, city of (Conn.): underrepresented, 222.
Bright, John: services to North (U. S., Civil War), 53; birth and parentage, 53, 354; cited, 244; approved, 262.
Brimhall, Dean R.: *Amer. Men of Science,* cited, 347. *See also* Cattell, Jas. McKeen.
Brissot, Jacques P.: origin and career, 138.
British Empire: govt. democratic, 135, 136; Imperial Conferences, 281; relation of Parl. and the Crown to, 309–310; Court of Imperial Justice suggested, 311; pol. leaders, 354–355; depends on control of sea, 600; self-sufficiency in, 600–601.
British and Foreign School Society: cited, 242.
British Ministry: repressive measures (Amer. colonies), 287.
British Museum: mentioned, 314.
British Prime Minister of Labor, The Unofficial. *See* Leverhulme, Lord.
Bristol, city of (Eng.): mentioned, 353; work of Wesleys and Whitefield in, 402, 522–523.
Brockdorff-Rantzau, Ulrich (Count von): heads German peace mission (1920), 596.
Brockton, city of (Mass.): favors I. and R., 228.
Broglie, Charles Francois (Comte de): mentioned, 389.
Brooklyn, city of (N. Y.): Buchanan carries (1856), 194.

Brooks, Phillips: birthplace, 519; rank as preacher, 519, 532 (n. 17).
Brooks, R. C.: *Govt. and Politics of Switzerland,* cited, 303, 317.
Brougham, Henry Peter (Lord): origin, 52; relation to slavery question, 52.
Broughton, John Cam Hobhouse Baron): nativity, 353; leader for Reform Act (1832), 353.
Brown, George: aids federation in Canada, 281; origin, 281.
Brown, John: origin and anti-slavery services, 52; raid of, 570.
Bruges, city of (Flanders): civic and pol. develop. of, 108, 126.
Bryan, W. J.: distribution of vote (rural and urban) for, 199 (1896), 199–200 (1900); pol. issues succeed, 200; origin and parentage, 364.
Bryanism. *See* Bryan, W. J.
Bryant, William Cullen: origin and anti-slavery services, 52.
Bryce, James (Viscount): birth and career, 354; cited, 231, 255, 375, 590; "The Predictions of Hamilton and De Tocqueville," cited, 13, 35; *Amer. Commonwealth,* cited, 13, 154, 371, 419, 569; "The Menace of Great Cities," cited, 13, 376–377, 400; *Modern Democracies,* cited, 106, 122, 281, 335, 336, 344, 376, 377, 378, 379, 385, 404, 416, 483, 495, 538, 554, 568; *Hindrances to Good Citizenship,* cited, 239, 229, 400, 404.
Bubonic plague: a rural problem (U. S.), 455.
Buchanan, James: vote for (1856), 194.
Buckinghamshire (Eng.): rural support to Parl. (Civil War, Eng.), 132.
Buckle, Henry T.: *Hist. of Civilization in Eng.,* cited, 130–131, 239, 499, 509, 535.
Bucklin, James M.: devises Amer. system of preferential voting, 297.
Buell, Jesse: origin, 12; services to agriculture, 12; *The Farmers' Companion,* cited, 10, 12.
Bulgaria: death rate in, 450. *See also* Balkan States.
Buller, Charles: relation to Eng. colonial system, 280.
Bulöw, Bernhard H. K. M. (Prince): origin and parentage, 358; *Imperial Germany,* cited, 8, 379.
Bunker Hill, battle of: evidences leadership of Boston, 161; incidental to occupation of Boston, 161.
Bunyan, John: origin and parentage, 517, rank as preacher, 519, 532 (n. 17).
Burgess, John W.: *Pol. Sci. and Compar. Constl. Law,* cited, 274, 275.
Burke, Edmund: birth and parentage, 353; cited, 98, 161.
Burr, Aaron: relation to party system, 298; relation to congressional caucus, 299.
Burr's Conspiracy: a rural revolt, 570.
Bury, J. B. A.: *Hist. of Freedom of Thought,* cited, 42.
Business interests (large): an ultra-conservative urban element, 174, 188.
Butler, Benjamin: nominated for president, 196–197.
Butler, Joseph (Bishop of Durham): origin, 517–518; *Analogy,* cited, 517–518.
Byles, Phoebe G. *See* Ashby, A. W.

Cabal (of Charles II, of England): uses caucus, 298.
Cabinet system (Eng.): origin and introd., 134.
Cahors, town of (Fr.): birthplace of Gambetta, 142.
Calabria, district of (It.): illiteracy, 243.
Calcutta, city of (India): mentioned, 280.
Calhoun, John C.: defends Bank of U. S., 187; shifts to state rights, 542–543.
California, State of: comparatively urban, 343; primary vote (1908), 343; missions on coast of, 521; threatens secession, 543; Commission on Land Colonization and Rural Credits, cited, 66–67; State Immigration and Housing Commission, cited, 67.
Calvert County (Md.): over-represented, 221, 222.
Calvin, John: establishes system at Geneva, 118–119; influence on relig. and pol. liberty, 118–119, 129; as Reformation leader, 129; influence on representative govt., 278–279; as pol. leader, 355; origin, 355, 517. *See also* Reformation, Protestant; Presbyterians; Independent régime; Geneva.
Calvinistic. *See* Calvin, John.
Cambray, city of (Fr.): mentioned, 355.
Cambridge, town of (Mass.): mentioned, 522.
Cameron, Simon: origin and early career, 363.
Campbell, Douglas: *The Puritans in Holland, England, and America,* cited, 120, 126, 127, 130; "Origin of American Institutions," cited, 389.
Canaan, a: transformed, 500.
Canada, Dominion of: cityward trend, vi; rural economic status, 86; govt. democratic, 136; contrib.

to democracy, 152; relation to Brit. colonial system, 280–281; leaders in federation, 281, 354–355; pol. corruption, 404; efficiency of govt., 416–417; temperance, 483; aliens resist Canadianization, 557–558; distinguished airman (World War), 610 (*see also* Warneford, Reginald, A. J.). *See also constituting provinces.*
Canandaigua, town of (N. Y.): convention at, 209.
Canadian French: a rural element, 557–558; unassimilated in Canada, 557–558; attitude in World War, 558; assimilation in cities of U. S., 558.
Canadianization. *See* Aliens, assimilation of, Canada.
Canterbury, Archbishop of. *See* Walter, Hubert.
Caporetto, battle of: Italian defeat at, 360.
Caprivi de Caprera de Montecuccoli, G. L. von (Count): birth, 358.
Carey, Matthew: *Nine Letters to Dr. Adam Seybert,* cited, 181, 374.
Carey, William: birth and distinction, 521.
Carlisle, town of (Pa.): James Wilson resides in, 292; delegate nominating convention at (1817), 300.
Carlovingian régime: renewed pol. decline follows, 105; basis of, 350.
Carniola, duchy of (Aus.): sexual morality in, 486.
Carolinas, The: early revolts, 158. *See also* North and South Carolina.
Cartwright, Edmund: Origin, 118.
Carver, John: origin, 360.
Carver, Professor Thomas N.: condemns absentee landlordism, 69–70; "Rural Depopulation," cited, 16; *Principles of Rural Economics,* cited, 16, 61; *Principles of Pol. Economy,* cited, 25, 58, 59, 61, 76; *Pres-Econom. Rev. in the U. S.,* cited, 581.
Cassell, city of (Ger.): mentioned, 359.
Catalonia, captaincy-general of (Sp.): industrial and commercial develop., 335; voting, 335.
Catherine of Sienna: birthplace and parentage, 517.
Catholic(s): meet at Regensburg, 121; Zurich and Bern withdraw from, 121–122; expel Huguenots, 125; leaders, 518; priests in rural France, 524. *See also* Roman See; Romanist party; Reformation, Protestant; Huguenots; Religion.
Cato, the Censor: as pol. leader, 350; *De Re Rustica,* cited, 4.
Cattell, James McKeen: *Amer. Men of Science,* cited, 347. *See also* Brimhall, Dean R.
Catteral, R. C. H.: *Second Bank of the U. S.,* cited, 180.
Caucus (pol. device): early use in Eng., 297; origin in U. S., 298; contrasted with gerrymander and spoils system, 298; American, introduced into Eng., 377.
Cavalier(s): in country and in town (Eng.), 131; among Virginia colonists, 154.
Cavell, Edith: characterized, 549.
Cavour, Camillo Benso (Count): as pol. leader, 359; origin, 359, 541.
Caxton, William: origin, 117.
Cecil, Robert: origin, 352; minister to Elizabeth, 352, 354.
Cecil, William: nativity and origin, 352; minister to Elizabeth, 352, 354.
Celt(s): in early London, 553.
Census (U. S.): cited, v, 17, 174–175.
Cevennes (Mts., France): Huguenots in, resist, 124.
Chalmers, Thomas: Work in Glasgow, 518; birth, 518.
Chamber of Deputies (France): mentioned, 142.
Chamberlain, Joseph: relation to Imperial Conferences, 281; origin, 281.
Channing, Edward: *Hist. of the U. S.,* cited, 173.
Channing, William Ellery: anti-slavery services, 52; origin and nativity, 52, 519.
Chapman, J. Wilbur: birthplace, 520.
Charles I (Eng.): support in Civil War, 130–132. *See also* Stuarts.
Charles II (Eng.): Cabal uses caucus, 298; pol. corruption in reign of, 401; mentioned, 353.
Charles V (Roman emperor): persecutes in Netherlands, 126.
Charles VI (France): mentioned, 108.
Charles the Great (Roman emperor): arrests decaying govt., 105; as pol. leader, 350.
Charleston, town of (Mass.): founded, 155; mentioned, 292.
Charleston, city of (S. C.): citizens laud agriculture, 11; Federalists carry (1800), 173; mentioned, 292, 363.
Charters, colonial (Amer.): for Mass. Bay Colony (1629), 156; of Virginia, *et al.,* provide for representative govt., 156, 280, 281–282, 285; as forerunners of written const., 285, 286; urban character, 286; Franklin's relation to, 287.
Charters, town (Europe): cities of Netherlands and Flanders, *et al.,* receive, 108; London receives, 109–110, 112; other Eng. towns receive, 110.
Chartres, city of (Fr.): Girondist center, 138.

Chartist movement (Eng.): promotes reform, 135; origin of leaders, 135, 354.
Chase, Salmon P.: origin and career, 363.
Checks and balances, system of: embodied in U. S. Senate, 284; in Const. of U. S. in general, 290; origin, 290; distrust of, 290, 308, 426.
Chelsea, city of (Mass.): favors I. and R., 228; fire leads to munic'l reconstruction, 315.
Cheyson, M.: cited, 9.
Chicago, city of (Ill.): Fremont carries, 194; under-represented, 223; favors I. and R., 229; defects in govt. of, 435; rural interference affects, 435–436.
Chicago *Daily News:* cited, 17, 146–147.
Chicago *Tribune:* cited, 15, 494.
Child labor: early view of (U. S.), 26; relation to birth rate, 469, 470; affects rural child, 529.
Children. *See* Young, the.
Childs, Richard S.: "County Government in New York," cited, 94; "The County Manager Plan," cited, 308.
China: enters industrial stage, vii; cityward trend, vii; pol. corruption, 404; efficiency of govt., 416–417; Matteo Ricci as missionary to, 521; militarism, 539; pol. instability, 568, 575.
Christ: disciples of, disseminate gospel from Jerusalem, 516; conversion of Moslem world to, 520; unheard of, 524.
Christian Endeavor movement: origin, 522.
Christianity: city elements, 516; dying out in certain areas, 524; absence of believers in rural area, 524.
Christians: Paul organizes into churches, 516–517.
Chrysostom, St. John (Church father): birthplace, 517; rank as preacher, 519, 532 (n. 17).
"Chrysostom of American Evangelists." *See* Kirk, Edward Morris.
"Chrysostom of the English pulpit." *See* Liddon, Henry Parry.
Church, Christian (in general): Paul establishes, 516–517. *See also* Religion.
Church, Established (Eng.): clergy of, 130.
Churchill, Lord Randolph Henry Spencer: cited, 262–263.
Cigar Makers' International Union of America: uses referendum, 226.
Cincinnati, city of (Ohio): votes for Clay (1832), 184; votes for Jackson (1824, 1828), 184; birthplace of Wm. H. Taft, 364; Henry Ward Beecher, a resident, 519.
Cincinnatus: tradition of, 4, 350; origin, 350.
Cinques Ports (Eng.): back Simon de Montfort, 110.
Cistercians (religious order): inspire revivals, 522.
Cities. *See* Urban centers; *and individual cities.*
Cities, free (Middle Ages): transmit liberties, 25; the home of modern democracy, 25, 58; labor in, 51; rise of, affects serfdom, 51; pop. of, self-employed, 58; pure democracy in, 97; relation to city-state system, 275; representative govt. in, 279; party spirit, 370; public spirit, 382, 383, 418; efficiency of govt., 418; love of Art, 418.
Citizen Genet: agitation as to, affect voting, 325.
Citizen (Word): original significance, 25; relation to London, 37 (n. 3).
Citizens' Alliance (U. S.): relation to Peoples' Party, 197.
City government: In general—city growth complicates, 17, 253–254, 264–265; modern city conditions complicate, 19–20; a school of liberty, 102, 251; use of I. and R. and recall corrects lack of contact, 254; administration by experts, *id.* 265; enjoys opportunity for pol. co-operation, 265–266, 306, 405, 616. (*See also* Efficiency of government, city; *and individual cities and countries*). In the U. S.—relation to the town system, 235, 307; relation to democracy, 235, 426 (*see also* Democracy, U. S.); interest in, 306, 425–426; recent reconstruction, 306–307, 384, 425–426; civic spirit, 382–384; pol. corruption (*see* Political corruption, U. S.); services afforded, 421–422; European comparisons, 421–422; outside interference, 422–423, 617. (*See also* Urban centers, U. S.; Efficiency of city government, U. S.; *individual cities.* In England—develop. of, 109–110; purity of, 400; efficiency of (*see separate title*); Municipal Corporations Act (1835), 402, 423; outside interference, 423; in the County of London, 436. In Germany — municipal rights granted, 144; non-democratic in type, 307; compared with city govt. in U. S., 307, 421–422; civic spirit, 379; pol. purity, 400.
City-manager government (U. S.): recent develop. of, 307, 384, 425–426; proposed extensions, 308. *See also* City government, U. S. Commission government.
City-republics (Middle Ages). *See* Cities, free (Middle Ages).
City-state(s): In general—conceived

ideal, 24, 273; contrib. to machinery of govt., 273; urban character, 273, 540. Greek—pure democracy in, 91–92, 97, 232; origin 102–103; birthplace of citizenship, 102–3, 261, 273; extent democratic, 103; fruits justify, 103, 274; democratic contrib., 105; contrib. to forms of govt., 273–274; limitations, 274–275; pol. leaders, 350; party spirit, 370; public spirit, 370, 378, 382; efficiency, 417–418; demagogic influence, 567, 577. Phoenician—influence of merchant families, 100; less agricl., 100–101. Roman—origin, 102, 103; rise of citizenship, 102–103, 261, 273; contrib. to law, 103; contrib. to machinery of govt., 103, 273, 274–275; rural element, 103; democracy, 103–105; civic spirit, 104, 370, 382; accomplishments, 104–105; limitations and failure, 104–105, 275; pol. leaders, 350; efficiency, 417–418; demagogic influence, 577. *See also* Rome; Roman Empire.

City Temple (London): mentioned, 518.

Cityward trend. *See* Urbanization.

Civic pride. *See Public spirit.*

Civil service (Gt. Brit.): merit system affects, 402–403; urban elements promote reform of, 403–404.

Civil Service Bill of 1883 (U. S.): urban sponsorship and support, 406.

Civil service reform (U. S.): cities lead in promoting, 406; leaders, 406; cities accept, 406–407; in rural sphere, 407; derived from England, 407. *See also* Spoils system; Party system; Political corruption.

Clark, Francis E.: founds Christian Endeavor movement, 522; origin, 522.

Clarke, E. L.: "American Men of Letters," cited, 347.

Clarkson, Thomas: origin, 52; opposes slavery, 52.

Clay, Henry: popular vote (1832), 183; electoral vote (1832), 183–184; represented both manuf'g and agricl. interests, 187, 362; changes front on U. S. Bank, 187; candidacy (1844), 191; urban influences, 361–362.

Clemenceau, Georges: as statesman, 357; birth, parentage, and career, 357; Paris influences, 357.

Clergy: rural, a Tory element (Eng.), 130; influences rural pop. in France, 143; contrib. to written const. (U. S.), 286–287; character of rural (Eng.), 523.

Cleveland, Grover: origin, 364.

Clinton, De Witt: mayor of N. Y. City, 178; relation to nominating machinery, 178–179, 300–301.

Clinton, George: elected governor (N. Y.), 175.

Clinton County (N. Y.): vote irregular, 175.

Clinton Republicans: for Jackson (1824), 301.

Clive, Robert (Lord): founds empire of British India, 353; birth and origin, 353.

Cobden, Richard: birth and parentage, 354.

Cockburn, Sir John A.: *Australian Federation*, cited, 281, 310–311.

Coddington, William: origin, 155.

Coinage: improves, 415.

Coke, Sir Edward: birth and parentage, 352.

Colliers. *See* Miners.

Collings, Jesse: *Colonization of Rural Britain*, cited, 8.

Collishaw, Colonel Raymond: standing as airman, and nativity, 610.

Colman, Henry: origin, 12; services to agriculture, 12; cited, 12, 482.

Cologne, city of (Ger.): mentioned, 279, 358.

Colonial system (Brit.): origin and develop., 279–280.

Colquhon, Patrick: characterized, 26; defends manuf's, 26.

Combes, J. L. Emile: origin, 356.

Commerce: develop. of in Japan, vii; given predominance, 5, 10–11, 589; expansion affects feudal system, 51, 107–109, 540–541; *id.*, promotes rise of Third Estate, 107; Crusades affect, 107–108; relation to democracy, 106–108, 584; develop. on national scale, 116; part in changes, 116; requires freedom, 130; educative features, 247; advantages for, in city, 349, 415; builds cities, 444, 584; relation to peace and war, 536; city favors freedom of, 537; relation to government and order, 584; relation to military efficiency, 589, 591, 599.

Commission government (U. S.): applied in cities, 307, 384; development of, 425–426; other extensions suggested, 308. *See also* City-manager government; City government, U. S.

Commission on Industrial Relations (U. S.): hearings reveal rural unrest, 572.

Committees of correspondence: in Stamp Act period, 287; revived, 287–288; of N. Y. City, proposes Contl. Cong., 288; relation to origin of constl. convention, 287–288.

Commons, House of (Eng.): narrow electorate for (before 1832), 95; urban representatives in (early), 111; Colonel Pride purges, 130; relation of Simon de Montfort to,

278; relation to pol. corruption, 401. *See also* Parliament (Gt. Brit.); Representative government; Cabinet system.
Commonwealth, the (Eng.): established, 132.
Commune of 1871 (Fr.): internationalism during, 545.
Community life: true creed of, 47; dependence on center of pop., 437. *See also* Rural community; Urban centers.
Compiègne, city of (Fr.): birthplace of French airman, Guynemer, 609.
Concord, battle of (Amer. Rev.): incident to occupation of Boston, 161.
Concord, town of (Mass.): demands use of constl. convention (1776), 289.
Condorcet, Marie J.: birth, 138; promotes legislative initiative, 304; unites scientific method and pol. creativeness, 316.
Confederacy, Southern (U. S.): North blockades, 53; agricultural, 195; relation to democracy, 195.
Confederation, period of the (U. S.): type of democracy characterizing, 185; pol. corruption, 390; admin. of justice disturbed, 413, 499; inefficiency of gen. govt., 430; lawlessness, 499.
Congregational ecclesiastical organization: relation to town system, 304. *See also* Independent régime.
Congress (U. S.): Continental—proposed, 162, 288; meets at Phila., 162; delegates recalled (Pa.), 229; inefficiency, 229, 257–258, 414; mentioned, 283; recommends colonies adopt govt., 285, 288. National period—memorialized, 181–182; senators and representatives instructed (Pa.), 182; ineffectiveness and pol. ignorance of, 257–258. *See also* Constitution, U. S.; Senate, U. S.
Congressional Medal of Honor: recipients (World War), 609.
Conkling, Roscoe: birth and parentage, 364.
Connecticut: origin, 155, 279–280; soldiers furnished (Rev.), 165; inequitable representation, 219, 222; plan for Const. (U. S.), 291, 292; pol. apathy (1830), 326; abandons town system, 433; refuses militia, 543.
Conquerer, The. *See* William I (William of Normandy).
Conscription: In Gt. Brit.—in World War, 458. In U. S.—in Civil War, 460, 542, 549, 558–559; in World War, 460, 549–550, 560.
Conservatism: In general—rural pop. conservative, 15, 34, 61, 137, 565–566, 572, 574–575, 584; large urban business interests, 174, 188; urban elements in general, 573, 576–577, 578; urban laboring elements, 573, 578–9 (Eng.), 579–580 (U. S.); relation of ultra-conservatism to pol. stability, 573–575, 581, 585; natural inclination to, 584; rural vs. urban, 584. (*See also* Political stability: Land; Property; Stocks and bonds; Employee ownership.) In U. S.—in older agricl. districts, 159, 188; urban leadership, 159, 188; large urban business interests, 174, 188; relation to Const. (U. S.), 258, 318; checks pol. creativeness, 318. *See also* Rural population, U. S.; Urban population, U. S.; *and other titles as above.*
Considérant, Victor: relation to proportional representation, 296–297.
Constantine (Roman emperor): promulgates Edict of Milan, 42.
Constantinople, city of: relation to Renaissance, 117.
Constitution (British). *See* Constitution (English).
Constitution (English): relation of Simon de Montfort to, 278; preferred as unwritten, 310–311. *See also* Parliament; Commons, House of; Cabinet system; Representative government, England.
Constitution (Federal, of 1787). *See* Constitution (U. S.).
Constitution (U. S.): embodies principle of relig. liberty, 44; unique character, 154, 318; urban support in adoption, 166, 173, 267, 290–293, 337, 361–362, 420, 583; rural opposition to adoption, 166, 290–293, 318, 362; extent democratic, 167–168; significance of attitude toward adoption of, 166–168, 318; liberalized, 171, 176, 311–313; ratification in Virginia Convention (1788), 189; recall in first draft, 230; federalism in, 283; Senate as a feature, 283–284; reflects pol. creativeness, 283–284, 290–293, 310, 317–318; relation to constl. convention and written const., 284, 290; basis of constl. law, 284; checks and balances, and separation of powers, 290; Gladstone characterizes, 290; plans for, 291; made a fetich, 318; apathy as to ratification, 325, 326, 337; pol. corruption charged, 390; promotes pol. systematization, 392; preambles lists functions of govt., 411–412; funding of debts affects, 583. *See also* Articles of Confederation; Political inventiveness, U. S.
Constitution, unwritten: British const. typifies, 310; advantages and disadvantages, 310–311.
Constitution, written: Const. of

U. S. typifies, 284, 290; various Amer. forms illustrate, 284–286, 288–289; urban and rural credit in developing (U. S.), 286–293; leading promoters, 287; advantages and disadvantages, 310–311.
"Continental Sunday": in cities (U. S.), 510.
Contract, social: influences Amer. colonists, 286.
Convention constitutional (principle of): development in U. S., 284, 285–286, 288–290; leading promoters (U. S.), 287. *See also* Political inventiveness, U. S.
Convention, constitutional (U. S.): mentioned, 283, 284, 290, 325; origin, 283; urban influence and participation, 291, 292; pol. corruption feared, 390.
Cook County (Ill.): under-represented, 223; rural over-representation, 223, 435–436.
Coöperation: difficult among farm population, 75–77, 365, 381, 618; advantage for, in cities, 444–445, 510–511, 526–527, 616, 618; journals in cities promote farm, 445; in urban industry, promotes temperance, 484; capacity for among rural and urban soldiers, 605. *See also* Labor organizations; Farmers' unions.
Copenhagen, city of (Denmark): mentioned, 518.
Corbin, Hannah Lee: suffragist leader, 216.
Corn Laws (Eng.): give privileged status, 79–80; abrogation of, 80. *See also* Protection, agricultural; Tariff.
Cornwall, county of (Eng.): supports Charles I, 130; feudal conditions persist, 130.
Corporation(s): democratic as to form, 83–84; consider interests of employees, 84; government control of, 171, 196; the trading, an element in the town system, 304; relation to pub. spirit, 382; relation to pol. corruption, 396–397, 422.
Corrupt Practices Act(s) (Eng.): Of 1854—checks pol. corruption, 402; urban support, 403. Of 1883—cities promote, 135, 403; checks pol. corruption, 403.
Coster, Laurens J.: birth, 117; invention of printing, 117.
Cotton, John: denounces democracy, 97.
Cotton (agricl. prod.): Northern blockade hinders export, 53; cotton gin makes profitable, 54; growing of, promotes slavery, 54, 186.
Cotton gin: invention of, promotes slavery, 54–55.
Country, open: identified with rural, vii. *See also* Rural districts; Rural environment; Rural life; Rural community; Agriculture.
Country Party: In England—elements in, 131, 133, 352–353; rural leadership, 352–353; urban leadership, 353. In U. S.—existence and significance, 158.
Countryside. *See* Country, open.
County; County government. *See* Government, local, U. S.
County Down (Ire.): relation to Woodrow Wilson, 364.
Court of Imperial Justice: suggested for British Empire, 311.
Courtrai, battle of: mentioned, 108.
Courts. *See* Judiciary; Supreme Court (U. S.); Court of Imperial Justice; Judicial administration; Judicial interpretation.
Coventry, town of (Eng.): political aptitude in, 262.
Cowley, Abraham: origin, 6; lauds rural life, 6, 530.
Cowper, William: lauds rural life, 6, 530.
Coxe, Tench: John Adams removes, 393.
Crane, Dr. Frank: cited, 45.
Crawford, Wm. H.: represents Jeffersonian democracy, 178; relation to congressional caucus, 178; favors U. S. Bank, 187.
Crawford County (Pa.): home of direct primary, 301–302; voting, 342–343.
Creativeness, political. *See* Political inventiveness.
Crédit Mobilier: corrupt operations, 396.
Creditor class (U. S.): identified with undemocratic elements, 157–158; *id.* shown unwarranted, 159, 160.
Crete, island of: mentioned, 360.
Crime: General considerations—relation to manuf's, 26; contrasted with criminality, 490; relation to urban life, 490–492, 495–496, 497; relation to rural life, 492, 497, 498–501; prevalence (U. S.), 492–494, 496, 498–502; unreliable statistics (U. S.), 493, 497; significance of decline in Eng. and Wales, 495–496; age distribution affects, 497; frontier spirit affects, 498–499. Rural vs. urban—in Eng. and Wales, 26; in U. S., 26, 497–502; in Europe in general, 496; in all countries, 496; in Belgium, 497. Trend of—in general, 480, 493, 494; in U. S., 492–494, 500; in France and Germany, 494; in Eng. and Wales, 494–495; in Scotland and Ireland, 495. *See also* Criminality; *individual crimes.*
Criminality: distinguished from crime, 490; relation to urban life, 490–492, 495–496; relation to

rural life, 492, 497, 498–501; relation to divorce, 504–505.
Criminals: non-voters in U. S., 95; rural origin of urban, 497. *See* Crime; Criminality.
Crispi, Francesco: nativity, 359.
Crompton, Samuel: origin, 117.
Cromwell, Oliver: occupation, 130, 132, 352; helps form Eastern Association, 132; origin, 132, 352; relation to Instrument of Government, 284–285; a rural migrant, 352.
Cromwell, Thomas: official position, 352; birth and origin, 352.
Crowd psychology; group psychology. *See* Mob; Mob psychology.
Crowder, General E. H. (Provost Marshal General): cited, 460, 461.
Crusades: promote rise of cities, 107–108; economic results in general, 116.
Cultivators: Aristotle excludes from govt., 24, 323. *See also* Rural population; Agriculture.
Currency, paper: how attitude toward, affects democracy, 168; Peoples' Party demands govt. issue of, 198.
Currey, C. H.: *British Colonial Policy,* cited, 280.
Currier, Dr. A. H.: *Nine Great Preachers,* cited, 518, 519.
Curtis, George Wm.: leader in civil service reform, 406.
Custom: relation to pol. creativeness, 309; adherence to, 310.
Czarist régime (Russia): debacle of, 585.
Czecho-Slovakia: pol. leaders, 360.

Daily Vacation Bible School, the: origin, 522.
Danby, Earl of (Sir Thomas Osborne): heads Tory party, 353; origin, 353.
Danish elements: in London, 553.
Danton, George Jacques: origin and career, 138.
Darmstadt, city of (Ger.): mentioned, 358.
Dastre, A.: cited, 456.
Davenport, Dr. Eugene: *Education for Efficiency,* cited, 15.
Davies, George R.: *Social Environment,* cited, 347.
Davis, William Stearns: *Outline Hist. of the Roman Empire,* cited, 104, 382, 553.
Davison, William: influences William Brewster, 360.
Dayton, city of (Ohio): flood leads to munic'l reconstruction, 315.
Deakin, Frank: *Spain To-day,* cited, 264, 572–573.
Deane, Richard: occupation, 130
Dearborn Independent: cited, 17:
Death rate: General considerations—standardizing of, 453, 455; deficient statistics (rural), 455. In Eng. and Wales—in general, 33; in London, 427; in other large cities, 427. Trend of—in cities, 418, 452–453, 463; significance of, in Eng. and Wales, 448; in general, 448, 463, 465; declines with urbanization, 448, 615; in Eng. and Wales, 448–449; in various other European countries, 449–450; in the U. S., 450, 452; in the upper age periods, 452; in the rural districts, 452–453, 463; rural vs. urban, 452–453, urban contrib. to general decline, 463–465. Rural vs. urban (level)—in general, 452–453; in Austria and European Russia, 453; in the U. S., 454. *See also* Health; Disease(s); Infant mortality; *individual diseases.*
Deaths, non-resident: correction of standard death rate for, 453, 455.
Debt, public (U. S.): opposition to funding of, no proof of democracy, 168; funding of, stabilizes, 583.
Debtor class (U. S.): identified with democratic elements, 157–158, 171–172; *id.* shown unwarranted, 159, 160, 167–168, 172 ff.; State bank interests as a, 181–182. *See also* Democracy, U. S.
Debts, repudiation of: relation to democracy, 159, 168; Washington opposes, 168.
Decadence: said to result from city life, 17. *See also* Degeneration.
Declaration of Grievances (Amer. colonies—Carolinas): significance, 158.
Declaration of Independence (U. S.): mentioned, 157, 285; made from Phila., 162; North Carolina instructs delegates for, 163–164; Virginia delegates instructed to propose, 164; Richard Henry Lee moves, 164; John Adams seconds, 164; not an actual form of govt., 167; compared with the Const. as to democracy, 167.
Declaration of Rights (Fr. Rev.): reveals inequalities, 139.
Degeneration (in general; mental; physical; race): said to result from city life, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 20, 33, 457–458, 474. *See also* Decadence; Rural decadence; Mental maladies; Feeble-mindedness; Insanity; Health; Physique; Urban environment.
Delaware: opposes Dec. of Ind., 164; Clay carries (1832), 183; rural opposition to I. and R., 228.
Delbrück, M. F. R. von: birthplace, 358.
Delcassé, Théophile: author of the entente cordiale, 357; origin and career, 357.
Democracy: In general—Aristotle

et al. oppose, 4, 97–98; relation of city life to, 13, 17–19, 25, 32, 35–36, 412, 614; based on agricl. class, 18, 29–30, 58, 151, 153; analyzed and defined, 40–41, 91–96; economic freedom basic to, 57; relation to self-employment, 57–61; discussion outlined, 90–91; gains in respectability, 92; characterized, 94; essential factors, 94–96; absolute not possible, 96; danger of hasty generalization, 96–97, 192–193; excesses admitted, yet favored, 98–99; contrib. of ancient oriental states, 100, 102; both local and national factors required, 102; contrib. of Greeks and Romans, 102, 103–105, 274; contrib. of Germanic folk moots, 102; war injures, 104–105; effect of feudalism, 105–106; phases of (opening of modern period), 115–116; econ. and relig. aspects (*id.*), 115–118; contrib. of Reformation, 118–119, 120–129; contrib. of Reformation leaders, 118–120; urban and rural solidarity as to, 120; relation to republicanism, 185; changing ideals as to, 188; effect on birth rate, 469–471. In the U. S.—to conserve, the problem, 18; based on free land, 18, 64; based on agricl. classes, 18, 29–30, 151, 157–158, 171, 191, 206, 213, 219, 223, 224, 235–236; progress of, 18, 35, Chs. VIII–X, 202, 235, 385, 412; favorable prospect, 18, 29–30, 235, 385; relation to city life, 85, 156, 219, 231, 235–236; equality and popular sovereignty basic, 93–94, 151–152; generalizations as to source, 152–153, 159, 191–193, 234–236; favoring conditions, 153; frontier claimed as *the* source, 157–158, 234, 471; *id.* shown unwarranted, 159–160, 235–236; planting of, in America important, 160; urban and rural factors in rev. of 1800, 175; Jacksonian movement jointly rural and urban, 177, 188; local type of, characterizes Rev. and Confed., 185; trend toward national form, 185; greatest contrib. of rural pop., 196; demands of Peoples' Party, 198; ebbing tide (1900 ff.) jointly rural and urban, 199–200; Progressive movement (1909–16) jointly rural and urban, 200–202; fruition (1912–1900), 202; reaction (1920 ff.) jointly rural and urban, 202; test of suffrage, 206, 219; test of representation, 206, 223; test of initiative and referendum, 206, 224, test of town system, 206, 231, 235. In Eng. and Wales—progress of, 32, 80, 95, 106–107, 108–112, 118, 120–121, 129–137; relative rural and urban contrib., 32, 80, 106–112, 120–121, 129–137, 143; relation to abolition of slavery, 51–52; attitude toward Civil War (U. S.), 53; relation to pol. reforms, 80; relation to parl. govt., 109; in certain large cities, 383. The Netherlands—progress of, 51, 106–108, 126–128, 137. In Belgium—progress of, 72, 108 (*see also* Low Countries; Flanders; Ghent; Bruges; Ypres). France—progress of, 105–107, 122–126, 137–144; Huguenot migration affects, 125–126; leads Continent, 137; French Rev. affects, 141; relation to peasant ownership, 143. Germany—progress of, 106–107, 121, 144–147; relation to socialist element. 146. Italy—progress of, 71, 102–107 (*see also* City-state, Roman; Cities, free, Middle Ages). Scotland—progress of, 128–129. Switzerland—progress of, 121–122, 137, 279, 302–304.

Democracy, pure: distinguished from representative govt., 91; in the Greek city-states, 91–92, 87, 232; in N. E. towns, 91–92, 232–234 (*see also* Town system, N. E.); in free cities (Middle Ages), 97; representative democracy replaces, 91–92, 233–234, 254; in form of initiative, referendum, and recall, 92; identified with democracy in general, 92, 97; folk moots a form of, 102; early popular assemblies of Greeks and Romans a form of, 102; direct primary a form of, 302.

Democracy, representative. *See* Representative government.

Democracy, industrial. *See* Economic freedom.

Democracy, social: equality a factor in, 94.

Democratic Party (U. S.): relation to frontier, 157; apologists for slavery (in North), 187; dominated by slave interests, 187, 189, 195; a party of expediency (1840), 189; Whigs beat at party game, 189; vote for (1840), 191; elects Polk, 191–192; survives slavery issue, 192; significance of survival, 192; strength in cities, 194 (1856), 201–202 (1912); industrial workers affiliate with, 195.

Democratic-Republican Party (U. S.): victory of 1800 as an agrarian triumph, 172–173; congressional caucuses, 299; relation to nominating conventions, 301; press of criticized, 374; Jefferson desires equilibrium for, 393. *See also* Election of 1800; Jefferson, Thomas; Jeffersonian democracy.

Demosthenes: mentioned, 347.

Denmark: cityward trend, vi; rural increase, vi; abolishes slave trade,

51; status of farmers, 72–73; farm coöperation, 72, 148; rural and urban contrib. to democracy, 148; efficiency of govt., 417; lengthening life, 451.
Depopulation: in France, 9.
Dessau, town of (Ger.): mentioned, 610.
Desertion (in war): rural and urban, Civil War (U. S.), 542; in general, World War (U. S.), 549; rural and urban, World War (U. S.), 559–560.
Deterioration, physical. *See* Physique deterioration.
De Tocqueville, Alexis H. C. M. C. (Count): views criticized, 13, 35, 569; *Democracy in America,* cited, 34, 35, 93, 102, 152, 255, 338, 562.
Dewey, John: "The Ethics of Democracy," cited, 57, 94.
Diarrhea: threatens infant life, 454–455.
Dicey, A. V.: cited, 284; *Introd. to the Study of the Law of the Const.,* 413–414.
Dickinson, John: relation to Phila., 162; characterized, 162, 283, 292–293; view on Dec. of Ind., 164; relation to Articles of Confederation, 283; contrib. to written const., 287; wrote "Fabius Letters," 292.
Dijon, town of (Fr.): relation to Bernard of Clairvaux, 517; *id.,* to Bossuet, 518.
Diocletian (Roman emperor): origin, 350.
Direct Legislation League: first local organized, 227.
Direct Legislation Record: founded, 227–228.
Direct primary. *See under* Nominating machinery.
Disease(s): organic, in upper age periods, 452; organic, among urban recruits, World War (U. S.), 461. *See also* Health; Death rate; *and individual diseases.*
Disraeli, Isaac. *See* Beaconfield, Lord.
Dissent: London the center of, 130.
Distributive interests (U. S.): farmers complain of, 77; farmers revolt against, 195.
District of Columbia (U. S.): residents non-voters, 95.
Divorce: situation serious, 480, 504, 615; in Eng., France, and U. S., 502; trend, 502, 503; urban vs. rural, 502, 504; as index of morality, 502, 503, 615; urban influence, 502–504, 615; grounds for, 503; relation to feminist movement, 503–504; *id.* to hasty marriage, 504; *id.* to lawlessness, 504–505. *See also* Home; Family; Young, the; Women.
Dodd, W. E.: *Statesmen of the Old South,* cited, 286–287, 361–362.
Dodd, W. F.: *Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions,* cited, 288–289.
Domestics, class of: relation to illegitimacy, 486; origin, 486.
Dominicans (religious order): revivals by, 522.
Dorchester, town of (Eng.): Amer. colonists from, 155.
Dorr, Thomas Wilson: leads rebellion, 212.
Dorr's Rebellion: causes, 212, 221; an urban revolt, 570; justification, 570.
Dorsey, Governor Hugh M. (Ga.): cited, 87 (n. 10).
Douglas, Stephen A.: parentage and early career, 363.
Dragonades, the (Fr.): force Huguenots into exile, 124.
Drayton, Jonathan (Speaker, House of Representatives, U. S.): pol. corruption of, 391.
Dresden, city of (Ger.): mentioned, 358, 521.
Duane, William: factional strife with John Binns, 300.
Dublin, city and county (Ire.): illiteracy, 242.
Duel: origin of, 500.
Duff, Alexander: origin, 520.
Dumouriez, Charles François, nativity and parentage, 355.
Dundee, town of (Scot.): characterized, 128; Reformation center, 128–129.
Duning, W. A.: *Hist. of Pol. Theories, Ancient and Mediaeval,* cited, 106, 275; *Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 1865–1877,* cited, 397–398.
Dunstan, Saint: as statesman, 351; birth and origin, 351–352.
Durham, John George Lambton (Lord): relation to British colonial system, 280; work in Canada, 280; birth and rearing, 353; relation to Reform Act (1832), 353; "Report on the Affairs of British North America (1839)," cited, 280.
Dutton, Francis S.: devises Australian ballot, 296.
Dwight, Timothy: origin and distinction, 518–519; *Travels in New England and New York,* cited, 499, 513, 541–542, 569.

East: sea-route to, 116.
East (U. S.): distrib. of Bryan vote (1896), 199; influenza-pneumonia epidemic (soldiers, 1918–19) in, 462; divorce, 502; tendency to political revolt, 569; good government element, 569. *See also individual States; and United States.*
East Jersey. *See* New Jersey.

East Lothian, county of (Scot.): pol. fitness of agricl. laborers, 263.
East Side. *See* New York City.
Easter: significance unknown, 524.
Eastern Association (Eng.): organized, 132.
Eaton, Dorman B.: civil service reform leader, 406; *Independent Movement in New York*, cited, 299; *Govt. of Municipalities*, cited, 306, 420, 427; *Civil Service in Great Britain*, cited, 392, 401.
Ebert, Friedrich: president German Republic, 359; sketch, 359.
Ebert government (Ger.): uprisings against, 146–147.
Economic determinism, theory of. *See* History, economic interpretation of.
Economic efficiency: cityward movement promotes, 349, 444, 614–615; declining sickness promotes (U. S.), 450.
Economic Freedom: defined, 40; basic to liberty, 57; relation to self-employment, 57–58, 78; alleged reversal of, for rural and urban pop., 57–58, 84–85; in general, 58–60, 75–76, 77–79, 81–85, 86–87; in U. S., 60–70, 76–77, 405; in Old World (except Eng.), 70–73, 85–86, 261; in Eng. and Wales, 73–75, 79–81, 85, 261; in Canada, 86; relation to sale of product, 78; rural superiority in doubted, 81, 84–87; organization of urban workers affects, 81–83; govt. employment in cities affects, 84; trend toward (opening of modern period), 115–116; a factor in Prot. Reformation, 119, 121, 122–123; of women, in cities, 215, 469, 504; cities favor, 504, 614. *See also* Land; Property; Labor organizations; Strikes; Agricultural laborers; Tenancy, farm; Coöperation.
Economic interest, conflict of: industrial revolution creates, 543–544; future of, 544; harmonising of, 544.
Eddy, George Sherwood: origin, 520; relation to Y. M. C. A., 520; *India Awakening*, cited, 44.
Edgehill, battle of: London regiments at, 131.
Edict of Milan: relation to relig. liberty, 42.
Edict of Nantes: provisions, 123; revoked, 124.
Edinburgh, city of (Scot.): mentioned, 52, 138, 292, 518.
Edinburgh Journal (Chambers): circulation, 243–244.
Education, advantages of city for, 240, 243, 245–248, 445, 528; relation to republican govt., 255; agencies improve with urbanization, 415; rural districts inferior as to, 435; city-located agencies promote agricl., 445; relation to birth rate, 469; effect on temperance, 484. *See also* Schools; Literacy; Books; Libraries; Intelligence, general; Work, educative value of.
Educative influences: of old N. E. farm, 15; of early N. E. factories, 27; superior in modern city, 30. *See* Education.
Edward I (Eng.): adopts scheme for Parl., 110, 277; perfects *id.*, 277; birth, 351; pol. corruption in period of, 401, 402.
Edwards, Jonathan: promotes separation of church and state, 44; on religion and morals in Northampton, 513; relation to The Great Awakening (1734), 513–514; origin and distinction, 518–519.
Efficiency of government (in general): pol. purity a factor in, 388; problems raised by urbanization analyzed, 411; effect of urbanization on broad functions of govt., 411–416, 614; efficiency of, in rural and in urban countries, compared, 416–417.
— of city government: Ancient and Mediæval—in Greek and Roman city-states, 417–418; in city-republics of Middle Ages, 418. In modern Europe (in general)—trend relative to important services, 418; progress from Middle Ages, 418, 420; occasional decided lack of, 418, 420; present situation, 418–419, 420; as to police service, 436. In England—lacking before 1835, 402, 418, 420; in certain large cities of, praised, 418–419; present situation, 419, 420. In U. S.—lack of, 13, 36, 235, 260, 419–420, 430, 433, 435, 439, 614; improvement, 34, 36, 234–235, 306–307, 424–426, 501; hopeful attitude, 35, 36–37, 306–307, 384–385, 419–426, 439; aliens as a handicap, 260, 423–424, 428, 429; Negroes, *id.*, 260; hasty develop., *id.*, 420–421, 428; size of task, *id.*, 421–422, 428; outside interference, *id.*, 422–423; improved forms of city govt., 306–307, 384, 425–426; in large cities (espec. N. Y. City), 418, 425, 426–428; example of European cities, 420; pol. capacity of urban pop. a factor, 420; testing by positive results, 422, 428, 437; World War affects, 429–430; out-lawing of liquor traffic affects, 430; compared with State and Federal govt., 430–431; compared with rural govt. (in general), 430–439; compared with the town system, 432–433; in the urban

county, 435–436; urban vs. rural police system, 436.
—of Federal government (U. S.): increases with urbanization, 411–412, 614; relative to a more perfect union, 412; relative to liberty, 412; relative to judicial administration, 412–414; relative to common defence, 414, 430, 542, 549–550; relative to general welfare, 415–416; in period of Confederation, 430.
—in the State sphere (U. S.): proposed reconstruction, 308; in Illinois (1818–30), 394; growing efficiency, in general, 420, 614; defective in early days, 430; internal improvements (frontier States), 430–431; reconstruction govts. (South), 431.
—of local rural government: In U. S.—compared with city govt., 430–439, 614; of N. E. town system, 431–433; early varying opinion as to, 433; later investigation and criticism, 433–434; rural justice (N. Y.), 435; care of mental defectives and disadvantaged children, 435; in county govt., 435–436, 439; rural police service, 436; inefficiency obscured, 436–437; negative virtues, 437; rural govt. at a crisis, 437–439; proposals to eliminate local rural govt., 438–439; rural exodus affects, 439–440; decline relative, 440. In England—trend of, 438; attempts to revive, 438; rural vs. urban county councils, 438. In France—default of rural local govt. in, 438.
Egypt: cultivation and settlement anciently, 101.
Eight-hour day: Peoples' Party demands, 198; established, 205 (n. 29).
Einsiedeln, town of (Switz.): supports Zwingli, 121.
Eisner, Kurt von: birth, 359.
Elderton, Ethel M.: *Report on the English Birth-rate,* cited, 468, 469, 471–472.
Election, direct (U. S.): extended, 177; demanded (for U. S. senators, *et al.*), 198; achieved (for U. S. senators), 202.
Elections (in general): system of, improved with urbanization, 416. (*For elections in other countries than Gt. Brit. and the United States, see under* Political activity, *or under titles for said countries.*)
Elections (Great Britain): parliamentary elections (1906 and recent), 332; character of local rural, 332–333; municipal, 332–333. *See also* Political activity, Gt. Brit.; Corrupt Practices Act(s); Suffrage, England; Political corruption, Gt. Brit.
Elections (U. S.): In general—fraud and corruption (early days), 394–396; betting, 395. (*See also* Political activity, Political corruption, Suffrage, *and individual elections,* in U. S.). Of 1800—whether an agrarian victory, 172–173; rural and urban vote analyzed, 173–175; bearing on democracy, rural and urban, 175. Of 1828—interest in, 326. Of 1832—popular vote (Clay and Jackson), 183. Of 1836—character, 326. Of 1840—issues and candidates, 188–190; distribution of vote, 190–191; size of vote, 326–327. Of 1844—candidates and parties, 191. Of 1848—candidates and parties, 191–192. Of 1852—Whigs carry agricl. States, 192. Of 1856—distribution of vote, 194. Of 1860—distribution of vote, 194–195. Of 1896—distribution of vote, 199; relation to decline in voting, 327. Of 1900—distribution of Bryan vote, 199–200. Of 1912—candidates and issues, 201; character, 201. Of 1920 and 1924—proportion of voters to qualified electors, 327, 340.
Electors, presidential (U. S.): become passive agents, 176; people choose, 176; Jeffersonian constituency popularizes, 178; South Carolina popularizes, 178.
Eliot, Dr. Charles W.: cited, 15, 38 (n. 18); *Road Toward Peace,* cited, 534.
Eliot, John: origin, 520.
Eliot, Sir John: origin, 131, 352.
Eliot, Jonathan: *Debates,* cited, 166, 229, 230, 283, 325, 390.
Elizabeth (Queen of England): contest with Philip of Spain, 120–121; mentioned, 348.
Elliott, Edward G.: "The Schoolhouse as a Crime Contributor," cited, 489.
Ellsworth, Oliver: origin and services, 292.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo: origin and anti-slavery activities, 52.
Empire, German. *See* Germany.
Employee ownership—representation—management: conservative factors, 581, 582; extent (U. S.), 581–582.
Endicott, John: origin and services, 155, 360.
Engels, Friedrich: nativity and parentage, 358.
England and Wales: loss of males in agriculture, v; cityward trend, v, 329, 495, 548, 593; serfdom, 51; abolition of slave trade, 51–52; city pop. favors North in Civil War (U. S.), 53; status of agricl. laborers, 73–74, 79–80; farm ten-

ancy, 74; ownership of land, 81; urban status, 80–81, 85, 105, 122–123, 242–243; urban vs. rural econ. status, 85; a democracy (1832), 95; compared with Roman Empire, 105; cities centers of struggle for pol. liberty, 106, 108–111, 121, 129–137; cities take place in gen. system of govt., 107, 109; relation of merchants to factory system, 117; attacked by Spain, 120–121; Reformation, 120–121, 128; towns Protestant, 121; assists French Huguenots, 123–124; haven of exiles from Holland, 126–127; Pilgrims flee to Holland, 127; contrib. of rural pop. to pol. and relig. liberty, 129, 131–132; class distinctions, 136; illiteracy, 242, 243–244; written ballot, 296; principles of govt. worked out, 311; origin of leaders, 348–349, 351–354, 541; pol. partisanship, 375–378; pub. spirit, 375–378, 382–383; purity of municipal govt., 400, 402; pol. corruption in general (*see* Pol. corruption, Gt. Brit.); relation of towns to boroughs, 403; efficiency of govt., 416–417; failing rural govt., 438; lengthening life, 451; health, physique, mortality, infant mortality, birth rate (*see under these titles*); temperance, 482–483; illegitimacy, 485, 486; prostitution, 487; crime, 494–496; divorce, 502; religious conditions, 523; peaceable inclination, 538; rural contrib. to nationalism, 541; contrasted with Russia, 545, 584; patriotism, 548–549; labor unrest, 578–579; Bank of England estab., 582–583; World War loans, 583; contrasted with Mexico, 584; Germany as rival on sea, 597; policy as to food supplies (*see* Food, supplies of, Gt. Brit.); distinguished airmen, 609–610. *See also* Great Britain; United Kingdom; National self-sufficiency; Military efficiency; World War.

English Colonies in America: suffrage in, 206–207.

English National Birth-rate Commission (1913): cited, 31, 466, 471–472.

English Shire (horse): mentioned, 464.

Enteritis: threatens infant life, 454–455.

Equality: a prime element in democracy, 93, 93–94, 94, 385; French Rev. promotes, 141; sense of, on frontier (U. S.), 207; relation to birth rate, 469. *See also* Democracy.

Erasmus, Desiderius: origin, 117.

Erzberger, Matthias: negotiates peace terms (1918), 359; origin, 359.

Essex, Robert Devereux (2d Earl of): commands Parliamentary army, 131; origin, 131–132.

Eugenic influences: relation to urbanization, 474–475. *See also* Eugenist.

Eugenist: views on birth rate, 473. *See also* Eugenic influences.

Euripides: lauds farmer, 3.

Europe (in general): village normally rural, viii; agricl. laborers an isolated class, 31; urban pop. leads in struggle for liberty, 129, 148; rural contrib. to democracy, 148, 261; undemocratic forces, 153; status of peasantry, 244, 246; urban pop. excels in pol. initiative, 269; pub. spirit in cities, 382, 384; pol. purity in cities, 400; birth rate, 465–466, 471; temperance, 483; illegitimacy, 486; infanticide, 487; German incursions, 537; rural source of nationalism, 541; Nordicized and Alpinized Mediterranean peoples, 568–569; hetereogeneity checks rural action, 576; rural masses property less, 581; rural contrib. to pol. and relig. liberty, 129; illiteracy, 242; pol. unfitness of rural pop., 264; prostitution, 487. *See also Countries of.*

Evangelical movement (Eng.): initiated by Wesleys and Whitefield, 402; effect on pol. corruption, 402; centers of origin, 402, 522–523.

Evangelists: origin, 519–520; conversions by modern, 522.

Executive, the: Jackson, Roosevelt, and Wilson enlarge powers of, 185; alleged tyranny of (U. S.), 185; view of Jefferson as to relation to the legislative branch, 185.

Experts, government by: tendency toward in city govt., 265; democratic possibilities of, 265; agencies for control of, 265.

Extravagance: a chief malady, 9. *See also* Luxury, Urban centers.

"Fabius." *See* Dickinson, John.

Factories; Factory system: Effects —on birth rate, 15; on health and physique, 15, 27; on religion and morals, 15, 26–27, 28; disciplinary, 26; on crime and vice, 26; on slavery, 53–54; on self-employment, 58. Miscellaneous—intellectual conditions, 27, 242–245; 246–247, 264 (*see also* Intelligence, general); rise and progress, 28, 53–54, 58, 116–117; assimilative features, 555; relation to war, 602–603. *See also* Manufactures; Industrial population.

Fairlie, J. A.: *Munic. Admin.*, cited,

103, 423, 425, 433; *Local Govt.*, cited, 233, 338, 433; "Centralization of Administration in New York State," cited, 253; "County and Local Government in Illinois," "County and Town Government in Illinois," "Report on Revenue and Administration," cited, 433–434.
Family: size of (*see* Birth rate); children as contrib. members, 469, 470; in cities, 504; life, in U. S., 505; the French bourgeoisie, 530. *See also* Home; Young, the; Marraige; Divorce.
Faneuil Hall: characterized, 161.
Farm journal: locates in city, 445.
Farmers' Alliance (U. S.): pol. convention (1889), 197; demands I. and R., 226–227.
Farmers' movements (U. S.): progress, 195–200; relation of rural pop. (West) to, 268; affects rural voting, 338–339. *See also* Granger movement; Greenback movement; Alliance and Populist movements; Peoples' Party.
Farmers' unions: relation to violence, 500, 571. *See also* Coöperation; Crime.
Farm(s): educational effects (N. E.), 15; abandoned (N. E.), 28. *See also* Agriculture; *and kindred titles.*
Fast Day: proclaimed, 524.
Federalist, The: relation of Hamilton and Madison to, 92, 291–292; relation of Jay to, 291–292; Guizot characterizes, 292; compared with 'Fabius" letters, 292–293.
Federalists (pol. party, U. S.): relation to democracy, 97; plutocratic elements back, 172–173; vote analyzed (1800), 173–175; in N. Y. State election (1792), 175; nominate De Witt Clinton, 178–179, 300–301; attitude toward U. S. Bank, 186–187; agricl. support, 188, 293; urban leadership, 188, 293, 391; oppose manhood suffrage, 210; control 1st and 2d Congresses, 293; employ congressional caucus, 299; press of, criticized, 374; civil service under, 391, 393; Jefferson dismissed, 393.
Federal Reserve System (U. S.): mentioned, 202.
Federal system: Greek contrib. to, 274, 282–283; in ancient world, 275; Const. of U. S. illustrates, 282, 283–284, 318; Achaian and Aetolian leagues as forms of, 282–283; colonial (U. S.) forms of, 283, 285; North German Confederation and Imperial German Const. as forms of, 293; early Swiss confederations as forms of, 303; requires written const., 310. *See also* Political inventiveness.
Feeble-minded, the: excluded from suffrage (U. S.), 95; care of, improves, 416; elimination of, 474; rural origin of, 474, 486, 492; relation to illegitimacy, 486; relation to criminality, 492; in rural Northwest, 500; in New Jersey, 500. *See also* Mental maladies, Degeneration.
Feminist movement: relation to woman suffrage, 215; relation to anti-slavery movement, 215; sources of impulse to, 215, 471, 504; relation to birth rate, 469, 470, 471; relation to divorce, 503–504.
Ferrero, Guglielmo: cited, 9.
Feud: origin and persistence, 500.
Feudalism; Feudal period: status of rural pop. under, 49, 58, 112–113, 115; expansion of commerce affects, 51, 107–109, 540–541; self-employment in, 58; effect on free institutions, 105–106; decays, 116, 540–541, 589; relation to class status (Eng.), 136; downfall in France, 139, 140–141; influence persists (Ger.), 145, 334; political service, 275, 540; as a form of pol. organization, 275–276, 418; in early N. Y. (State), 392; relation of downfall to money, 589. *See also* Serfdom.
Fichte, Johann G.: contrib. to German unification, 358; parentage, 358.
"Fifty-Four Forty or Fight": frontier element backs, 537–538.
Filibustering: by early fathers (U. S.), 400.
Fillmore, Millard: carries St. Louis (1856), 194.
Finland: illegitimacy in, 485.
Finney, Chas. G.: as evangelist, 519; origin and education, 519.
Firma burghi: London et al. towns gain right of, 109–110; relation to representative system, 278.
Fish, Carl: *The Civil Service and the Patronage,* cited, 299, 391, 392–394.
Fisher, Irving: report on "National Vitality," cited, 451; "Lengthening of Human Life in Retrospect and Prospect," cited, 451–452.
Fisher, J. Francis: contrib. to proportional representation, 296–297.
Fiske, George Walter: *Challenge of the Country,* cited, 15–16.
Fiske, John: *Amer. Pol. Ideas,* cited, 154, 282.
Fitspatrick, E. A.: *Experts in City Govt.,* cited, 19, 265, 375.
Flanders, Count of (Louis II of Mâle); mentioned, 108.
Flanders, country of: Cities of—trade guilds exert democratic influence, 108; lose liberty, 108; oligarchy yields to democracy, 108,

126; civic spirit, 383. In general—Protestant Reformation in, 121, 122.
Flemish. *See* Flanders, country of.
Flick, A. C.: *Loyalism in New York,* 164.
Florence, city of (It.): a Renaissance center, 117; early use of gun-powder, 117; men of distinction in, 348, 351, 356.
Foch, Ferdinand (Marshal): birth and parentage, 357.
Folk depletion: in rural districts, 250.
Folk-moot(s): a form of pure democracy, 102; relation to representative system, 276.
Fonck, Captain Rene Paul: standing as airman, 609; origin, 609.
Food conservation (World War): urban and rural (U. S.), 550; in Gt. Brit., 550. *See also* Food, supplies of.
Food, supplies of: In general—relation of manuf'g class to, 589; importance in war, 589–590, 592, 598, 602–603; foreign dependence in, 592; crop failures affect self-dependence in, 600; imperial self-sufficiency in, 600–601, 602; local self-sufficiency in, 601. (*See also* National self-sufficiency; Agriculture). In U. S.—foreign dependence in, feared, 14. In Gt. Brit.—dependence as to, 592, 593; relation to war, 592, 593–595, 597, 598–601; national policy as to, 593, 594–595, 597, 598–601; recommendations of Royal Commission (1905), 593–594; Germany directs submarine toward, 593–594; drawn from world sources, 593–594, 597, 598–601; difficulties in way of self-dependence in, 595. In Germany—foreign dependence in, 592, 595; relation to war, 592–598, 601–602; efforts to avoid dependence, 595–596; relation to German failure (World War), 596–597. In Austria—dependence in, 592; relation to war, 592, 602. In Belgium—dependence as to, 592; relation to war, 592, 597–598. In Russia—surplus in, 601; lack (World War), 601.
Forbes, W. Cameron: cited, 272 (n. 47).
Ford, Henry: origin, 17; contrib. to city growth, 17.
Ford, H. J.: *Rise and Growth of Amer. Politics,* cited, 10, 207, 208, 259, 371, 375, 377; *Representative Govt.,* cited, 278; "Direct Legislation and the Recall" cited, 392, 417, 430.
Ford, Thomas (Governor): cited, 394.
Forest Cantons (Switz.): disproportionate voting power, 119; oppose Reformation, 122; popular govt. in, 122; contrib. to democracy, 122.
Forethought: relation to birth rate, 469, 471.
Forster, W. E.: relation to Imperial Conferences, 281; origin, 281.
Fortescue, Sir John: cited, 6.
"Four Hundred" (N. Y. City): relation to Lost Battalion, 560.
Fourier, François C. M.: origin, 143.
Fourteenth Amendment (U. S. Const.): extends suffrage to Negroes, 95; Negro suffrage previous to, 214.
Fowler, W. W.: *City-State of the Greeks and Romans,* cited, 347–348, 370.
Fox, George: origin, 52, 517; founds sect of Quakers, 52, 517.
Fox, Wilson: "Agricultural Wages in England and Wales," cited, 31.
France: cityward trend, vi, 71, 611; loss of rural population, vi; depopulation, 9, 33, 467; status of agricl. laborers, 71, 581; rural vs. urban status, 85; civic life revives, 106; cities take place in gen. govt., 107; Reformation, 121, 122–126 (*see also* Huguenots); status of industrial workers, 122–123; result of exile of Huguenots, 125–126; Revolution (*see separate title*); leads democratic develop. on Cont., 137; urban contrib. to democracy, 137, 141, 143; services of peasant class, 143, 333; illiteracy, 243; Girondist const. (1793), 304; overlook rural voters, 333; cities excel in authors, 348; origin of pol. leaders, 355–357; suffers defeat under Napoleon, 356; party spirit and pub. spirit, 378; patriotism, 378, 549, 565–566 (*see also* Patriotism, France); pol. corruption, 404; efficiency of govt., 416–417; rural local govt., 438; death rate, 449; lengthening life, 451; birth rate, 466, 471, 472; health of soldiers, 462–463; prostitution, 487; crime, 494; divorce, 502; religious conditions, 523; family life, 530; peaceful inclination, 539; Paris stands for, 541, 553; internationalism, 545; attitude of Canadian French, 558; election (1919), 579; ownership among rural masses, 581; Germany fails to defeat (1914), 596; as source of food for Germany, 596; Belgium aids, (1914), 598; deficient in coal, 600; self-sufficiency inadequate, 601; sugar supplies (World War), 601; German battle line broken (1918), 603; sense of imponderables, 604; distinguished airmen, 609; quality of soldiers, 611. *See also* Political activity; Political stability; Military effi-

cency; World War; National self-sufficiency.
Franciscans (religious order): origin, 517; revivals by, 522.
Francke, August H.: promotes missions, 521; origin, 521.
Frankfort-on-Main, city of (Ger.): mentioned 358.
Franklin, Benjamin: characterized, 162, 287; relation to Phila., 162; sketch, 162–163, 287, 313, 361; democracy of, 163; contrasted with John Adams, 163; member com. on Dec. of Ind., 164; author of Albany Plan, 283; submits Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, 283; favors unicameral legislature, 284; contrib. to written const. and constl. convention, 287; agent of Mass. 287; contrib. to nationalization, 313; compared with John Marshall, 313; unites scientific method and pol. creativeness, 313, 316.
Fraternity: relation to democracy, 93, 94.
Frederick County (Md.): underrepresented, 221.
Freedom, personal: defined, 40; cities favor, 41–42. *See also* Slavery; Slave Power (U. S.); Serfdom; Liberty.
Freedom, political. *See* Democracy.
Freeman, E. A.: *Growth of the Eng. Const.*, cited, 110, 277–278; *Hist. of Fed. Govt. in Greece and Italy*, 122, 257, 274, 276, 282–283.
Free silver: as pol. issue, 171; Peoples' Party demands, 198; relation to Bryan vote in N. Y. (1896), 199.
Free Soil Party: candidates and vote (1848), 191–192, 193; constituency, 193; founders, 193.
Fremont, John C.: candidates for president, 194; vote for (1856), 194; origin and rearing, 194, 363.
French Army: origin and heroism of Twentieth Corps, 608–609; mentioned, 610.
Friends, German (Germantown, Phila.). *See* Quakers.
Friends, Society of. *See* Quakers.
Fronde, The (Fr.): mentioned, 125.
Frontier (U. S.): a quasi-revolutionary area, 157; relation to Democratic Party, 157; as *the* source of democracy, 157–158, 234; a real but not exclusive source of democracy, 159–160, 235–236, 471; attitude toward Rev., 163; opposes adoption of Const., 166, 290–293, 318; significance of attitude toward Const., 167–168; hostile to nominating caucus, 178; attitude toward manhood suffrage proves democracy, 207, 214; *id.*, woman suffrage, 215, 216–217, 471; contrib. to feminist movement, 215, 471, 504; relation to inequality in representation, 219–220; lacks pol. knowledge, 257, 259, 316; people of manifest pol. initiative, 266–269, 319; John Marshall and Thomas Jefferson as products of, 312–313; contrib. to pol. creativeness, 319; dims civic traditions, 383; marriage and birth rate on, 471; disappearing, 471; city life tames spirit of, 498; relation to crime, 498–500; militancy, 537–538; separatist conspiracies, 543; relation to Lost Battalion, 560. *See also* Land; Whisky Insurrection; Bacon's *and* Shays' rebellions; Burr's *and* Wilkinson's conspiracies.
Fry, James B. (Provost Marshal General): cited, 542.

Gage, Thomas (Governor): occupies Boston, 161.
Galicia, crownland of (Aus.): Russian farm pop. migrates to, 70.
Gallatin, Albert: favors recharter of First Bank, 187; influences administrations of Jefferson and Madison, 361; origin, 361.
Galpin, C. J.: "The Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community," cited, 437.
Galt, Sir Alexander T.: promotes federation in Canada, 281; origin, 281.
Galton, Francis: lauded, 58; cited, 7; *Hereditary Genius*, cited, 274, 347.
Galveston, city of (Tex.): commission govt. in, 297; uses short ballot, 297; disaster leads to munic'l reconstruction, 315.
Gamaliel: teaches Saul of Tarsus, 516.
Gambetta, Leon: elected deputy, 142; sketch, 142, 356.
Garfield, James A.: origin, 364.
Garibaldi, Giuseppe: birth and parentage, 359.
Garner, James W.: defines democracy, 93; *Govt. in the U. S.*, cited, 17; *Introd. to Pol. Sci.*, cited, 92–93, 98, 276; "Crime and Judicial Inefficiency," cited, 494.
Garrison, William Lloyd: origin and anti-slavery services, 52.
Genesee, Presbytery of (N. Y.): religious conditions (1822), 514.
Geneva, Scottish. *See* Dundee, city of.
Geneva, city of (Switz.): Calvin establishes system at, 118–119; influences democratic movement, 122, 148, 279; Reformation center, 129; birthplace of Rousseau, 138, 355; uses constl. referendum, 302.
Genius: origin, 16, 319, 320, 365–366; among ancient Greeks, 274,

347–348; city life promotes, 320, 348–349, 365–366; relation to capacity for work, 365–366. *See also* Political inventiveness; Inventiveness, general; Inventions, mechanical.
Genoa, city of (It.): mentioned, 359.
George I (Eng.): Walpole in reign of, 353.
George II (Eng.): Walpole in reign of, 353; the elder Pitt in reign of, 353.
George III (Eng.): relation to Amer. Rev., 161, 285–286; relation to the Pitts, 353; pol. corruption in reign of, 401.
Georgia: peonage, 87 (n. 10); mentioned, 178; voting in, 340.
German element (U. S.): attitude in World War, 547–549; attitude in Civil War, 558–559. *See also* Aliens, U. S.; Aliens, assimilation of, U. S.
Germanic peoples: folk-moots of, 102.
Germantown, suburb of (Phila., Pa.): mentioned, 52.
Germany: cityward trend, v, 71, 242, 329; status of agricl. laborers, 71, 581; rural vs. status, 85, 145, 606; cities promote pol. liberty, 106; relation of cities to central govt., 106–107; Reformation, 121; status of industrial workers, 122–123; relation to French Rev., 144; trend toward autocratic govt., 144, 147; Revolution of 1848, 144–145; Metternich influences, 144–145; unification, 145, 358, 541; compared with France under Louis XIV, 145; Junker influence, 146–147; illiteracy, 242–243; pol. knowledge, 250, 264; pol. activity, 329–330, 334; origin of famous men, 348; efficiency of govt., 416–417; death rate, 449; lengthening life, 452; health of soldiers, 462–463; birth rate, 466; urban contrib. to city growth, 472; illegitimacy, 485–486; crime, 494; incursions diminish, 537; industrial elements control, 538; rural leadership, 541; patriotism, 547, 549; pol. stability, 568; ownership among rural masses, 581; food supplies, 592–598, 601–602; submarine attack (World War), 593–594, 597, 598; agricl. policy, 593–594, 595–598, 601–602; causes of failure (World War), 596–597, 602; policies and diplomacy, 601–602; fails at Ypres and Verdun, 603; emphasizes material factor, 604; sense of imponderables, 604; initiative of soldiers, 606; distinguished airmen, 610. *See also constituting parts; World War;* National self-sufficiency; Military efficiency; Political leadership; Democracy.
Gerrymander: origin, 297; condemned, 298; relation to party system, 298; early use of, 400.
Ghent, city of (Flanders): pol. and civic develop., 108, 126; career of Jacques van Artevelde, 351.
Gibbons, James (Cardinal): birth, 519.
Giddings, F. H.: cited, 16, 319; *Democracy and Empire,* cited, 93; *Principles of Sociology,* cited, 120.
Gilbertson, H. S., *The County,* cited, 399, 426, 436.
Gill, Charles O.: *The Country Church* (see also Pinchot, Guifford), cited, 16; *Six Thousand Country Churches,* cited, 524.
Gilpin, Thomas: contrib. to proportional representation, 296–297.
Gioberti, Vincenzo: nativity, 359.
Giolitti, Giovanni: nativity, 359.
Girardin, Emile de: contrib. to proportional representation, 296–297.
Girl-scout movement: origin, 521, 532 (n. 21a).
Gironde, department of (Fr.): mentioned, 138.
Girondists: aims of, 138; urban support of, 138; leaders, 138, 355; overcome by Jacobins, 140; const. of (1793), 304.
Gladstone, Wm. E.: origin, 53, 354; relation to Civil War (U. S.), 53; carries Third Reform Act, 135, 262; champions agricl. laborers, 262; characterizes U. S. Const., 290, 295 (n. 39).
Glanvil, Ranulf de (Justiciar): contrib. to representative system, 277; origin, 352.
Glasgow, city of (Scot.): mentioned, 26, 128 (diocese), 292, 354; inhabitants imprisoned, 129; work of Thomas Chalmers, 518.
Gloucester, city of (Eng.): evangelical movement in, 402; birthplace of Whitefield, 518; birthplace of Robert Raikes, 521.
Godkin, Edwin L.: leader in civil service reform, 406; *Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy,* cited, 92, 252, 324, 422.
Goffe, William (Colonel): occupation, 130.
Goldsmith, Oliver: cited, 6.
Gomme, G. L.: cited, 131; *Governance of London,* cited, 553.
Goodnow, President F. J.: *City Govt.,* cited, 17–18, 85; *Munic. Home Rule,* cited, 421, 422, 423.
Gorham, Nathaniel: origin and services, 292.
Government (in general): Centralization of—urbanization promotes, 17, 253–254; in rural districts, 254, 440; limits rural pol. activities, 440; affects rural govt. ef-

ficiency, 440. Miscellaneous—urban trend toward oligarchical, 17–18, 85; municipal spirit affects govt. in general, 308 (U. S.); usage vs. machinery in, 309–310, 316. (*See also the various countries; and see* Efficiency of government.)
—, Federal (U. S.): judicial determination in, 311; people too well satisfied with, 318. *See also* Constitution, U. S.; Congress, U. S.; Efficiency of government.
—, local rural: Various—Germanic folk-moots, 102; Roman and Greek popular assemblies, 102; in Forest Cantons (Switz.), 122; dearth of problems, 253, 255; Amer. contrib. to, 304; importance in Australia, 336; failing in England, 438; default of, in France, 438. In U. S. (Township)—investigated in Illinois, 433–434; functioning of, 437; an invisible govt., 437; lacks community aspect, 437; proposals to eliminate, 438–439. In U. S. (County)—failure forces improvement, 305, 435–436; origin, 305; forms of, 305; relation to pol. creativeness, 305; in N. Y. and Pa., 305; in South, 305, 433, 436; in West, praised, 305, 433; reorganizations, 305, 433; manager plan in, 308; consolidated city and county govt., 308, 436; pol. corruption in rural, 399; spoils system, 407; criticized (Illinois), 434; rural vs. urban, 435–436; future of, 439. *See also the various countries; and see* Efficiency of government.
—, municipal. *See* City government.
—, republican. *See* Representative government.
—, State (U. S.): commission govt. proposed for, 308; defective, 392, 430; pol. corruption, 392. *See also individual States, and see* Efficiency of government.
—, the: employs labor, 84; regulates working conditions, 84.
Grand Junction, town of (Colo.): preferential voting in, 297.
Grange: supports I. and R. (Maine), 228; educational program, 244. *See also* Granger movement.
Granger movement: contrib. to control of corporations, 196; contrib. to Woman suffrage, 196. *See also* Grange; Greenback movement.
Grant, U. S.: birth, 363–364; as pol. leader, 363–364.
Graydon, Alexander: *Memoirs of a Life,* cited, 164, 165.
Great Awakening (1734), The: effect declines, 513–514. *See also* Revivals, religious.
Great Britain: govt. democratic, 135–136, 151; dispute with Amer. colonies, 288; relation to Dominion and Commonwealth govts., 309–310; religious conditions, 515; preachers, 519; food control in (World War), 550; affects Irish attitude (U. S.), 559; food supplies, 592–595, 597–601; agricl. policy, 594–595, 597, 598–601; soldiers display initiative (World War), 606, 607–608; quality in general of soldiers, 611. *See also constituting countries.*
Great Charter: John forced to sign, 110.
Great Revival, The (1858–59): origin, 523. *See also* Revivals, religious.
Great War. *See* World War.
Greece: liberties of, handed down, 25, 106; spread of *latifundia* into, 105; Aetolian life, 122; balloting, 296; leadership of Eleutherios Venizelos, 360; view of declining physique, 456.
Greeks, ancient: respect for agriculture, 3–4; Ionian, contrib. to religious liberty, 42; the city-state, 102–105, 273–274; pol. inventiveness of, 273–274, 276, 282, 290, 296; contrib. in general, 274; general ability, 274, 347–348; statesmen, 274, 350.
Greeley, Horace: parentage and origin, 363.
Green, F. E.: *Tyranny of the Countryside,* cited, 31, 45, 57, 263.
Green, John Richard: *Hist. of the Eng. People,* cited, 131, 132, 133, 279.
Greenback Labor Party. *See* Greenback Party.
Greenback movement: controversies in, 171, 196–197; democracy of, 196; National Labor Union joins, 196; extent rural, 196–197; fusion with Granger movement, 197; Senator Pendleton supports, 406. *See also* Greenback Party.
Greenback Party: labor interests join, 196; rural support, 196; labor vote for, 196, 196–197; endorses Peoples' Party, 196–197. *See also* Greenback movement; Granger movement.
Grimké sisters, the: suffragist leaders, 216; origin and rearing, 216.
Grisons, canton of (Switz.): use of referendum in, 302.
Guerin, Lieutenant ——: standing as airman, 609; origin, 609.
Guillon, M. Jean: *L'Émigration des Campagnes,* cited, 9, 33, 448, 465, 487, 494, 497, 523.
Guizot, François P. G.: characterizes *The Federalist,* 292; rank as statesman and pol. leader, 356; birth and origin, 356.
Gumplowicz, Ludwig: cited, 566–567.
Gunpowder: invention and early use, 117.

Gunsaulus, Dr. Frank W.: birth, 519.
Gutenburg, Johann: origin, 117; invention of printing, 117.
Guynemer, Captain Georges M. L.: standing as airman, 609; parentage and origin, 609.

Haarlem, town of (Hol.): mentioned, 117.
Hadrian (Roman emperor): fosters cities, 104; birth and rearing, 350.
Haggard, H. Rider: *Rural Denmark*, cited, 7.
Haig, R. M.: *Hist. of the Gen. Property Tax in Ill.*, cited, 394, 430.
Haldane, Richard Burdon Haldane (Lord): cited, 311; "The Future of Democracy," cited, 263, 482–483, 484; *Education and Empire*, cited, 281, 309–310.
Hall, G. Stanley (President): *Educational Problems*, cited, 15.
Hall, James Norman (Captain): standing as airman, 610; parentage and nativity, 610; *Kitchener's Mob*, cited, 608.
Halle, city of (Ger.): home of Pietism, 521; birthplace of airman, Boelcke, 610.
Halyburton, James: origin, 128.
Hamilton, Alexander: champions manuf's, 10, 26; defines democracy, 92–93; relation to *The Federalist*, 92, 291–292; shifts from belief in democracy, 97; relation to N. Y. City, 162; lacks knowledge, 271 (n. 26); contrib. to federal system, 282; services relative to the Const., 291; part in organization of govt. of U. S., 291; favors candidacy of Pinckney, 299; on pol. activity in N. Y., 325; as pol. leader, 361; influences admin. of Washington, 361; alleged corruption, 391; *Report on Manufactures*, cited, 26.
Hamilton, Patrick: origin and martyrdom, 128.
Hampden, John: origin, 131, 352; raises regiments, 132; helps organize Eastern Association, 132.
Hancock, John: evidences leadership of Boston (Amer. Rev.), 161; origin, 164; first signer, Dec. of Ind., 164; as pol. leader, 361.
Handicrafts: slavery unprofitable in, 50; rise affects serfdom, 51; self-employment in, 58; promote pol. liberty, 106; yield to factory system, 116; promote city growth, 444. *See also* Manufactures.
Hankey, Donald: *A Student in Arms*, cited, 608.
Hanover, village of (N. H.): delegates demand constl. convention, 289.
Hanover, province of (Ger.): mentioned, 357.
Hanseatic League: form and activities, 275.
Hanseatic towns: representative govt. in, 279; civic spirit, 383.
Hansen, Dr. George: cited, 8; views criticized, 33.
Hardenberg, Karl August von (Prince): institutes reforms in Prussia, 144–145, 357; nativity and rearing, 357.
Hare, Thomas: contrib. to proportional representation, 296–297.
Hargreaves, James: origin, 117.
Harrington, James: influences Fathers of Amer. Const., 316.
Harris, Howell: origin, 520.
Harrisburg, city of (Pa.): nominating convention at (1788), 300.
Harrison Frederick: *The Meaning of History*, cited, 418, 427, 429.
Harrison, Wm. Henry: elected president, 188, 189–190; views, 189; sketch, 189–190; contrasted with Van Buren, 190; source of vote for, 190–191.
Hart, A. B.: cited, 433; *Actual Govt.*, cited, 255; *National Ideals Historically Traced*, cited, 366.
Hartford, city of (Conn.): underrepresented, 222; Fundamental Orders (1639) framed at, 285.
Hartford Convention: offset to nullification, 542.
Hartigan, Wm. D. (Captain): "City Boys as Soldiers," Cited, 607.
Haselrig, Sir Arthur: popular leader, Civil War (Eng.), 132; origin, 132.
Hastings, battle of: Londoners at, 109.
Hayes, E. C.: *Introd. to Sociol.*, cited, 473, 482, 491–492.
Hazard, Rowland G.: *Economics and Politics*, cited, 374, 395–396.
Health: In general—urban life unfavorable to, 6, 8, 11, 15, 20, 448, 457, 459, 465, 615; rural life favors, 6, 9, 11, 15, 451, 464; urban life affects favorably, 27, 29, 31, 33, 446, 448, 452–453, 463–465, 591, 604, 615; public agencies of, improve with urbanization, 415, 418, 463–465; rural vs. urban, 454–455, 456–457, 459–462; depends on laws, 455; real relation to rural life, 455, 463–465; inferior in rural districts, 456–457, 461–462; urban contrib. to improvement in, 463–465, 591, 604. In the U. S.—provisions as to, in N. Y. City, 428; provisions as to, in rural districts, 435; decrease in serious diseases, 450; morbidity surveys, 450; diseases in upper age groups, 452; rural vs. urban, 454–455, 456–457, 460–462. In Eng. and Wales—decline in "city diseases," 449; of military recruits and soldiers, 457–461. In France—

of armies in World War, 462–463. In Germany—of armies in World War, 462–463. In Russia—morbidity, 453. In India—morbidity, 476 (n. 12). In Peru—among the Quichua Indians, 477 (n. 32). *See also* Death rate; Infant mortality; Life, average expectation of; Life, duration of; Disease(s); *and individual diseases.*
High cost of living: in urban centers, 9; relation to urbanization, 446–447, 470; contrasted with expensive standard of living, 447, 469; relation to birth rate, 468, 468–469.
Hebrew. *See* Jew.
Heidelberg, city of (Ger.): mentioned, 369.
Heister, Joseph: relation to nominating convention, 300.
Hellferich, Karl: birthplace, 358.
Henne, Antoine: originates modern referendum in Switz., 303; models for work of, 303.
Henry I (Eng.): gives charter to London, 109; Cistercian revival in reign of, 522.
Henry II (Eng.): contrib. to representative system, 277; birth and origin, 351.
Henry III (Eng.): queen of, calls representative assembly, 277.
Henry IV (France): abandons Protestantism, 123.
Henry V (Eng.): period of, mentioned, 120.
Henry VIII (Eng.): mentioned, 352.
Henry Plantagenet. *See* Henry II (Eng.).
Henry, Patrick: evidences importance of Va. in Rev., 163; on use of recall in N. J., 229; as pol. leader, 361.
Heribert, Archbishop of Milan: as pol. leader, 351.
Herrin, town of (Ill.): massacre near, 508 (n. 39).
Herriot, Edouard: origin, 143.
Hertling, Georg (Count von): origin and nativity, 358.
Heurtaux, Captain Alfred M. J.: commands Stork Escadrille, 609; nativity, 609.
Hildreth, Richard. *Hist. of the U. S.*, cited, 166, 173.
Hill, Thomas Wright: relation to proportional representation, 297.
Hindenburg, Paul L. H. von: as pol. leader, 358; origin and lineage, 358–359.
Hindus, Maurice G. *The Russian Peasant and the Revolution,* cited, 70–71, 264, 381, 453, 548.
Hinsdale, B. A.: *Old Northwest,* cited, 154–155.
History, economic interpretation of: certain writer reflect, 18; mentioned, 57.
Hobbes, Thomas: cited, 567.
Hodge. *See* Agricultural laborer(s), Eng.
Holland. *See* Netherlands, The.
Holles, Denzil H. (Baron): origin and distinction, 131–132.
Holstein, district of (Ger.): mentioned, 358.
Holy Land of modern Europe. *See* Netherlands, The.
Home: influence in city, 14, 37; city life affects, 20; among immigrants (U. S.), 424; sanitarian criticizes farm, 463; sunshine and fresh air in farm, 464; relation to divorce, 504. *See also* Family; Young, the; Women.
Homicide: In U. S.—record, 494; trend, 494; urban vs. rural, 496; in cities of South, 496; rural, in urban centers, 496–497; on frontier, 499. In England and Wales—trend, 495.
Hooker, Richard: view of democracy, 92.
Hookworm: rural prevalence, 454.
Hoover, Herbert (Secretary of Commerce): cited, 14; *Preface to a Report of the U. S. Food Administration,* cited, 596–597.
Hospitals, provision for, in large cities, 418.
House, Colonel Edward M.: cited, 580.
House of Representatives (U. S. Cong.): mentioned, 10.
Howe, F. C.: *The City the Hope of Democracy,* cited, 35–36; *The Land and the Soldier,* cited, 35–36, 143.
Howe, Julia Ward: suffragist leader, 216; origin, 216.
Hudson County (N. J.): primary vote in, 343.
Huguenots (Fr.): constituting elements, 122–124, 125; lose La Rochelle, 123–124; relation of feudal nobility to, 123–125; exiled, 123–126, 355; treat with Richelieu, 124, movement characterized, 125–126; results of exile, 125–126; survive in cities, 473. *See also* Reformation, Protestant; France.
Hull, city of (Eng.): mentioned, 52.
Humanitarian: views on birth rate, 473.
Hume, David: Essay "Of Commerce," cited, 589.
Hungary: death rate, 449–450; militarism, 538–539.
Hunterdon County (N. J.): primary vote in, 343.
Huss, John: social and pol. doctrines, 118; origin, 517.
Hyde, William De Witt (President): cited, 114.

Illegitimacy: as index of sexual

morality, 485; decline (various countries), 485–486; rural, in cities, 486; excess of young adults in cities affects, 486; relation of domestics and feebleminded to, 486; urban concentration of aliens and Negroes affects (U. S.), 486–487; rural vs. urban (various countries), 486–487.
Illinois: Buchanan carries, 194; alien and Negro suffrage in, 214; inequitable representation, 223; urban vs. rural support of I. and R., 228–229; pol. corruption in (1818–30), 394; township and county govt. in, criticized, 434.
Immelmann, Lieutenant Max F.: as airman, 610; origin, 610.
Immorality. *See* Vice.
Imperial Conferences (British): character and significance, 281; leaders, 281.
Imperial German Government. *See* Germany.
Imperial Legislature, Houses of (British). *See* Parliament, Great Britain.
Incas, period of: Peruvians of, compared with Nordics, 568.
Income tax: Peoples' Party demands, 198; way opened for, by constl. amendment, 202.
Independence, national: city growth affects, 90, 540–541; relation of farmer class to (Amer. colonies), 160–161. *See also* Patriotism; Nationalism.
Independent ecclesiastical organization. *See* Congregational ecclesiastical organization.
Independent regime (Eng.): establ. of, 132. *See also* Congregational ecclesiastical system.
India, Empire of: enters industrial stage, vii; cityward trend, vii; Clive founds, 353; lengthening life in, 451; mortality, urban and rural, 476 (n. 12); Bartholomew Ziegenbalg a missionary to, 520; England unable to get food from, 600–601; British airmen born in, 609.
Indiana: Fremont fails to carry, 194; alien and Negro suffrage in, 214.
Indians (Amer.): migrating agricl. pop. comes into conflict with, 537.
Individualism: distinguished from individual liberty, 49; among the rural pop., 49, 365, 375, 381, 528.
Industrial development: in China, India, and Japan, vii; undue, brings complications, 17. *See also* Manufactures; Industrial population.
Industrial population: patriotism, 3, 543–544; compared with agricl. pop., 5, 10–11, 27, 129–130, 589; championed, 10, 25–28, 262; intellectual conditions, 27, 242–250, 331; pol. knowledge, 27, 261–262, 264; econ. and pol. status, 51, 60, 80, 86–87, 108, 122–123, 124, 129–130, 134–135, 157; attitude toward slavery, 53, 186, 194–195; an employed pop., 58; individual bargaining, 59, 80, 82; unity of spirit, organization characteristics, 66, 76, 83; supports Reformation, 121, 122–123, 127; supports Puritan Rev. (Eng.), 130–131; supports Amer. Rev., 162, 165–166; supports Jefferson and Jackson, 182–183; supports recent popular movements (U. S.), 200–201, 226–227, 371–372; pol. activity, 331, 332–333, 334–335; pol. independence, 371–372; birth rate among rural, 471–472; radical influences, 543–544, 566, 572, 578–579; conservative influences, 544, 573, 578–584. *See also* Urban population; Socialism; Labor organizations; Strikes.
Industry (industrial): city provides advantages for, 444–445; effect of develop. of, on peace and war, 535–536, 590; *id.*, on national expansion, 537; democratization of, 581–582; relation to defeat of submarine menace (World War), 598. *See also* Manufactures.
Industry (quality). *See* Work.
Infanticide: relation to sexual morality, 485; relation to illegitimacy, 485; excess in rural districts, 487.
Infantile paralysis: rural prevalence, 454.
Infant mortality: In general—rate, a test of social efficiency, 427; relation to gain in longevity, 452; character of birth statistics affects rate, 452. Rate (in general)—in Berlin, 427; in London (city and county), 427, 453–454; in N. Y. City, 427–428, 454; in European Russia, 453; in U. S. (and various cities of), 454. Rate (rural and urban)—in general, 453, 455; in Eng. and Wales, 427, 453–454; 455; in Germany, 427; in N. Y. (State), 427–428, 454; in Russia, 451; Austria, 451, 453; in U. S. (in general), 454, 455; in France, 455. Decline (in general)—in Eng. and Wales, 449; in U. S., 450. Decline (rural vs. urban)—in Prussia, 451.
Influenza: normal prevalence, 454; prevalence of influenza-pneumonia epidemic (1918–19), 454, 462.
Ingram, J. K.: *Hist. of Pol. Econ.*, cited, 24, 100, 535; "Slavery," cited, 56.
Initiative (general quality): rural vs. urban, 266–267, 314, 606.
Initiative (political principle): In

general—relation to popular rule, 92, 224; use corrects representative system, 224, 235. In Switzerland—credit (rural vs. urban) for recent use, 148; credit (rural vs. urban) for origin, 148, 303; introd. of modern legislative form, 304. In U. S.—a pol. issue, 172; credit (rural vs. urban), 172; Peoples' Party demands, 198; colonial use, 224; first formal demand for (recent period), 304; constitutional, originates in U. S., 304; credit (rural vs. urban) for origin, 304. (*See also* Referendum, U. S.). In France—Girondist const. (1793) embodies legislative, 304.

Initiative (political quality): relation of city life to, 20, 37, 267, 314, 319, 606, 607, 614; relation to democracy, 94, 606; a factor in pol. capacity, 239, 315, 407; among frontier pop. (U. S.), 267–268; character in new rural regions, 268, 339; character among urban pop., 268–269; cities as future source, 269, 319, 606; relation to pol. creativeness, 315, 319; rural pop. in France lacks, 333–334; relation to military efficiency, 605. *See also titles above.*

Injunction: use in labor disputes, 82; Peoples' Party demands restriction on use of, 198.

Insanity: city life causes, 9; care for, improves with urbanization, 416; care under town system, 431; in rural N. J., 500. *See also* Mental maladies; Degeneration.

Instability, political. *See* Political stability.

Instrument of Government (Cromwell's): as first written const., 284–285.

Intelligence, general: a prime factor in progress, 239–240; a factor in pol. capacity, 239–240; relation to city life, 240–250, 314, 375, 415, 416, 469, 504; urban intelligence and superficiality, 249–250; intellectual activity among urban workers (Eng.), 243, 331; better postal facilities promote, 415; relation to love of fighting, 536. *See also* Education; Schools; Libraries; Books.

Intemperance: In general—relation of rural life to, 446, 481–482, 483; relation of urbanization to, 481, 484; temperance movement in Boston (1824), 481; church formally against (1840 ff.), 481; relation of urban life to, 483–484, 509–510; rural, in cities, 484. Decline—in general, 467–468, 481; in U. S., 481–482; in Gt. Brit., 482–483; in Contl. Europe, Australia, and Canada, 483. Prevalence—urban vs. rural, 446, 471, 480, 480–481, 491–492; in early N. E., 481; in West and South (1812–13), 514; in Western N. Y. (1822), 514. *See also* Liquor traffic; Alcoholism.

Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration, Report of the (Eng.): cited, 7, 31.

Internal improvements: relation of govt. to, a pol. issue, 177; South and West differ as to govt. relation to, 180; urban manuf'g classes differ, *id.*, 180.

Internationalism; Internationalists: rise of, affects patriotism, 543–545; lack cohesion, 544–545; responsibility sobers, 544–545; emphasize state, 544–545; prevalence of extreme forms, 545; Eng. and Russia contrasted as to, 545: commendable features, 545; extreme forms decline with urbanization, 545–546; compared with patriotism and nationalism. *See also* Socialism; Bolshevism; I. W. W.

Intolerance, religious: rural prevalence, 44.

Inventions, mechanical: urban origin of revolutionizing, 117–118, 321 (n. 33); combining ideas in, 319; rapid progress of, 354. *See also* Inventiveness; Genius.

Inventiveness (in general): resourcefulness of human, 266; guessing vs. logical and scientific method in, 316; combining ideas in, 319. *See also* Inventions, mechanical; Political inventiveness; Genius.

Iowa: mentioned, 610.

Ipswich, town of (Eng.): mentioned, 352.

Ireland, John (Bishop): cited, 14–15.

Ireland, country of: relation to repeal of Corn Laws, 80; illiteracy, 242, 244; death rate, 450; crime, 495; origin of Molly Maguires, 500. *See also* Irish.

Irenaeus (church father): nativity, 517.

Irish: London, survive in city, 473; propensity for city life, 482; intemperance among, 482; lead draft riots (Civil War, U. S.), 558–559; general attitude toward Civil War (U. S.), 558–559; attitude in World War (in U. S.), 559. *See also* Ireland.

Ironsides (Cromwell's): constituting elements, 132.

Irwin, Will: *The Next War,* cited, 602–603, 608.

Isolation: deadening effect of, in rural life, 29; unsocial influences of, in rural life, 492, 529–530, 556; rural crime concealed through, 501; as deficiency of rural life, 528; complicates assimi-

lation in rural districts, 561; prevents common impulse among rural pop., 566, 577; relation to extreme action, 576, 576–577. *See also* Rural life; Rural community; Rural environment; Rural districts.
Italy: cityward trend, vi, 71; farm tenancy, 71; status of agricl. laborers, 71; rural workers emigrate, 71; rural vs. urban status, 86; civic revival, 106; urban contrib. to democracy, 106, 147–148; cities not subordinated to gen. govt., 106–107; cities centers of Renaissance, 117; illiteracy, 243; pol. education, 264; pol. activity, 334–335; Mazzini promotes unification, 358; civic spirit (Middle Ages), 383; pol. corruption, 404; efficiency of govt., 417; birth rate, 466; illegitimacy, 485; militarism, 538; rural vs. urban contrib. to unification, 541, 553; urban leadership today, 541; lacks coal, 600.
I. W. W. movement: a rural movement, 66, 571; crime and sabotage by, 500; official testifies to conservatism of Amer. labor, 580.

Jackson, Andrew: promotes nationalization, 177, 185, 542; extent of victory (1832), 183; urban support, 183–184, 191; vote in general (1824, 1828), 184; enlarges powers of executive, 184, 185; crushes nullification, 185, 543; attitude toward local self-government, 185, 543; relation to slavery, 186, 187–188; leading exponent of democracy, 188, 191; Van Buren influences admin. of, 190, 361; compare with Zachary Taylor, 191; party of, 195; party spirit in period of, 374; corruption of civil service, 393; champions state rights in early years, 543.
Jacksonian democracy, triumph of, 171; in N. Y. City, 175; extent really democratic, 176, 184–185, 188; rotation in office and popular access to office characterizes, 177–179; relation to rise of party system, 177, 189, 298–299; featured by rise of spoils system, 177, 185, 298–299; constituting elements, 177, 182, 188, 268, 299; relation to reform in nominating machinery, 179; contradiction of proslavery and democratic views, 188; reality of pol. alignments in period of, 189, 193.
Jacobins (Fr. Rev.): overcome Girondists, 138, 139–140; leaders, 138–139; dissension occasions downfall, 140. *See also* Revolution, French; Terror, The.
Jacquard, Joseph M.: origin, 118.
Jagow, Gottlieb von: origin and nativity, 358.
James II (Eng.): deposed, 133.
Jameson, J. F.: "Did the Fathers Vote?" cited, 325.
Japan: cityward trend, vii; commerce and manufactures, vii, 537; efficiency of govt., 417; pressure of pop. and militarism, 537; liberal and pacific element, 538.
Jay, John (Chief Justice): relation to N. Y. City, 162; defeated for governor (1792), 175; part in *The Federalist*, 291; origin and services, 291–292, 361; relation to legislative caucus, 299; as pol. leader, 361; influences admin. of Washington, 361.
Jay, John: leader in civil service reform, 406.
Jefferson, Thomas: origin, 9, 164, 313, 361; characterized, 9, 164, 313; lauds agriculture and agricl. class, 9–10, 12, 390, 566; physiocrats influence, 10; condemns cities and manuf'g, 10, 584; pol. views (in general), 10, 11, 92, 164, 185, 255, 258–259, 313, 373, 584; changes attitude on manuf'g, 27; defines democracy, 92, 185; relation to Virginia and the rural element, 163; contrasted with John Adams, 164; member of com. on Dec. of Ind., 164; nature of objection to Const. (U. S.), 167; source of vote for (1800), 173–175, 178; effect of refusal of third term, 176; contrib. to nationalization, 177, 313, 542; views on relation of legislative and executive branches, 185; relation to state rights doctrine, 185, 313; changes front on U. S. Bank, 186; party of, 195 (*see also* Democratic-Republican Party; Democratic Party); promotes town system, 255; characterizes pol. knowledge of his age, 258–259; contrasted with John Marshall, 313; as pol. leader, 361; urban men influence admin. of, 361; on partisan criticism, 373; on value of the press, 373–374; relation to spoils system, 393; on revolutions, 584. *See also* Jeffersonian democracy.
Jeffersonian democracy: triumph of (1800), 171, 172–175; in N. Y. City, 173–175; features of, following 1800, 176–177; distinguished from Jacksonian democracy, 177; urban laboring classes a part of, 182; reality of pol. alignments in period of, 189, 193; people of West and Southwest support, 268; voting during period of, 326. *See also* Jefferson, Thomas.
Jena, battle of: mentioned, 144, 357.
Jenckes, Thomas A.: leader in civil service reform, 406.

Jerusalem, city of (Palestine): Day of Pentecost at, 516; Christianity disseminated from, 516; Paul educated at, 516.
Jesuit(s): Father Marquette represents, 520.
Jew(s): a race of city-dwellers, 354; prolific in statesmen and pol. leaders, 354; survive in city, 473.
John (Eng. king): signs Great Charter, 110; summons a representative assembly, 277.
Johnson, Andrew: compared with Grant as pol. leader, 363–364; birth and rearing, 363–364.
Johnson, Hiram: Progressive leader (1909–16), 201; origin, 201.
Jones, Michael (Colonel); Civil War (Eng.) leader, 130; occupation, 130.
Journal of Farm Economics: cited, 16, 472, 617.
Journeymen House Carpenters (Phila., Pa.): strike (1827), 182; organize labor party, 182.
Joyce, Cornet: Civil War (Eng.) leader, 130; occupation, 130.
Judicial administration: In U. S.—under the Confederation, 390; present status, 412, 413; training of lawyers and judges, 413; relation of politics to, 413; during Rev. and early national period, 413; juvenile court in city and in country, 528; rural justice in N. Y., 435. *See also* Judiciary. In other countries—efficiency of, improves with urbanization, 414.
Judicial interpretation: democratizes Const. of U. S., 176; relation to pol. creativeness, 309; relative importance in U. S. and Eng., 311; urban influences affect, 312–314. *See also* Supreme Court (U. S.); Court of Imperial Justice (Brit. Empire); Judiciary; Judicial administration.
Judiciary (U. S.): training of, now and formerly, 413; influence of politics, 413; disrespect to (early days), 413. *See also titles above; and see* Lawyers.
Judson, Adoniram: birth and distinction, 521.
Jugo-Slavia, country of: militarism, 538–539. *See also* Balkan States.
Jukes, The: origin, 500.
Julius Cæsar (Roman emperor): birth, 350.
Junker(s): origin of term, 146; application today, 146; in East Prussia and Pomerania, 146–147; in Silesia, 147; von Jagow descended from, 358.
Jury system (Eng.): relation to representative system, 277.
Justin Martyr (church father): birth, 517.
Juvenal, Decimus J. J.: mentioned, 348.
Juvenile delinquency (U. S.): investigated in rural N. Y., 435; trend, 494; rural, in form of homicide, 496; rural, in urban centers, 497, 529; ignored and unrecorded in rural districts, 497, 529; among children of immigrants, 498; not a city problem alone, 529. *See also* Crime; Young, the.

Kalb, Johann (Baron de): cited, 389, 390, 414.
Kansas-Nebraska Bill: effect of passage, 194.
Kansas: a rural State, 343; primary vote, 343; pol. corruption (1861–74), 397–398; Border Ruffians (1854–58), 570; mentioned, 572.
Kappists (Ger.): mentioned, 147.
Kay, John: origin, 117.
Kenney, Lieut. Franklin P.: "Which is the better soldier—city or country man?" cited, 607.
Kent, C. B. R.: *Early Hist. of the Tories,* cited, 130, 541, 565, 584.
Kent, James (Chancellor): alleges pol. superiority of agricl. pop., 11–12, 60, 566; opposes manhood suffrage, 11–12, 60, 98, 208, 210; opposes democracy, 98; *Commentaries on Amer. Law,* mentioned, 60.
Kent County (Del.): over-represented, 221.
Kent, County of (Eng.): rural support of Parliament in (Civil War), 132; mentioned, 610.
Kentucky: political complexion (1840 ff.), 191.
Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, the: Northern offsets to, 542; origin, 542.
Kercheval, Samuel: mentioned, 258.
Keswick Movement, The: origin, 523.
Khamurabi (Babylonian king): promulgates code, 553; unifies empire, 553.
King, Dan: *Life and Times of Thos. Wilson Dorr,* cited, 165–166, 212, 395.
Kingsbury, President Frederick J. (Amer. Soc'l Sci. Assoc.): cited, 28–29.
King's Mountain, battle of (Ameri. Rev.): reflects divided rural attitude toward Amer. Rev., 165.
Kinley, David (President): cited, 15, 30.
Kinley, Lieut. Fields: standing as airman, and origin, 610–611.
Kirk, Edward Morris: characterized, 519; nativity, 519.
Knapp, Isaac: associate of William Lloyd Garrison, 52.
Knights of Labor: join in pol. con-

vention, 197; join in organization of Peoples' Party, 197; insert I. and R. plank in platform, 226.
Knox, Henry: opposes Shays' Rebellion and Whisky Insurrection, 167.
Knox, John: as Reformation leader (Scot.), 128; origin, 128, 517.
Kraepelin, Dr. Ernst: views of, 8; views criticized, 31.
Kucynski, Dr. R.: *Der Zug nach der Stadt*, cited, 33.
Kultur, modern: relation to mental maladies, 8.

Laboratory: bacteriological, a city health agency, 464; relation to the next war, 602–603.
Labor organizations: affect status of workers, 66, 81–83, 372; denied to early factory workers (Eng.), 80; features of strength, 82–83; urban and rural, in Germany, 146–147; organize labor parties (U. S.), 182, 196; affiliate politically with farmers (U. S.), 196–197; use initiative and referendum, 226; contrib. to revival of I. and R., 226–228; educative influences, 247; representatives in Parl. (Eng.), 331; pol. activity (U. S.), 339; as assimilating agency, 555; establish banks (U. S.), 582.
Lafayette, Marquis de: origin and profession, 355.
Lafayette escadrille: members of, 610.
Laharpe, L. G.: *La Dépopulation des Campagnes*, cited, 9.
Lancashire (Eng.): textile pop. favors North (Civil War, U. S.), 53; mentioned, 354; county council functions actively, 438.
Lancaster, city of (Pa.): votes for Jackson (1832), 184; nominating convention (1788), 300.
Lancaster, county of (Pa.): votes for Wirt (1832), 184; produces Simon Cameron, 363.
Land: relation to birth rate, 7, 471–472; relation to conservatism, 12, 19, 565–566, 583; relation to national progress, 17; free, as basis of democracy, 18, 64; relation of Southern Negro to (U. S.), 62–63; free, affects agricl. laborer, 64, 65; rural non-owners of, 581 (*see also* Tenancy, farm; Agricultural laborers); concentration of ownership, 70–73, 86, 136 (*see also* Tenancy, farm); free, brings competition to farmer (U. S.), 78; relation to econ. status, 78–81; relation to class and social status, 136; relation of peasant ownership to democracy (Eng. and Fr.), 143–144; as basis of suffrage (*see* Suffrage); landed oligarchy in R. I., 212, 221; free, leads to crude methods of culture, 248; relation to pol. leadership, 351; symbolic of stability. *See also* Agriculture; Frontier; Property; Economic freedom; Feudalism; Latifundia; Back-to-the-land movement; Political Leadership.
Landlordism: relation to individual liberty, 49; trend toward, in mature agriculture, 49, 64–65; absentee, condemned, 69–70; urban and rural compared, 74–75; agricl. protection promotes, 79. *See also* Tenancy, farm; Tenancy, urban; Tenants, farm.
Landis, Captain Reed G.: standing as airman and origin, 610–611.
Landowners: dominate dependent rural classes, 49, 62–63, 69–74, 79–81; econ. status, 61, 63–64, 68–69, 72–73, 75–79, 80–81, 84–85, 85–86; difficulty of organization, 75–77; deals at disadvantage with city business interests, 75–76, 81. *See also* Land; Agriculture.
Lane, Franklin K. (former Secretary of Interior): cited, 14.
Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canterbury: birth, 352.
Langton, Stephen: churchly statesman, 351; birth and origin, 351–352.
La Rochelle, city of (Fr.): captured, 123–124.
Lasalle, Ferdinand: as pol. leader, 358; origin, 358.
Las Casas, Bartolome De: characterized, 520; nativity, 520.
Latifundia: relation to decay of Rome, 5; spread of slavery and serfdom on, 105.
Law: contrib. to in ancient oriental states, 100; contrib. of Roman city-states to, 103; Greek contrib. to international, 274; constitutional, as pol. contrib. of U. S., 284.
Lawlessness: relation of children of immigrants to (U. S.), 424; on the frontier (U. S.), 498–499; relation to divorce, 505. *See also* Crime; Criminality.
Laws, William: birth and distinction, 521.
Lawyers: urban environment influences, 155, 161, 188, 286–287, 291, 361–362, 363; speak for large urban interests, 188; relation to written const., 286–287; pol. creativeness of, 307; relation to rural pop., 361, 362; training of, improves, 413. *See also* Judiciary.
Leaders (in general): view of preponderant rural origin, 16, 347–349, 365; *id.*, disproved, 30, 347–350, 365 (and Ch. XV in general), 515–522, 530. *See also* Political leadership; Religious leaders; Genius.
Lecky, W. E. H.: distrusts democ-

racy, 98; *Democracy Liberty,* cited, 382–383, 418, 565.
Lee, Richard Henry: relation to Virginia, 163; moves resolution for Dec. of Ind., 164; as pol. leader, 361.
Legislative Assembly (Fr. Rev.): mentioned, 138; urban proletariat dominates, 139.
Legislature(s); Legislative branch: Penna. const. (1776) provides for unicameral, 163; relation to executive, 185, 311; trend toward unicameral, 284; acts of, distinguished from constl. forms, 286; relation to judiciary (Eng.), 311; stealing of (early U. S.), 400.
Leibnitz, Gottfried W.: birth and distinction, 521.
Leith, city of (Scot.): Reformation center, 129.
Leroy-Beaulieu, M.: cited, 33.
Leverhulme, Lord (William Hulme Lever): characterized, 579; cited, 579.
Lexington, battle of (Amer. Rev.): an incident to the occupation of Boston, 161.
Leyden, city of (Hol.): Pilgrims reside in, 127, 154.
Libby, Orin G.: cited, 173.
Liberator (anti-slavery journal): mentioned, 52.
Liberty Bell (Phila.): proclaims liberty, 162.
Liberty: In general—defined, analyzed, and classified, 40; positive and negative concepts of, 46–48; relation to econ. freedom, 57; rural conditions favor, 61; qualifications, *id.,* 62–79; a slogan of the French Rev., 93; basic to democracy, 93, 94, 385; trend toward (opening of modern period), 115; relation to Prot. Reformation, 118–129; slave power (U. S.) opposes, 186; term embodied in motto of Free Soil Party, 193. (*See also under* Freedom; *and see forms of* Liberty, *below.* Civil—cities promote, 32, 41, 614; love of, rural and urban, 32–33; forms of, 40–41; relation to econ. freedom, 41; in the ancient oriental states, 100–101; in municipal and rural areas of ancient Europe, 102; urban pop. enjoys in superior degree, 100–101, 105, 109, 111–113; under the feudal regime, 113, 115; trend toward (opening of modern period), 115; restored to Huguenots, 125; in the Netherlands, 126; Puritan Rev. (Eng.) promotes, 133; Fr. Rev. contributes to, 140–141; Louis Napoleon promotes (Fr.), 142; slave power opposes (U. S.), 186. Individual—in country and in city, 45–49; positive and negative concepts of, 46–48; relation to individualism, 49; rural pop. in feudal times lacks, 49; dependent rural classes to-day lack, 49. Personal — mentioned, 40; urban pop. emphasizes, 45; of urban workers, threatened, 59; aids liquor traffic, 482. Religious—relation to struggle for civil and pol. liberty, 41–42, 118; in ancient oriental world, 42; in ancient Greece and Rome, 42; origin, 42; in Middle Ages, 42–43; in Paris and Bologna (12th cent.), 42–43; the Renaissance promotes, 43; contrib. of the Sozzini, 43; in cities of the Netherlands and Eng., 43, 111, 126–127; Reformation promotes, 43, 118–129; Fr. Rev. promotes, 43, 141; progress in America, 43–44; leading promoters in America, 43–44; prevails in cities today, 58; restrained in rural Belgium, 74; phases of (opening of modern period), 115–116; the Netherlands as the home of, 127; struggle for, in Scot., 128–129; Puritan Rev. (Eng.) promotes, 133; toleration act assures (Eng.), 134; city life favors, 614. *See also* Religion; Thought, freedom of; Speech, freedom of; Press, freedom of.
Liberty Party (U. S.): constituting elements, 193.
Libraries: in cities, 243, 418; in rural districts, 245; contrib. to assimilation, 555.
Library of Congress (Washington, D. C.): mentioned, 314.
Liddon, Henry Parry: characterized, 518; parentage, 518.
Lieber, Francis: *Manual of Pol. Ethics,* cited, 326, 330, 395, 456.
Liebknecht, Wilhelm: origin, 358.
Life, average length of: increases with urbanization, 448, 452, 615; rural vs. urban, 448, 452; rate of increase (various countries and in London and N. Y. City), 451–452; relation to infant mortality, 452; relation to mortality in upper age groups, 452; urban credit for rural gain, 465. *See also* Life, expectation of; Health; Death rate.
Life, city. *See* Life, urban; Urban centers.
Life, expectation of: rural and urban, 448, 452. *See also* Life, average length of.
Light Brigade: heroism of, compared with heroism in World War, 608.
Lille, city of (Fr.): returns Gambetta as deputy, 142.
Limoges, town of (Fr.): mentioned, 138.
Lincoln, Abraham: preserves Union, 53; origin and anti-slavery services of, 53, 363; distribution of

vote for (1860), 194–195; compared with Jefferson, 363; Amer. working class venerates tradition of, 580.
Lindsey, Judge Ben: origin, 317; pol. creativeness of, 317.
Lippmann, W. A.: *A Preface to Politics*, cited, 269, 310, 315–317; *Stakes of Diplomacy*, cited, 534–535.
Liquor traffic: outlawed (U. S.), 205 (n. 29), 430, 529; support in cities, 480–481; prohibition coincides with urbanization (U. S.), 481. *See also* Intemperance; Alcoholism.
Literacy: higher in urban centers, 240; effect of urbanization, 240–241; rural vs. urban (various countries, 241–243.
Liverpool, city of (Eng.): mentioned, 53, 354; civic spirit praised, 383.
Livingston, Peter R.: characterized, 61–62; cited, 61–62.
Livingston, Robert R.: relation to N. Y. City, 162; member of com. on Dec. of Ind., 164; as pol. leader, 361; influences admin. of Jefferson, 361; cited, 391.
Livingstone, David: origin, 520.
Lloyd George, David: urges back-to-land movement, 8; on rural vs. urban landlordism, 74; birth and parentage, 354; emphasizes money factor in war, 591; on submarine peril, 594; on British and German agricl. policy, 594, 597; cited, 613 (n. 16).
Lloyd, Henry Demarest: *Wealth Versus Commonwealth*, cited, 396.
Loans, government: Peoples' Party demands, 198; importance in war, 539; rural vs. urban support (U. S., World War), 550, 557; relation to pol. stability, 582–583. *See also* Stocks and bonds; Property.
Lobbying: Peoples' Party demands as to, 198.
Locke, John: views on democracy, 92; origin and services, 132; influences Fathers of Amer. Const., 316; views on revolution, 584.
Lock-out, the: use of, 59, 82.
Lockport city-manager plan: models for, 307.
Log Cabin and Hard Cider period (U. S.): characterized, 188–189.
Lollards: distribution of, 120; martyrdom of, 120; religious revival by, 522.
London, city of (Eng.): families die out in, 6; people called "citizens," 37 (n. 3); early quasi-independence of, 109; national loyalty of, 109; Conqueror grants charter, 109; Henry I grants privileges, 109; relation to Stephen, 109; Richard I grants charter, 109–110, 112; helps gain Great Charter, 110; backs Simon de Montfort, 110; seal used, 110; part in establ. of Parl., 110–111, revolt in (1196), 112; Lollards in, 120; center of Whiggism and Dissent, 130; Parliamentary stronghold (Civil War), 130–132; relation to Commonwealth and Protectorate, 132; supports Restoration, 133; relation to fruition of Civil War, 133; helps depose James II, 133; Mass. Bay colonists from, 155; voting, 332; alien elements, 332, 424, 553; origin of men of distinction, 348; civic spirit, 382; evangelical movement, 402, 522–523; civic efficiency, 427; death rate, 427; infant mortality, 427, 453–454; lengthening life, 451; contrib. to own pop. growth, 472; birth rate, 472; illegitimacy, 486; sobriety, 505 (n. 4); current interest in religion, 523; stands for England, 541; as an assimilative agency, 553; a rebellious city, 567. *See also* England and Wales; Efficiency of government, city; Health; Physique.
London, county of (Eng.): infant mortality, 427, 453; govt. in, 436.
London Company: grants charter to Virginia (1621), 285.
London County (Va.): under-represented (1820), 221.
Longbeard, William: leads revolt in London, 112.
Longevity. *See Life*, average expectation of.
Longfellow, William H.: origin and anti-slavery services, 53.
Longstaff, Dr. G. B.: cited, 6–7, 30; *Studies in Statistics*, cited, 472.
Loria, Achille: *Econ. Foundation of Society*, cited, 18, 152.
Los Angeles, city of (Calif.): infant mortality rate, 454.
Lost Battalion, The: story of, 560.
Lottery: John Adams participates in, 390.
Loubet, Emile F.: origin, 356.
Louis XIV (Fr.): persecutes Huguenots, 125; absolutism of, 125; characterizes Dutch, 128; compared with Bismarck and the German kaisers, 145; reign mentioned, 518.
Louisiana Purchase (U. S.): a nationalizing influence, 542.
Louisville, city of (Ky.): votes for Clay (1832), 184; votes for Jackson (1824, 1828), 184.
Lovejoy, Elijah P.: origin and anti-slavery services, 52.
Low, Mrs. Juliette: founds Girl Scouts, Inc., 532 (n. 21).
Low Countries, The: serfdom in, 51. *See also* Belgium; Flanders; Netherlands.
Lowell, A. L.: *Govts. and Parties in*

Contl. Europe, cited, 48, 333–335; *Pub. Opinion and Popular Govt.,* cited, 264–265, 335–336, 380; *Govt. of Eng.,* cited, 329, 332, 372, 376–377, 404, 495, 579; "Oscillations in Politics," cited, 374.
Loyalist(s) (Amer. Rev.): relation to urban and rural pop., 158, 159, 160, 163, 165, 166. *See also* Revolution, American; Patriotism, U. S.
Lucerne, canton of (Switz.): opposes Prot. Reformation, 122; joins League of Forest Cantons, 122; member of first Swiss confederation, 303.
Lucretius, Titus L. C.: mentioned, 348.
Ludendorff, Erich (General): as a pol. leader, 358; origin and lineage, 358–359.
Ludlow, Roger: origin, 285; author of Fundamental Orders (1639), 285; relation to written const., 287.
Lufbery, Major Raoul: standing as airman, 610; nativity, 610.
Luke, Lieut. Frank, Jr.: standing as airman, and origin, 610–611.
Lundy, Benjamin: origin and anti-slavery services, 52.
Luther, Martin: origin, 517.
Lutheranism: among industrial workers of Germany, 121; literature enters Scotland, 129.
Luxury: a feature of city life, 4, 9, 15–16, 20, 528, 606; in urbanized Rome, 4, 479–480; relation to war, 590. *See also* Extravagance; Urban life; Urban centers.
Lycurgus: as statesman, 274, 290.
Lynching: serious character, 493; declines with city growth, 493–494; excess in rural States, 496; on frontier, 499; offsets Northern urban outbreaks, 570. *See also* Mob(s); Mob psychology; *etc.*
Lynn, city of (Mass.): ability of shoemakers, 27, 245.
Lyons, city of (Fr.): mentioned, 118; a Girondist center, 138; birthplace of Peter Waldo, 517.

McAuley, Jerry: sketch, 520.
McCheyne, Robert Murray: sketch, 518.
McConnell, James Rogers (Sergeant) standing as airman, 610; sketch, 610.
McCubbin, Lieut. G. R., exploit as airman, 610; origin, 610.
McCudden, Major J. T. B.: sketch, 610.
Macdonald, Sir John: promotes federation in Canada, 281; origin, 281.
Macdonald, Ramsey: first Labor prime minister (Gt. Brit.), 354; sketch, 354.
Machiavelli, Niccolo: birth, 351.
McKean, Thomas: a Jeffersonian, 392; elected governor of Pa. (1799), 392; corruption and inferior appointments under, 392–393.
McKinley, William: sketch, 364.
Mackinnon, James: *Hist. of Modern Liberty,* cited, 103–104. 105–106, 119, 370.
McLaren, Alexander: sketch, 518, 519, 532 (n. 17).
MacMahon, Marie E. P. M. de: origin, 356.
McMaster, John B.: *Hist. of the People of the U. S.,* cited, 194, 209, 210, 413, 499–500, 514; *With the Fathers,* cited, 400.
Madison, James: mentioned, 10; distinguishes a democracy from a republic, 92; part in *The Federalist,* 92, 291–292; services relative to the Const. (U. S.), 166, 291, 362; origin, 166, 291, 361–362; De Witt Clinton nominated in opposition to, 178; relation to state rights doctrine, 185, 542; changes front on U. S. Bank, 186; opposes manhood suffrage, 208; lacks knowledge, 271 (n. 26); contrib. to federal system, 282; author of Virginia plan (Const., U. S), 291; services as member of 1st Cong., 291; Gallatin influences admin. of, 361; urban influences on, 361–362; stands with city group on Const. (U. S.), 362.
Madrid, city of (Sp.): mentioned, 279.
Mafia: origin, 500.
Maine, Sir Henry: defines democracy, 93; distrusts democracy, 98.
Maine, District and State of (U. S.): Federalists carry (1800), 173; Jackson carries (1832), 183; Greenback movement, 197; separation from Mass., 225; Federation of labor and Grange support I. and R., 228; independent voting, 371.
Mainz, city of (Ger.): mentioned, 117.
Major, John: origin, 128.
Malaria: rural excess, 454.
Mal-nutrition: rural vs. urban, 456, 461.
Malthus, Thomas R.: disciples oppose high birth rate, 473.
Manchester, city of (Eng.): textile pop. favors North in Civil War (U. S.), 53; intellectual conditions (1843), 244; mentioned, 354; civic spirit praised, 383.
Manhattan Island (N. Y. City): expert soldiers from, 607.
Mannock, Major E. W.: standing as flyer, 610; nativity, 610.
Mansfield, William Murray (Lord): decision on slavery, 51.

Mantua, city of (It.): mentioned, 117.
Manufactures: relation to agriculture, 5, 589; defended, 10, 26; relation to commerce, 10–11; moral effects, 10–11, 15, 26–27; educational effects, 11, 26, 27, 242–244, 245, 247; promotes urban growth, 17, 444, 584; relation to crime, 26; relation to child labor, 26; Jefferson changes attitude toward, 27; home, displaced by factory (Mass.), 28; domestic, report on (Mass.), 28; develop. in South (U. S.), 53–54; require freedom, 130; develop. in Europe (opening of modern period), 116; part in changes (opening of modern period), 116; city provides advantages for, 349; rapid progress of, 354; pol. effects, 584; relation to war, 589–592, 597, 598, 602–603; protection for, in Eng., 599–601.
Marache's Boarding House (Phila.): nominating caucus meets in (1800), 299.
Marat, Jean Paul: sketch, 138.
Marcus Aurelius (Roman emperor): birth, 350.
Marcy, William: relation to party system (U. S.), 298.
Marlborough, Duke of (John Churchill): origin, 353.
Marquette, Jacques (Father): as missionary and explorer, 520; nativity, 520.
Marriage: economic independence of women postpones, 469, 470, 471; increasing age at, affects birth rate, 469, 470, 471; early, on frontier, 471; intermarriage, rural and urban, 474, 529; re-marriage and divorce, 503; relation of hasty marriage to divorce, 504.
Marseilles, city of (Fr.): birthplace of Thiers, 142; chooses Gambetta as deputy, 142; enriches Mirabeau family, 355.
Marshall, Alfred (Professor): *Principles of Economics*, cited, 31.
Marshall, John (Chief Justice): opposes manhood suffrage, 208; work of, a nationalizing force, 312, 362; sketch, 312–313, 361–362; compared with Franklin and Jefferson, 313; urban influence on, 361–362.
Martineau, Harriet: *Society in America*, cited, 326, 499.
Mary (Queen of Scots): mentioned, 129.
Maryland, State of: religious toleration, 44; Clay carries (1832), 183; few Fremont votes outside Baltimore, 194; early spoils system, 392; repeating and corruption (1821), 395; religious conditions (1811), 514.
Maryland Toleration Act: mentioned, 44.
Marx, Karl: sketch, 358.
Masaryk, Thomas (President, Czecho-Slovakia): nativity, 360.
Mason and Dixon's line: mentioned, 187.
Massachusetts, State of: early settlement, 155; leadership in Rev., 161, 195, 232; opposes Stamp Act, 161; importance of town meeting (Rev.), 163; soldiers and sailors furnished (Rev.), 165; status of Revolutionary soldiers, 165–166; distribution of vote (1800), 173; Clay carries (1832), 183; elects Charles Sumner senator, 193; Free Soil vote (1848), 193; Fremont vote (1856), 194; urban pop. (1860), 195, 496; leadership in Civil War, 195; greenback movement, 197; pol. influence of labor, 197; suffrage (1820–21), 208–209; initiative and referendum, 224–225, 228; towns become municipalities, 225; popular ratifying of const. (1780), 225, 289; recall (1780), 229; pol. activity, 287, 324–325, 341–342; proposed const. rejected (1778), 288–289; const. of 1780 characterized, 289; independent voting 371; pol. corruption, 390; accepts civil service reform, 406–407; lengthening life, 451; homicides, 496; religious conditions (1811), 514; refuses militia (1812), 543.
Massachusetts Bay Colony: established, 155; form of organization, 156, 279–280.
Massachusetts Bay Company: sends colonists to New World (1628) 155; becomes a colony, 156; charter of, 156; a trading company, 156.
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention (1820–21): democracy opposed, 98; Revolutionary soldiers found disqualified for suffrage, 165–166; *Journal of Debates and Proceedings in*, cited, 208–209, 394, 433.
Masterman, Rt. Hon. C. F. G.: cited, 579; *How England is Governed*, cited, 332–333, 438.
Mather, Cotton: origin, 519.
Mather, Increase: on religion and morals in N. E., 513.
Maya; Mayan (people); religious, 532 (n. 23); contrasted with Nordics, 568.
Mayflower Compact: nature of, 284.
Mazarin, Jules (Cardinal): relation to Huguenots, 125; contrib. to monarchic absolutism, 125; sketch, 355.
Mazzini, Giuseppe: contrib. to unification of Italy, 358; sketch, 359.

Meaux, city of (Fr.): Reformation center, 122.
Mechanicks in Union, The (N. Y. City): protest use of const., 234–235; oppose drafting of const., 289.
Mecklenburg, district of (Ger.): status of agricl. laborers, 71; sexual morality, 486.
Mecklenburg resolutions (Amer. Rev.): proposed by Whig faction, 163.
Melanchthon, Philipp; sketch, 517.
Memphis, city of (Tenn.): birthplace of John Sharp Williams, 364.
Mennonites: unassimilated in U. S. and Canada, 557; attitude in wars (U. S.), 557; resist Canadianization, 557; migrate from Canada, 557. *See also* Amish, the.
Mental defectives. *See* Feeble-minded, the; Mental maladies; Insanity; Degeneration.
Mental maladies: cities responsible for, 98; less of, in cities, 492. *See also* Feeble-minded, the; insanity; Degeneration.
Mercantilist period: rise of national trade and commerce in, 5; develop. of modern state in, 5; relative status of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, 5, 589; emphasis on money, 589, 591; independence in food supplies, 592.
Merchants: relation to factory system, 117; patrons of the Renaissance, 117; contrib. to nationalism, 541.
Merriam, Charles E.: cited, 225–226; *Hist. of Amer. Pol. Theories,* cited, 98, 188; *Primary Elections,* cited, 393; *Amer. Pol. Ideas,* cited, 535, 538.
Methodism: origin, 522–523; revival in N. Y. City (1806–07), 523.
Metropolis of America. *See* New York City.
Metternich-Winneburg, Clemens W. L. (Prince): reactionary influence, 144–145; dominates Congress of Vienna, 356; sketch, 356.
Mexico, Republic of: efficiency of govt., 416–417; Southern planters promote war with, 537; Mennonite migration to, 557; pol. instability, 568, 575, 584; early Toltecs characterized, 568; compared with Eng., 584.
Michelangelo: mentioned, 348.
Michigan: origin of Republican Party, 194; Fremont vote in (1856), 194; alien and Negro suffrage, 214; primary vote, rural and urban, 343.
Middle Ages: agriculture favored, 5, 589; revival of human spirit, 25; free cities transmit liberties, 25, 106 (*see also* Cities, free); religious freedom, 42; mechanic labor free, 51; mentioned, 111, 370, *et al.;* changes marking close of, 115–117; pol. movements of later, 330; feudal system the centralizing force, 540.
Middlesex, county of (Eng.): county council functions actively, 438.
Middle States (U. S.): Anti-Masonic vote (1840), 190.
Middleton, T. H. (C. B.): "The Recent Development of German Agriculture," cited, 593, 594, 596.
Middle West (U. S.): conditions of employment, 66; greenback movement in, 196; pop. active in farmers' movements, 268; alien voters, 340; rural pol. corruption, 398–399; influenza-pneumonia epidemic (soldiers), 462; rural religious and moral decadence, 524; tendency to pol. revolt, 569. *See also* Mississippi Valley.
Milan, city of (It.): mentioned, 517.
Military efficiency: In general—rural superiority (ancient), 3–4, 589; cities a growing factor, 414; urbanized countries superior in, 414, 596, 597–598, 602–603, 611–612; racial factors, 463; still a national concern, 534; world state needs, 534; lack of, invites attack, 534–535; broad treatment required, 539; political factors, 539–540; urbanization increases, 540, 596–597, 597–598, 600–602, 604, 612; patriotism as a factor, 540–551; alien assimilation affects, 540, 551–561; pol. stability affects, 540, 564; human vs. material factors, 588, 590, 603; self-sufficiency in food supplies affects, 589, 592–603; military alliances affect. The material factor—various forms and phases of, 588, 589–592, 593–594, 597–598, 599–600, 601, 602–603, 604, 616; in urban vs. rural countries, 590–592, 597–598, 601, 609–603, 616. The human factor—rural vs. urban, 3, 4, 7, 19, 589–590, 592, 604, 605–612, 616; various other phases, 588, 591, 601–602, 603; factors determining, 588, 591, 604–605, 609. In U. S.—in general, 414; initiative of soldiers (World War), 606; urban vs. rural recruits (*id.*), 607, 609, 610–611; increases with urbanization, 612. In Gt. Brit.—of rural pop., 6, 608, 609; physique, 7, 457–458, 458–460; of Scotland (early), 26; armies (World War), 458; military initiative and aptitude (*id.*), 606, 607–608; urban soldiers (*id.*), 608; airmen (*id.*), 609–610; soldiers in general (*id.*), 611; increases with urbanization, 612. In France—of armies (World War), 462–463; of soldiers from

Paris (*id.*), 608; airmen (*id.*), 609; soldiers in general (*id.*), 611; increases with urbanization, 612. In Germany—of armies (World War), 462–463; in general (*id.*), 596; urbanization increases, 596–598, 612; initiative of soldiers (World War), 606; airmen (*id.*), 610. In other European countries—in Belgium (World War), 597–598; in Russia (*id.*), 601, 611, in Serbia (*id.*), 611. *See also indexed titles for a number of factors mentioned.*
Mill, J. S.: defines democracy, 93.
Millerand, Alexandre: origin, 143, 356–357.
Mills, B. Fay: origin, 520.
Mills, Samuel John: religious investigation (1912–13), 514.
Milton, John: origin and services, 132, birth, 517; *Areopagitica*, cited, 41.
Miners: lack thrift, 445–446; physique (Gt. Brit.), 459; birth rate (Eng. and Wales), 471–472; tendency toward violence, 500–501, 571, 576; demand nationalization of mines (Eng.), 578.
Minneapolis, city of (Minn.): primary vote in, 343.
Minnesota: primary vote in, 343.
Mirabeau, Honoré G. R. (the younger): ancestry, 355.
Mirabeau, Victor R. (the elder): cited, 5; ancestry, 355.
Missionaries: rural vs. urban. origin, 520–521.
Mississippi River: mentioned, 218; navigation of, 229.
Mississippi, State of: most rural State, 340, 550; abstention from voting, 340; claims for exemption from service (World War), 550.
Mississippi Valley (U. S.): pol. partisanship on central and upper, 371; early settlers characterized, 569. *See also* Middle West (U. S.).
Missouri, State of: Buchanan carries, 194; votes cast for Lincoln (1860), mostly from St. Louis, 194–195.
Missouri Compromise: effect on Kansas-Nebraska Bill, 194.
Mitchell, John Purroy: cited, 426.
Mob(s): In general—Jefferson condemns, in cities, 10; in N. E. towns, 431–432; rural, ascribed to cities, 497. Mob spirit—urban inclination toward, 19; relation to the decay of early city republics, 567. Mob rule—democracy identified with (Aristotle), 92, 97. Mob psychology—urban vs. rural prevalence, 566, 576–577. *See also* Lynching; Political stability.
Moffatt, Robert: origin, 520.
Molesworth, Sir William: relation to the English colonial system, 280.
Molly Maguires: origin, 500; characterized, 570.
Mommsen, Theodor: cited, 275.
Monod, Adolph: characterized, 518; birthplace, 518.
Monod, Victor: cited, 523–524.
Monopoly: in case of U. S. Bank, 180–183, 187.
Monroe, James: opposes manhood suffrage, 208; J. Q. Adams influences admin. of, 361; party spirit subsides during admin. of, 374.
Montagu, F. C.: "French Revolution," cited, 140–141.
Montana: rural, 496; homicides, 496.
Montesquieu, Charles L. D. S.: age of, characterized, 277; principle of separation of powers traced to, 290; *De L'Esprit des Lois*, cited, 276.
Montfort, Simon de: struggle with King and barons, 110; summons burgesses, 277; characterized, 278; sketch, 278, 352.
Montmorency, Philip de (Count of Horn): martyr, 351; origin, 351.
Montrose, seaport of (Scot.): Reformation center, 128–129.
Moody, Dwight L.: sketch, 519–520.
Moorhouse, Lieut. W. B. Rhodes: as airman, 609; career, 609.
Moors: compared with early Nordics and Alpines, 568–569.
Morality: relation of urbanization to, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 26–27, 33, 479–490, 495–496, 509, 530, 615; fails to keep pace, 9, 536; care for, in early factories (U. S.), 26–27; rural vs. urban (N. E.), 26–27, 28, 481–482; uncritical comparisons, 399–400, 513; city agencies promote, 402, 405, 511, 516–517, 521–523, 530; pol. and soc'l value, 479; lax standards of, asserted, 480; 513–515, 523, 524, 525; standards improve, 485, 490, 503, 513, 525–526; trend in Eng. and Wales, 495, 523; relation to divorce, 502–503; in early N. E., 513; in Western N. Y., 514; early of rural residents vs. rural migrants, 516. *See also* Religion; Vice; Prostitution; Illegitimacy; Abortion; Infanticide; Intemperance; Crime; Criminality; Divorce.
Moravia margraviate of (Aus.): mentioned, 360.
Moravians (religious sect): mentioned, 521.
Morbidity. *See* Health; Disease(s); *individual diseases.*
More, Thomas: laments displacement of men by sheep, 6; origin, 117, 352.
Morel, Bénédict A.: cited, 29.
Morris, Gouverneur: disbeliever in democracy, 97; birthplace, 162; as pol. leader, 361.

Morris, Robert: characterized, 162; relation to Phila., 162; services in organizing govt., 258; as pol. leader, 361.
Morrison, Robert: origin, 520.
Mortality rate. *See* Death rate.
Mott, John R.: represents Y. M. C. A., 520; origin, 520.
Mott, Lucretia: suffragist leader, 216; sketch, 216.
Mounier, Jean J.: sketch, 355.
Mt. Hermon, village of (Mass.): mentioned, 522.
Mountain States (U. S.): conditions of rural employment, 66; recent agricl. depression, 76–77; influenza-pneumonia epidemic (soldiers, 1918–19), 462; deserters (World War), 549–550.
Müller, George: birth and distinction, 521.
Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 (Eng.): effect on city govt., 402.
Municipal institutions. *See* City government.
Munro, W. B.: *Govt. of the U. S.*, cited, 36–37, 102, 269, 283–284, 306–307, 399, 423, 424, 426, 566–567, 569–570; *Current Problems in Citizenship*, cited, 371; *Govt. of European Cities*, cited, 376–377, 402, 421.
Museums: cities provide, 243.
Mussolini, Benito: origin, 360.

Nantes, city of (Fr.): mentioned, 609.
Napoleon (Bonaparte): Characterizes Holland, 128; close of period of, 141; leads attack on Prussia, 144; services to Germany, 144; masters the French Rev., 355–356; sketch, 356; fall of, 356; cited, 590.
Napoleon, Louis (French emperor): Promotes civil and econ. liberty, 142; rural voters favor, 143; pol. corruption in reign of, 404.
Napoleon III. *See* Napoleon, Louis.
Narrative of the State of Religion, A: cited, 514.
National Assembly (France): third estate constitutes, 139; proletariat controls, 139; policy as to feudal claims, 139; elects Thiers president, 142.
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People: inquiry by, 87 (n. 12).
National Convention (France): Jacobins control, 139–140; decrees general recruiting levy, 140.
National Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union. *See* Farmers' Alliance.
Nationalism: deification and abolition, 534; origin, 540, 541; based on commerce and manuf's, 540–541; relation to colonial develop., 541; rural contrib. to, 541; shifting attitude toward (U. S.), 542–543; urban and rural support (U. S.), 543; rise of internationalism affects, 543–547; compared with internationalism, 545–546; original character, 546. *See also* Patriotism; Political stability; State rights; Nullification; Nationalization.
Nationalist: views on birth rate, 473.
Nationalization (U. S.): relation to democracy, 177, 185; Jackson promotes, 177, 185; Jefferson promotes, 177, 313; John Marshall promotes, 312–313; Franklin promotes, 313; urban contrib. to 412. *See also* Nationalism.
National Labor Union (U. S.): interest in greenback question, 196.
National Medical Service Boards (Gt. Brit.): examine recruits (World War), 458–460.
National Peoples' Party. *See* Peoples' Party.
National Republican Party (U. S.): fuses with Anti-Mason Party, 190; constituting elements, 190.
National School Society (Eng.): cited, 242.
National self-sufficiency, policy of: effect on international trade, 599; impossible for many commodities, 599–600; on imperial basis, 600, 601; compared with control of sea and air, 600, 602; *id.*, alliances, 600, 602, required on local basis, 601; fails France, 601; gen'l inadequacy, 602. *See also* Food, supplies of; Military efficiency; Tariffs; Agricultural protection.
"National Vitality," report on: cited, 451. *See also* Fisher, Irving.
Nativism (U. S.): in newer, Western States, 214; in N. E., 214; relation to manhood suffrage (R. I.), 214; in Old South, 214, 215; in N. Y. City, 214–215; relation of Tammany Hall to, 215; rural vs. urban, 215. *See also* Aliens, U. S.
Natural right: Greek contrib. to, 274; relation to constl. conventions, 286.
Naumann, Friedrich: *Zum Sozialdemokratischen Landprogramm*, cited, 264; *Demokratie und Kaisertum*, cited, 592.
Navarre, province of (Sp.): industry and commerce, 335; voting, 335.
Naville, Ernest: relation to proportional representation, 297.
Neaopolis, city of (Asia Minor): mentioned, 517.
Nebraska: pol. corruption in, 397–398.
Negroes: status in rural South, 61–64; peonage, 62; exodus to North-

ern cities, 63; cotton farmers and croppers, 63; disfranchisement in South, 95, 259–260, 327; illiteracy, 241–242, 244, 260; relation to pol. education, 259–261; concentration in cities (North), 259, 260–261, 487; pol. activity (North), 260; votes manipulated, 260; affect urban illegitimacy, 487; affect urban crime, 497, 501; apprenticeship in crime, 501.
Netherlands Republic. *See* Netherlands, The.
Netherlands, The: rural increase, vi; cityward trend, vi, 128; serfdom, 51; cities as centers of struggle for pol. liberty, 106, 107–108, 126–128; cities take place in general system, 107; takes leadership from Flemish cities, 108; significance of Dutch independence, 108; Dutch exiles enter Eng., 126; lauded, 126–127; Prot. Reformation, 126–128, 129; independence achieved, 127; commercial and industrial supremacy, 127; exiles from Eng. enter, 127, 360; agriculture declines, 127–128; effect of urbanization on democracy, 128; Louis XIV and Napoleon characterize, 128; as part of a great continental state, 274; influences authors of New England Confederation (1643), 283; written ballot, 296; pol. corruption, 404; efficiency of govt., 417; death rate, 449; birth rate, 472; illegitimacy, 486.
Newark, city of (N. J.): mentioned, 227.
Newbury, battle of: London regiments at, 131.
Newburyport, city of (Mass.): mentioned, 52.
New Castle County (Del.): under-represented, 221.
New England (U. S.): educative influences on early farm, 15, 244; religion and morals, 26–27, 29, 513, 524; factories and factory operatives, 26–27, 245; abandoned farms, 28; life and character, 28, 29, 244, 255, 513; rural deterioration, 29; Pilgrims, 127, 360; Puritan settlements, 154, 360; fathers rural or urban? 154–156, 233, 304–305, 360, 518; urban factors in pol. organization, 156, 304–305; environmental and institutional influences, 154–157, 232–233, 305; democratic belt, 157; place of Boston, 161; attitude toward Rev., 165; rotation of office in, 179; Whig strength (1840), 189; Negro suffrage, 214; nativism, 214; leadership in Rev., 232; Webster speaks for commercial and industrial classes, 362; independent voting, 371; spoils system, 394; pol. corruption, 394, 398; stress on towns (Rev.), 431; influenza-pneumonia epidemic (soldiers, 1918–19), 462; intemperance, 481.
New England Confederation (1643): a plan of union, 283; urban lineage, 283.
New Hampshire, State of: Federalist triumph in (1800), 174; Jackson carries (1832), 183; adopts written const., 288; holds constl. convention, 288; organizes provincial govt., 288–289.
New Hampshire Grant: mentioned, 289, 363.
New Haven, town and city of (Conn.): founders of, 53, 513; under-represented, 220; adopts civil service reform, 407; birthplace of Lyman Beecher, 519.
New Jersey: rural vote gives Federalist victory (1800), 174; Fremont fails to carry, 194; rural counties over-represented, 222; early use of recall, 229; offers "small state" plan (Const., U. S.), 291; primary vote, 343.
New Orleans, city of (La.): defeats woman suffrage, 218; municipal reconstruction, 315; accepts civil service reform, 407.
Newport, city of (R. I.): mentioned, 519.
Newsholme, Dr. A.: cited, 427; *Prevention of Tuberculosis*, cited, 449.
Newspapers: urban vs. rural circulation, 243; effect of rural free delivery, 245; country and city, compared, 249–250; non-partisan, in country and in city, 372–373; Jefferson characterizes, 373–374; Matthew Carey characterizes, 374; corruption, rural and urban, 398–399; alien, in foreign colonies, 554; as urban assimilative agency, 555.
Newton, Dr. Joseph Fort: sketch, 519; "Some Living Masters of the Pulpit," cited, 519.
New World: precious metals from, 116; Pilgrims migrate to, 127, 360; as home of democracy, 151–153; democracy brought to, 153; Puritan migration to, 155; new conditions in, 282.
New York, city of: physique (1820–70), 29; hostility of up-state sections to, 158; events at opening of Rev., 162; Revolutionary leaders, 162; proposes Contl. Cong., 162, 288; attitude toward Rev., 165; attitude toward adoption of Const. (U. S.), 166, 259; Jefferson carries (1800), 173; ultra-conservative business interests in, 174; vote (1800) analyzed, 174–175; census of occupations (1820), 174–175; suffrage qualifications

(1800), 175; growingly Jeffersonian and Jacksonian, 175, 183–184; Federalist delegate convention 1812), 178–179, 300–301; Working Men's Party, 182–183; Jackson carries 183–184, 191; Democratic strength (1840), 191; Buchanan carries, 194; Lincoln fails to carry (1860), 194; attitude in Civil War, 195; Republicans barely carry (1896), 199; nativism, 214–215; decisive vote on woman suffrage (1917), 218; under-represented, 223; mechanics demand constl. convention (1776), 289; voting (1919), 342; birthplace of Theodore Roosevelt, 364; James Bryce addresses City Club, 375; pol. corruption, 393, 428; Tweed frauds, 396; leaders in civil service reform, 406–407; govt. in today, 426–428; infant mortality, 427–428, 454; Americanization, 428; pub. spirit, 428; health laws, 428; school system, 428; water system, 428; lengthening life, 452; vice, 506 (n. 11a) religious revivals, 523; draft riots (1863), 558, 570; relation to "Lost Battalion," 560; as Metropolis, 560; expert soldiers (World War), 607.

New York, county of (N. Y.): Republicans carry (1800), 173; census of occupations (1820), 174–175; relation of delegates from, to suffrage amendment (1821–22), 211–212.

New York, State of: suffrage, 12, 60, 98, 208–212; predictions as to commerce and manuf's, 60; democratic belt, 157; up-state hostility to N. Y. City, 158; Revolutionary leaders, 162; vote on Dec. of Ind., 164; rural and urban attitude toward Const. (U. S.), 166, 259; country constituencies Federalist (1792), 175; delegate nominating conv. 178–179, 300–301; Jackson carries (1832), 183; Anti-Masonic Party, 190; labor support of greenback movement, 196; distrib. of Bryan vote (1896). 199; party system, 300; mixed legislative caucus (1811), 301; pol. apathy (1787), 325; spoils system (early), 392; civil service reform, 406–407; the Jukes, 500; religious conditions, 514, 524; draft riots (1863), 558–559; rent riots, 570.

New York State Convention (1821): *Report of the Proceedings and Debates of,* 11–12, 60–62, 209–212, 213.

New York *Times:* cited, 227, 342, 452, 571–572.

New Zealand, Dominion of: cityward trend, vi, 336; extent rural, 336; civic duty at polls, 336; efficiency of govt., 336.

Niagara, Presbytery of (N. Y.): religion in (1822), 514.

Nice, city of (Fr.): birthplace of Garibaldi, 359.

Night-riding, located, 500.

Niles, Hezekiah: editor of *Niles Register,* 220, 394–395; cited, 220, 394–395.

Niles Register: cited, 220–221, 394–395.

Nominating machinery (U. S.): In general—popularizing of, a pol. issue, 171–172, 176–177, 201; credit for popularizing of, 172, 178–179; credit for perfecting of, 299–302. Congressional caucus—displaced, 176–177, 178–179, 300; frontier pop. opposes, 178; revived (1912), 201; origin, 299–300; subordinated, 300; demise, 300. Delegate nominating convention—displaces congressional caucus, 176–177, 178–179; origin, 178–179, 300–301; first national, 179, 300; delegate conventions in Rev. period, 287–288; relation to party system, 298. State legislative caucus—aimed at Madison, 178, 299; early use, 299; established (1796 ff.), 299; subordinated, 300; superseded, 300. "Mixed" legislative caucus—defined, 301; forerunner of delegate convention, 301; urban promotion of, 301; origin and early use, 301. Direct Primary—versus the congressional caucus (1912), 201; origin, 301–302; a form of pure democracy, 302.

Non-importation movement (Amer. Rev.): origin, 162.

Non-Partisan movement (U. S.): origin, 571; character, 571–572.

Nord, department of (Fr.): described, 142–143.

Nordau, Max: cited, 8, 29; *Degeneration,* cited, 8.

Nordic(s): barbarians in recent past, 568; compared with Maya, Toltecs, and Peruvians (Inca), 568; compared with Moors, 568.

Nordicized and Alpinized Mediterranean peoples: mentioned, 568–569.

Nordhoff, Charles: origin, 297; relation to short ballot, 297.

Norfolk, county of (Eng.): Lollards in, 120; refugees from Holland people, 127.

Norman Conquest: mentioned, 109, 553.

Normans (Eng.): assimilated in London, 553.

North (U. S.). *See* Northern States (U. S.).

North American Review: cited, 297.

North Carolina: Mecklenburg resolutions, 163; frontier element di-

vides on Rev., 163, 165; authorizes delegates to join in a dec. of ind., 163–164; battle of King's Mountain, 165; voting, 346 (n. 34); mentioned, 610.
North Dakota: Non-Partisan movement in, 571–572.
Northern States (U. S.): blockade Southern ports, 53; support of Republican Party (origin), 193–194; Fremont vote (1856), 194; Lincoln vote in cities (1860), 194; attitude of urban industrial pop. to Civil War, 195; States carried by Bryan (1900) characterized, 200; attitude toward Negro suffrage, 213; urban pop. support Progressive movements, 268; influenza-pneumonia epidemic (soldiers, 1918–19), 462; intemperance (1817), 482; urban disturbances offset by outbreaks in South, 570. *See also individual States.*
Northfield, East, village of (Mass.): birthplace of Dwight L. Moody, 520.
Northwest (U. S.): recent agricl. depression in, 76–77; relation to I. and R., 225–226, 228; Jefferson promotes town system in (Old), 255; farmers' movements in, 268; rural immorality, 489; rural foreign colonies, 559
Norvell, John: mentioned, 373–374.
Norway: efficiency of govt., 417; illegitimacy, 485.
Norwich, city of (Eng.): Lollards in, 120; refugees from Holland people, 127.
Nottingham, city of (Eng.): birthplace of General Booth, 521; birthplace of airman, Ball, 609–610.
Noyon, city of (Fr.): birthplace of John Calvin, 355.
Nullification: relation to state rights, 185; in South Carolina (1832–33), 185, 542; offsets to, 542.
Nungesser, Lieut. Charles E. J. M.: a Parisian, 609; standing as airman, 609.

Oberlin, Jean Fréderick: as country pastor, 522; origin, 522.
Occupational selection: affects physique, rural and urban, 460, 462, 474.
O'Connor, T. P.: cited, 505 (n. 4).
Odin, Alfred: cited, 347.
Ohio, State of: distrib. of presidential vote (1824), 184; distrib. of Whig and Democratic strength (1840 ff.), 190–191; pol. corruption, 398; disease among prehistoric peoples of, 477 (n. 32); relation to preachers (1838), 515; cityward movement, 531 (n. 11); endorses Ky. and Va. resolutions (1821), 542; typically western (1821), 543; alien avoidance of military service (Civil War), 559.
Okey, John: popular leader, Civil War (Eng.), 130; occupation, 130.
Old Sarum, borough of (Eng.): inequitable representation, 220.
Old World: democracy carried from, to New World, 153.
Omaha, city of (Neb.): farm and labor convention at (1892), 226–227.
Omaha (Neb.) *World Herald:* cited, 17.
Ontario County (N. Y.): convention on suffrage (1811), 209.
Ontario, province of (Can.): mentioned, 610.
Oregon, State of: accepts I. and R. (1899–1902), 228.
Oriental States, ancient: nature of contrib., 100; main features, 100; civil and pol. liberty, 100; militarism, 100, 101; character of govt., 100, 273; rural character, 100–101; pol. activity, 101; rural and urban pol. contrib., 101; fail politically, 102. *See also* Babylonia; Phoenicia, Egypt.
Origen (theologian): birthplace, 517.
Orlando, Vittorio E.: comes into power, 359–360; nativity, 360.
Orth, Samuel P.: *Socialism and Democracy,* cited, 135.
Osgood, H. L.: "England and the Colonies," cited, 136; "United States—History," cited, 164, 283, 285.
Ostrogorski, M.: *Democracy and the Party System,* cited, 299; *Democracy and the Organization of Pol. Parties,* cited, 299, 323, 324, 342.
Otis, James: argument on "writs of assistance," 161; as pol. leader, 361.
Otsego County (N. Y.): irregularity in vote (1792), 175,
Oxford-Brighton Movement: origin, 523.
Oxford, city of (Eng.): mentioned, 354; evangelical movement in, 402; Oxford-Brighton Movement, 523.

Pacific Garden Mission (Chicago): relation of "Billy" Sunday to, 520.
Pacific Ocean: relation to railroad (U. S.), 543.
Pacific States (U. S.): conditions of rural employment, 66–67, 500; agricl. depression, 76–77; people active in Progressive movement, 268; pol. partisanship, 370–371; immorality in rural schools, 489; disorders in fruit and vegetable areas, 500; religious conditions, 524; voices separatist tendencies, 543. *See also individual States.*
Padua, city of (It.): ancestral home of Savonarola, 517.

Paine, Thomas: as pol. leader, 361.
Palermo, city of (Sicily): mentioned, 360.
Palmer, Frederick: *The Folly of Nations*, cited, 538, 548.
Pan-American peace delegation: gives dinner (Paris), 151.
Pan-Germans: in Pomerania and Silesia, 147.
Paris, city of (Fr.): center of freedom of thought (12th cent.), 42–43; contrib. to Prot. Reformation, 129; leads democratic movement, 137, 138–139, 142, 279, 333, 541, 553; precipitates Terror (Rev.), 137–141; pol. instability, 137–141, 142–143, 545, 565, 567, 579; Girondist leaders, 138, 140; Bastille stormed, 139; elects Gambetta deputy, 142; dinner for Dr. Pessoa, 151; Calvinistic influences, 279; registered voters (1919), 330; abstention from voting, 333; famous men, 348, 355; civic spirit, 378, 382; aliens, 424; model city, 427; prostitution, 487; stands for France, 541, 553; assimilative power, 553; election (1919), 579; French Twentieth Corps recruited from (World War), 608.
Parker, Joseph: sketch, 518.
Parker, Theodore: sketch, 52.
Parkes, Sir Henry: relation to federation in Australia, 280–281; sketch, 280–281.
Parliament (Gt. Brit.): mentioned, 8, 110, *et al.*; Edward I adopts scheme for, 110; rural support of in Civil War, 131; urban support, *id.*, 131–133; monarchy subordinated to, 134; involved with Boston (Mass.), 161; develop. and perfecting of, 276–278; controversy with Amer. colonies, 285; relation to distant subjects of the Crown, 309–310; debates on bribery, 403. *See also* Commons, House of; Representative government, England; Cabinet system; Political inventiveness, England.
Parliament, Barebones (Eng.): rural and urban membership in, 132.
Party government (U. S.): develop. in Jacksonian period, 177, 189. *See also* Party system.
"Party Politics, Period of" (U. S.): applied to 1840 ff., 189.
Party System: In general—advantages and disadvantages, 368–370; value doubtful, 369; relation to party spirit and party politics, 369–370. In U. S.—origin and develop. (Jacksonian period), 177, 189, 298–299; Whigs perfect, 189; Van Buren's relation to, 189, 298; serves a real purpose at times, 189, 192–193, 298–299; other contributors to, 298; ingenuity of, 298–299; in N. Y. and Pa., 300; U. S. and Eng. compared as to, 377; slavery to, 384. In Gt. Brit.—urban laborers help popularize, 331; growing cohesion or disintegration? 376–377; operates more sanely than in U. S., 377. In Germany—lack of scope for, 378.
Paton, John G.: origin, 520.
Patriotism: In general—among rural pop., 3, 548, 552; among urban pop., 3, 19, 540, 543–545, 548, 552; relation to pub. spirit, 367, 368, 378, 551; effect of urbanization, 367, 548, 551, 605, 616; effect of internationalism, 543–548; compared with internationalism, 546–547; attitude of socialists (World War), 547–548; World War tests, 548, 559; no one test of, 551; in time of peace, 551; relation to assimilation of aliens, 551–552, 616. In U. S.—in the Revolution (rural and urban), 158–159, 160–166, 542; in N. E. (Rev.), 165, 431; in Va. (Rev.), 165; in Civil War, 195, 542, 549, 557–559; shifting attitude as to, 542–543; in World War (espec. rural and urban), 549–550, 559–561; among aliens, 550, 551–552, 556, 557, 558–561. In Gt. Brit.—of rural classes (early), 541; in South African War, 548; in World War, 548–549. In other countries—in France, 378, 549; in Germany, 547–548; in Belgium, 549; in Serbia, 549; in Canada, 557–558.
Patriots (Amer. Rev.): some identify with interior rural elements, 158; *id.* shown unwarranted, 159–160, 160–166.
Paul, the Apostle: speech on Mars' Hill, mentioned, 55 (n. 2); sketch, 516; establishes Christian church, 516–517; rank as missionary, 520.
Pavia, town of (It.): mentioned, 352.
Peace, international: relation of preparedness to lack of means to secure, 534; a desideratum, 535; relation to economic develop., 535–536; effect of urbanization, 535–539; relation of religion to, 536; city life favorable to, 539, 616.
Peasant Revolt (Eng.): wrongly characterized, 112; urban phase of, 112.
Peasants' War (Ger.): constituting elements, 121.
Peel, Robert: sketch, 354.
Pellagra: excess in rural districts, 454.
Penal servitude: system of, improves with urbanization, 415–416.
Pendleton, George H. (Senator): exponent of greenback idea, 406; sponsors Civil Service Bill (1883), 406.

Penn, William: contrib. to relig. liberty, 43; Quaker leader, 52; origin, 52, 361, 518.
Pennsylvania: religious liberty, 44; democratic belt, 157–158; Blue Ridge vs. coast towns, 158; constl. convention (1776), 163; vote on Dec. of Ind., 164; delegate nominating convention, 178–179, 300; U. S. Bank favored, 182; Jackson carries (1832), 182–183; Fremont loses (1856), 194; greenback movement, 196–197; suffrage issue (1835), 212–213; State legislative nominating caucus (1790), 299; party system, 300; mixed legislative nominating caucus (1808), 301; origin of direct primary (1860), 301–302; pol. apathy (1828, 1836), 326; spoils system and corruption, 392–393; religious conditions (1811), 514; aliens avoid military service (Civil War), 558–559.
Pentecost, Day of: at Jerusalem, 516; conversions, 522.
Peonage, in rural South (U. S.), 62.
Peoples' Party (U. S.): organized, 197, 238 (n. 25); nominates Benjamin Butler, 197; vote (1884), 197; labor candidates, 197; demands, 198; contrib. to democracy, 198; urban participation, 198–199; recommends I. and R., 226–227, 238 (n. 25).
Pequot Indians: enslavement of protested, 52.
Percheron (horse): mentioned, 464.
Pericles: as statesman, 274.
Périer, Casimir Pierre: sketch, 356; as pol. leader, 356.
"Personal Politics, Period of" (U. S.): applied to 1816–1832, 189.
Personality: a factor in democracy, 94.
Perth, town of (Scot.): a Reformation center, 128–129.
Peruvians (S. A.): early, compared with Nordics, 568.
Pessoa, Dr. Epitacio (President-elect of Brazil): honored at dinner, 151.
Pétion de Villeneuve, Jerome: sketch, 138.
Petrarch, Francesco: origin, 117.
Philadelphia, city of (Pa.): anti-slavery center, 52, 53; part in Rev., 162; metropolis of America (Rev.), 163; Federalists carry (1800), 173; favors First U. S. Bank, 181; Bankers' Convention at (1816), 181; strike of Journeymen House Carpenters, 182; Jackson loses (1832), 184; Jackson carries (1824, 1828), 184; Democratic strength in industrial suburbs (1840), 191; Buchanan carries, 194; nativism, 214–215; under-represented, 223, 297; gerrymander used vs., 297; congressional nominating caucuses in (1800), 299; mentioned, 364; water system (1825), 432; aliens avoid military service (Civil War), 558–559.
Philadelphia, county of (Pa.): joins in gerrymander vs. City of Philadelphia, 297.
Philadelphia, The Chamber of Commerce of: lauds agriculture, 11.
Philip, Dr. Andrew (Moderator, United Free Church of Scot.): cited, on religious conditions in Scot. (1821–1921), 515.
Philippine Islands: report on, 272 (n. 47); pol. knowledge in, 272 (n. 47).
Phillips, Wendell: sketch, 52.
Philosopher(s): relation of political, to pol. creativeness, 315; views of social, on birth rate, 474.
Physical Deterioration, Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on (Gt. Brit.): cited, 7, 457–458.
Physical deterioration. *See* Physique.
Physiocratic period: agriculture magnified, 5.
Physiocrats, French: bias toward agriculture, 5, 589–590.
Physique: Rural vs. Urban—city life unfavorable to, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 20, 33, 448, 457, 459, 465, 590; rural life favorable to, 8, 11, 14, 15, 451, 461, 462, 589, 590; urban life affects favorably, 26, 29, 30, 31, 33, 446, 448, 452–453, 455–456, 463–465; inferior among rural pop., 29, 30, 456–457, 461. Deterioration in—claimed as to British recruits, 7, 457–458, 458–460; no proof of, 455–456, 456–457, 458, 460, 462–463; claim of, very ancient, 456. Improvement in—in general, 29, 463, 591, 604, 615; in Gt. Brit., 457–458; in U. S., 460; urban contrib. to, 463–465, 591, 604. Records of—increasing adequacy, 455, 456–457, 458–461; rural and urban in U. S. (various groups), 456–457, 529; in World War (U. S. and Gt. Brit.), 457, 459–460, 460–462; in Civil War (U. S.), 460; qualifications as to military examinations, 459–460, 461–462. Miscellaneous—real relation to rural life, 455, 463–465; weaker go to cities, 455, 460, 462, 474 (*see also* Occupational selection); defects widely prevalent, 455–456; 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 604; urban elimination of congenital defects, 474; World War tests, 604. *See also* Health.
Picardy, province of (Fr.): mentioned, 138.
Piedmont, district of (It.): illiter-

acy, 243; mentioned, 352, 359, leads in unification of Italy, 541.
Pietism: origin, 521.
Pilgrims, the: migrate to Amsterdam and Leyden, 127; adapt religious system to civil and pol. sphere, 127; urban apprenticeship, 127, 154, 360; migrate to the New World, 127, 360; carry democracy to New World, 153; compared with Puritans as to origin, 154; colony, in N. E., 154; influence on N. E., 154; Mayflower Compact, 284; leaders, 518.
Pinchot, Gifford: pol. creativeness of, 317; *The Country Church* (*see also* Gill, Chas. Otis), cited, 16; *Six Thousand Country Churches* (*see also* Gill, Chas. Otis), cited, 524.
Pinckney, Charles: offers plan for Const. (U. S.), 291.
Pinckney, Charles C.: candidate for president, 299.
Pisa, town of (It.): mentioned, 359.
Pitt, William (the elder): democratic services, 134; origin, 134, 353; discards pol. corruption, in part, 401.
Pitt, William (the younger): supports movement vs. "rotten boroughs," 134; origin, 353.
Pittsburgh, city of (Pa.): citizens oppose First U. S. Bank, 181; votes for Clay (1832), 184; votes for Jackson (1824, 1828), 184; Fremont carries, 194; mentioned, 364, 610.
Place, Francis: a leader in Chartist Movement, 135; occupation, 135, 353–354; services to democracy, 135, 353–354; promotes Reform Act (1832), 353–354.
Plains (U. S.): project for railroad across, 543.
Plato: views on democracy, 97; *Laws*, cited, 4; *Republic*, cited, 4.
Plebiscite: early use of in Switz., 302. *See also* Referendum.
Plunkett, Sir Horace: cited, 7–8, 30.
Pneumonia. *See* Influenza.
Pobyedonostseff, Constantine P. (Procurator of the Holy Synod of Russia): cited, 585.
Poitiers, town of (Fr.): Reformation center, 129.
Poland: migration of workers from Russian, 71; militarism, 538–539.
Policing: in large cities, 418; rural vs. urban, 436.
Political (word): origin, 25.
Political activity: In general—rural vs. urban, 20, 324; a factor in pol. capacity, 239, 407; trend of, 252, 324, 368; importance of, 323; hindrances in rural districts, 323; city life favors, 323, 344, 614; hindrances in cities, 324, 340–341 (U. S.); in formative periods, 324; full suffrage affects, 327; registration affects, 328, 341 (U. S.); alien suffrage affects (U. S.), 340–341; relation to public spirit, 367–368. In U. S.—among Negroes, 260; trend of, 324–327, 342; liberalized suffrage affects, 326–327, 328, 341; educational qualifications affect, 327; registration affects, 327–328, 341; primaries affect (regular election), 328, 341, 344; torchlight processions decline, 577–578. In Europe—rural vs. urban, 261, 330. In Gt. Brit.—significance of trend, 328–329; in parliamentary elections, 329; compared with rural countries as to, 329; urban vs. rural, 330, 331–333. In Switz.—in general, 329; rural vs. urban, 335–336. In Belgium—in general, 329. In Italy—in general, 329; rural vs. urban, 334–335. In Germany—in general (Reichstag elections), 329–330; rural vs. urban, 334. In France—in general, 329; rural vs. urban, 333. In Russia—urban vs. rural, 334. In Spain—in general, and rural and urban, 335. In Australasia—in New Zealand and Queensland, 336; in Australia, in general, 336. In Canada—rural vs. urban, 336–337.
Political boss: manipulates Negro and foreign-born voters in cities, 260, 424; Thomas Wharton the first, 401; cities dethrone, 425.
Political capacity: determining factors, 239, 407, 419; urbanization promotes, 407, 416, 419, 614; character of govt. enjoyed the final test, 411, 419.
Political corruption: in general—city life said to favor, 10, 19, 388, 405; relation to pol. capacity, 239, 407; relation to pub. spirit, 388; not an urban vice, 388, 403, 404–406; no increase with urbanization, 388, 400–401, 404, 405–406, 614. In U. S.—Jefferson fears, 10; registration reduces, 328; rising standards, 385, 388–389, 426, 501; low standards of fathers, 389, 390–391; during the Rev., 389–390; relation to the Const., 390; period of Confederation, 390; early national period, 391, 393–394; urban, 388, 390–391, 393–395, 396–397, 399, 405–406, 419, 422–6, 428, 429, 430, 436; rural, 388, 390–391, 392, 393–396, 397–399, 405–406; spoils system complicates, 391–392, 393–394; systematizing of, 392, 393, 396–397; in the State sphere (in general and various States), 392–395, 397–399; by corporations (1850 ff.), 395–396; culminates, 396–397; persistence of early, 397, 399; city handicaps as to, 405,

406, 422–424. In Europe—Jefferson alleges existence, 10; cities free from today, 400; early urban prevalence, 418, 420. In Gt. Brit.—slight, 400, 404; significance of disappearance, 400–401, 404; early prevalence, 401–402, 404; correctives, 402; early urban, 402, 418; rural vs. urban, 403–404; work of John Wilkes, 403–404; rising standards, 404. In other countries (France, Switz., Australia, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Canada, Russia, China), 404. *See also* Spoils system; Civil service reform; Corrupt Practices Acts; Evangelical movement; *and the various countries and cities.*

Political intimidation: In general—relation to econ. freedom, 57–59, 85; relation to pol. corruption, 403. In various countries—in U. S., 60, 62–63, 69; in Belgium, 72; in Eng., 73, 74, 79–80, 331, 332, 403; in Germany, 146–147; in France, 333–334. *See also* Press, freedom of the; Speech, freedom of; Thought, freedom of.

Political inventiveness: In general—relation of city life to, 20, 266, 311–320, 420, 614 (*see also* Chs. XII and XIII in general); a factor in pol. capacity, 239, 407; compared with pol. initiative, 273; analyzed, 273, 309; necessity mothers, 305–306, 309, 314, 315–316, 319; among lawyers, 307, 316; relativity of, 309; in form of administrative interpretation, 309, 311, 314; in form of judicial interpretation, 309, 311; relation of rural life to, 311–320; specific favoring factors, 315; relation of pol. movements to, 315; among the pol. philosophers, 315, 316; pol. knowledge a limiting factor, 315, 316, 319; logical thought and scientific method as factors, 316–317; in formative periods, 317–318; conservatism and national pride check, 318–319; combining ideas in, 319. In ancient and mediaeval times—in the city-state system, 273, 274–275; in general, among Greeks, 273–274, 276, 282, 290, 296; in general, among Romans, 273–275, 290, 296; in the feudal system, 275–276; among the Teutons, 276. In Eng.—in general (various forms), 276–282, 284–285, 290, 296–297, 298, 309–311. In U. S.—as to general forms, 281–293, 310, 318; as to special forms and principles, 296–302, 304–309, 315, 318, 407, 420, 426; in form of judicial interpretation, 311, 312–313; in general, 315, 316, 317–319, 419; conspicuous representatives, 317. In Australia—general forms, 280–281, 310–311; special forms, 296, 297. In Canada—general forms, 280–281. In Switz.—special forms, 302–304. In France—in Const. of French Republic (1875), 293; legislative initiative, 404. In Germany—general forms, 293.

Political knowledge: In general—city life promotes, 31–32, 36, 251–254, 261, 262, 264–266, 308, 319; relation to pol. capacity, 239, 256, 319, 407; relation to general intelligence, 250; relation to pol. activity, 252, 260, 261–264; in formative periods, 252–253, 317–318, 324; centralization of govt. affects, 253–255, 264–265; needs redirection, 254–255, 265; urban adequacy to needs, 264–266, 308, 319; relation to govt. by experts, 265; relation to pol. creativeness, 315, 316, 319. In U. S.—among N, E. factory pop., 27, 245; town system promotes, 232, 255–256; of early fathers, 257–259; trend, 259, 261, 284; urban handicaps, 259–261; *id.*, in South, 259–261; bad govt. affects, 260; changed immigration affects, 260–261. In Europe—urban vs. rural, 261; rural masses lack, 264. In Gt. Brit.—agricl. laborers lack, 31, 262–263; industrial pop. has, 261–262; in Scotland, 263–264. In Germany—general deficiency, 250; rural masses lack, 264. In Russia, Italy, and Spain—urban superiority, 264.

Political leadership: In general (incl. ancient and mediaeval)—relation of rural life to, 16, 347–349, 365 (and Ch. XV in general); relation of city life to, 20, 349, 365 (and Ch. XV in general); a factor in pol. capacity, 239, 349, 407; a factor in pol. creativeness, 315, 349; a form of pol. activity, 349; relation to pol. initiative, 349; defined, 349; in Gr. and Rom. city-state period, 350; in Middle Ages, 350–352; not threatened by urbanization, 365. In U. S.—urban, 159, 161–163, 185, 188, 200–201, 290–293, 299, 301, 340, 360–364, 365, 391, 569; rural, 163–164, 176, 185, 188, 201, 290–293, 360–364, 569. In Eng.—urban, 106–107, 108–112, 130–135, 348–349, 351–354, 365; rural, 110–111, 131–132, 134–135, 348–349, 351–354, 541. In France—rural, 123–124, 141, 143, 355; urban, 137–143, 355–357. In Germany—rural and urban, 145, 334, 357–359. In Italy—rural and urban, 359–360. In Canada—leaders in federation, 281, 354–355. In Australia—leaders in federation, 281, 354–355. In South Africa—rural, 355. In

other countries (Czecho-Slovakia, Greece), 360. *See also* Leaders, in general; Religious leaders; Genius.
Political obedience: relation to success in govt., 379–380; defined, 380; among English-speaking peoples, 380; in U. S., 380–381; certain rural countries lack, 381. *See also* Public spirit; Political partnership; Political stability.
Political partisanship: In general—affects party attitude, 192–193; relation to pol. capacity, 239; relation to pub. spirit, 368; characterized, 368; part in decay of city-state system, 370. Rural vs. urban—in general, 370; in U. S., 370–373. Prevalence and trend—in general, 370; in U. S., 373–375; in Eng., 375–378; in France, 378; in Germany, 378–379; in Switz., 379; in Australia, 379. Comparisons—U. S. vs. Eng., 377. Effect of World War—in U. S., 429. *See also* Party system.
Political purity. *See* Political corruption.
Political stability: In general—rural pop. possesses, 7, 8, 15, 34, 565–566 (*see also* Land; Conservatism); urban pop. lacks, 7, 8, 10, 11–12, 13, 18–19, 23, 36–37, 565–567, 569, 573; property a factor, 18–19, 57–58, 60, 210, 565–566, 580–584; manuf's promote, 26, 34, 584; commerce promotes, 34, 584; conservative urban elements affect, 174, 544, 569, 573, 575–576, 578, 580–584; grows with urbanization, 414–415, 568, 569, 573, 583–584; war tests, 564; views as to urban effect modified, 567–568, 569–570, 573–574, 584–585, 616; racial factors, 568–569; contradictory views, 569–570; rural passivity endangers, 571–572; relation to pol. stagnation, 573–575, 584–585; homogeneity and divergence affect, 575–576; crowd psychology (rural and urban), 576–577; modern voting affects, 577–578; rural non-ownership affects, 581; govt. *et al.* securities a factor, 581, 582–583; relation to ultra-conservatism, 581, 584, 585; employee ownership affects, 581–582; inclination to conservatism, 584; danger of revolution, 584. In U. S.—frontier lacks, 157–158; period of Confederation, 168, 257, 499; serious revolts rural, 380, 499, 542, 543, 570, 576; relation of Civil War to, 380–381, 542, 549, 570; trend, 385, 414; radical aliens threaten, 424; World War affects, 429, 549, 570–571; farmers' unions affect, 500, 571; rural tendency to extreme measures, 500–501, 571, 572; urban revolts and outbreaks, 570–571; rural and urban offsets, 570–571; Non-Partisan movement, 571–572; rural passivity endangers, 572; homogeneity and divergence affect, 576; crowd psychology (rural vs. urban), 576–577; attitude of labor, 579–580; govt. *et al.* securities, 581, 582–583; employee ownership affects, 581–582. In Europe—urban artisan pop. lacks, 261; after World War, 564–565; rural threat to, 572–573. In Eng.—rural vs. urban, 129–30; manuf'g pop. shows (1859), 262; early London lacks, 567; significance of high, 568; urban contrib. through pol. evolution, 574, 578–579; among labor classes, 578–579; establ. of Bank of England affects, 582–583; war loans affect, 583; compared with Mexico and Russia as to, 584. (*See also* Reform Act, 1832; Chartist Movement; Miners). In France—rural pop. affects, 137, 140, 143; relation of Paris to, 137–141, 142–143, 545, 565, 567, 579; relation of provincial cities to, 137–141, 142–143; grows with urbanization, 568, 579; rural conservatism and passivity threaten, 574–575; urban lack overestimated, 579; unstable govt., 579; distrib. of govt. bonds affects, 583. (*See also* Revolution, French; Terror, the; Internationalism; Socialism; Vendee, dept. of). In Russia—lacking, 548, 568, 575, 584–585; significance of lack, 568, 584–585; rural reaction affects 575; contrasted with Eng. as to, 584; relation to world situation, 585. (*See also* Internationalism; Bolshevism; Socialism; Pobyedonostseff; Czarist regime). In other countries—in Australia, 379; rural countries lack, 381; Greek city-states, 567; mediaeval city-republics, 567; Spain, Portugal, China, Mexico, 568, 575, 584; Germany, 568, 580.
Political stagnation: in purely rural states, 251–252. *See also* Political stability.
Politics, party: affects attitude on pub. questions, 186, 188–189, 192–193, 369; relation to pol. excitement, 577–578. *See also* Party system; Political partisanship.
Polk, James K.: elected president, 191–192.
Pollock, Sir Frederick: cited, 274.
Polycarp (church father): nativity, 517.
Pomerania, territory of (Ger.): status of agricl. laborers, 71; Junkers in, 146; organization of agrarian workers, 146; Ludendorff ancestry, 359.
Pomeroy, Eltweed: relation to in-

trod. of I. and R. (U. S.), 227–228.
Pomponazzi, Pietro: origin, 117.
Popular sovereignty: origin and prevalence (Amer.), 151–154; in various govt. spheres (U. S.), 281; relation to written const., 286.
Population: In general—urbanization of, v-vi: stationary in France, 9, 33, 467, 471; factors in natural growth of, 465; effect of urbanization on growth of, 465–475; effect of declining birth rate, 467; growth in last cent., 467; danger of excessive, 473, 474. Agglomerated—in U. S., v, vii; defined, vii. Commercial *and* Manufacturing—*see* Commerce, Manufactures, Industrial population. *See also* Rural population; Urban population.
Portland, city of (Me.): mentioned, 53; relation to Christian Endeavor movement, 522.
Portland, city of (Ore.): infant mortality, 454.
Portsmouth, city of (N. H.): merchants attack U. S. Bank, 182.
Portugal: relation of rural character to pol. stability, 568, 575; Moorish influence on pol. stability, 568–569.
Posen, city of (Ger.): mentioned, 359.
Postal facilities: effect of rural free delivery (U. S.), 245; improve with urbanization, 415.
Pound, Roscoe: *Spirit of the Common Law* cited, 413, 435.
Poverty: In General—contrast with wealth in cities, 18–19, 491; not confined to cities, 492; city favorable to elimination of, 504. Relief—improves with urbanization, 416; progress in large cities, 418; under the town system, 431; urban vs. rural, 435.
Powderly, T. V. (Grand Master Workman, K. of L.): recommends I. and R., 226.
Preachers: leading, 516–522. *See also* Clergy; Religious leaders; Religion.
Preferential voting: origin of (Eng., U. S.), 297.
Presbyterian Church: on religious conditions in Western N. Y. (1822), 514.
Presbyterians: relation to delegate nominating convention, 300; sponsor Harrisburg convention (1788), 300. *See also* Calvin, John.
Press, freedom of the: relation to struggle for civil and pol. liberty, 41–42; cities favorable to, 41–42, 45, 614; origin, 42; slave power (U. S.) opposes, 186; Jefferson characterizes, 373–374. *See also* Newspapers; Political partisanship.
Preston, town of (Eng.): mentioned, 117.
Pride, Thomas (Colonial): occupation of, 130.
Primary, direct: affects voting at regular elections, 328; rural vs. urban voting in, 342–343. *See also under* Nominating machinery.
Prince, Lieut. Norman: standing as airman, and nativity, 610.
Printing: invention of, 117.
Privy Council (Gt. Brit.): appoints com. on phys. deter., 7, 457.
Procurator of the Holy Synod of Russia. *See* Pobyedonostseff, Constantine P.
Progress: material, outrunning moral, 9, 535–536; relation to farm life (U. S.), 17.
Progressive Movement, The (U. S.): relation to movement in the 90's, 200; constituting elements, 200; leadership and leaders, 200–201; urban support (1912, 1924), 202, 371–372; relation to pol. initiative, 268.
Prohibition. *See* Liquor traffic.
Property: relation to pol. stability, 18–19, 57–58, 60, 210, 565–566, 580–583; relation to econ. freedom (see Economic freedom); resources of labor organizations, 82, 581–582; influence of, in Phoenicia and Babylonia, 100; relation of inequality as to, to urban crime, 491; rural non-ownership of, 581 (*see also* Tenancy, farm; Agricultural laborers); forms of, owned by urban pop., 581–583; relation of capitalist-workmen to attacks on, 582. *See also* Land; Stocks and bonds; Conservatism; Political stability.
Proportional representation: originators, 296–297.
Prostitution: as index of sexual morality, 485; relation to illegitimacy, 485; relation to feeble-mindedness, 486, 488, 500; in France and Paris, 487; in Eng. and on Continent, 487; as a city institution, 487–488; rural, in cities, 487–488; urban excess in young adults affects, 488. *See also* Vice; Morality.
Protection, agricultural: favored on military grounds (Europe), 7; promotes landlordism, 79; favors dominant agricl. classes, 79; exemplified in Corn Laws (Eng.), 79.
Protectorate (Eng.): established, 132.
Protestant. *See* Protestantism.
Protestant Episcopal Church: condition in U. S. (1811), 514.
Protestantism: Edict of Nantes af-

fects, 123; Amsterdam symbolizes, 127; distinguished representatives in France, 518, 523; Dr. Frank W. Gunsaulus represents, 519; missionaries, 520, 521; relation of Daily Vacation Bible School movement to, 522; in France today, 523. *See also* Reformation, Protestant; Huguenot; Puritan; Pilgrim; Dissent.
Providence: vain to fight against, 28.
Providence, city of (R. I.): Federalists carry (1800), 173; underrepresented, 222.
Prussia, Kingdom of (Ger.): origin of power, 8, 146, 357; defeats at Jena and Auerstadt, 144; reforms of Stein and Hardenberg, 144–145, 357; relation of Brandenburg to, 146; rural strikes put down, 146; pol. leadership, 357–359; death rate, 449; infant mortality, 451; lengthening life, 451. *See also* Germany; Prussia, East *and* West.
Prussia, East, province of (Ger.): Russian rural workers migrate to, 70; status of agricl. workers, 71; Junkers, 146; organization of agarian laborers, 146.
Prussia, West, province of (Ger.): status of agricl. workers, 71.
Public opinion: status in city, 17, 491–492.
Public spirit: In general—effect of city life on, 17, 19, 36, 375, 382, 614; relation to democracy, 36, 367; *id.*, pol. capacity, 239; 367, 407; defined and analyzed, 367; relation to patriotism and pol. activity, 367–368; *id.*, party spirit, 368; *id.*, pol. obedience, 368, 379–380; *id.*, pol. stability, 380–381; *id.*, pol. purity, 388. Ancient—in Roman Empire (Provincial cities), 104; in city-states, 370, 378, 382. In U. S.—in general, 375, 377, 385, 421; in cities, 375, 382–384, 421; compared with Europe, 377; rural, 381–382; rural vs. urban, 382–385; in N. Y. City, 428. In Europe—compared with U. S., 377; in cities, 379, 382, 384; in Germany and Switz., 379; in London *et al.* Eng. cities, 382–383. In Australia—James Bryce on, 379. Trend—in Eng., 375–378, 402; in France, 378; in general, 378, 385. *See also* Political partisanship.
Public utilities: provision for, in large cities, 418; relation to pol. corruption, 422–423.
Puritan movement (Eng.): strength in cities, 130–131, 132–133; rural support (Civil War), 131–132; becomes odious, 133. *See also* Democracy, England; Puritans; Pilgrims.
Puritans (N. E.): bring democracy to New World, 153; compared with pilgrims as to origin, 154; influence on N. E., 154; urban character, 154, 360, 523; relation of lack of artistic sense to Pol. creativeness, 315; rural and urban leaders, 518; rearing of young, 530. *See also* Puritan movement (Eng.); New England.
Putnam, Lieut. David E.: standing as airman, and origin, 610–611.
Pym, John: origin, 131, 352.

Quakers (religious sect): relation to slavery, 52; founded, 52, 517; pacifist influence in Phila. (Amer. Rev.), 162; contrib. to delegate nominating convention, 300; sponsors Lancaster convention (1788), 300; urban origin, 522. *See also* Fox, George; Penn, William.
Quesnay, François: origin, 5; bias in favor of agriculture, 5.
Queensland, state of (Austral.): extent rural, 336; civic duty at polls, 336; cityward movement, 336.
Quichua Indians (Peru, S. A.): health and mortality, 477 (n. 32).
Quick, Herbert: cited, 16–17.
Quincy, Josiah: relation to Boston (Mass.), 161; as pol. leader, 361; *Municipal Hist. of Boston,* cited, 432–433.
Quincy, city of (Mass.): mentioned, 53.

Racial factors: relation to pol. stability, 381, 568–569; relation to tuberculosis, 454; relation to military efficiency, 463.
Raikes, Robert: part in origin of Sunday School movement, 521; sketch, 521.
Railroads (U. S.): Control of—a pol. issue, 171; farmers promote, 195–196; Peoples' Party demands, 198. Strikes—character (1877), 570.
Raleigh, city of (N. C.): Andrew Johnson born in, 363–364.
Ramus, Peter: Reformation leader, 129.
Randolph, John: opposes manhood suffrage, 208; origin, 292.
Rathenau, Walther: origin, 359.
Recall: relation to popular rule, 92, 224; Penna. const. (1776) embodies, 163; urban vs. rural credit as to, 172, 230; use corrects representative system, 224, 231, 235; demanded, 226; early use, 229–230; Theodore Roosevelt advocates (as to judges), 230. *See also* Initiative; Referendum.
Reconstruction, period of (U. S.): political interest during, 327; corrupt govt. in South during, 431.
Recreational agencies: cities provide,

243, 418, 492, 509–510, 528–529; relation to criminality, 492; urban attention to, in religion, 511; rural churches neglect, 511, 512, 525.
Referendum: In general—relation to popular rule, 92, 224, 235; use corrects representative system, 224, 235; relation to representative govt., 302, 303. In Switz.—rural vs. urban credit for origin, 148, 303; influences introd. in U. S., 226–227; early use (primitive), 302; origin (modern form), 302–303; urban pop. excels in use, 335–336. In U. S.—as a pol. issue, 172; urban vs. rural credit as to, 172, 224, 224–226, 227–228, 304; Peoples' Party demands, 198; use corrects representative system, 224, 235; early use, 224, 225; Jefferson proposes constl., 224–225; first formal demand for, 226; Swiss influence, 226, 227; labor organization use general, 226–227; leading promoters, 227–228; adoption (various States), 228–229; independent origin of statutory, 302; exclusive origin of constl., 304. In Eng.—labor organizations use, 226. *See also* Initiative; Recall.
Reform Act(s) (Eng.): Of 1832—urban leadership and support, 134–135, 330–331, 353–354, 402; extends pol. rights to middle classes, 135, 331; effect on pol. corruption, 402; a compromise, 578. Second (1867, 1868)—extends pol. rights to workmen, 135; urban support, 403. Third (1884)—enfranchises agricl. laborers, 135; Gladstone carries, 135; urban support, 135, 403. *See also* Suffrage, England; Representation, England.
Reformation, Protestant: contrib. to relig. freedom, 43; inter-relation of pol. and relig. factors in, 118; contrib. to democracy, 118–129; in England, 120–121; in Germany, 121; in Switz., 121–122; in France, 122–126 (*see also* Huguenots); in the Netherlands, 126–128; in Scotland, 128–129; supported by towns generally, 129; origin of leaders, 517; work of Tyndale, Wiclif, and Lollards at dawn of, 522. *See also* Catholics; Romanist party.
Reformed cause; Reformed movement. *See* Reformation, Protestant.
Regensburg, city of (Ger.): Romanist party makes plans at, 121.
Registration: affects voting, 328, 332, 333; repeating before introd. of, 395. *See also* Voting; Elections; Political corruption.
Rensselaer County (N. Y.): petitions for convention, 209.
Report of the Ministry of National Service (Gt. Brit.): cited, 459, 463.
Representation: In general—relation to democracy, 95. In U. S.—inequalities (early), 95, 220–221; relation to democracy, 172, 223; inequalities (today), 221–223; rural over-representation in metropolitan counties, 223, 435–436. In Gt. Brit.—previous to 1832, 95; "rotten borough" system affects, 134; Reform Act (1832) corrects, 134; Reform Acts (1867, 1868) correct, 135; redistribution of, 261, 262. In Switz.—unequal, 119. *See also* Democracy (*for the three countries*).
Representation of the People Bill (Eng.): debate on (1859), 262.
Representative government: In general (including other countries than Eng. and U. S.)—relation of great capital cities to, 13; definitions and general considerations, 91, 92–93; replaces pure democracy, 91–92, 233–234, 254, 302–303; wise use of I. and R. and recall favorable to, 224, 231 (recall), 235; Greek contrib. to, 274, 276; importance, 276; credit for, 276; Teutonic contrib., 276; a growth, 276, 277; Calvinistic contrib., 278–279; in the Hanse towns, *et al.*, 279; in Switz., 279, 302–303. In England—develop. of, 110, 276–278; relation of the *firma burghi* to, 278; urban and rural credit, 278; Eng. characterized as to, 278; origin of cabinet system, 279. (*See also* Parliament; Commons, House of; Cabinet system; Political inventiveness, England). In U. S.—earliest, in Va., 156–157, 280; place of executive in, 185; wise use of I. and R. and recall favorable to, 224, 231 (recall), 235; scope, 281; Amer. colonies develop, 281–282. (*See also* Charters, colonial; Constitution, U. S.; Political inventiveness, U. S.).
Republic: Madison defines, 92; a pol. contrib. of U. S., 281–282. *See also* Constitution, U. S.
Republicanism: defined, 91–92, 185; relation of legislature and executive in, 185, 255; relation of education to, 255; relation of local govt. to, 255.
Republican Party: persists, 192; principles (1854–56), 192, 193; origin, 192, 193–194; urbo-rural constituency, 193; nominates Fremont, 194; distrib. of vote in N. Y. (1896), 199; relation to origin of direct primary, 301–302; vote in primaries (Calif., 1908), 343.
Religion: among early factory pop. (N. E.), 26–27, 469, 470; influ-

ence, in city and country, 37, 45, 405, 509–510, 530; irreligion in cities, 44–45, 510, 524; financial support of rural church, 380–381, 511; relation to birth rate, 469, 470, 473–474; pol. and soc'l importance, 479; effect of urbanization, 479, 480, 509–526, 530, 615; early attitude toward drinking, 481; rural community favorable to, 509, 510, 525; general trend, 509, 513, 515, 525–526; vicious and sceptical influences in city, 510; urban advantages as to, 510–511, 522; defects of rural church, 512, 513; elimination rural churches, 512, 513; early religious conditions, 513–514; attitude toward preachers, 515; religious conditions in Scot., 515; character of services in early days, 515, 525; mutual debits and credits of rural and urban churches, 516; city influences in Christianity, 516; religious leadership (rural and urban), 516–522; urban forward movements in, 521–522, 536; urban revivals, 522–523, 536; rural vs. urban (Eng.), 523; rural vs. urban (France), 523–524; in rural districts (U. S.), 524–525; church meets competition, 525; functioning of church and S. S. in cities, 528; relation to international peace, 536; alien churches in foreign colonies (U. S.), 551–552, 556, 559; attitude of Amer. workers toward, 580. *See also* Protestantism; Reformation, Protestant; Huguenots; Catholics; Preachers; Clergy; Revivals, religious; Evangelists; Sunday School(s); Week-Day Church School; Daily Vacation Bible School; Y. M. C. A.

Religious leaders: origin, rural and urban, 516–522, 530. *See also* Religion.

Renaissance: part of agricl. classes in, 25; promotes religious freedom, 43; an urban movement, 43, 117; merchant patrons of, 117; inventions associated with, 117.

Responsibility: a characteristic of democracy, 94.

Restoration (Eng.): joint rural and urban support of, 133; endangers democracy, 133; mentioned, 131, 353. *See also* Civil War (Eng.).

Revivals, religious: evangelical movement (Eng.), 402, 522–523; alternate with backsliding, 513–514; Great Awakening of 1734, 513–514; Awakening of 1800, 514; Day of Pentecost, 516, 522; at camp-meetings, 522; modern tabernacle meetings, 522; of early religious orders (Eng.), 522; at rise of Quaker sect, 522; in N. Y. City (1806–07), 523; Great Revival (1858–59), 423; Keswick and Oxford-Brighton movements, 523; city life favorable to, 536. *See also* Religion.

Revolution, American: sectional and class hostilities, 157–158, 172; "Country Party" and Court Party," 158; Loyalists and Patriots, 158, 160–166; rural vs. urban support, 158, 160–166, 337, 542; significance of farmer support, 160–161; trumpet of sounded, 161; Mass. and Boston lead, 161, 195, 232; first blood shed, 162; Virginia leads, 163, 542; period following characterized, 168; type of democracy characterizing, 185; colonies adopt constitutions, 285; pol. corruption during, 389–390; judicial administration during, 413; inefficient conduct of, 414, 431; lawlessness and crime during, 499; religious conditions, 513–514; Amish and Mennonites in, 557; govt. assumes State debts following, 583.

Revolution, French: promotes relig. freedom, 43–44, 125; slogan, 93; exile of Huguenots affects, 125–126; importance, 137; city coöperation in, 137; course of, 137–141; source of excesses, 137, 574–575; urban leadership, 138–139, 140, 141, 355–356; the Terror, 139–140; political results, 140; results in civil sphere, 140–141; German sympathy with, 144; turns to national aggrandizement, 144; Bonaparte masters, 355–356; internationalism in, 545; rural responsibility for excesses of, 574–575. *See also* France; Paris; Terror, the.

Revolution of 1688 (Eng.): democratic fruits of, 133–134; mentioned, 353, 376.

Revolution of 1830 (France): results, 141.

Revolution of 1848: in France, 141–142; in Germany, 144–145; in Austria, 144–145. *See also the various countries.*

Revolution, Puritan (Eng.). *See* Civil War (Eng.).

Rhastia. *See* Grisons, canton of (Switz.).

Rhode Island, State of: relig. liberty in, 44; anti-slavery law (1652), 52; Revolutionary soldiers disqualified, 165, 212; rise of nominating conventions, 178–179; Clay carries (1832), 183; vote in, for Fremont, 194; attempts at suffrage reform, 212; landed oligarchy in, 212, 221; Dorr's Rebellion, 212, 221; inequitable suffrage and representation, 212, 219, 221–222; nativism,

214; const. of 1842, 221–222; rural opposition to I. and R., 228; recall of judicial decisions (1639), 229; State legislative caucus, 299; mixed legislative caucus, 301; independent voting, 371; pol. corruption, 389, 390, 394–396, 398; homicides, 496.
Ribot, Alexandre F. J.: origin, 356–357.
Ricci, Matteo: sketch, 521.
Richard, Earl of Cornwall: contrib. to representative govt., 277.
Richard I (Eng.): grants charter to London, 109, 112; contrib. to representative system in reign of, 277; as a pol. leader, 351.
Richard Lionheart. *See* Richard I (Eng.).
Richelieu, Armand J. du P. de (Cardinal): treats with Huguenots, 123–124; Mazarin endangers work of, 125; contrib. to absolutism, 125; sketch, 355.
Richman, I. B.: *Rhode Island,* cited, 389, 390, 398–399, 524.
Richmond, city of (Ind.): J. Wilbur Chapman born in, 520; manufactures, 520.
Richmond, town of (Eng.): described, 120.
Richthofen, Captain Manfred A. (Count von): Standing as airman, 610; sketch, 610.
Rickenbacker, Captain Edward V.: standing as airman, and origin, 610–611.
Robbins, Raymond: Progressive leader (1909–16), 201; origin, 201.
Robertson, Frederick W.: sketch 518, 519, 532 (n. 17).
Robespierre, Maximilien F. M. J.: Jacobin leader, 138–139; sketch, 138–139.
Robinson, James Harvey: "The Reformation," cited, 122, 127; "The Spirit of Conservatism in the Light of History," cited, 584.
Robinson, Lieut. Wm. L.; origin, 609.
Rochdale, town of (Eng.): mentioned, 53; John Bright born in, 354.
Rochester, city of (N. Y.): Fremont carries, 194.
Rogers, Thorold: cited, 126.
Roland, Jean Marie: sketch, 138.
Roland, Madame: sketch, 138.
Roman Catholic Church. *See* Catholic(s).
Roman Empire: democracy in country and in town, 105; relation of dissolution of, to decline in democracy, 105–106; embodies principle of universal empire, 275; character of, under Antoninus, 275; extent democratic, 275; free cities and feudal system follow, 275; creators and pol. leaders, 350; assimilating forces in, 553. *See also* City-state, Roman; Rome; Romans, The.
Romanist party: meets at Regensburg (Ger.), 121.
Roman *See:* letter sent to, 110.
Romans, The: imitate Greek respect for agriculture, 4; develop the city-state, 102–105, 273, 274–275; develop universal empire, 274–275; pol. creativeness, 275. *See also* City-state, Roman; Roman Empire; Rome.
Rome, city and power of: free distribution of grain, 4, 531; decay and downfall, 4–5, 9, 16, 479–480, 517; urbanization in, 4–5, 480; held as warning example, 5, 9, 16, 479–480; growth of latifundia, 5, 105; ascribe decay to rural decadence, 16; liberties of, handed down, 25, 106; creates a world empire, 274–275; checks and balances and separation of powers in govt. of, 290; uses written ballot, 296; men of high distinction, 348; pol. leaders, 350; Alfred the Great visits, 351; mentioned, 355; view as to declining physique, 456; not parallel with modern cities, 531; Christianity in, 532 (n. 15a); relation to unification of Italy, 541, 553. *See also* City-state, Roman; Roman Empire; Romans, The.
Rondergues, Louis M.: *La Multiplication des Chaumières,* cited, 9.
Roscher, Wilhelm: cited, 566–567.
Rosebery, Archibald P. P. (Lord): relation to Imperial Conferences, 281; origin, 281.
Roses, war of the (Eng.): reflects factional spirit, 375–376; mainly rural, 376.
Ross, E. A.: cited, 489; *Changing America,* cited, 319, 406, 569; *Foundations of Society,* cited, 566.
Roosebeke, battle of: mentioned, 108.
Roosevelt, Theodore: enlarges powers of the executive, 185; Progressive leader (1909–16), 201; sketch, 201, 364; advocates recall of judges, 230; pol. creativeness of, 317; rank as pol. leader, 364, 408; cited, 14, 30; *Thomas Hart Benton,* cited, 182; *Historic Towns. New York,* cited, 213, 259, 570.
Rotation in office: characterizes Jacksonian democracy, 177, 179; rural and urban support of, 179; in Old South and N. Eng., 179; a feature of the party system, 298.
Rothamstead Experiment Station (Eng.): mentioned, 8.
Rotten boroughs (Eng.): control of, 134, Old Sarum as type of, 220; frequently rural, 403. *See also* Representation, Gt. Britain.

Rotterdam, city of (Hol.): mentioned, 117.
Roumania: unequal distribution of land ownership in, 71–72; status of rural masses, 72.
Roundhead(s): in town and country, in Eng., 131.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques: view of agriculture and city life, 5, 9; origin, 138, 355; relation to Fr. Rev., 138, 355.
Rowan County (N. C.): under-represented, 221.
Royal Commission on the Supply of Food and Raw Materials in Time of War (1905) (Gt. Brit.): cited, 593–594.
Royal Engineers (Eng.): mentioned, 610.
Royal Statistical Society (London, Eng.): meeting of, 21, 30; views of members of, on cityward trend, 30–31.
Runyon, Damon: cited, 607.
Rural Basle, half-canton of (Switz.): referenda voting in, 335.
Rural community: censorship of acts in, 45, ancient contrib. to democracy, 102; no real and definite, 437; lacks adaptation to rural exodus, 448; advantages for rearing young, 480, 526–530, 615; vicious conditions not typical, 489; conditions favoring criminality, 492; lacks recreational interests, 492, 509–510; 511; divorce, 504; compared with city as to religion, 509–511; lacks assimilative agencies, 555, 556. *See also* Rural life; Rural environment; Rural districts; Rural population; Agriculture.
Rural decadence: pol. corruption as a phase of, 399; exodus of best elements causes, 479, 489, 516, 525–526; unwarranted talk of, 516, 525. *See also* Degeneration; Rural exodus.
Rural districts: best elements migrate, 7–8, 15, 16, 479, 483, 489, 516; seed-bed of civilization, 16, 470 (*see also* birth rate); lack tolerance, 44–45; emphasize sectarianism, 44–45; deficient in pol. and soc'l agencies, 437; worst elements migrate, 455, 483, 516; lack civilizing influences, 571. *See also* Agriculture; Land; Rural population; Agricultural laborers; Tenancy farm; Rural community; Rural environment; Rural life.
Rural environment: influences small centers, viii, 111; virile and stimulating, 16; lacks mental stimulus, 251–252, 255, 314, 316, 428; relation to largeness of view, 312–313; relation to pol. inventiveness, 312–313, 316, 614 (*see also under this title*); origin of leaders, 347, 349–350, 365 (*see also* Leaders, *and kindred titles*); community life difficult, 437, 618; drawbacks, 447; health and physique, 460, 462, 463–465 (*see also* Health; Physique); rude influences, 499. *See also* Rural districts, *and kindred titles.*
Rural exodus: counteracting of, urged, 5; attempts to prevent (early Eng.), 5–6; a national danger (Eng.), 8; causes rural deterioration, 15, 16; threatens morals and physique, 33 (*see also* Morality; Physique); causes, 45; by rural laborers, 49, 71, 80; agricl. laborers improve status through, 71–74, 80; effect on rural church, 509, 512, 515–516; relation to religious decline, 509; relation to moral decline, 509. *See also* Urbanization; Rural districts, *and kindred titles.*
Rural life: Effect on physique (*see* Physique); called natural or normal, 9, 17, 20; simple, 20, 479–480, 509; independent, 11, 29–30, 48, 58, 61, 77–78, 556 (*see also* Economic freedom; Liberty); recuperative advantages, 29; isolation of, 29, 492, 501, 528, 529–530, 556, 561, 556, 576, 576–577; divergent views as to rural and urban life, 39, 569–570, 573; unsocial influences of, 492, 529–530; serious problems of, 616, 617–618; anti-urban prejudice harms, 617–618; politically and socially valuable, 618. *See also* Rural districts, Rural Population, *and kindred titles.*
Rural population: In general—growth (in various countries), vi; defined officially, vii; refined for this study, viii-ix; pol. superiority asserted (by various persons), 3–12, 15–17, 24–25, 61, 322, 565–566, 589–590; mercantilists subordinate, 5, 589, 592; exodus of best and worst elements (*see* Rural districts); general superiority alleged, 8, 15; esteemed conservative, 15, 34, 61, 137, 565–566, 572, 574–575, 584; relation to democracy, 18, 29–30, 58, 120, 129, 151 (*see also* democracy); relation to Renaissance, 25, 31; religion, 37, 45, 120, 129, 509–510, 523 (*see also* Religion); divergent elements, 39, 111, 569, 570, 573; individualistic, 49, 365, 375, 381, 528; lack individual liberty, 49, 106, 108–109, 111–113; self-employment, 58, 84–85 (*see also* economic freedom); dependent on natural forces, 61, 76; dependence on markets, 61, 77–78; demand for agricl. products affects, 76; organization difficult, 75–77, 365,

381, 618; civil and pol. status, 105–106, 109, 111–113; part in changes at opening of modern period, 116; education and its agencies, 240, 243, 245–246; educative value of work, 248; narrowness, 249–250; political inventiveness, political activity, political stability, political initiative, political leadership, public spirit, political corruption, crime, criminality (*see under these titles*); financial support of community enterprises, 381–382; 511; standard of living, 447–448; feeble-mindedness, 474, 486, 492, 529; debt to cities, 501, 618; intermarriage, 529; many propertyless, 581; valuable pol. and soc'l element, 618. (*See* Health, Physique, Birth rate, *and kindred titles; and see* Agriculture, Rural districts, *and kindred titles.*) In ancient oriental states—militaristic, 101; crude politically, 101–102; contrib. to pol. centralization, 101–102; repress civil freedom, 101–102. In U. S.—in North, supports anti-slavery struggle, 53, 193–195; discontent and its significance, 79; excels (Europe) in democratic contrib., 107, 235; capacity for work, 143, 240; forces corporation control, 196; future source of conservatism, 236, 570, 571; intellectual conditions (1843), 244; relation to Progressive movement, 268; westward expansion brings war, 537–538; slow but inclined to extremes, 572; homogeneity, 576; relation to submarine menace, 598; economic status (*see* Economic freedom); democracy, patriotism, leadership, political leadership, religious leadership, public spirit, political corruption, political stability, agricultural laborers, tenancy (farm), crime, criminality, political knowledge, political initiative, health, physique, military efficiency (*see under these titles*). (*See also* Agriculture, Rural districts, *and kindred titles*). In Eng. and Wales—military qualities lauded, 6; no deterioration of, 31; status, 70, 73–75, 89 (n. 37), 143; Corn Laws no advantage to bulk of, 79–80; civil and pol. rights, 109, 111–113, 331; contrib. to democracy, 110–112, 129, 143, 144, 261; urban influence on, 111; submissiveness, 129; compared with rural pop. of France, 143–144; intellectual conditions (1843), 243–244; pol. fitness of agricl. laborers, 262–264; politically inactive, 331–332; relation to "boroughs," 403; religion, 523. (*See also other titles as above under* "In U. S."). In France—passive during Rev., 137, 140–141, 574; exerts conservative influence, 137, 143, 333, 575; peasants resist moderation, 139; upper classes overthrown by Rev., 139, 141, 574–575; resists conscription, 140; votes Second Empire, 142; precipitates estab. of Second Republic, 143; industry and thrift, 143, 333; recent passivity, 143, 333, 565; voters overlooked, 333; party spirit, 378; religious conditions, 523–524; ownership, 581. (*See* France; *and other titles as above under* "In U. S.") In Germany—rural workers migrate to cities, 71; status, 71, 85, 121–123, 145, 581, 606; Peasants' War, 121; supports Reformation, 121; lacks rights, 146; pol. leadership, 357, 541; ownership, 581; iniative, 606. (*See* Germany; *and other titles as above under* "In U. S.")

Russell, E. J. (Director Rothamstead Experiment Station: Eng.): cited, 8.

Russell, Dr. F. A. R.: cited, 6.

Russell, Hon. G. W. E.: *Politics and Personalities*, cited, 263.

Russell, John (Lord): services to North in Civil War (U. S.), 53; sketch, 53, 353.

Russia: serfdom, 51, 70; rural workers migrate, 70–71; limited urban develop. affects, 70–71; status of peasants and agricl. laborers, 70–71; pol. ignorance of peasants, 264; pol. corruption, 404; efficiency of govt., 416–417; mortality, 543; militarism, 538–539; compared with Eng., 545, 584; lacks national unity, 548; sectarian colony in San Francisco, 556; pol. instability, 568, 575, 584–585; rescuing the world, 585; Czarist debacle, 585; Germany fails to defeat (1914), 596; source of food for Germany, 601 (World War); suffers lack of food (World War), 601; transportation, 601; quality of soldiers, 611. See also Internationalism; Socialism; Bolshevism; Pobyedonostseff, C. P.

Rutledge, John: sketch, 292.

Sabbath: rural desecration of, 514, 525. *See also* Continental Sunday.

Sabotage (U. S.): political, decreasing, 380; by I. W. W., 500; by slaves, 501.

St. Andrews, town of (Scot.): Reformation center, 128; mentioned, 292.

St. Francis of Assisi: founds order of Franciscans, 517; sketch, 517.

St. Gall, canton of (Switz.): choice of govt., 302–303; modern refer-

endum originates in, 302–303; legislative initiative proposed, 304.
St. Louis, city of (Mo.): Clay carries (1832), 184; Fillmore carries, 194; casts many Lincoln votes (1860), 194; pol. convention (1889), 197; under-represented, 223.
Saint-Simon, Claude H. de R. (Comte de): origin, 143.
St. Stephens, Chapel of (Westminster, Eng.): mentioned, 132.
Salandra, Antonio: resigns (1914), 359; origin, 359.
Saleeby, Dr. C. W.: praises British armies, 31, 458; denies degeneracy in Gt. Brit., 31, 458; *Eugenic Prospect,* cited, 477 (n. 22). (*See also* English National Birth-rate Commission.)
Salem, city of (Mass.): founded, 155.
Salem County (N. J.): primary vote, 343.
Salisbury, Robert A. T. G.—C. (3d Marquess of): sketch, 354.
Saloon. *See* Liquor traffic; Intemperance.
Salvation Army: founded, 521.
Sandys, Sir Edwin: influences William Brewster, 360.
San Francisco, city of (Calif.): accepts civil service reform, 407; infant mortality, 454; Russian sectarian colony, 556.
Sanitarian: critical of farm home and surroundings, 463; views on birth rate, 473.
Sanitation: care for, in early N. E. factories, 27; superior in cities, 29, 84, 463–465; improves, 29, 415, 418; inferior in rural districts, 435, 463–465; relation to crime, 491, 492. *See also* Health; Disease(s).
Sarganza, town of (It.): ancestral home of Bonaparte family, 356.
Saul of Tarsus. *See* Paul, the Apostle.
Savannah, city of (Ga.): Fremont born in, 363; work of Wesleys and Whitefield in, 523; mentioned, 532 (n. 21a).
Savigny, Friedrich Karl von: birthplace, 358.
Savonarola, Girolamo: origin, 517.
Saxon elements: in early London, 553.
Saxony, kingdom of (Ger.): urbanization, v.
Schaffhausen, canton of (Switz.): referenda voting, 336.
Schermerhorn, John F. religious investigation by (1812–13), 514.
Schiedemann, Philip: socialist leader, 359; sketch, 359.
Schmoller, Gustav, cited, 34.
Schools: rural, used more effectively, 240; superior in city, 240, 555; rural, lack financial support, 381–382; in large cities (in general), 418; in N. Y. City, 428; sanitarian condemns rural, 463; compulsory attendance affects birth rate, 469; immorality and crime in rural, 489; alien, in foreign colonies, 551–552, 554–556, 559; as assimilating agency, 555, 556. *See also* Education; Illiteracy.
Schouler, James: cited, 173.
Schurz, Carl: leader in civil service reform, 406.
Schuyler, Philip J.: relation to N. Y. City, 162; as pol. leader, 361.
Schwab, Lieut. Jacques M.: standing as airman, and origin, 610–611.
Schyz, canton of (Switz.): opposes Protestant Reformation, 122. *See also* Forest Cantons.
Scotland: urbanization, v; efficiency in war, 26; relation to battle for constl. liberty, 128; leaders of Reformed cause, 128; Reformation, 128–129; rural contrib. to pol. and relig. liberty, 129; pol. fitness of agricl. laborers, 262–263; pol. unfitness of Highlander, 264; voting, 332; pol. corruption, 400, 401–402, 404; illegitimacy, 485; crime, 495; religious conditions (1821–1921), 515. *See also* Great Britain; England and Wales; United Kingdom.
Scottish Highlander: politically uninformed, 264.
Scrooby, village of (Eng.): early importance, 360; William Brewster, born in, 360.
Sea-power: strength defensive, 61; relation to food supply (Eng.), 593; German and British (World War), 597; relation to general self-sufficiency (Eng.), 599–601; relation to imperial self-sufficiency, 600–601; allied, vital to France (World War), 601; group control assures safety in war, 602, 603.
Seattle, city of (Wash.): accepts civil service reform, 407; infant mortality, 454.
Second Empire (France): rural electorate votes, 142; downfall of, 142; family life in France under, 530.
Second Republic (France): established, 142; Empire replaces, 142.
Sedgwick, Theodore (Speaker, U. S., H. of R.): speculates corruptly, 391.
Seeley, Sir J. R.: *Introd. to Pol. Sci.,* cited, 50, 275, 278.
Selden, John: origin, 132, 352.
Selective Service (U. S., 1917–18). *See* Conscription.
Self-determination, national: city growth affects, 90. *See also* Independence, national.
Self-employment: urban pop. lacks, 57–58; said to characterize agri-

culture, 58; qualifications as to *id.*, 62–73, 79, 86; alleged reversal as to, for rural and urban pop., 58, 84–85; qualifications as to *id.*, 62–73, 79, 84–85; relation to econ. freedom and democracy, 58–61, 78–79, 84–87. *See also* Landowners; Tenants, farm; Agricultural laborers; Economic freedom; Democracy.
Senate (U. S.): reflects federal principle, 283; purpose served, 283–284; a purely Amer. product, 284; ingenious character of, 284; modifications, 284.
Separation of powers, principle of: Const. of U. S. embodies, 290; origin, 290; in ancient city-states, 290; present distrust of, 290.
Serbia: death rate, 450; patriotism, 549; character of soldiers, 611.
Serfdom: rural character, 50; relation to "wage slavery," 50; declines with city growth, 50, 51; displaces slavery, 51; in Russia, 51, 70; in Italy, 71; in Roumania, 71; in Roman Empire, 105; Germany abolishes, 144–145. *See also* Feudalism; Feudal period.
Serra, Junipero: founds California missions, 520–521; sketch, 520–521.
Seventeenth Amendment (U. S., Const.): rural and urban support of, 218–219.
Seville, city of (Sp.): Las Casas (the younger) born in, 520.
Seward, Wm. H.: sketch, 363.
Seybert, Adam: *Statistical Annals of the U. S.*, cited, 450.
Seymour, Charles: *Election Reform in Eng. and Wales*, cited, 332, 401, 403, 404.
Shaw, Dr. Albert: *Munic. Govt. in Gt. Brit.*, cited, 35, 419–420; *Munic. Govt. in Contl. Europe*, cited, 400.
Shays' Rebellion (U. S.): doubtfully democratic, 167; pol. complexion of sphere of (1788, 1800), 173; effect on voting, 325; instances rural pol. instability, 570.
Sherman, Roger: sketch, 164, 292; services, 292, memb. of com. on Dec. of Ind., 292.
Showalter, Wm. J.: cited, 428.
Sicily, island of (It.): mentioned, 359, 360; home of the *Mafia*, 500.
Siddim, Vale of: mentioned, 500.
Sievés, Emmanuel-Joseph: sketch, 353, 355; compared with Talleyrand, 356.
Sighele, Scipio: cited, 566–567.
Silesia, province of (Ger.): status of agricl. laborers, 71; Junker landlords in, 147.
Six Hundred: at Balaklava, 560.
Skippon, Philip: popular leader, Civil War (Eng.), 131; occupation, 131.
Slave Power, The (U. S.): rural character, 53–55, 186; aristocratic, 54–55, 195; promotes slavery, 186; antagonist of human freedom, 186; dominates Democratic party, 187, 189, 195; Civil War ends national leadership, 362. *See also* Slavery (U. S.); South (U. S.).
Slavery. In general—declines with city growth, 50; rural character, 50, 53–55; in ancient city-states, 50, 101; uneconomical, 50–51; mediaeval towns lack, 51; England abolishes, 51–52; pol. effects, 55; moral effects, 55; in Roman Empire, 105; relation of feminist and anti-slavery movements to, 215. (*See also* Freedom, personal; Slave Power, U. S.; Slave trade; Civil War, U. S.). In U. S.—rural and urban attitude toward, 52–53, 186, 187, 215; persists in South, 62; shadow remains, 64, 70, 490; rural responsibility for, 172; efforts to perpetuate, 177; North abolishes, 186; in period of Jackson, 186–188; politics affects alignment on, 187; liberal apologists for (North), 187; opponents of, form Republican party, 192, 193, Civil War brings to test, 193; urban foreign-born favor, 194; distrib. of anti-slavery vote (1856, 1860), 194–195; agitation affects voting, 327; moral taint (South), 490; sabotage among slaves, 501. (*See also* Civil War, U. S.; South, U. S.; Slave Power, U. S.).
Slave trade: centers in cities, 50; Denmark abolishes, 51; England abolishes, 51–52; U. S. abolishes, 186. *See also* Slavery.
Slavocracy. *See* Slave Power (U. S.).
Sloane, W. M. (Professor): *Powers and Aims of Western Democracy*, cited, 25, 31.
Slums: Rural—not typical of rural life, 399; often worse than urban, 529. Urban—not typical of urban life, 399.
Smith, Adam: *Wealth of Nations*, cited, 50, 76, 79.
Smith, "Gypsy" (evangelist): origin, 520.
Smith, Henry J.: cited, 579.
Smith, John (Captain): sketch, 360–361.
Smuts, Jan: origin, 355; rank as pol. leader, 355.
Smyrna, city of (Asia Minor): mentioned, 517.
Snowden, Philip: cited, 595.
Sobriety: rural environment factors, 447. *See also* Intemperance.
Social diseases: in city and country, 8.
Socialism: urbanization promotes,

34; origin of leaders, 143; character of, in U. S., 202; constructive proposals, 322 (n. 34); promotes pol. activity in Eng., 332–333; socialist party in Germany, 334; *id.*, in Italy, 335; *id.*, in Australia, 336; relation to independent voting, 372; effect on Patriotism, 543; attitude of socialists in World War, 547–548. *See also* Internationalism; Bolshevism; I. W. W.
Socialist Labor Party (U. S.): demands introd. of I. and R. and recall, 226.
Social ostracism: attaches to agricl. laborer, 65; significance of *id.*, 66.
Solid South. *See* South (U. S.).
Solon: as statesman, 274, 290.
Sonnino, Sidney (Baron): nativity, 359.
Sons of Liberty: origin, 162.
South (U. S.): deterioration among mountain whites, 29; factory system affects, 53–54; slavery, 53–55, 62, 64, 70, 186–187, 195, 490, 501; cotton gin affects, 54; anti-slavery movement in, 54; peonage, 62; econ. status of Negro, 62–64; farm depression, 76–77; effect of environment on pol. organization, 156–157, 233; democratic belt, 157; planters favor Const. (U. S.), 166; rotation in office in, 179; opposes tariff, 179; Northern business relations (1861), 195; instances rural revolt, in Civil War, 195, 542, 570; termed "Solid South," 200, 371; Negro suffrage, 213, 259–260, 327; nativism, 214; woman suffrage, 218–219; direct legislation in, 229; developed scattered pop. and county govt., 233; pol. education, 259–261; abstention from voting, 340; voting by aliens, 371; spoils system, 394; pol. corruption, 394, 431; reconstruction govts., 431; influenza-pneumonia epidemic (soldiers, 1918–19), 462; intemperance (compared with North, 1817), 482; moral taint from slavery, 490; homicides, 496; lynching, 496, 499, 570; religious conditions, 514; planter element militant, 537; deserters (World War), 549–550; slave insurrections, 570. *See also* individual States.
South, Old. *See* South (U. S.).
South Africa, Union of: mentioned, 355; Jan Smuts represents, 355; efficiency of govt., 417; home of McCubbin, airman, 610.
South America: efficiency of govt. in, 416–417; pol. instability, in rural parts, 568.
South Australia, state of: mentioned, 296.
South Carolina: slow to popularize electoral system, 178; Jackson checks nullification in, 185; abstention from voting, 340; mentioned, 363.
South Central States (U. S.): night-riding in, 500; rural, 502; divorce, 502.
Southwest (U. S.): conditions of employment (wheat fields), 66; recent agricl. depression, 76–77; greenback movement, 196; Jeffersonian and Jacksonian movements, 268; alien suffrage, 340; night-riding, 500, 575; draft resistance (World War), 549, 570–571; divorce, 502; nationalizing effect of pub. domain, 543; separatist conspiracies, 543; activities of outlaws, 570; rural unrest, 572. *See also individual States.*
Sozzini, the (theologians): nativity, 43; contrib. to relig. liberty, 43.
Spain: attacks Eng., 121; struggle with Holland, 127; Pol. activity, 335; extent urban, 335; mentioned, 354; efficiency of govt., 416–417; pol. instability, 568–569, 575; effect of Moorish blood, 568–569.
Spalding, John F. (Bishop): cited, 14.
Spanish Cabildo: model for new municipal forms, 307.
Sparta, city-state of (Greece): use of checks and balances, 290; use of separation of powers, 290.
Speech, freedom of: Milton magnifies, 41; cities promote, 41–42, 45, 614; origin, 42; in the Netherlands, 126; in city of Amsterdam, 127; slave power (U. S.) restrains, 186. *See also* Liberty, civil; Press, freedom of the; Liberty, religious.
Speer, Robert E.: represents Y. M. C. A., 520; origin, 520.
Spencer, Ambrose (Chief Justice, N. Y.): opposes manhood suffrage, 208, 210.
Spencer, Herbert: views on generative capacity, 467; *Pol. Institutions,* cited, 274, 494, 535.
Spencer, Robert (Earl of Sutherland): originates the British cabinet system, 279; sketch, 279.
Spires, city of (Ger.): Protestant representatives gather at, 121.
Spoils system (U. S.): rise in national sphere, 177, 185, 298, 393; Jackson's relation to, 185; condemned, 185, 298; early prevalence, 298, 392–393; relation to pol. corruption, 391–392; rural and urban responsibility for, 392–394, 406; John Adams' relation to, 393; Jefferson's relation to, 393; J. Q. Adams' relation to, 393; established in State sphere, 393; sway in national sphere, 393, 406; early fathers use, 400; culminates,

406; urban leaders in restricting, 406–407; persists in rural govt., 407; responsibility for, in cities, 423; recent elimination, 455. *See also* Party system; Civil service reform; Political corruption.
Sportsmanship: instinct of, superior in cities, 605; as a military quality, 605–606. *See also* Athletic games.
Spottswood, Alexander: contest under, as governor, 158.
Spurgeon, Charles H.; sketch, 518.
Stamp Act (Amer. Rev.): Boston and Mass. lead in opposing, 161; N. Y. City backs opposition, 162; promotes revival of committees of correspondence, 287.
Standard of living: in great cities, 17; urbanization affects, 447, 468, 470, 528; effect on birth rate, 468–469, 470; in rural districts, 528, 606. *See also* Subsistence; Luxury; Extravagance.
Stanley, Herbert Wilton (alias Harold Lord Varney): cited, 580.
Stanton, Edwin M.: birthplace, 363.
Stanton, Elizabeth Cady: suffragist leader, 216; sketch, 216.
Starling, E. H.: "Report on Food Conditions in Germany," cited, 596–597.
State rights: partisans of, promote slavery, 177; relation to democracy, 177, 185; Jackson checks, 185; origin, 185, 313, 542; relation to U. S. Bank, 187; Republican party opposes, 192; relation to use of recall, 230; South shifts to, 542. *See also* Nullification.
States-General (France): assembles, 137, 138, 139.
States, slave. *See* Slave Power (U. S.).
Statistical service: improves with urbanization, 415.
Staunton, city of (Va.): Woodrow Wilson born in, 364.
Stegomyia: relation to yellow fever, 463–464.
Stein, Heinrich F. K. (Baron): institutes reforms in Prussia, 144–145, 357; sketch, 357.
Stephen (king of Eng.): London supports, 109; grants London charter, 109; Cistercian revival in reign of, 522.
Stirling, town of (Scot.): Reformation center, 128–129.
Stevens, Thaddeus: origin, 363.
Stickney, Albert: origin, 297; advocates short ballot, 297; *Democratic Govt.*, cited, 297; *A True Republic*, cited, 397.
Stock, Rev. Thomas: relation to Sunday School, 532 (n. 21).
Stocks and bonds: Amer. workingmen own, 580; relation of urban ownership of, to pol. stability, 581, 582–583. *See also* Loans, government; Victory Liberty Loan (U. S.); Property.
Stoic philosophy: Greek contrib. to democracy through, 274.
Stone, Lucy: suffragist leader, 216; origin, 216.
Stork Escadrille: Mentioned, 609.
Stowe, Harriet Beecher: sketch, 52–53; anti-slavery services, 52–53.
Strassburg, city of (Alsace): Jean Frédérick Oberlin born in, 522.
Strikes: threaten interests of employers, 83; workers win many, 83; fail (1877), 196. *See also* Labor organizations.
Strode, William: origin, 132, 352.
Strong, Dr. Josiah: *Our Country*, cited, 14; *Challenge to the City*, cited, 14.
Stuarts (Eng.): regime of, 127, 130–133; arbitrary govt. of, 352; loyalty of country elements to, 376. *See also* Charles II and James II, of England.
Stubbs, William (Bishop): *Constl. Hist. of Eng.*, cited, 111, 277, 351.
Student Volunteer Movement, The: origin, 521–522.
Submarine(s), German (World War): threaten British food supply, 593–595, 597, 598; possibly better attack by, 594; menace of, eliminated, 594, 598. *See also* War, World; Sea-power; National self-sufficiency; Food, supplies of.
Subsistence: urbanization affects cost of, 447; recent plentifulness of, 447, 468; cost of, affects birth rate, 468. *See also* Agriculture.
Suffolk County (Mass.): votes (1821) for liberalized suffrage, 208; votes for I. and R. (recent), 228.
Suffrage: In general—privilege may be useless, 59–60; relation to democracy, 94–95. In U. S.—freehold qualification for, 11, 165–166, 206–213, 220–221, 394–395; liberalizing of, opposed, 11–12, 60, 98, 208, 210, 212; liberalizing effected, 95, 171, 172, 176, 177–178, 207–219, 220; limitations on, 95, 206–207, 212; of Revolutionary soldiers, 165–166, 206–207, 212; rural and urban attitude, 172, 177–178, 206–219; qualifications reduce voters, 174–175, 206–208, 209–211, 212, 324–326; War of 1812 influences, 207; religious and moral qualifications, 207; personality as a qualification, 207, 394–395; tax as a qualification, 207, 213; fraudulent qualifying for, 394–395. In England—previous to 1832, 95; liberalizing of, 135, 261, 262–263. In France—Declaration of Rights reveals inequalities in, 139; universal replaces limited,

139–140; narrow electorate (1830–1848), 141; universal established (1848), 142.
—, alien (U. S.): alien freeholders possess (1812), 207; in R. I., 214; in newer, Western States, 214, 340–341; in U. S. generally (today), 328.
—, manhood (U. S.): opposed, 11–12, 60, 98, 208, 210, 212; a moot question, 60; won for white pop., 95; established (in various States), 207–214; enlarges proportion of eligible voters in pop., 326.
—, Negro (U. S.): withheld, 95; barred in South, 95, 213, 214, 327; Fourteenth Amendment grants, 95, 214; attitude toward in Pa., 212–214; *id.*, in N. Y., 213; *id.*, in various Northern and Border States, 213–214; *id.*, in N. E., 214.
—, woman: In U. S.—but recently granted, 95; granger movement promotes, 196, 217; Peoples' Party demands, 198; achieved, 202; frontier pop. favors, 215, 216–217; joint rural and urban support, 215; rural and urban leaders, 216, 364–365; early forms, 216; early constitutional provisions, 216; rural support, South and East, 217; urban labor support, 217; State referendum votes, 218; vote in N. Y. City (1917), 218; vote on suffrage amendment (various States), 218–219; affects proportion of eligible voters in pop., 326–327; anti-suffragists, 328. In Eng. and Wales—early realization of, 135; mentioned, 262; effect on Proportion of actual to total qualified voters, 329. In France—not yet granted, 135. (*See also* Feminist movement).
Sullivan, James W.: promotes I. and R. in U. S., 227, 228; *Direct Legislation*, cited, 227.
Sully, Maximilien de B. (Duc de): sketch, 355.
Sumner, Charles: origin, 52, 363; anti-slavery services, 52, 193, 363; a founder of Free Soil and Republican parties, 193; elected U. S. senator, 193.
Sumner, W. G.: *Alexander Hamilton*, cited, 164, 257–258, 414, 430; "Andrew Jackson," cited, 180–181; *Financier and Finances of the Amer. Rev.*, cited, 389.
Sunday, "Billy" (W. A.): sketch, 520; workers' interest in, 580.
Sunday School(s): provided in early N. E. factories, 27; founded, 521, 532 (n. 21); functions better in city, 528. *See also* Religion, *and kindred titles.*
Supreme Court (U. S.): relation to pol. inventiveness, 311; Chief Justice Taft enters, 413; lauded, 413–414.
Sweden: efficiency of govt., 417; lengthening life, 451.
Switzerland: urbanization, vi, 329; Zwingli seeks change in Const., 119; Reformation, 121–122; democratic develop., 122, 279, 302–304; contrib. of rural pop. to pol. and relig. liberty, 129, 148; urban vs. rural contrib. to I. and R., 148, 302–304; representative govt., 279, 302–303; use of popular veto (federal diets), 303; pol. activity, 329, 335–336; party and public spirit, 379; pol. corruption, 404; efficiency of govt., 416–417, 441 (n. 11); illegitimacy, 485; rural elements lead in nationalization, 541. *See also* Initiative; Referendum.

Taft, William H. (Chief Justice, U. S. Supreme Court): leads conservative forces (1912), 201, 202; source of electoral votes for (1912), 202; birthplace, 364; cited, 413.
Talleyrand-Perigord, Chas. M. de: sketch, 356.
Tallien, Jean Lambert: birth, 356; precipitates fall of Terror, 356.
Talmadge, T. De Witt: origin, 519.
Tammany Hall: demands convention (1820), 210; attitude toward nativism, 215; relation to party system, 298; proposes State nominating convention, 300; leaders, 301.
Tammany Society, *See* Tammany Hall.
Tarde, Gabriel: cited, 566–567.
Tariff: as a pol. issue, 177; a divisive issue, 179–180; Peoples' Party demands reform of, 198; mentioned, 205 (n. 29); relation to war, 537, 601–602; relation to self-sufficiency (Gt. Brit.), 599–601; relation to international trade, 599. *See also* Protection, agricultural; Food, supplies of.
Tarsus, city of (Asia Minor): Paul, the apostle, born in, 516.
Taylor, Dr. Graham: cited, 94, 579–580, 584; "Organized Labor and the Body Politic," cited, 339.
Taylor, Zachary: characterized, 191; elected president, 191–192.
Temperance. *See* Intemperance.
Tenancy, farm: In U. S., 62–64, 67–68, 69–70; extent objectionable, 67; compared with position of farm laborer, 67, 68; limits status of farm operator, 67, 68; effect on farm coöperation, 69; in Italy, 71; in Roumania, 71–72; in Belgium, 72; in Eng. and Wales, 73, 74–75, 594–595; compared with urban tenancy, 74–75; in Chile,

88 (n. 18). *See also* Tenants, farm; Latifundia.
Tenancy, urban: compared with farm tenancy, 74–75.
Tenants, farm: In general—organization difficult among, 69, 75; Corn Laws advantage large (Eng.), 79–80. Status—in general, 49, 67, 68, 74–75, 79; in U. S., 63–64, 67–69; compared with that of farm laborer, 67–68; in Russia, 70; in Italy, 70; in Roumania, 70–71; in Belgium, 72; in Eng. and Wales, 74–75, 79–80. *See also* Tenancy, farm.
Ten-hour day: strike for (1827), 182.
Terror, the (French Revolution): exile of the Huguenots contributes to, 125–126; Parisian populace establishes, 137–138, 140; leaders, 138–139, 355; causes of ending of, 140; fall of, 356.
Tetanus: germ of, characterized, 464.
Teutons: relation to representative govt., 276.
Thaw, Lieut.-Colonel William: standing as airman, and nativity, 610.
Thermopylae, battle of (B. C., 480): heroic deeds at, compared, 608.
Thiers, Louis A., sketch, 142, 356.
Third Estate: rise of, 107; dominates States-General (France), 137, 139.
Third Republic (France): leading urban elements sponsor, 142–143, 293; promoters, 142, 143, 356; rural pop. precipitates establ. of, 143.
Thomas, J. H.: *When Labour Rules*, cited, 483.
Thorpe, F. N. *Constl. Hist. of the U. S.*, cited, 206–207, 255.
Thought, freedom of: cities favorable to, 34, 41–42, 45, 614; magnified by Milton, 41; relation to struggle for civil and pol. liberty, 41–42; origin of, 42; in Paris and Bologna (12th cent.), 42–43; English village laborers lack, 55 (n. 11), 74; Belgian farm tenants lack, 72; in Amsterdam, 127; promoted by French Rev., 141; Slave Power restrains in U. S., 186. *See also Speech*, freedom of, *and kindred titles.*
Thrift: relation to econ. independence, 84; urban employers encourage, 84; among French peasants, 143, 471; rural environment favors, 445–446, 471; cities facilitate agencies for, 446; savings bank depositors among city pop., 446; urban correction for rural thrift, 446; affects birth rate, 469, 471.
Thurman, Allen G.: sketch, 364.
Tiberius (Roman emperor): birth, 350.
Tilden, Samuel J.: origin, 364.
Tioga County (N. Y.): irregularity in vote (1792), 175.
Toltec (people): contrasted with Nordics, 568.
Toronto, city of (Can.): absorbs gain in provincial pop., vi–vii.
Torrey, R. A.: nativity, 520.
Tory, Tories (Amer. Rev.). *See* Loyalists.
Tory, Toryism (Eng.): elements and leaders, 130; sentiment among rural pop., 134; mentioned, 541.
Town system (N. E.): pure democracy in, 91–92, 232, 233–234, 235; product N. E. soil, 156; importance in Rev., 163, 232, 431; change to municipalities, 225, 234; significance of abandonment, 231, 432–433; rural or urban, 231–232, 256–257, 304–305, 431; unsuited to dispersed settlement, 232–233; distribution, 232–233, 256, 338; village affairs occupy, 233, 256–257; commonwealth development limits, 233–234; relation to theory of frontier as basis of democracy, 234; unsuited to large centers, 234; defects concealed, 235, 256, 304, 431; reflects pol. ingenuity, 304; origin, 304–305; relation to forms of city govt., 307; arouses interest of citizens, 337–338, 431; lauded, 431; inefficiency, 431–433; over development, 433; voting, 577. *See also* New England; Government, local-rural, U. S.
Trade. *See* commerce.
Trade-guilds: in Flemish cities, fight for pol. privileges, 108.
Trajan (Roman emperor): sketch, 350.
Trans-Mississippi States (U. S.): urban and rural support of Progressive movement, 268.
Treasury (U. S.): plans disclosed, 390.
Treitschke, Heinrich von: contrib. to German unification, 358; birthplace, 358.
Trèves, city of (Ger.). *See* Trier, city of (Ger.).
Tribuni plebis (Rome): veto by, influences referendum (Switz.), 303.
Trier, city of (Ger.): mentioned, 358, 517.
Troy, city of (N. Y.): draft riots (1863), 558.
Trust legislation (U. S.): Peoples' Party demands, 198; progress in 1912–20), 202.
Tuberculosis: declines (Eng.), 449; characterized, 449, 454; urban and rural, 454.
Tucker, George (Professor, U. of Va.): *Progress of the U. S. in Pop. and Wealth*, cited, 32–33, 473.

Tudor times (Eng.): pol. corruption in, 401.
Tuffnell — : popular leader Civil War (Eng.), 130; occupation, 130.
Tull, Raymond: sketch, 521.
Tupper, Sir Charles: promotes federation in Canada, 281; origin, 281.
Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques: sketch, 355.
Turin, city of (It.): Cavour born in, 359, 541; *id.*, Gioberti, Balbo, and Azeglio, 359; contrib. to unification of Italy.
Turkey: war with Balkan States, 360.
Turner, F. J. (Professor): "Contributions of the West to American Democracy," cited, 18, 157–158; *Frontier in Amer. Hist.*, cited, 18, 157–158, 499; *Rise of the New West, 1819–1829*, cited, 543.
Tweed, William: corruption and fraud by, 396.
Tyler, John: characterized, 190.
Tyndale, William: part in religious revival, 522.
Typhoid fever: prevalence in Eng. and Wales, 449; mainly a rural disease, 454.
Typhoid house fly: a rural pest, 464.
Typographical Union: mentioned, 227.

Ulm, city of (Ger.): Protestants meet at, 121.
Union, plans of (U. S.): listed, 283, 285.
Union, The (U. S.): preserved (Civil War), 53, 195; Jackson supports, 185, 543; business and industrial interests hesitate (1861), 195; relation of use of recall to, 230–231; urban contrib. to, 412; Webster supports, 543. *See also* Constitution, U. S.
Unitarian(s): Channing as leader of, 519.
United Kingdom: back-to-land movement urged, 8; food supplies in war, 593 (*see also* Food, supplies of, Gt. Brit.). *See also constituting countries.*
United States Army: mentioned, 607.
United States Bank(s): In general—as pol. issue, 171, 177, 180–182; as a monopoly, 180; opposition, urban and rural, 180–182. First—incurs hostility of State banks, 181; recharter favored and opposed, 186. Second—merchants open attack on, 182; Pennsylvania favors, with Jackson, 182; urban laborers oppose, 182–183; Clay measures sentiment for, 183; politics affects, 186–187; Federalists oppose charter (1816), 186–187; Clay changes front on, 187; Calhoun defends, 187; views of Van Buren on, 190.
United States Department of Agriculture: cited, 489.
United States: urbanization, v, vi, 17, 35, 183, 191; endangered by large cities, 13, 34, 35, 569; econ. status, 62–79, 85–86 (*see also* Economic freedom); regarded democratic, 95; popularizing of pol. system (1800 ff.), 176; Washington and Jefferson refuse third term, 176; origin of early presidents, 361; urban influences on rural administrations, 361; pol. partisanship, 370–375, 377, 391, 429; pol. capacity, 420; militancy, 537–538; socialists divide (World War), 547–548; railroad strikes (1877), 570; torchlight processions decline, 578; food economy (World War), 594; citations (World War), 609; distinguished airmen (World War), 610–611. For political knowledge, pol. initiative, pol. leadership, pol. activity, pol. inventiveness, pub. spirit, death rate, birth rate, health, physique, divorce, religion, morality, military efficiency, efficiency of govt., *see under these titles. See also* Democracy; Frontier; Government-Federal-State-Local rural; City government; Constitution, U. S.; Agriculture; Rural and Urban population; *and individual States and geographical divisions.*
Universal empire: Greek contrib. to, 274; Romans create, 274–275.
University College (Oxford, Eng.): mentioned, 118.
Unterwalden, canton of (Switz.): opposes Prot. Reformation, 122. *See also* Forest Cantons.
Upper Valais, canton of (Switz.): early use of referendum, 302.
Upshur, Abel P.: opposes manhood suffrage, 208.
Urban centers: In general—draw best and worst elements (*see under* Rural districts): large, prone to insurrection, 10, 12–13, 34, 35, 567 (*see also* Political stability); a menace, 14; trend toward oligarchic govt., 17–18, 85, 103–104, 108, 112; vice commercialized in, 19, 487–488, 491; relation to democracy, 25, 29, 32, 34, 35, 36, 58, 86, 100–101, 105, 106–109, 111–113 (*see also* Democracy); rearing of young, 26, 30, 526–530, 615–616; pol. and soc'l experiments in, 31–32, 35, 36, 251; quality of extremes, 32, 37, 405; favorably characterized, 32–33, 35, 36; tolerance, 44–45, 375; personal liberty, 45, 482; individual liberty, 45–49; advantage agricl.

laborers, 64–65, 66; offer econ. freedom to women, 215, 470, 471; advantages for schools and education, 240, 243, 245, 349, 375, 468; promotes pol. coöperation, 265–266, 306, 405, 526–527, 616, 618; as habitat for pol. life and functions, 349, 437, 618; offer strategic advantages for good, 405, 484; large, criticized and defended, 418, 426–427, 428; limits to growth, 428–429; advantages for industry, 445–446, 616; advantage farmers, 445, 616–617; civilizing influences, 492, 498, 501; constructive quality of contrib., 504; grave problems, 616; disparagement of, 617–618. (*See also* Health; Physique; Disease(s); Sanitation; Leaders, *and kindred titles;* Aliens, assimilation of; Military efficiency; Crime; Intemperance; Degeneration; Morality; Religion; Political corruption; City government; Efficiency of government (city); Urban population; *and individual countries and cities.*) In U. S.—as a menace, 13–14, 37; sanitation, 27, 29, 84, 418; afford services, 35, 37, 421–422; support Progressive movement (1909–16), 200–202; 371–372; contrib. to feminist movement, 215, 470, 504; problems, 228, 616; as agents of State, 421–422; public health, 435, 463, 464–465 (*see also under* Health, Physique, Disease(s)); natural growth of pop., 472; intemperance, 480–482, 483; homicide, 494, 496 (*see also* Crime); juvenile delinquency, 494, 497, 529; civilizing influences, 498, 501; rearing of young, 526–530; national leadership, 541–542. (*See also many titles, as under* Urban centers (in general) *above; and see* Urban population (U. S.); United States; *individual cities*).

Urban environment: general influence, vii, viii, 57; degenerative effects, 6–7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 20, 29, 33, 457–458, 474; promise for pol. life, 24, 34–35, 36, 419–420, 614; materials for mental stimulus, 251, 253, 555; effect on pol. creativeness (*see* Political inventiveness); production of genius and leadership, 348–349, 350, 365; relation to good govt. (U. S.), 419; relation to child life, 449 (*see also* Infant mortality); not anti-biological, 470 (*see also* Birth rate); relation to race breeding, 475; consciousness of God, 522; instinct of sportsmanship, 605–606. *See also* Urban population, *and reference titles under same;* Urban life.

Urbanism. *See* Urbanization.

Urbanization: progress, v-vii, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 34, 71, 183, 191, 242, 329, 344, 495, 548, 593, 611; inadequately studied, ix; regretted, 3, 4, 4–5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17; counteracting of, urged, 5, 8, 9, 14, 617 (*see also* Back-to-land movement); inevitable, 14, 35, 617; causes, 17, 444, 584, 614–615, 617; favored, 28–29, 35; capably studied (Tucker, Weber), 32, 33; limits, 428–429, 617; not over-done, 448, 617; correctives, 617. *See also* Rural exodus; Urban centers; Urban population.

Urban life: assimilative aspects, 15, 30, 552, 555–556 (*see also* Aliens, assimilation of); termed unnatural, 16, 17, 20, 463–464; dangers of, not alarming, 30–31. *See also* Urban centers; Urban population; Urban environment.

Urban population: In general—growth, v; defined, vii, vii–ix; depreciated, 3–5, 6–7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14–17, 27, 32; given predominance, 5, 24, 34–36, 589; morality, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 15–16, 19, 20, 27, 28, 33, 479 ff., 487–488, 491; religion, 9, 20, 37, 45, 129, 470, 479–480, 509 ff. (*see also* Religion); decadent, 14, 17; public opinion, 17, 19; pol. and econ. status, 18, 18–19, 25, 26, 58, 82, 85 (*see also* Economic freedom); intellectual conditions, 19, 27, 30, 240–250; initiative, 20, 36–37; pol. superiority, 24, 43; relation to Renaissance, 25; liberal and progressive, 34, 36–37; family life and home, 36–37 (*see also* Young, rearing of the); divergent elements, 39, 85, 567, 569–570, 573; ability to organize, 75–77, 82; educational advantages, 240, 243, 245–246 (*see also* Schools; Education); superficiality, 249–250; military qualities, 604–612. (For health, physique, death rate, birth rate, crime, divorce, democracy, patriotism, internationalism, political knowledge, pol. initiative, pol. inventiveness, pol. activity, pol. leadership, pub. spirit, pol. corruption, pol. stability, pol. partisanship, *see under these titles; see also* City government, Efficiency of government (city), Urban centers, Urban environment, Urban life, *and individual cities and countries*). In U. S.—defined, iv; proportion to total pop., v, vi, 10, 35, 86, 183, 191; morality, 10, 15, 26–28 (*see also* Morality); suffrage, 10, 60, 206 ff. (*see also under* Suffrage); health, 15, 27, 29, 450, 454–455, 461, 462; physique, 15, 29, 30, 456–457, 460–462; birth rate, 15,

471, 472; religion, 26–27, 509–511, 516, 518–520, 521–522, 523, 524, 525; intellectual conditions, 27, 30, 241–247; relation to relig. liberty, 43–44; pol. and econ. status, 60, 62, 63, 77, 78, 85, 86–87; Negro element, 63, 259–261, 487; laborers characterized, 77; rural hostility, 158, 159, 617; lacking in South (early), 159; suffers inequality in representation, 219–223; alien elements, 241, 246, 259, 383, 498 (*see also* Aliens); pol. creativeness, 283–293, 297 ff., 304–305, 313, 314, 315, 317–319; independent voting, 370–375; intemperance, 480, 482, 483; illegitimacy, 486–487; divorce, 502–505; divergent elements, 575–576; military qualities, 606, 607, 609, 610–611. (*See also* United States; Urban centers, U. S.; *and titles under* Urban population, in general, *above*). In Eng. and Wales—proportion to total pop., v, 593; relation to slavery, 51–52, 53; status, 80–81, 85, 105, 122–123, 242–243; contrib. to democracy, 106–112, 120–121, 129–137, 154 (*see also under* Democracy); rural influence on early, 111; Protestant, 121; source of levelling influences, 136; intellectual conditions, 242, 243–244; party spirit, 376–377; public spirit, 382–383; health and mortality, 448–449, 453–454 (*see also under* Physique); birth rate, 465–466, 471–472; illegitimacy, 486; crime, 495–496; religious leaders, 517–519, 520, 521; religion, 522–523; military qualities, 606, 608, 609–610. (*See also* England and Wales; London, *and other individual cities; and see reference titles above under* Urban population, in general). In France—status, 71, 85, 122–123, 137, 139; literacy, 245; voting, 333; party spirit, 378; prostitution, 487; religion, 523; family life, 530; military qualities, 608, 609. (*See also* France; Paris, *and other cities; and titles under* Urban population, in general). In Germany—proportion to total pop., v; status, 71, 85, 122–123, 145, 146, 606; contrib. to democratic develop., 145, 147; literacy, 242–243; voting, 334; natural growth, 472; present control, 538; military qualities, 606, 610. (*See also* Germany; *Berlin; and titles under* Urban population, in general.)

U'Ren, W. S.: direct legislation advocate and leader, 228.

Uri, canton of (Switz.): opposes Reformation, 122. *See also* Forest Cantons.

Usher, Roland: *Rise of the Amer. People,* cited, 18, 158, 389.

Usquin, M. Emile: *La Depopulation des Campagnes,* cited, 9, 22.

Utica, city of (N. Y.): State nominating convention at (1824), 301.

Valenciennes, town of (Fr.): mentioned, 142.

Van Buren, Martin: relation to party system, 189, 298; contrasted with William Henry Harrison, 190; defeated (1840), 190; views, 190; source of vote (1840), 190–191; Free Soil candidate (1848), 191–192; influences Jackson's admin's, 361.

Vancouver, city of (Can.): absorbs provincial pop. gain, vi–vii.

Vandervelde, Émile: characterized, 34; *L' Exode Rurale et le Retour aux Champs,* cited, 9, 34, 487, 497.

Vane, Sir Henry (the elder): origin, 352.

Vane, Sir Henry (the younger): origin, 352.

Van Tyne, C. H.: *Loyalists of the Amer. Rev.,* cited, 163, 164.

Varro, Marcus Terentius: cited, 4–5.

Vaud, canton of (Switz.): modern legislative referendum originates in, 304.

Vaughan, Robert. Age of Great Cities, cited, 31–32, 242, 243–244, 251, 484–485.

Vaughan, Lieut. George A.: standing as airman, and origin, 610–611.

Veblen, Thorstein: *Enquiry into the Nature of Peace,* cited, 535, 536; *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution,* 535, 538.

Vendée, department of (Fr.): insurrection in (1793), 140; Clemenceau ancestral home in, 357.

Venice, city-republic of (It.): doges of, 351; mentioned, 354.

Venizelos, Eleutherios: sketch, 360.

Venner, Thomas: sketch, 130.

Verdun, battle of: Germans fail at, 603.

Vergniaud, Pierre V.: sketch, 138.

Vermont: Federalists carry (1800), 174; goes Anti-Mason (1832), 183; Fremont vote in (1856), 194; non-use of I. and R. in, 228; mentioned, 363; independent voting in, 371.

Versailles, city of (Fr.): German peace mission at, 596.

Vice: city commercializes, 19, 487–488, 491; manufactures diminish, 26; in West Boston (1822), 432; sway of, in urbanized Rome, 480; urban vs. rural, 480, 484, 488–490; rural, in the city, 484, 486, 487; trend, with urbanization, 485, 490; concealment in city and in country, 488; in rural districts, 488–

490; effect of slavery (U. S.), 490; relation to urban crime, 491; suburban growth affects, 529.
Victory Liberty Loan of 1919 (U. S.): rural and urban support of, 550.
Vienna, city of (Aus.): pop. concentrated in, v–vi; Rev. of 1848, 145; sexual morality, 486; stands for Austria, 541.
Village: defined, for U. S. and Europe, viii; condemned (U. S.), 530.
Virginia: relig. liberty, 44; Cavaliers dominate, 154; dispersed settlement in, 156–157; founded by a trading company, 156–157, 279–280; granted representative govt. (1619), 156–157, 280, 281–282; Bacon's Rebellion, 157–158, 570; democratic belt, 157–158; Blue Ridge vs. coast towns, 156; leadership in Rev., 163, 542; Revolutionary leaders, 163–164; relation to Dec. of Ind., 164; fighting qualities of gentry (Rev.), 165; pol. hierarchy attacked (1812), 178; absence of town system lamented, 255; charter of 1621 as written const., 285; offers "large estate" plan for Const. (U. S.), 291; abstention from voting, 340; religious conditions (1811), 514; John Brown's raid, 570.
Virginia Convention (1788): deals with ratification of adoption of U. S. Const., 189, 291.
Virginia resolutions. See Kentucky and Virginia resolutions.
Visher, Stephen (Professor): cited, 348.
Viviani, Rene R.: origin, 143, 357.
Volunteering (World War): in Gt. Brit.: 458, 459, 548–549; officially discouraged in U. S., 549; by urban foreign born (U. S.), 556.
Voting: In general and various—three-class system in Germany, 334; by proxy and by mail, 335; compulsory, 335, 337–338; registration (*see* Registration); repeating, 389, 395; payment for trouble of, 398. Independent—utility of, 370; rural vs. urban in U. S. (West, South, New Eng.), 370–371; in urban groups (U. S. and Eng.), 371–372; non-partisan newspaper as measure of, 374; beginnings of (U. S.), 374; trend (U. S. and Eng.), 374–375, 375–378; party designations (U. S., municipal), 375; in municipal elections (Eng.), 376–377; urban pop. monopolizes (France), 378. *See also* Suffrage; Party system; Political partisanship; Public spirit; Political corruption.

Wakefield, Edward Gibbon: relation to Eng. colonial system, 280.
Waldenses (sect): founded, 517.
Waldo, Peter: founds Waldenses, 517; birthplace, 517.
Wales. *See* England and Wales.
Wall Street (New York City): clerks from, as artillerists, 607.
Wallace, Henry C. (late Secretary of Agriculture): cited, 76–77.
Wallas, Graham: *The Great Society*, cited, 314; *Human Nature in Politics*, cited, 576.
Waller, Sir William: origin, 132.
Wallingford, borough of (Conn.): mentioned, 610.
Wallon, Henri A., sketch, 142–143, 356.
Walpole, Horace: dominates reigns of George I and George II (Eng.), 353; origin, 401; pol. corruption of, 401.
Walter, Hubert (chief justiciar, Eng.): contrib. to representative system, 277; origin, 352.
War (in general): causes urbanization in ancient Greece and Rome, 3–5; in ancient oriental states, 100–101; effect on democracy in Roman city-state, 104–105; relation to pol. corruption, 397; high birth rate promotes, 474; preparation for, 534 (*see* Ch. XII *in general*); relation of econ. and industrial forces to, 536, 538–539; militancy, rural and urban, 536, 538–539, 590; destructiveness promotes peace, 538, 602–603; trend of, 538–539; victory in modern, characterized, 602–603. *See also* International peace; Military efficiency; Self-sufficiency, national; Food, supplies of; *and the various countries and various wars.*
—, Boer: relation to physical deterioration, 7, 457.
—, Civil (Eng.): Buckle characterizes, 130; popular leaders, 130–131; sources of Royal and of Parliamentary support, 130–132, 376, 523; urban part in Commonwealth phase, 132–133, 352; democratic fruits of, 133.
—, Civil War (U. S.): frees slaves, 53, 193; joint rural and urban support of (North), 53, 193–195, 542; mentioned, 54, 393, 431, 493; Mass. and Boston lead, 195; relation of rural South to, characterized, 195; patriotism in, 195, 542, 549; voting during, 327; ends national leadership of planter element, 362; Northern leaders in, 363; pol. leadership following, 364; management of, 414, 432; draft, 542, 549, 558; medical exam. of recruits, 460; agricl. expansion occasions, 537; Southern planters precipitate, 537; draft resistance, 549, 558–559, 570; Amish and Mennonites in,

557; attitude of foreign elements, 558–559; a rebellion of rural South, 570. *See also* U. S. Northern States (U. S.); South (U. S.); Slavery; Slave Power; Negro; State rights.
—, Continental, mentioned: 27.
—, Crimean: relation to physical deterioration, 7, 457.
—, Franco-Prussian: ends Second Empire (France), 142, 356.
—, French and Indian: mentioned, 392; N. E. town system functions badly relative to, 432.
—, of 1812 (U. S. and Eng.): causes interference with commerce and shipping, 27; New Eng. opposes, 189; relation to liberalizing of suffrage (U. S.), 207, 209.
—, of the Regulation (Amer. colonies): mentioned, 158.
—, Peloponnesian: mentioned, 3.
—, South African: British patriotism in, 548.
—, World: reduces Austria's territory, v; mentioned, 7, 8, 31, 144, 145, 147, 356, 359, 360, 378, 449; effect on rural and urban econ. status (Germany), 85; effect on party govt., 377; tests patriotism, 378, 547–550, 611; management of (U. S.), 414; proves urban military efficiency, 414, 611–612; affects city progress (U. S.), 429–430; effect on mortality, 450; physical examinations of recruits, 457–463; British armies, 458, 460; conscription, 458, 460, 549–550; French and German soldiers in, 462–463; affects urban growth (Ger.), 472; volunteering, 458–459, 548–549, 556; desertion (U. S.), 549; draft resistance (U. S.), 549, 571; relation to Americanization, 552, 554, 556; Amish and Mennonites in, 557; Canadian French in, 557–558; German and Irish elements (U. S.) in, 559; unrest follows (G. Brit.), 578–579; develop. of material agencies in, 590–591; importance of money in, 591; British food supply and German submarines, 593–595, 597, 598; United States enters, 594; German food supply, 594, 595–598; causes of German failure, 596–597, 601–602; 604; Germany initiates, 597; battles of Ypres and Verdun, 603; German battle line broken, 603; German equipment, 604; initiative of urban soldiers, 606; urban vs. rural soldiers, 606–608; individual heroes and citations (U. S.), 609; distinguished airmen (various countries), 609–611; soldiers in urbanized and in rural countries, 611; proves persistence of military qualities, 611–612. *See also* Military efficiency; Food, supplies of; Self-sufficiency, national; Sea-power; Submarine(s), German; International peace; *and the various countries involved.*
Ward, Lester F. (Professor): *Applied Sociology,* cited, 347, 348; *Pure Sociology,* cited, 499–500, 568–569.
Warehouse interests (U. S.): farmers revolt against, 195.
Warneford, Sub-Lieut. Reginald A. J.: nativity, 609.
Warren, Joseph: relation to Boston (Mass.), 161; as pol. leader, 361.
Warren, Mercy Otis: suffragist leader, 216; origin, 216.
Warwick, Richard Neville (Earl of) (the king-maker): as a pol. leader, 352.
Washington County (Md.): underrepresented, 221.
Washington, George: lauds agriculture, 10; made commander-in-chief, 162; relation to Virginia and rural element, 163; relation to Constl. Convention (1787), 166; favors adoption of Const. (U. S.), 166; origin, 166, 361; opposes Shays' Rebellion and Whisky Insurrection, 167; effect of refusal of third term, 176; as a pol. leader, 361; urban men influence admin's of, 361–362; complains of party spirit, 373; purity of admin's, 391, 393; tradition of, venerated by Amer. workers, 580.
Water: rural, condemned, 464.
Watt, James: origin, 117.
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice: *A Const. for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Brit.,* cited, 319, 545; *English Local Govt.,* cited, 515.
Weber, A. F.: *Growth of Cities,* cited, 8, 33, 249, 453, 486, 487, 496, 584, 592.
Webster, Daniel: relation to Second U. S. Bank, 186–187; opposes manhood suffrage, 208; urban influences on, 361–362; speaks for N. E. commercial and manuf'g interests, 362; attitude toward War of 1812, 543; supports the Union, 543.
Webster, Pelatiah: cited, 390.
Weed, Thurlow: sketch, 363; *Autobiography,* cited, 301.
Weeden, W. B.: *Econ. and Soc'l Hist. of New Eng.,* cited, 154, 156, 161, 233, 234.
Week Day Church School, the: origin, 522.
Weights and measures, system of: improves with urbanization, 415.
Wells, H. G. *Anticipations,* cited, 429; *Outline of History,* cited, 534, 536; *Salvaging of Civilization,* cited, 534, 535–536, 547.
Wesleys, The (John and Charles):

work, in urban centers, 402, 522–523; origin, 518.
West (U. S.): recent agricl. depression, 76–77; democratic belt, 157; relation to democratic develop., 157; favors tariff, 179; Kansas-Nebraska Bill arouses, 194; Bryan carries agricl. States (1896), 199; alien suffrage, 214; attitude toward woman suffrage, 218; relation to Jeffersonian and Jacksonian movements, 268; independent voting, 371; code of morality, 394; pol. corruption, 394, 387–398; divorce, 502; religious conditions, 514, 524; public domain affects, 543; separatist tendencies, 543; rural foreign colonies, 559; activities of outlaws, 570. *See also individual States;* United States; Frontier; Northwest (U. S.); Mississippi Valley; Middle West (U. S.); Pacific States (U. S.); Southwest (U. S.).
West Australia, state of (Austral.): preferential voting, 297.
West Greenwich, town of (R. I.): over-represented, 222.
West Jersey. *See* New Jersey.
West Riding. *See* Yorkshire.
Wetherford, town of (Conn.): relation to Fundamental Orders (1639), 285.
Whalley, Edward (Major General): popular leader, Civil War (Eng.), 130–131; occupation, 130–131.
Wharton, Thomas: member Whig Junto, 298; leads first Whig ministry, 401; first modern political boss, 401; notoriously corrupt, 401.
Whig Junto (Eng.): use of caucus by, 298; membership of, 353.
Whig Party (Eng.): falls under aristocratic control, 134; William III puts govt. into hands of, 279; use of system of checks and balances by, 290; in the reign of Anne, 353.
Whig Party (U. S.): perfects party organization, 189; a party of expediency, 189–190; political policies of (1840), 189–190; elects Harrison (1840), 189–190; distribution of vote (1840), 190–191; in elections of 1844 and 1848, 191; distribution of vote (1852), 192; wrecked by slavery issue, 192; persistence of, 192.
Whiggism (Eng.): London as center of, 130. *See also* Whig Party (Eng.).
Whig(s) (Amer. Rev.) *See* Patriot(s).
Whigs (U. S., 1824–1854). *See* Whig Party.
Whisky Insurrection (U. S.): democracy of, 167; Samuel Adams opposes, 167; instance of rural revolt, 570.
White, Dr. Andrew D.: cited, 14.
White, Horace: leads civil service reform, 406.
Whitefield, George: part in Great Awakening (1734), 513–514; origin, 518; work of, in urban centers, 522–523.
Whitman, Walt: sketch, 53.
Whittier, J. G.: sketch, 52.
"Who's Who in America": urban vs. rural origin of persons listed, 348.
Wiclif, John: soc'l and pol. doctrines, 118; sketch, 120, 517, 522; relation to revivals, 522.
Wilberforce, William: sketch, 52.
Wilcox, Delos F.: *The Amer. City*, cited, 18–19, 36; *Study of City Govt.*, cited, 18–19, 264–265; *Govt. by All the People*, cited, 18–19, 231, 567, 577–578; *Great Cities in America*, 36, 385, 424.
Wiley, Dr. Harvey H.: origin, 317; pol. creativeness of, 317.
Wilkes, John: contrib. to reform of pol. corruption (Eng.), 403–404.
Wilkinson's conspiracy: instances rural revolt, 570.
Willcox, Walter F.: cited, 466; "Divorce," cited, 504–505.
William I (William of Normandy, Eng. king): gives first charter to London, 109; uses local representatives, 277; origin, 351.
William III (Eng.): relation to cabinet system, 279; Whig Junto under, use caucus, 298; sketch, 353; Anne puts Whig ministry of, in charge, 353; use of bribery by, 401.
William of Orange. *See* William III (Eng.).
William the Silent (Prince of Orange): hero of Dutch independence, 351; sketch, 351.
Williams, George: founds Y. M. C. A., 521; sketch, 521.
Williams, John: sketch, 519.
Williams, John Sharp: sketch, 364.
Williams, Roger, contrib. to relig. liberty, 44, 155; protests enslaving of Pequot Indians, 52; sketch, 155, 360, 518.
Williams' "Death Farm" (Jasper County, Ga.): discussed, 87 (n. 10).
Wilson, James: sketch, 292; cited, 290.
Wilson, Woodrow: enlarges powers of executive, 185; leads progressive element in his party, 201; sketch, 201, 364; pol. creativeness of, 317; rank as statesman and pol. leader, 364; cited, 151–152, 153; *The State*, cited, 25, 35.
Windsor, town of (Conn.): relation to Fundamental Orders (1639), 285.

Winnipeg, city of (Can.): absorbs provincial pop. gain, vi–vii.
Winship, Dr. A. E.: cited, 30.
Winsor, Justin (Ed.): *Nar. and Crit. Hist. of Amer.,* cited, 164.
Winthrop, John: sketch, 155, 360.
Wirt, William: vote for (1832), 184.
Wisbeck, port of (Eng.): mentioned, 52.
Wisconsin, State of: relation to origin of Republican Party, 194; Fremont vote in, 194; alien and Negro suffrage in, 214; alien avoidance of military service (Civil War), 559.
Wishart, George: sketch, 128.
Wisharts of Pitarrow (Scot.): mentioned, 128.
Witenagemot, the (Eng.): relation to representative system, 276.
Wolsey, Thomas (Cardinal): origin, 352.
Women: find econ. independence in cities, 215, 469; employment of, affects birth rate, 469, 470; relation of fear of child-birth, to birth rate, 469; social and philanthropic activities of, affect birth rate, 469, 470; immodesty in dress among, 480, 490; no moral decline among, 490; relation to crime, 508 (n. 33); relation to war, 612. *See also* Feminist movement; Woman suffrage; Home; Young. the.
Wood, Leonard (Major General): cited, 272 (n. 47).
Work: relative educational value of rural and urban, 11, 246–248; superior capacity of rural pop. for, 143, 240, 365, 495; wholesome, for children (in country and in town), 527, 529.
Working Men's Party (U. S.): in Phila. and N. Y., 182–183; in N. Y. City, condemns U. S. Bank, 182–183.
Wright, Frances: suffragist leader, 216; origin, 216.
Wright, Martha C.: suffragist leader, 216; origin, 216.
Wyatt, John: origin, 117.

Xenophanes: relation to relig. toleration, 42.
Xenophon: as statesman, 274; *Economist,* cited, 3.

Yazoo City (Miss.): John Sharp Williams born in, 364.
Yorkshire, county of (Eng.): mentioned, 120, 130; Royal and Parliamentary support in (Civil War), 130.
Young Men's Christian Association: leading representatives, 520; founding of, 521.
Young, the: relation of city environment to rearing of, 26, 30, 526–530, 615–616; *id.,* rural community, 480, 625–630, 615; attention attracted from religion, 510; rural church neglects play instincts of, 512; rural vs. urban community as to training of, 526, 615–616; child labor in rural districts, 529; rural hereditary defect affects, 529; rural neglect of (U. S.), 529–530; family life in urban France, 530; rearing of, among Puritans (N. E.), 530. *See also* Home; Education; School; Sunday School.
Ypres, battle of: Germans fail at, 603.
Ypres, city of (Flanders): pol. and civic develop. of, 108, 126.

Ziegenbalg, Bartholomew: sketch, 520.
Zimmermann, Arthur: sketch, 358.
Zinzendorf, Nicolaus Ludwig (Count von): sponsors Moravians, 521; nativity, 521.
Zolla, M. *L'Agriculture Moderne,* cited, 33, 448.
Zueblin, Charles: *Amer. Munic. Progress,* cited, 36, 426; *Religion of a Democrat,* cited, 106, 135, 353–354.
Zug, canton of (Switz.): opposes Reformation, 122. *See also* Forest Cantons.
Zürich, canton of (Switz.): abandons Catholicism, 121–122; accepts Reformation, 302; compulsory and proxy voting in, 335; referenda voting in, 335, 336.
Zürich, city of (Switz.): abandons Catholicism, 121–122; leads in formation of Protestant league, 122; accepts Reformation, 302; joins first Swiss confederation 1351), 303.
Zwingli, Huldreich: democracy of, 119; sketch, 12–122, 517.

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